Between spirit and matter : an ethnographic history of British zoology and zoologists, ca. 1660-1800 by JORGENSEN, Kirsten Winther
I
i
a.
IX i.
.J -I '! t
!:
i •'
; vs
ill
J Ü
x!
J-'
i , :
;; n;
'i! !*:
V i‘*
■ •' M
1
y .
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE 
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY & CIVILIZATION
BETWEEN SPIRIT AND MATTER 
An Ethnographic History o f British Zoology and 
Zoologists, ca. 1660-1800
Kirsten Winther J0 R G E N S E N
A thesis submitted with a view to assessing the PhD-degree in 
Histoiy & Civilization
Jury members:
Prof. Peter Becker, EUI (supervisor)
Prof. Hans-Erich Bödeker, Max-Planck-Institut, Göttingen 
P rof Michael Harbsmeier, Roskilde University 
P ro f Simon Schaffer, University o f  Cambridge
I Florence, September 2003
|


^iww^mmwmii,i.|nu.,!UHH(,B, hw,
: " - n - i r i 'tM M i1, . ' . y ' ü h H T ^ y r T T J W H ^ f W J ^ w w w m w H W H w m t m m » Hrh:":r?î(ïïrmîîîTS^ r
European University Institute
3 0001 0041 1130 0
Between Spirit 
and Matter
An Ethnographic History of British Zoology 
and Zoologists, ca. 1660-1800
0  r
Hr- ' •« >:V' "
iK... . ,
Kirsten Winther Jorgensen
A thesis submitted to the Department of History and Civilisation, the European University 
Institute, Italy, with a view to assessing the PhD-degree in History and Civilisation, 2003
----------------------------
LIB
5 9 0 .9 0 4 1  
06  JOR
"!Ulwnüimi«fP
Contents
List of illustrations, iii 
List of tables, iv
Note on references and quotations, v
1 T w in  H is to r ie s , 1
History of science in review, 5 
The Problématique, 14 
Theoretical perspective, 15 
The empirical corpus, 23
The zoological endeavour and society: a prelude, 24 
Books in between, 26
Scholars at the Margins of Polite Society, 34 
Thesis in outline, 44
Part I T he Matter  of Facts______________________________ 47
2 N atu ral H isto ry  b en ea th  th e  A n g les, 48
Renaissance labyrinths, 54 
Renaissance Simples, 55 
The Primacy of Philosophy, 57 
Natures of natural history, 60 
The Empty Mind, 60 
The Light of Facts, 65 
The Nature of Nature, 70 
The human predicament of knowledge, 73 
Homo Duplex, 73 
Self-Government, 77
3 From  N atu re to Facts, 82
Transforming nature into facts, 82 
Collecting animals, 86 
Selecting Specimens, 86 
The Gatherers, 89
The Credibility of Collectors, the Truth of Facts, 92 
The Social Division of Labour, 97 
Standardising animals, 99
The Representing Potential of Language, 100 
Animals in Language, 102 
Animals Illustrated, 107 
Compiling zoology's natural history, 111
4 T h e  S o c ia l  L ife  o f A n im als , 115
Animals in the republic of letters, 117 
Animals in museums, 122
The Renaissance Cabinet of Curiosities, 123 
Taxidermy, 125
Eighteenth-Century Cabinets and Museums, 128
Animals in commerce, 145 
The zoologist's space, 149
Part II  T he Spirit o f Order______________________ 153
5 T ra n s c e n d in g  the E m p irica l M aze, 154
Classification in history, 156 
Classical Classification, 157 
Renaissance Implications, 161 
Andrea Cesalpino's Explications, 164 
Linne's Orders, 167 
Empiricist classification, 171 
The Exegesis of Species, 175 
The Exclusivity of Species, 183
6 S p e c ify in g  N atu re , 187
Terms of comparison, 188
Communal Definition of Species, 188 
Differences which Could Make a Difference, 190 
Specifying perfection, 196 
Specific Prototypes, 198 
Male Prototypes, 210 
Specifying normality, 217
7 In a c c u ra te  O rd ers, 223
Systems' double-edge, 225 
Taxonomies, 226
The Language of Taxonomy, 228 
The Structure of Taxonomy, 233 
Nature's order, 243 
Nature's order cf. man's order, 246 
The Great Unknown, 251
8 M an  in  th e  M irro r o f  N atu re, 255
Man in zoology, 256 
Men on the scale, 260 
Progress of Society, 261 
Between Culture and Nature, 269 
Between spirit and matter, 273 
The end of natural history's  zoology, 281
B ib lio g ra p h y , 294
Primary literature, 294 
Secondary literature, 305
watts »MgwggWilBaBBiHiUUiM ? u L*ij lj JllJli! 11!» KL 4
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE 
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY & CIVILIZATION
BETW EEN SPIRIT AND MATTER 
An Ethnographic History o f  British Zoology and 
Zoologists, ca. 1660-1800
Kirsten Winther J0RGENSEN
A thesis subm itted with a view to assessing the PhD-degree in 
History &  Civilization
Jury members:
Prof. Peter Becker, EUI (supervisor)
Prof. Hans-Erich Bödeker, Max-Planck-Institut, Gottingen 
Prof. Michael Harbsmeier, Roskilde University 
Prof. Simon Schaffer, University of Cambridge
Florence, September 2003
■WWBBM
List  of I llustratio ns
Front page The Black Ostrish (detail). From P. Brown, New Illustrations (1776).
1.1 Gentlefolk hunting butterflies. From M. Harris, The Aurelian (1766).
2.1 The cat. From E. Topsell, The Histone o f the Foure-Footed Beastes (1607/1973).
2.2 Mermaid and -man. From U. Aldrovandi, Monstrum historia (1642).
3.1 Methods of catching birds. From F. Willughby and J. Ray, The Ornithology (1678/1972).
3.2 A two-headed snake. From E. Bancroft, An Essay on the Natural History o f Guiana (1769).
3.3 The orang-outang or pygmie ape. From E. Tyson, Orang-Outang, sive Homo Sylvestris (1699).
3.4 Three birds of paradise. From R. Bradley, A Philosophical Account o f the Works o f Nature (1721).
3.5 The zebra, the American fox, the caribou and carcajou. From R. Brookes, A New and Accurate 
System (1763-72), vol. I.
3.6 Homed narval; or sea unicorn. From Anonymous, The Naturalist's Pocket Magazine (1799-1802), 
vol. V.
3.7 The Virginian opossum. From G. Shaw, Museum Leveriani explicato (1792).
3.8 The ostrich and the cassowary. From F. Willughby and J. Ray, The Ornithology (1678/1972).
3.9 The water ouzell, the hoopoe, the kingfisher, the bee-eater, the guira guainumbi, and the
iaguacati guacu. From F. Willughby and J. Ray, The Ornithology (1678/1972).
3.10 The zebra. From G. Edwards, Gleanings o f Natural History (1758-64), vol. I.
4.1 Three insects on pins. From J. C. Lettsom, Naturalist's and Traveller's Companion (1772).
4.2 Case with stuffed birds, specimens from the Leverian Museum. From Anonymous, Descriptive 
Catalogue (1814).
4.3 The rotunda from the Leverian Museum, 1805. From C. E. Jackson, Sarah Stone (1998).
4.4 Three fishes in Mr Slater's Coffee-house. From R. Bradley, A Philosophical Account o f the Works o f 
Nature (1721).
4.5 The wonderful pig, 1785. From R. Altick, The Shows of London (1978).
6.1 The magellantic vulture, or condor. From G. Shaw, Museum Leveriani explicato (1792).
6.2 Different kinds of white ants. From H. Smeathman, 'Some Account of the Termites' (1781).
6.3 Hillocks of white ants. From H. Smeathman, 'Some Account of the Termites' (1781).
6.4 A variety of butterflies in different stages of life. From M. Harris, The Aurelian (1766),
6.5 Six perfect butterflies. From M. Harris, An Exposition of English Insects (1782).
6.6 Young elephant with tusks added, and a rhinoceros. From G. Edwards, Gleanings of Natural 
History (1758-64), vol. I.
6.7 Transformation of the frog. From R. Bradley, A Philosophical Account of the Works o f Nature (1721)
6.8 Fallow deer and female fallow deer. From Buffon ed. W. Smellie, Natural History (1780), vol, IV.
7.1 The coot-footed tringa. From G. Edwards, 'An Account of a new-discovered Species' (1757).
7.2 The hippopotamos and hippocampus, and the porcupine and armadillo. From F. Watson, The 
Animal World Display'd (1754).
7.3 J. Ray: Animalium Tabula generalis. From J. Ray, Synopsis (1693).
7.4 J. Hill: Quadrupeds, series 2. From J. Hill, A General Natural History (1751-58), vol. HI.
7.5 J. Hill: Quadrupeds, series 4. From J. Hill, A General Natural History (1751-58), vol. HI.
7.6 T, Pennant: Method. From T. Pennant, Synopsis o f Quadrupeds (1771).
1U
7.7 R. Brookes: The Contents. From R. Brookes, A New and Accurate System (1763-72), vol. I.
7.8 O'Lord, how Wonderfull are thy Works. From Anonymous, Beauties o f Creation (1790).
8.1 Skeletons of man and ape. From R. Bradley, A Philosophical Account o f the Works o f Nature (1721).
8.2 Simiae. From F. Watson, The Animal World Display'd (1754).
8.3 C. Darwin: Diagram of the descent of species. From C. Darwin, The Origin o f Species (1859/1979).
Li s t  o f  T a bles
1.1 Survey: Natural historians' fathers' occupation.
1.2 Survey: Natural historians' education.
1.3 Survey: Natural historians' occupation.
1.4 Survey: Natural historians' membership in learned societies.
Note on R eferences  an d  Q uo tatio ns
Information in in-text citations of published works has been kept to a relative minimum in the 
present thesis. Adopting and adapting the citation practice of Steven Shapin & Simon Schaffer 
in Leviathan and the Air Pump (1985), only the author's name, title of published works in 
abridged form, and year of publication have been listed in the footnotes. In references to 
primary literature, the original date of publication of the edition referred to is also always 
given here, together with the actual year of publication; in references to secondary literature, 
the original date of publication is only given in the footnotes where it is essential to the 
argument. Full bibliographic details can be found in the bibliography at the end of this work. 
In the citations of manuscript sources, full bibliographic details are also given in the notes for 
the purposes of identification.
In the quotations, the original spelling, capitalisation and punctuation have been kept. 
Furthermore, in order to avoid too many sics, a sic has only been added where spelling has 
been judged to be outside the boundaries of seventeeth- and eighteenth-century orthography.
v

Chapter 1
Twin Histories
As the seventeenth century approached its end, zoology emerged as an unprecedentedly 
popular field of study within Britain. Encouraged by more general transformations in the field 
of learning, which had been under way since the turn of the century, the exploration of the 
animal kingdom moved from the apothecaries' shops, the physicians' colleges, and the 
aristocrats' cabinets of curiosities where it had mainly been pursued during the Renaissance, 
into a much wider social terrain, centred on the Polite Society of the rising middle echelons. 
From the last decades of the seventeenth century and during the next century, an expanding 
group of men, principally from these middle echelons, began writing about zoological and, 
more generally, natural historical subjects. From the 1660s onwards, learned societies were 
established in London and later around the country, placing natural history and natural 
philosophy on the agenda. At the same time, it became fashionable for men and, to some 
extent, for women of Polite Society to spend part of their spare time in the bosom of nature, 
collecting flowers and hunting especially for the more picturesque branches of animals, such as 
butterflies. It became popular to collect stones, dried flowers and stuffed animals and to put 
them on display in the small, private cabinets which were found in many homes of gentlefolk 
during the eighteenth century. Natural history made its way into poetry in the shape of the 
very popular genre of natural history poems, in which both nature and the natural historians' 
'discoveries' of 'her' secrets were celebrated. In a more popular context, museums such as, 
most notably, the Ashmolean, the Leverian, and the British Museum opened their doors to a 
general public, who seemed eager to gaze at the exotic animals in their collections. At coffee­
houses, stuffed animals and other natural historical curiosities came to adorn the walls as part 
of the establishments' attraction. At market places, exotic animals -  African elephants, 
Barbarian lions, and Siberian tigers -  drew crowds of spectators; and books with titles such as
CHAPTER 1
British Zoology or The Aurelian: or, Natural History o f English Insects1 became well-known best­
sellers which could compete with the most famous travel accounts and most cherished novels 
of the day. '[NJatural history is now/ a writer at the Critical Review observed in 1763, 'by a kind 
of national establishment, become the favourite study of the times'.1 2 3
By the eighteenth century nature, it appears, had been turned into one 'Grand Mu­
seum', as Richard Kentish put it, where man could dwell on grand questions:
When he beholds the productions of different dimes, and sees the varied forms of nature; w hen he finds him self 
surrounded with the inhabitants of different elements, and divers countries; when he traces the variety of spedes, 
and infinitude of products; when he examines the contrast in size and shape of animals, the wonderful ceconomy o f 
Vegetables, and the properties of the Mineral kingdom, he is led into a thousand speculations on the appearances of 
life, the methods made use of to sustain the living prindple, and the wonderful extent, and diversity of organized 
and unorganized matter.®
On this account, the zoologists were concerned, on one hand, with making a systematic 
inventory of this Museum. By describing the countless animals around in the world as 
accurately as humanly possible, by comparing them to each other and thereby finding such 
'indelible marks'4 as would allow the zoologists to classify them in immutable species, kinds, 
tribes, races, families, and kingdoms, the zoologist sought an order in that 'infinitude of 
products' in the empirical world which at first looked bewildering confusing. But the 
zoologists were also, on the other hand, concerned with the divine originator of the Grand 
Museum. The quest for order, which was central to the eighteenth-century zoological 
endeavour, was cast as, potentially, a disclosure of a divine order: 'Look thro' Nature, up to 
Nature's God/ Kentish, from Pope, choose as the bon mot for his book, like quite a few other 
authors from the period.5 To 'penetrate' nature's 'sources, and trace it backwards, if possible to 
find out the First Cause and Mover of all things/ ought likewise, according to George 
Edwards, to be the ultimate purpose of any study of nature.6 What the zoologists encountered 
when they approached nature, and what the general public could read about in their books, 
was not only animals, but animals divinely ordained. Studying the animal kingdom not only 
implied studying nature's order, but also the order of the universe.
The present thesis is a study of the zoological branch of 'the favourite study of the 
times', and of the men who pursued it. It is a study of how these men transformed raw nature 
into zoological knowledge, and of the content of that knowledge. It is, in a word, a study of the 
twin histories of British zoology and zoologists of the long eighteenth century.
Looking back in 1859 on this eighteenth-century zoological endeavour after yet another 
transformation had taken place in the field of natural studies in the first part of the nineteenth-
1 By, respectively, T. Pennant (1768-77), and M. Harris (1766).
2 Critical Review, vol. 16 (Oct, 1763), p. 312.
3 R. Kentish, An Essay on the Method (1787), pp. 8-9.
4 Ibid., pp. 71-2.
5 Ibid., Title page (unpaged).
6 G. Edwards, A Natural History o f  Birds (1743-51), vol. H, p. 108.
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111. 1.1 G en tlefo lk  h unting  bu tterflies  (M. Harris, The Aurelian, 1766). During the eighteenth- 
century, engaging in the zoological endeavour in a more leisurely manner became fashionable within 
Polite Society. In particular, the more picturesque branches of zoology, such as entomology, became 
popular, and books describing methods of collecting and objects to be collected, such as The Aurelian, 
from whence this plate is taken, found a wide audience among gentlemen and -ladies.
CHAPTER 1
British Zoology or The Aurelian: or, Natural History o f English Insects1 became well-known best­
sellers which could compete with the most famous travel accounts and most cherished novels 
of the day. '[N]atural history is now,' a writer at the Critical Review observed in 1763, 'by a kind 
of national establishment, become the favourite study of the times'.2
By the eighteenth century nature, it appears, had been turned into one 'Grand M u­
seum', as Richard Kentish put it, where man could dwell on grand questions:
When he beholds the productions of different dimes, and sees the varied forms of nature; w hen he finds him self 
surrounded with the inhabitants of different elements, and divers countries; when he traces the variety of species, 
and infinitude of products; when he examines the contrast in size and shape of animals, the wonderful ceconomy o f  
Vegetables, and the properties of the Mineral kingdom, he is led into a thousand speculations on  the appearances of 
life, the methods made use of to sustain the living principle, and the wonderful extent, and diversity of organized 
and unorganized matter.3
On this account, the zoologists were concerned, on one hand, with making a systematic 
inventory of this Museum. By describing the countless animals around in the world as 
accurately as humanly possible, by comparing them to each other and thereby finding such 
'indelible marks'4 as would allow the zoologists to classify them in immutable species, kinds, 
tribes, races, families, and kingdoms, the zoologist sought an order in that 'infinitude of 
products' in the empirical world which at first looked bewildering confusing. But the 
zoologists were also, on the other hand, concerned with the divine originator of the Grand 
Museum. The quest for order, which was central to the eighteenth-century zoological 
endeavour, was cast as, potentially, a disclosure of a divine order: 'Look thro' Nature, up to 
Nature's God/ Kentish, from Pope, choose as the bon mot for his book, like quite a few other 
authors from the period.5 To 'penetrate' nature's 'sources, and trace it backwards, if possible to 
find out the First Cause and Mover of all things,' ought likewise, according to George 
Edwards, to be the ultimate purpose of any study of nature.6 What the zoologists encountered 
when they approached nature, and what the general public could read about in their books, 
was not only animals, but animals divinely ordained. Studying the animal kingdom not only 
implied studying nature's order, but also the order of the universe.
The present thesis is a study of the zoological branch of 'the favourite study of the 
times', and of the men who pursued it. It is a study of how these men transformed raw nature 
into zoological knowledge, and of the content of that knowledge. It is, in a word, a study of the 
twin histories of British zoology and zoologists of the long eighteenth century.
Looking back in 1859 on this eighteenth-century zoological endeavour after yet another 
transformation had taken place in the field of natural studies in the first part of the nineteenth-
1 By, respectively, T. Pennant (1768-77), and M. Harris (1766).
2 Critical Review, vol. 16 (Oct, 1763), p. 312.
3 R. Kentish, An Essay on the Method (1787), pp. 8-9.
4 Ibid., pp. 71-2.
5 Ibid., Title page (unpaged).
6 G. Edwards, A Natural History o f Birds (1743-51), vol. II, p. 108.
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century, engaging in the zoological endeavour in a more leisurely manner became fashionable within 
Polite Society. In particular, the more picturesque branches of zoology, such as entomology, became 
popular, and books describing methods of collecting and objects to be collected, such as The Aurelian, 
from whence this plate is taken, found a wide audience among gentlemen and -ladies.

TWIN HISTORIES
century, Charles Darwin in The Origin o f Species compared his evolutionary conception of living 
beings to that of his eighteenth-century forebearers, and found their notions rather peculiar. 
Referring to their idea of this divinely ordered universe -  an idea which, as we will later see, 
implied ideas of providentially defined, immutable species created ca. 4004 BC, a Great Chain 
of Being connecting all living beings on an unchanging scale from plants and animals through 
man to the angels, and which, furthermore, implied an idea of the perfect zoologist as almost 
an angel -  referring to these ideas, Darwin asserted that the eighteenth-century naturalists had 
'look[ed] at an organic being as a savage looks at a ship, as at something wholly beyond his 
comprehension/7 8With the idea of nature as not only corporeal, but also divine, and with the 
closely related ideas about the nature of animals, species and taxonomy, and about the 
zoologist himself, the eighteenth-century zoological endeavour, indeed, at a first glance 
appears exotic -  possibly not only to Darwin, but also to a twenty-first century reader to whom 
the idea of man's decent from the apes and every living beings' origin from some primeval 
amoeba seems as if it was evident.
Darwin, of course, stopped short at noticing the strangeness of his forebearers' ideas (as 
also many more recent historians of an evolutionary bent, incidentally, have done) -  his 
mentioning of them was only made in order to argue the case for his own biological system. 
Inspired by almost a century long tradition of ethnographic research, I shall here propose to 
start this study of the twin histories of eighteenth-century British zoology and zoologists where 
Darwin stopped: with the sense of the exotic.®
Since in the 1910s and 1920s, when Bronislaw Malinowski undertook his studies of the 
Trobriand Islands, the object of ethnographic studies has been defined to a very large extent in 
terms of such differences, which the sense of the exotic seems to intimate: 'They/ all the tribes 
throughout the world who have received a visit from an ethnographer, might look strange to 
the new-comer, but that is only because they are different.9 An 'other' who conceptualises the 
world in different ways from us, who organises their social relations in other ways, and who 
entertains different ideas about the order of the universe.10 Considering the 'difference' as the
7 G  Darwin, Origin o f  Species (1859/1979), p. 456.
8 Within history of science studies, Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer have recently argued for a congenial 
approach to the study of 'science' in history with their advocacy for a 'stranger's account' o f seventeenth- 
century experimental philosophy; S. Shapin and S. Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985), pp. 4ff. and 12ff.
9 Cf. M. Auge, A Sense for  the Other (1998), p. 109.
10 Within ethnography, this method of approaching natives as an 'other' has recently come under attack, and 
though I do acknowledge that we should be careful not to make the people of our study too exotic in our 
representations, and thereby overlook what they might have in common with 'us,' I do still find it fruitful to use 
the notion of the 'other' as a heuristic device, as a way of speaking which allows us to assume that everybody 
else in the world is not exactly like 'us/ nor merely a deviating form of 'us/ For critiques of the ethnographic 
concept of the 'other/ see J. Fabian, Time and the Other (1983); M.-R. TrouiUot, 'Anthropology and the Savage 
Slot' (1991); L. Abu-Lughod, 'Introduction' (1993), and most of the essays in J. Gifford and G. E. Marcus, 
Writing Culture (1986). For a reassessment of the notion of the 'other,' not too different from mine, see M. Auge, 
A Sense for the Other (1998)
3
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CHAPTER 1
point of departure for the study has, in turn, made it possible to investigate the different ways 
of interacting with and understanding the world; to inquire into, as Malinowski stated in  his 
first monograph on the Trobriands, 'the native's point of view, his relation to life, [...] his vision 
of his world/11
Traditionally, the ethnographer has inquired into contemporary natives' point o f 
view,12 and at some levels there are differences between the way contemporary natives a n d  
historical ones can be approached. There is a difference in the way contemporary and historical 
natives are delimited by the ethnographer -  the former in terms of differences in space, th e  
latter primarily in terms of differences in time13 14-  and in the methods used in studying th e  
natives at an empirical level -  in the first case through participant observation in the field, in  
the second case through reading of primary sources in libraries and archives. However, there is  
no principle difference between the way a contemporary 'other' and a historical 'other' can b e  
analytically approached. We might as well inquire into the eighteenth-century zoologists' p o in t 
of view as into that of the Trobiands or of the Azandes/4
Turning the British zoological endeavour into an ethnographic object, enables u s to  
view the zoologists of the long eighteenth century, not as 'savages' who did not comprehend 
what they saw in nature, but as 'natives' who understood the world in such a different w a y  
that it might seem at first, almost incomprehensible to us, but which, nevertheless, made sen se  
to them. And making sense, and even good sense, it seems fair from the outset to assume th a t 
the zoological endeavour did, not only from the point of view of the zoologists themselves, b u t 
also from that of those other gentlefolk who somehow were engaged in the zoological 
endeavour, either as collectors, spectators, or as readers: Why else would zoology have becom e
11 B. Malinowski, Argonauts (1964, org. 1922), p. 25; emph. in org.
12 By now, however, also historical ethnography or anthropology has become well-established as a tradition in  its  
own right, though it seems to have become a little out of fashion in the present day. With his initial thoughts o n  
the relationship between historiography and anthropology, E. E. Evans-Pritchard (see, for example, his 'S o c ia l 
Anthropology' (1962), pp. 20ff.) placed history on the anthropological agenda in the middle of the tw entieth  
century. During the 1970s and 1980s, historical ethnography gained force with studies such as Clifford G eertz ' 
on the Balinese theatre state in Negara (1980); James Boon's on Jacobean ethnology, among other things in O th er  
Tribes, Other Scribes (1982); Marshall Sahlins' analyses of late eighteenth-century Hawaiian culture and society  
in Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities (1981); idem., Island o f  History (1985); idem., How  "Natives" T h in k  
(1995); Kirsten Hastrup's study of Medieval and early modem Icelandic society, in Culture and History (1985); 
idem., Nature and Policy (1990); Anne Knudsen's on Corsica, in En 0  i Historien (1989); and M ichael 
Harbsmeieris study on early modem German travel literature in Wilde Völkerkunde (1994); just to mention so m e  
of the major works which have been decisive in shaping my historical ethnography here.
13 Cf. K. Hastrup, 'Sandheden' (1990), esp. pp. 82ff. For further discussions of the relationship b etw een  
anthropology and history, see also M. Sahlins, Island o f History (1985), pp. viiff.; G. Denning, H istory's 
Anthropology (1988), pp. 4-9,23-4,
14 Though there, of course, is a difference in the European ethnographer's relation to, say, the Trobiands and th e  
eighteenth-century zoologists, respectively, since the latter are our intellectual 'ancestors/ and the former are  
not. W e might, consequently, find bits and pieces in the eighteenth-century zoological endeavour that h av e  
been brought on to us in different ways and along different trajectories. But, as I shall attempt to show, in  th e  
eighteenth-century context, these made sense from another perspective than ours.
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TWIN HISTORIES
so popular? Taking my point of departure in the sense of the exotic, the purpose of the present 
thesis will then be to inquire into how it became meaningful from the natives' point of view to 
approach and conceptualise nature in the specific ways it was done during the long eighteenth 
century, ca. 1660-1800.
In this introductory chapter, the scene for my study will be set. Although the overall 
analytical frame is drawn from ethnography (my 'native' field), the present study of British 
eighteenth-century zoology and zoologists is also closely related to science studies, and in the 
following section, a review of literature within this field relevant for my analysis will be given. 
I shall here, moreover, discuss some of the main theoretical assumptions and thematic areas, 
which have generally characterised studies in the history of science. This discussion will firstly 
pave the way for a specification of the thesis' problématique, and, secondly, for the 
establishment of my theoretical perspective. In the theoretical section, by way Of a cultural- 
structuralist theory drawn from anthropology, an attempt is made both to substantiate the 
claims made above regarding the existence of different 'points of view/ with all that it implies, 
and, at the same time, to develop an analytical framework for the present analysis. I then turn 
to the empirical field presenting an outline of my empirical corpus, and giving a preliminary 
introduction to the endeavour of zoology by discussing its relation to society at large. Finally, 
an outline of the structure of the thesis will be given.
History  of S cience in R eview
The literature on eighteenth-century British zoology and zoologists is very sparse. Some of the 
leading British zoologists from the period have been portrayed and their works have been 
analysed in biographies;15 reference has been made of a few British zoologists in more general 
studies of the 'history of biology' or 'history of natural history';16 the disciplinary history of 
some branches of zoology has been traced;17 and more limited aspects of British zoological
15 Such as C. E. Raven, John Ray (1986); E. A. Martin, A Bibliography o f  Gilbert White (1897/1970); and C. E. Raven, 
English Naturalists (1947), on the zoologists, and naturalists in general, prior to John Ray.
16 Such as David E. Allen's work on naturalists in Britain in Naturalist in Britain (1994); Ernst M ayr's study of 
biological thought from Aristotle to the twentieth century in The Growth o f  Biological Thought (1982), esp. Part I; 
Émile Guyénot's work on the life sciences in European thought in the early modem period in Les Sciences de la 
Vie (1941); Scott Atran's study of the cognitive foundations of natural history from Aristotle to the eighteenth 
century in Cognitive Foundations o f  Natural History (1990), esp. Part III and IV, Paul Lawrence Farber's outline of 
the study of nature from Linné to the twentieth century in Finding Order in Nature (2000).
17 Most notably, in Paul Lawrence Farber's study of ornithology in The Emergence o f Omitology (1982); in studies of 
the emergence of primatology, for instance, G. Barsanti, 'Storia naturale della sdnunie' (1990), and R. Yerkes 
and A. Yerkes, The Great Apes (1929); and in studies of the research into polyps, in B. M. Stafford, 'Images of 
Ambiguity' (1996).
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research have been illuminated in articles.18 Almost exclusively, the focus of this literature h a s  
been on the few British zoologists who in the period, and in hindsight, have been considered to  
be "great/ such as John Ray, George Edwards, Thomas Pennant, Gilbert White, and John Ellis.
If we turn to studies of eighteenth-century zoology in a European context, this p attern  
is replicated. In this case also, the studies are few, and even those of a more, comprehensive 
nature, virtually always focus on the "great" zoologists and natural historians, and m o s t 
notably on the two giants of eighteenth-century natural history -  the Swedish natural historian 
Carl von Linné and the French director of Jardín Du Roí, George-Louis Leclerc de Buffon.19
Although the review of literature given here is far from complete, nevertheless it clearly  
indicates that, in stark contrast to botany and botanists,20 eighteenth-century British zoology 
and zoologists have only been accorded sporadic attention in history of science studies. E v e n  
when they have been made an object of study, a small handful of "great" zoologists and th e ir  
works have commonly come to represent the tradition as such. Most, if not all, of the zoologists 
discussed in these studies were also considered "great" by their contemporaries, and th e  
historical studies of these individuals are very interesting. In many cases, their work has b ee n  
an important source of inspiration for my reading of the zoological corpus in the present thesis. 
However, from an ethnographical point of view, where the zoological endeavour is m ainly 
considered as a socio-cultural phenomenon, this empirical perspective is too limited. In ord er 
to explain the reason for this, and in order to place my approach to the zoological endeavour 
within the more general field of science studies, I shall in the following go beyond the field o f  
zoology and review studies of science more generally, with the emphasis on studies in th e
18 Phillip Sloan has thus analysed the emergence of a new spedes concept towards the end of the seventeenth 
century in the writings of John Ray, in particular, in 'John Locke, John Ray7 (1972), also cf. P. R. Sloan, 'N atural 
History' (1990); Daniel Carey has touched upon zoology in his analysis of the interrelations between n atu ral 
history, travelling and the history of collection in 'Compiling Nature's History' (1997); Gillespie has done th e  
same in  his investigation of the relationship between natural history, natural philosophy, theology and th e  
sodal order in 'Natural History, Natural Theology (1987). A  number of authors have dealt with zoology in  
relation to collections, P. L. Farber, 'The Development of Ornithological Collections' (1980); P. J. P. Whitehead, 
'Museums in the History o f Zoology (1970); P. J. P. Whitehead, 'Museums in the History of Zoology (1970); P . 
C. Ritterbush, 'Art and sdence' (1969); W. George, 'Alive or Dead' (1985); and the relation between zoology a n d  
voyages is touched upon in P. J. P. Whitehead, 'Zoological Specimens' (1969), and some o f the essays in T. R ice , 
Voyages (2000), esp. chs. 4 ,5 ,6 ,7 .
19 Among works of a more general nature, also touching upon zoology, besides those already mentioned, are J .  
Roger, The Life Sciences (1997); G. Petit and J. Théodoridés, Histoire de la zoologie (1962); and Michel Foucault in  
his chapter on dassical natural history in The Order o f  Things (1970), ch. 5. The literature on Linné and Buffon is  
immense. On Buffon, see esp. Jacque Roger's biographical study, J. Roger, Buffon (1997). On Linné some o f th e  
more important works indude, F. A. Stafleu, Linneaus and the Linnaeans (1971); W. Blunt, The Compleat Naturalist 
(1971); S. Fries, Linnés (1971); L. Koemer, Linnaeus (1999), on both of the naturalists, see also D, Stemerding, 
Plants, Animals, and Formulae (1991); P. R. Sloan, 'The Buffon-Linrueus Controversy (1976); W. Lepenies, D as  
Ende der Naturgeschichte (1976). See, in addition, also B. Dal, Sveriges zoologiska litteratur (1996), for an exquisite 
review of Swedish zoological literature from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century.
20 A clear indication of the strangely asymmetrical relationship between studies of botany and studies on zoology 
can be seen in bibliographies on the two domains, such as, D. E. Allen, 'Life Sdences' (1983), and S. A . 
Jayawardene, The Scientific Revolution (1996), pp. 264ff.
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history of science, which have been important in shaping my conception of knowledge. Doing 
so, two main traditions within science studies will be distinguished and their main tenets 
briefly reviewed. This will be followed by a discussion of how these traditions have shaped the 
conception of knowledge and the analytical approach in the empirical field.
From one theoretical perspective, what we might term an evolutionary approach to 
science, the sparse attention accorded to the field of eighteenth-century zoology is not sur­
prising. In broad outline, evolutionary historians have approached science as a continuous 
process of progress in which facts were accumulated, and theories, offering more accurate 
representations of nature, successively developed. This idea of the history of science has been 
fuelled by particular conceptions of science and nature. Firstly, it has been presupposed that 
nature was constituted in such a way that, as Karl Mannheim stated it is 'essentially accessible 
to all'.21 Secondly, it has been presupposed that both man and his language were made in such 
a way that it was possible to represent nature accurately. On one hand, this implied that, in 
principle, human nature allowed nature to pass through the sensory organs in the same way in 
all researchers, and that it, furthermore, allowed the facts of nature to be processed in all 
researchers' minds in similar ways. It has, in other words, been presupposed that nature was 
fundamentally uniform and uniformly accessible. On the other hand, it has been implied that 
language could be made to represent nature transparently. As Emile Durkheim underscored in 
his classic comparison of science and religion, far from every human representation could be 
accepted as an accurate representation of nature, however. Like many of his contemporaries, 
Durkheim regarded primitive classification as a prime example of a representation, which did 
not primarily reflect on nature, but rather upon the people carrying it out. What differentiated 
scientific representations from primitive classification was argued to be the scientist's use of 
critical methods in his studies. According to Durkheim, employing such critical methods 
meant that the scientist in his classification of nature tended to overcome 'the social moulds 
according to which they were primitively classified'. As a result of the critical methods natural 
facts could in the scientist's representation 'be organized according to principles of their own, 
so logical organization differentiates itself from social organization and becomes 
autonomous.'22
For the history of science, this idea of science and the scientist has implied that science, 
firstly, could be studied relatively autonomously because it by definition was detached from
21 K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (1966, org. 1929), p. 150.
22 É. Durkheim, The Elementary Forms (1976, org. 1912), p. 445. For a critical reassessment of 'critical rationalism' as 
the defining feature of science, see K. Popper, Kritisk rationalisme (1973), esp. chs. 1, 2 and 6; for a contemporary 
philosophical defence of this position, see W. Newton-Smith, 'Relativism and the Posibility of Interpretation' 
(1982); idem., 'Realism' (1990).
7
CHAPTER 1
any social context thanks to critical method.23 Secondly, since accurate representations had n o t  
always existed it became possible to view the history of science as a development o f  
increasingly improved critical methods and modes of explanation that facilitated increasingly 
more accurate representations of the fundamentally uniform nature. It is in this sense, that th is  
approach to the history of science becomes evolutionary, and in a sense also teleological. 
Understanding the history of science as an evolution towards some ultimate representation o f  
nature, towards the Truth, what becomes of significance in science's history, and h e n ce  
noteworthy in the history of science, is those moments in history which has brought us c lo se r  
to that Truth. Seen from this perspective, the history of natural history becomes interesting 
only as a prehistory to biology, and it was hence only logical that eighteenth-century zoology, 
and especially the British branch of it, should lead a life at the margins of the history of science, 
because it, on this account, did not contribute to the progress of science. As Ernst Mayr, f o r  
instance, stated after having reviewed the zoological classifications of Linné and Buffon in  h is  
history of 'biological thought7: 'Little progress was made in animal classification during th e  
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries/24
From another theoretical perspective, that of the sociological (and sociological- 
historical) study of knowledge (SSK),25 an inquiry into eighteenth-century zoologists a n d  
zoology, in principle, appears more sensible (although in practice, such inquiries have o n ly  
been sporadically made). In explidt opposition to the evolutionary approach to sdence, fro m  
the beginning the SSK challenged many of the basic assumptions of this tradition: The idea o f  a  
uniformity of nature, a uniformity of man, and a uniformity of method. Ludwik Fleck could b e
23 In general, social factors have only been brought into the historical focus within this approach in analyses o f  
how specific historical contexts, on one hand, contributed to forwarding the course of science, such as in R o b e r t 
K. Merton's analysis of the Puritan impetus to the 'scientific revolution' in the seventeenth century in 'S c ien ce , 
Technology and Society' (1938), and idem., 'Puritan Spur* (1973). For a critical reading and reassessment o f  
M erton's thesis and the ideas about science which it is based on, see T. Gieryn, 'Distancing Sdence fro m  
Religion' (1988); R, Hall, 'Merton Revisited' (1963). On the other hand, from the evolutionary perspective w h a t 
emerge as sodal and epistemological hindrances to the progress of sdence have, inversely, also been m ade a n  
object of study. It is, for instance, a recurrent theme in E. Guyenot, Le$ Sciences de la Vie (1941); in A . T . 
Hopwood, 'The Development of Pre-Iinnaean Taxonomy {1958-9); and in A. Cain, 'Logic and Memory' (1958 ); 
and it is the focal point in Hull's analysis of taxonomy and essentialism, in, 'The Effect of Essentialism o n  
Taxonom y' (1965). See also, C. E. B. Bremekamp, 'A  re-examination of Cesalpino' (1953); idem., 'Linne's V ie w s 
on the Hierarch/ (1953).
24 E. Mayr, The Growth o f Biological Thought (1982), p. 182.
25 The labelling of the field, or, maybe more accurately, the conglomerate of fields all united by a relatively 
relativistic approach to sdence, is a bit perplexing. In different contexts, and at times with slightly d ifferent 
meaning or emphasis, such studies have been termed Sdence, Technology, Sodety (STS), Sdence a n d  
Technology Studies (STS), Sodology of Sdentific Knowledge (SSK), Sodal Sdence Studies, Sdence Stu d ies, 
History of Sdence. Not wanting to add to the confusion, in the following I shall use Sodology of S d en tific  
Knowledge (SSK) as the most indusive term, using it to refer to all of the studies within this approach (a lso  
such made before the term was invented in the 1970s), and hence, also subsuming under this category th e  
History of Sdence Studies with which I will be mainly concerned. M. Hallberg discusses in Symmetri o ch  
reflexivitet (1997), pp. 2ff, the desiginatory heterogeneity,
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seen as an important founder of the SSK-studies. Analysing the changing ideas and 
explanations of syphilis in early modem and modem Europe, Fleck elucidated that scientific 
theories and facts are always contingent upon a specific 'thought style' entertained within a 
historically situated 'thought collective/26 Developing and radicalising Fleck's point, Thomas S. 
Kuhn, in his analysis of scientific revolutions, argued that changes in the history of science are 
equivalent to paradigmatic alterations of the rules guiding the formation of scientific theories, 
the conception of facts, and scientific practices.27 Although within an entirely different 
theoretical framework, the very idea of such radical changes were also developed by Michel 
Foucault and described as 'epistemic transformations' in his archaeologies of knowledge.28 
Regardless whether scientific changes are conceptualised in terms of alteration of 'thought 
styles,' 'revolutions in paradigms/ or 'epistemic transformations/ in all three accounts science 
is historiced in the sense that scientific authority is no longer seen as dependent on a 
universally valid method, but primarily upon the prevailing 'thought style/ 'paradigm/ or 
'episteme/ Although in particular, Foucault's idea of 'epistemes' and Kuhn's notion of 
'paradigms' have been criticised on many accounts, the very idea of fundamental shifts in the 
history of science still, as George Levine has observed, 'opened up to the study of the history of 
science the extraordinary possibilities of non-intemalistic explanation/29 By historidsing 
science, science was also contextualised. Its autonomous existence, preconditioned in the 
evolutionary approach, could no longer be sustained.
During the last three decades SSK-studies seeking 'non-intemalistic explanations' to 
science have significantly increased, and their mode of explanation has taken many different 
forms. However, there seems to be three features uniting them. Firstly, it is generally presumed 
that scientific theory is always underdetermined by, what we pragmatically can call, 'data/ 
That the natural (and, for that matter, social) world in other words is constituted in such a way 
that it is always possible to give innumerable and, in principle, equally valid accounts of it.30 
Secondly, this means -  as highlighted in particular in the doctrine of symmetry of the 
Edinburgh School31 *-  no stance exists from which we as historians can judge the irrational from
26 L. Fleck, Uppkomsten (1997, org. 1935) esp. pp. 22ff and 48ff. Where nothing else is indicated in the notes the 
translations from Danish, as here, and later Swedish, Norwegian, and Latin are my own.
27 T. S. Kuhn, Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions (1996, org. 1962).
28 M. Foucault, The Birth o f the Clinic (1973, org. 1963), idem., The Order o f  Things (1970, org. 1966), idem., 
Archaeology o f  Knowledge (1972, org. 1969).
29 G. Levine, 'W hy Science Isn't Literature' (1994), p. 67.
30 As, for instance, argued by T. S. Kuhn, Structure o f Scientific Revolutions (1996), pp. 4f.; K. Knorr-Cetina, 'Strong 
Constructivism' (1993), pp. 557ff; M. Mulkay, Science and the Sociology o f  Knowledge (1979), pp. 60ff; D. Bloor, 
Knowledge and Social Imagery (1991), ch. 2.
31 The doctrine o f symmetry was first introduced by David Bloor in Knowledge and Social Imagery (1991), esp. pp.
8-13. It has later been developed, sometimes in more critical reassessments, by M. Hallberg, Symmetri och
reflexivitet (1997), esp. Ch. 2, M. Ashmore, 'The Life and Opinions' (1988); H. M. Collins, 'W hat Is TRASP?*
(1981), among many others.
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been shown to be a construction with a history of its own, dating from the seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-centuries.36 The methods of science, including those of seeing and observing, as well 
as those of explaining and validating claims to truth have been made objects of the historian's 
analysis.37 The object of knowledge itself, nature, as well as the basic building block which 
scholars in different ways have treated as 'facts' and 'evidence/ have been shown to be bound 
up in some measure within the specific historical context in which nature was (and is) 
investigated, facts evinced and classified.38 The interrelations between knowledge and the sites 
of production have recently begun receiving attention.39 Hence, the spatial context and its 
implications for the knowledge produced has been analysed in studies of the museum, which 
in the Renaissance served as one of the most important sites of studying,40 the laboratory which 
became an important site for the production especially of experimental facts from the 
seventeenth-century onwards,41 and, the clinic later in the nineteenth-century.42 Finally, in 
recent years, some studies have been made of scholars' appropriation of space in the field.43
36 C. Taylor, Sources o f the Self (1989), and R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1980), esp. Part I and II.
37 Michel Foucault was, of course, among the very first to point to the historicity of observing and gazing in his 
study of penalogy, in Overvdgning og stra f (1977, org. 1976), and in his analysis of the modes of visibility in 
eighteenth-century natural history, idem., The Order o f  Things (1970, org. 1966). In Techniques o f  the Observer 
(1990) J. Crary followed this lead in an analysis of the historical construction of vision and the position of the 
observer in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. From a somewhat different perspective, S. Shapin and S. 
Schaffer in Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985), ch. 2, esp. pp. 55ff., have studied the act of seeing as witnessing in 
seventeenth-century experimental philosophy, and Peter Dear has discussed norms and forms of experience in 
an early modem context, in Discipline and Experience (1995). On the history and changing modes of 'objectivity' 
in history, see especially the essays in A. Megill, Rethinking Objectivity (1994); L. Daston and P. Gallison, 'The 
Image of Objectivity' (1992); on truth and 'thought styles' in a historical context, see, besides L. Fleck, 
Uppkomsten (1997), I. Hacking 'Language, Truth and Reason' (1982); idem., 'Style' (1992); and on the emergence 
of quantitative modes of studying as a privileged method during the eighteenth century, see the essays in T. 
Frangsmyr, ƒ. L. Heilbron, and R. E. Rider, The Quantifying Spirit (1990). In studies of contemporary science, the 
idea of perception itself being culturally mediated, often advanced with reference to experimental psychology, 
has come to play an important role in explaining why science does not, and cannot, represent nature 
transparently. See, for example, D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (1991), pp. 25ff; H. M. Collins, Changing 
Order (1992), ch. 1; M. Mulkay, Science and the Sociology o f  Knowledge (1979), pp. 43ff.; K. Knorr-Cetina, 'Strong 
Constructivism' (1993), p. 558.
38 The most comprehensive book on eighteenth-century British conceptions of nature is K. Thomas, Man and the 
Natural World (1983), though Thomas far from exclusively deals with learned conceptions of nature here. The 
first, to my knowledge, to suggest that facts were something made as much as found was, as I hinted at above, 
Ludwik Fleck, L. Fleck, Uppkomsten (1997, org. 1935), pp. 55ff. and passim. This idea was later taken up by T. S. 
Kuhn, Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions (1996, org. 1962), p. 7, and have been further developed in a series of 
recent studies on the conceptual context and modes of practices shaping the notion and handling of facts in the 
early modem period, see, especially, S. Shapin and S. Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985), esp. pp. 25ff, 
and pp. 226ff.; and L. Daston, 'Marvelous Facts' (1994); idem., 'Baconian Facts' (1994); idem., 'The Cold Light of 
Facts' (1997); L. Daston and P. Gallison, 'The Image of Objectivity' (1992). For a more general discussion, also cf. 
R  C. Lewontin, 'Facts and the Factitious' (1994). In the same vein, also the notion of 'evidence' has been 
contextualised, see the essays in J. Chandler, A, Davidson, and H. Harootunian, Questions o f Evidence (1994).
39 For a more general discussion of the importance of situating the production of knowledge, see A. Ophir and S. 
Shapin, 'The Place of Knowledge' (1991).
40 Esp. P. Findlen, Possessing Nature (1994).
41 See S. Shapin's study of the 'physical and symbolic siting' of Robert Boyle's and Robert Hooke's experimental 
works in his 'The House of Experiment' (1988), and, especially on Boyle, see also S. Shapin and S. Schaffer,
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In a broader perspective, the relationship between the field of knowledge and other, 
often intermingled fields, of religion, philosophy, literature, and law have been made a subject 
of analysis, as have the particular ways of making distinctions between such fields.42 34 The 
interchanges between natural, political and social order have been analysed in detail, especially 
as regards seventeenth-century experimental philosophy.45 In part, in the context of the 
eighteenth century, the analysis of the relationship between science and society at large has 
been focused on the relationship between knowledge and the emerging national states,46 and, 
in dose connection with this, the building of empires from the end of this century onwards.47 
At a more local level, the production and use of knowledge in provindal contexts have been 
investigated.48 Furthermore, at an institutional level, inquiries have been made into the role
Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985), passim. See also O. Hannaway, 'Laboratory Design' (1986). Studies of 
laboratory life in contemporary science have multiplied during the last twenty years, .some of the most 
influential including B. Latour, 'Give Me a Laboratory' (1983); B. Latour, Science in Action (1987), esp. ch. 2; K. 
Knorr-Cetina, The Manufacture o f  Knowledge (1981), and M. Lynch, E. Livingston, and H. Garfinkel, 'Temporal 
Orderi (1983).
42 M. Foucault, The Birth o f  the Clinic (1973).
43 Esp., A. t. Heesen, 'Boxes in Nature' (2000), see also P. Carter, The Road to Botany Bay (1989), esp. Ch. 1.
44 Such as Barbara Shapiro's study of the interrelations between natural science, religion, history, law, and 
literature, in Probability and Certainty (1983); or the tracing of relations by L. Daston and K. Park between the 
m edieval and early modem concept of wonder and changing intellectual, philosophical, symbolic, artistic, 
social, religious, and epistemological contexts, in their Wonders and the Order o f  Nature (1998). From another 
perspective, see Foucault's analysis of the formation of disciplinary fields in the early m odem  and modem 
period in The Order o f Things (1970).
45 See S. Shapin and S. Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985), on seventeenth-century experimental 
philosophy and contemporary conceptions o f political and sodal order; Shapin's analysis of the political context 
of the Leibniz-Clarke controversy around 1700, in his 'O f Gods and Kings' (1981); Mario Biagioli's analysis o f 
the merging of 'self-fashioning' and 'world-fashioning' in early modem scholarship, in his 'Scientific 
Revolutions, Social Bricolage' (1992); A. J. Grieco's study of social and botanical classification in Renaissance 
philosophy, in his 'The Social Politics' (1992); F. Rigotti, 'Biology and Society' (1986), on the association between 
the notion of the Great Chain of Being in eighteenth-century continental natural history and social order in the 
w ake of the French revolution; and A. Bewell, '"Jacobin Plants'" (1989), on botany and social theory in late 
eighteenth-century Britain. Studies on the relationship between early m odem knowledge and religion, include 
M. C. Jacob, The Newtonians (1976); J. R. Jacob and M. C. Jacob, 'The Anglican Origins' (1980), on the Anglican 
spur to science; M. Hunter, Science and the Shape o f  Orthodoxy (1995), esp. chs. 12-15, on both the close connection 
betw een knowledge and theology and on the secularising potential of the 'new philosophy,' nevertheless.
46 Especially, L. Koemer, 'Purposes of Unnaean Travel' (1996), idem., Linnaeus (1999), on the relationship between 
Linnean natural history and the nation; and, within a British context, J. Gascoigne, Science in the Service o f  Empire 
(1998), on the uses of and demands on 'science' by government, and 'scientists' contributions to the 
development o f bureaucratic institutions of the modem state. Another group of studies have focused on 
national differences in the 'scientific revolution'; see the essays in R. Porter and M. Teich, The Scientific 
Revolution (1992).
47 O n the relationship between botany, in particular, and the emergence of the British empire, see the essays in D. 
P. M iller and P. H. Reill, Visions o f  Empire (1996), and J. Gascoigne, Science in the Service o f  Empire (1998); on the 
politico-strategic dimension of the scientific exploration of the Pacific Ocean, see A  Frost, 'Science for Political 
Purposes' (1988), idem., 'The Antipodean Exchange' (1996), and D. A. Baugh, 'Seapower and Science' (1990). On 
British scholars' perusal of linguistics, history, natural history and other field in late eighteenth-century India, 
see D . Kopf, British Orientalism (1969).
48 On the 'scientific revolution' in Scotland, see P. Wood, 'The Scientific Revolution in Scotland' (1992), and N. T. 
Phillipson, 'Culture and Sodet/ (1975); and on the teaching of and the selective interest in certain aspects of
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played by universities/9 the learned societies,49 50 the international and amorphous institution of 
the Republic of Letters,51 and cabinets of curiosity and museums.52
Making conceptions of both method and nature relative to context means, finally, that 
it has become possible to approach scientific texts as literary texts. If science cannot be read as a 
more or less accurate representation of a uniform nature, the manner of presentation itself 
becomes epistemologically significant. The structure of scientific arguments, the style and 
rhetoric of presentations, the expository practices, and the iconography of illustrations have 
thereby been brought into the historian's analysis.53
By showing how science and the scientist are related to, conditioned by, and contribute 
to conditioning the social, the SSK-studies have, in conclusion, brought science and scientists 
out of their almost sacred, autonomous sphere beyond the social and into the centre of the 
'mundane affairs' of social life.54 By giving up the idea of scientific history as a history of 
progress of still more accurate explanations of a uniform nature, science -  contextualised and 
historicised -  has been transformed into a subject which, in principle, can be treated like any 
other subject in social or cultural history, or ethnography for that matter.
knowledge in provincial England during the eighteenth century, see J. Money, 'Teaching in the Market-Place'
(1993) .
49 J, Gascoigne, 'Politics, Patronage and Newtonianism' (1984); idem., 'The Universities and the Scientific 
Revolution' (1985).
50 On the history of learned societies in general, see J. E. McClellan III, Science Reorganized (1985), and the critique 
of McClellan's thesis by D. S. Lux, 'The Reorganization of Science' (1991); on the Royal Society, see M. Hunter, 
'The Social Basis' (1976), where its sociological composition is discussed, and idem., Science and the Shape o f  
Orthodoxy (1995), Part II. See P. Dear, 'Totius in verba' (1985), and S. Shapin, A Social History o f  Truth (1994), esp. 
chs. 6-8, for discussions of the role of the Royal Society in introducing and authorising the 'new philosophy' in 
the final decades of the seventeenth century.
51 Especially, Goldgar's detailed study of the practices and norms of the Republic of Letters, in Impolite Learning 
(1995).
52 Such as Paula Findlen's study of Renaissance museums and knowledge production, in her Possessing Nature
(1994) , and Krzysztof Pomian's analysis of the place and role of the museum in early modem Europe, in his 
Collectors and Curiosities (1990), idem., 'Museet' (1993).
53 For more general discussions of the relations between representation and knowledge, see H. White, Tropics o f  
Discourse (1985), M. A. K. Halliday, 'Language and the Order of Nature' (1987), D. LaCapra, 'Rhetoric and 
History' (1985/1998). On representation, rhetoric, and literary structure in an early modem context, see 
especially P. Dear, 'Totius in verba' (1985); idem., The Uterary Structure (1991); R. Rappaport, 'Borrowed Words' 
(1982); on the history of the footnote, see A. Grafton, 'The Footnote' (1994), Expository practices have been 
further explored in studies of present day science. See, for instance, S. Yearley, 'Textual Persuasion' (1981), G. 
Myers, Writing Biology (1990), B. La tour, Science in Action (1987), esp. Ch. 1, K, Knorr-Cetina, The Manufacture o f  
Knowledge (1981), pp. 94ff. Especially during the last decade illustrations in science books have received 
increasing attention, for instance, with Martin Kemp's analyses of the history of naturalistic representation in 
science in his 'Taking It on Trust* (1990)), and his analysis of anatomical representations in the early modem 
period in idem. 'The Mark of Truth' (1993); Martin Rudwick's analysis of the development of a visual language 
in geology at the turn of the nineteenth century, in his 'The Emergence' (1976), Daston and Gallison's analysis of 
the production of objectivity through specific modes of illustrations, in their 'The Image o f Objectivity* (1992), 
and the essays in W. R. Shea, Science and the Visual (2000), on visual representation in natural history and 
philosophy during the eighteenth century.
54 With a phrase borrowed from S. Shapin, 'Here and Everywhere' (1995), p. 304.
13
CHAPTER 1
On this background, let us return to the present study. Although conceptualised in 
ethnographic terms, my approach to the British zoological endeavour of the eighteenth century 
owes a great deal to these SKK-studies in the history of science, as will appear throughout the 
thesis. Indeed, it is their contextualisation and historisation of science, which have made the 
present study possible. There is, however, one tendency in the SSK-studies, which I, for 
purposes of this study, would like to draw attention to here.
Despite the differences between SSK-studies, one common trend in their analytical 
focus might be noted. Although there certainly are exceptions, in analysing the social con­
ditioning of science the emphasis tends to be placed on the modes of producing knowledge 
rather than on the content of the knowledge produced. In many cases, and certainly more so in 
some than in other, it is as if the question 'what did they know' -  so meticulously and, indeed, 
almost exclusively, studied within the evolutionary tradition of the history of science -  has 
come to play a mainly ancillary part in answering the question 'how did they know it?' This is 
certainly very useful if we want to know how knowledge was produced. However, it could be 
argued that there is more to science than the act of producing it, and that it might be interesting 
again to bring the question of content into fuller view. Although we cannot, of course, 
understand the product without understanding its mode of production, if we accept the basic 
assumptions of SSK, which I shall do, we cannot understand its content solely in terms of its 
production either. Ontologically, at least, they are two different things.
The Problématique
In this study, by a slight turn of perspective, I propose to bring the question of 'how' and the 
question of 'what' equally into focus. I shall attempt to do so by heuristically distinguishing 
between the history of zoology and the history of zoologists. The first history will be concerned 
with the observations, the descriptions and depictions, and the classifications of animals, in 
brief, with the subject matter of zoology, and with the socio-cultural context, which 
conditioned the specific formulation of the subject. The second history will be concerned with 
the zoologists and their sodo-cultural positioning as scholars, their modes of researching in the 
field, exchanging information, writing letters and books, describing, depicting and classifying 
animals. Although these two histories are inevitably intermingled and hence must be studied 
in tandem, I will argue that it is not possible to reduce the history of zoology to that of the 
zoologists, or vice versa. Zoology is to the zoologist as the text is to the author, as the product 
is to the act of production, as, one might say, knowledge is to epistemology. Although they in a 
very basic sense are each other's condition of possibility, they are also irreducible histories in 
their own right.
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Insisting on the dual nature of knowledge and its production, of course, does not in any 
way occasion a revolution in the history of science, since the content of science only in few 
cases has been entirely omitted, or has been presented as completely subsumed into the modes 
of production.55 However, by highlighting and bringing the distinction between content and 
production into focus, it is possible to study the distinct specificity of each history, and to 
investigate the nature of the interrelations between them. That is what I propose to do in the 
present study. The guiding problématique may, thus, be formulated as a quest for that 'point 
of view' from where the zoological knowledge produced in eighteenth-century Britain became 
meaningful, and from where it became meaningful to produce it in the specific ways it was 
done. In order to give a more detailed explanation of how this study will be carried out the 
theoretical perspective must be introduced.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
As indicated above my theoretical perspective shares many of the basic assumptions of the 
SSK-studies. However, my emphasis is placed somewhat differently. Rather than taking the 
starting point from questions relating to knowledge and its production -  although such 
questions certainly also will form a substantial part of this inquiry -  the primarily focus will be 
on meaning, and the modes through which meaning is produced. That, in turn, brings us back 
to ethnography. In the following I shall present a cultural-structuralist approach to the 
production of meaning. Categorisation is here identified as the locus of the production of 
meaning, and cultural assumptions about the working of the universe are identified as the 
domain, which from the natives' point of view makes it meaningful to categorise that world's 
phenomena in particular ways. As an implication of this approach, the distinction between the 
histories of zoology and of zoologists collapses from a theoretical perspective. In principle, there 
is no theoretical difference between social and natural categorisation, and I shall, hence, argue 
that both histories can be studied through the same analytical means. However, in conclusion 
to this section, I return to the question of the two histories and discuss how it is possible and 
even fruitful, at another level, to distinguish between zoologists and zoology, men and their 
work.
55 However, there are examples of this. Hence, Knorr-Cetina, for instance, identifies an 'opportunistic logic' in 
present day laboratory scientists as the modus operandi of science, or Michael Mulkay who defines knowledge 
as a resource which the scientist can use to obtain other resources, such a funds and students. In both cases, 
content becomes insignificant for understanding science, since science here, to put it bluntly, is made a function 
of a social game. K. Knorr-Cetina, Vie Manufacture o f Knowledge (1981), p. 4 and passim; M. Mulkay, Science and 
the Sociology o f Knowledge (1979).
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If we, following Ferdinand de Saussure/ accept the assumption that the world does not 
determine its representation, nor the meaning of signs, the question becomes how, then, do 
words acquire meaning? As is well known, Saussure's answer was that they do so by being 
structurally related to each other in systems of differences.56 Transferring this theory of the sign 
to a sociological level, Claude Lévi-Strauss has argued that categories also at higher levels -  
like 'mythemes' in myths, groups in social systems, and, formulated more generally, any 
category in a classificatory system57 -  only gain meaning in relation to similar categories in a 
structural order:
Les termes n'ont jamais de signification intrinsèque; leur significtion est "d e position", en fonction de l'histoire et du 
contexte culturel d'une part, et d'autre part, de la structure du système où ils sont appelés à figurer58
It is through categorisation, therefore, that meaning arises. Lévi-Strauss never fully develops
the role of culture and history in the formation of structural systems, because the working of a
binary principle in his theory always supersedes the working of culture .and history in
organising the categories in human conceptual and social systems:
[...] tout ce que nous prétendons avoir démontré jusqu'à présent est que la dialectique des superstructures consiste, 
comme celle du langage, à poser des unités constitutives, qui ne peuvent jouer ce rôle qu'à la condition d'être définies 
de façon non équivoque, c'est-à-dire en les contrastant par paires, pour ensuite, au moyen de ces unités 
constitutives, élaborer un système, lequel jouera enfin le rôle d'opérateur synthétique entre l'idée et le fait, 
transformant ce dernier en signe. L'esprit va ainsi de la diversité empirique à la simplicité conceptuelle, puis de la 
simplicité conceptuelle à la synthèse signifiante.59
Structuration always precedes culture and history because the binary principle, as Lévi-Strauss 
suggests elsewhere, is universally present.60 In Lévi-Straussian structuralism meaning, 
ultimately, is made a function of a binarily defined categorisation. Although I shall follow 
Lévi-Strauss in assuming that meaning is a result of categorisation, I find it necessary -  as 
many others have done before me -  to modify his theory on two points.
Firstly, although signs may be theoretically determined to be arbitrary in relation to the 
world, within a particular context, signs mainly work as if they were also indexical. As 
Marshall Sahlins observes, in communication 'people bring signs into indexical relationships 
with the objects of their projects, as these objects form the perceived context for speech as a 
social activity/ Signs are used everywhere 'as the names of things/61 The world does not 
determine signs and their meaning, but people bring the world into the universe of signs by 
systematically using them in reference to the world.
We might even go one step further than Sahlins, and bring the world itself into the 
definition of the sign, as Charles S. Peirce did when he defined semiosis, the sign function, as a
56 F. de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (1995, org. 1916).
57 G  Lévi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures (1969); idem., 'The Deduction of the Crane' (1971).
58 Idem., La pensée sauvage (1962), p. 74.
59 Ibid., p. 174; emph. in org.
60 See K. Hastrup, 'Fransk strukturalisme' (1975), pp. 50ff., for a discussion of this point in Lévi-Strauss' theoiy.
61 M. Sahlins, Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities (1981), pp. 5-6.
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relationship between sign-object-interpretant.62 To begin with, this step raises the difficult
question, which has preoccupied philosophers at least since the time of Descartes and which
has also played a significant role in science studies, of whether any Real World outside our
conceptualisation of it, exists or not. Are human categories somehow motivated, or are they, as
Edward Sapir and Benjamin L. Whorf argued,63 entirely determined by our culture?64 Umberto
Eco has argued that even though the Real World, or 'being,' as he calls it, cannot be understood
nor conceived an sick, and only becomes comprehensible in language, our conception of being
is, nevertheless, not entirely constructed 'from scratch'.65 Language 'questions' being, 'and
finds always and in some way or another something given in advance.'66 This 'something' was
what Peirce called 'object' or 'Firsts/67 and what Eco chooses to call Tines of resistance':
When we say that there exists lines of resistance, it only means that even though being appears to be a consequence 
of language, it is not so in the sense that it constructs it altogether freely.6*
Eco exemplifies this by putting a twist on one of the full-blown constructivists' favourite 
examples: the differences in cuttings of meat and their denomination within different societies 
have caused problems in translating recipes. Different cultures, different cuttings, different 
names, therefore different categories. However, as Eco notes, 'it would be very difficult to 
imagine a cutting which at one and the same time offered both muzzle and tail.'69 The moral of 
Eco's example is that although the Real World does not determine our conceptualisation of it, 
neither is our conceptualisation of 'being' entirely independent. The two cannot be 
categorically separated,70 but neither can our categories be explained with reference to the 
World.
If the World somehow offers some lines of resistance to our formation of categories it 
means, on one hand, that not all descriptions are equally likely to be made (though they are, of 
course, imaginable in principle, like cuttings of muzzle and tail, or seven-legged pink cats with 
antennas and airscrews, and the like). But if the World does not determine our definition of 
categories that means that it is possible for different, also almost incomprehensibly different,
62 C  S. Peirce, Semiotik (1994), p. 116.
63 E. Sapir, 'The Status of Linguistics' (1968); B. L. Whorf, 'Language, Mind, and Reality' (1952), cf. F. Fearing, 'An 
Examination' (1954).
64 This question is immensely complex, and philosophers are much better equipped to discuss it than I am. In the 
following, I shall only give a very, very brief outline, the purpose here not so much being to solve the question -  
something which I think Umberto Eco, any way, has gone a long way towards doing in his recent book on 
language and understanding (U. Eco, Kant og nxbdyret (2000)) -  but merely to suggest how, within the 
framework of my theoretical perspective, we might afford the Real a place.
65 U. Eco, Kant og nxbdyret (2000), p. 61.
66 Ibid., p. 61; emph. in org.
67 C  S. Peirce, Semiotik (1994), p. 94. For a discussion of this point in Peirce's semiotic, see U. Eco, Kant og nxbdyret 
(2000), esp. pp. 104ff/Sec. 2.8, and F. Stjemfelt, RationaJitens himmel (1997), pp. 272ff.
68 U. Eco, Kant og nxbdyret (2000), p. 61.
69 Ibid., p. 60.
70 Cf. E. Ardener, The Voice o f  Prophecy (1989), esp. p. 168.
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CHAPTER 1
conceptions of being to exist. In order to understand how these different conceptions, or points 
of views, come into being we must return to the question of categorisation and ask how the 
meaning of categories is fixed.
As we saw above, in the final analysis, classic structuralism identified a binary 
structure as the universally present, ultimate locus of the production of meaning. Now, and 
this is the second objection which has been raised against classic structuralism, there is nothing 
evident about the existence of such an underlying, meaning producing structure. It is true that 
structural pattemings within a given community can be observed at an empirical level, and I 
shall, as argued above, with Saussure and Lévi-Strauss assume that it is through categorisation 
that meaning arises. However, the existence of a determining structure in the depth, some 
'great hidden forces/ in the words of Michel Foucault,71 which in 'inscrutable ways'72 organise 
the human categorical system, does not appear obvious at all.73 One problem with such a 
theory is that it does not leave any place for ambiguities in categories.74 Another serious, and 
related problem is, as Mary Douglas has argued, that classic structuralism tends to accentuate 
the most systematic parts of behaviour, which easily can be binarily-structurally analysed, and 
leave the rest unanalysed.75
In order to maintain the important insight of classical structuralism, that meaning is 
relationally established, and to overcome these problems, I shall, along with Anne Knudsen, 
assume that the meaning-producing structuralisation takes place at the surface in actual life, in  
the concrete 'social practising,' rather than in the depth.76 It is in both lingual and non-lingual 
practice that specific categories are related to other specific categories, whereby their meaning 
is fixed. From this perspective, practice becomes like a 'choreographing' of categories, in which 
meaning is produced as relations between category and category (and category...) are drawn.77 
As a category in practice, moreover, may be differently related to other categories at different 
times, its meaning may vary from context to context. Practice here becomes the locus of 
meaning production, because practice is identified as the locus of categorisation.
So far I have talked about 'categories' as if they existed in and of themselves. That is not 
the case, however. As David Schneider has argued, the delimitation of categories, or 'cultural
71 M. Foucault, The Order o f Things (1970), p. 251.
72 A. Knudsen, En 0  i Historien (1989), p. 42.
73 The idea o f a deep determining structure has not only been developed within structuralism, but in other form s 
also, for instance, within psychoanalysis (as the id), and Marxist historiography (as the economic basis). This 
idea of a deep structure might in  itself, as Foucault has argued, be seen as a historical construction which arose 
as a privileged form of explanation during the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century. M . 
Foucault, The Order o f  Things (1970), pp. 243-53; also cf. E. Ladau, 'Politics' (1988).
74 Cf. E. V. Daniel and J. M. Peck, 'Culture/Contexture' (1996), p. 9; and M. Douglas, Implicit Meanings (1975), ch. 
10. For a philosophic critique, see also E. Laclau, 'New Reflections' (1990).
75 M. Douglas, Implicit Meanings (1975), p. 170. For a similar critique, see also E. Leach, Lévi-Strauss (1970).
76 A. Knudsen, En 0  i Historien (1989), p. 41, cf. pp. 41ff.
77 Ibid., p. 42.
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units' as he calls them, is in itself a part of the categorising endeavour. As 'things' are related to 
each other they are not only defined but thereby are also distinguished in particular ways as 
entities.78 In some eighteenth-century contexts, the category 'man/ for instance, referred to 
every man and woman and gained its meaning by being either contrasted to the 'beasts' or to 
the 'angels.' In other contexts 'man' could be used as a synonym for 'civilised man' in contrast 
the 'Hottentots' and other savage people, etc. In each case both the extension and meaning of 
the category differed. The extension and referent of categories are not anterior to 
categorisation, then, but are in themselves subject to definition through the act of 
categorisation.
Now, although categories within the same community may be defined differently and 
thus gain different meanings in different contexts, the definition of categories are still far from 
fortuitous within a given community. On one hand, it is possible to observe patterns in the 
way people of the same community categorise; on the other hand, we have to assume that their 
modes of categorisation are meaningful at least to those members of the community who 
undertake them. In other words, they are collectively meaningful. Within a given community, 
something appears to mediate the acts of categorisation in such a way that it becomes more 
meaningful to draw certain relations between categories rather than others. Inspired by Bryan 
Cleal, I suggest that we call this 'something' for 'censuring contexts',79 of which we may here 
distinguish between two principally different kinds -  an institutionalisation of practices and a 
cultural space of implication.80
Firstly, the institutionalisation of practices. My notion of institutions is inspired by 
Mario Biagioli's definition of patronage as 'an institution without walls, its reality made of 
etiquette-bound rituals rather than of "things" such as buildings and statutes'.81 An institution 
is here, in other words, defined as an institutionalisation of practices. In some cases buildings 
and statutes may constitute a by-product of a specific process of institutionalisation, but they 
do not define the institution. The solidification of practices does. Within the context of the 
history of science, we may define not only the learned societies, which have, of course, often 
been seen as institutions, and patronage, as Biagioli suggests, but also the Republic of Letters, 
and expository practices as institutions, in the sense that also these define conventionalised 
ways of acting. Institutions such as these become censoring, in the sense that they help to
78 D. Schneider, American Kinship (1968), pp. 2ff.
79 B. Geal, 'Censurerende kontekster' (2001).
80 A third censoring context might be added, if my arguments for the World's lines of resistance are borne in 
mind, namely the World itself. However, since the lines of resistance, firstly, work on a vaguer level in relation 
to categorisation than the institutionalisation of practices and the cultural space of implications, and, secondly, 
since they do not play a very important role in my analysis of the zoologists and zoology (as Ardener has 
argued, what is universal and what is not is best determined in cross-cultural analyses, not in the analysis of a 
single community; E. Ardener, The Voice o f  Prophecy (1989), pp. 9ff.), they shall be omitted here.
81 M. Biagioli, 'Galileo's System of Patronage' (1990), p. 2.
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consolidate and make some types of actions, and thereby some kinds of categorisations, more 
likely to be performed within their context than others.
Not all practices, however, are institutionalised, and even those that are, do not become 
meaningful with reference to an institution alone. To explain both the meaningfulness of 
structuralisation from the natives' point of view, and its relative systematidty within a given 
context, we have to assume that there is something which gives meaning to the specific ways 
relations are drawn; which makes it more sensible to draw relations between some categories, 
rather than others. We might call this meaning-giving context for 'culture.' Culture becomes, 
on this account, not a substance, which people possess, nor an essence, which defines their 
being. Instead, culture becomes that universe of shared assumptions and notions which are 
taken for granted about the world, which we have to assume exists in order to explain why 
categorisation is both executed relatively systematically, and becomes meaningful from the 
natives' point of view. Such a culture cannot be seen. It is a 'virtual order', as Sahlins calls it,82 
or 'an analytical implication', as Knudsen puts it,83 which only becomes visible, or rather is 
only made visible through the ethnographer's analysis.
Within ethnography, culture has often been conceptualised as a 'whole,' as an entirely 
consistent world view. On one hand, we have to assume the existence of a certain degree o f 
coherence in the cultural universe. There has to be some agreement in the assumptions about 
the organisation of the universe that people collectively entertain in order for meaningful 
communication to take place. However, on the other hand, there seems no reason to assume 
that this cultural order is entirely consistent. 'Everything is connected to something else,' as 
Soren Christensen observes, 'but everything is not connected with everything'.84 The cultural 
order is not 'a synthesis', in which every taken-for-granted-notion is subsumed under and 
thereby adjusted to a whole.85 Indeed, culture does not possess a cogito ensuring that the 
shared assumptions are logically attuned to each other. Culture is always in motion. Old 
assumptions die, new ones are bom  -  culture is an ever evolving and hence, a not entirely 
consistent order, which 'nonetheless', as Clifford Geertz says with an apt metaphor, is ordered 
but in an 'octopoid' way.86 Rather than viewing culture as a consistent whole, we might, 
consequently, see it as constellations of assumptions, which give meaning to people's practises, 
but which do not necessarily do so in any logically consistent way, or in entirely the same way 
in different contexts.87 This also means that we must be prepared to find different assumptions
82 M. Sahlins, Island o f  History (1985), p. 153.
83 A. Knudsen, En 0  i Historien (1989), pp. 47-8.
84 S. Christensen, Fakticitetens ironi (1994), p. 68.
85 Ibid., p. 90.
86 C. Geertz, The Interpretation o f  Cultures (1973), p. 408.
87 Also cf. S. Christensen, Fakticitetens ironi (1994), pp. 90ff., and U. Hannerz, 'The World in Creolisation' (1987),
pp. 550ff.
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preconditioned in different contexts, which, if compared, may be found at odds with each 
other.8®
In his or her quest for the natives' point of view, the constellations of cultural 
assumptions become a primarily concern for the ethnographer. Indeed, it could even be said 
that the natives' point of view equals these constellations of assumptions. The ethnographer is 
not, however, the only one who contemplates such assumptions. The natives also do so, 
though their reflections unfold within an entirely different context from the ethnographic one 
outlined here. Along with Victor Turner, I shall call 'the level of indigenous interpretation' for 
'exegesis'.8 9 Exegetical contemplation is valuable for the ethnographer in two respects. Firstly, 
it often gives guidelines for how something ought to be done -  how, for instance, a taxonomic 
system ought to be formed, or how one should behave in order to be considered a polite 
gentleman. Thereby, exegesis helps to frame practising. Secondly, exegetical statements often 
give clues to relevant constellations of assumptions, which might help the ethnographer to 
identify why and how something becomes meaningful. But there is also a significant difference 
between saying and doing. The exegetical comment cannot be read as a neutral representation 
of the natives' practising, nor of their culture.90 Indeed, the exegetical comment is often an 
idealised representation, and therefore must be read as an extension of practice.91
In sum, from this cultural-structuralist perspective, meaning is viewed as a function of 
a structuring practising through which categories are both delimited and their meaning fixed, 
as relations are drawn between categories through concrete choreographing practices. Hence, 
the structuring practising can be observed at an empirical level. The modes of categorisation 
within a given community is never entirely contingent, as might be seen in the existence of a 
certain systematirity in categorisation within a given community. This systematicity arises, I 
have argued, as a result of censuring contexts. The conventionalisation of practices within 
institutions, on one hand, makes it more appropriate to draw some kinds of relations rather 
than others within their context. On the other hand, and more fundamentally; we have to 
assume that both institutionalised and non-institutionalised practices are framed by shared 
constellations of cultural assumptions which make it more meaningful to draw some kinds of 
relations, rather than others in the actual acts of categorisation. This cultural order is not 
visible, but is only made explicit in the ethnographer's analysis.92
88 Cf. J. Boon, 'Symbols, Sylphs, and Siwa' (1986), p. 242; M. Douglas, Implicit Meanings (1975), pp. 3-4.
89 V. Turner, The Forest o f  Symbols (1967), p. 50. For a discussion of Turner's exegesis concept, see also D. Sperber, 
'Pourqois les animaux parfaits' (1975), pp. 23ff.
90 As Turner himself also points out in The Forest o f  Symbols (1967), p. 25. Cf., in addition, also Pierre Bourdieu's 
analogous discussion of the differences between 'law' and 'rule,' in his P. Bourdieu, Outline (1977), pp. 17ff.; and 
Michael Hertzfeld's concept of 'disemia,' in his Anthropology through the Looking Glass (1987), p. 133 and passim.
91 lam  grateful to Hans Ravn Larsen for making this point dear to me.
92 In my distinction between the empirical level of structuring practices and the cultural space of implications I 
closely follow A. Knudsen, En 0 1 Historien (1989), p. 48.
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As I indicated in introduction to this section, through this cultural-structuralist optic, 
both zoology and zoologists can be seen as created through the same kind of structuring 
practices. To put it very simply, as a category the 'zoologist' becomes meaningful, on one hand, 
as he is related to other kinds of categories, to other kinds of persons (the 'vulgar,' the 'polite 
gentleman/ 'women/ etc.), and as he in this capacity becomes a man who does certain kinds o f 
things in certain kinds of ways, which again implies certain assumptions about who can and 
cannot act in this way, given, more fundamentally, certain presuppositions of what a man is, 
etc. etc. On the other hand, zoology can also be seen as the result of structuring practises in 
which animals, facts, spedes, genera etc. etc. are delimited and defined as they are related to 
each other in specific ways. This categorisation becomes meaningful on the background o f 
constellations of shared assumptions about nature, animals, God, etc. From a cultural- 
structuralistic point of view, there is no theoretical difference between making sense of man 
and making sense of the world. Social and natural categorisation works through the same 
means. However, empirically these structuring practices are directed towards different ends — 
towards the self and towards an other (nature and the animals), respectively. Empirically, self- 
fashioning and world-fashioning, although, as Biagioli stresses, taking place simultaneously,93 
establish themselves as two different processes with different objectives and results. The tw o 
histories may, then, be distinguished at an empirical level with reference to the objective o f 
their categorisations.
Translating my theoretical perspective into a methodology for the study of the two 
histories my method may be best described as a variant of Clifford Geertz's 'thick descrip­
tion.'94 In dealing with both histories, I shall take my point of departure in a detailed analysis o f 
practices, attempting to elucidate the common categories and structural patterns established 
through them. In order to illuminate exactly why certain kinds of structural patterns were 
established, and how from the natives' point of view they became meaningful an investigation 
into both the institutional settings, the exegetical framing, and the space of cultural 
assumptions mediating the concrete acts of categorisation will be carried out. Throughout I 
distinguish between acts of categorisation directed towards self-fashioning, and acts directed 
towards world-fashioning, in order to illuminate how these two histories differed and at the 
same time also conditioned each other.95
93 M, Biagioli, 'Scientific Revolutions, Social Bricolage' (1992), pp. 32ff.
94 C. Geertz, The Interpretation o f Cultures (1973), ch. 1.
95 When moving outside the field of zoological studies, and, for instance, comparing them to other kinds o f 
studies or activities in contemporary society, where the distinction between the two histories is of less 
importance, for the sake of brevity 1 shall refer to both histories at once as the 'zoological endeavour/
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THE EMPIRICAL CORPUS
This formulation of my theoretical understanding of the field has had a direct influence on the 
choice of empirical material that will be used in the analysis. First of all, an attempt to analyse 
the common structuring practices and the collectively shared cultural assumptions censoring 
the zoological endeavour ethnographically, means, on one hand, that the contributions of all 
eighteenth-century zoologists, either 'great' or 'insignificant,' in principle become equally 
important since such common practices and cultural assumptions are displayed in the works of 
the 'great' as well as in those of the 'insignificant.'96 On the other hand, this quest for the 
common and collectively shared also necessitates a rather comprehensive reading of zoological 
literature. Ignoring the distinction between 'great' and 'insignificant' zoologists, I have 
consequently searched bibliographies97 and library catalogues, most notably at the British 
Library, and rather indiscriminately read what came my way. Although the weight in this 
corpus lies in what may be called monographs -  books which in some way deal with the whole 
or part of the animal kingdom, in either a specialised or a more popular presentation (an 
elaboration on that distinction follows below) - 1 have also consulted contemporary catalogues 
from museums and cabinets, books on taxidermy, guidebooks on collection, and the like. Zoo­
logists' manuscript remains, mainly letters and notebooks, have also been used.
Since I assume that the zoological endeavour cannot be understood in itself, but only in 
relation to a broader sodo-cultural context it has, secondly, been found necessary to transgress 
the boundaries of zoological works in my reading of primary literature in a quest for censoring 
and meaning-giving contexts of the zoological endeavour. Therefore, although much less 
extensively, I have read a range of contemporary philosophical literature, books of manners, 
periodicals, moral tracts, political and auto-sociological works, travel accounts, theological 
literature, novels, and poems. It should be noted that in the selection of this literature I have 
been rather biased towards 'great7 authors, in order to limit the extent of reading. To remedy 
this bias in some measure, an attempt has been made to supplement the primary literature 
with secondary literature, which is based on a more comprehensive research of the fields in 
question.
Expect for a handful of writers, all of the authors of my source material are British. 
Although the European context was certainly important for the British zoological endeavour, 
and although I touch upon it every now and then throughout the thesis, this context tends to 
be put into the background in my analysis in order to explore more local contexts of the
96 Though it, of course, also from this perspective may be interesting to investigate how certain authors in a given 
period establish themselves and are established as 'great' and to examine the implications of such positioning 
for the knowledge produced. This will, however, not form a main theme in the present thesis.
97 Especially, V. J. Cam s and W. Engelmann, Bibliotheca Zoologica (1861), and G. H. Bell and D. B. Rhodes, A Guide 
to the Zoological Literature (1994), have been useful.
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zoological endeavour. As I shall attempt to show later (especially in Part II) this delimitation of 
a 'British zoology' is not entirely arbitrary. Though pursued in an international context, a more 
specifically British tradition of studying zoology established itself in this period, which may in 
some way legitimate this delimitation of source material.
With the problématique, the theoretical framework, and the empirical corpus pre­
sented, it is time to introduce the zoological endeavour itself.
T he Zoological  Endeavour and S o c ie t y : A Prelude
On my theoretical account -  and, of course, in accordance with the basic tenets of SSK-studies -  
science and scientists are always and everywhere constituted within a socio-cultural universe 
which is bigger than the scientific endeavour itself. However, it is theoretically impossible to 
say anything about the specific nature of the interrelations between science and, to put it 
briefly, 'society/ The origin of specific patterns of practices or the precise constellations of 
cultural assumptions implicated in specific actions can only be determined through a concrete 
investigation. In a sense, to speak about 'science/ 'scientists/ and 'society' before the empirical 
analysis has even begun is already to have said too much: 'Science' and 'scientists' do not 
simply exist as unproblematic categories that the ethnographer can take her point of departure 
from. On the contrary, part of the constitution of any 'science' and 'scientist' is an indigenous 
demarcation of the categories of 'science' and 'scientist/ or, in this present case, of 'zoology' 
and 'zoologist/ in relation to a particular 'society.' The way that these boundaries are drawn 
and the point where they are drawn differ across time and space, and in themselves become 
constitutive for the scientific endeavour.98
During the eighteenth century, the endeavour of zoology, like other branches of 
learning, was not formally differentiated from society, as science would later be with its 
institutionalisation in universities. The men of learning were always also something more than 
men of learning, and their zoological books were not exclusively addressed to a professional 
audience, rather their readers were found in a more or less restricted part of, mainly, Polite 
Society. There were no definitive institutional divisions between 'science' and 'society/ but that 
does not mean that the endeavour of zoology coincided with 'society' either.
As a first introduction to the empirical field, I shall in broad lines attempt to encircle 
where and in what terms the boundaries between the zoological endeavour and 'society' were 
drawn. I shall do so by discussing, firstly, how the zoological book and, next, the zoologist
98 Also cf. E. C. Spary, T h e  'Nature' of Enlightenment' (1999), and S. Shapin, 'Science and the Public' (1990). Both 
authors make an analogous argument, though the first does so in a eighteenth-century French context, and the 
second, in somewhat different analytical terms.
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were situated in relation to broader social contexts, and I shall argue that it was primarily 
Tolite Society' which constituted the point of reference for these demarcations of the 
zoological endeavour. As I shall attempt to show the demarcations were never final, nor 
definite, and the zoological endeavour, though in some ways clearly distinguished from, were 
in other ways intimately related to Polite Society. With regard to the zoological books, the focal 
point here will not be on their contents -  a few more opening remarks are necessary, I am 
afraid, before we get to the animals -  but on their generic features. These not only helped to 
frame the presentation of the content, but also, on one hand, worked to distinguish the 
zoological book from other categories of books in an intertextual universe, and, on the other 
hand, worked to position the books 'intersocially' in relation to an audience. In the second part 
of this section the focus will be on the zoologists. I shall here sketch out the zoologists' relation 
to especially the Polite Society of the emerging middle echelons to which the majority of 
zoologists belonged in sodo-occupational terms. In the course of the analysis below, in order to 
elucidate purely sociological features of the naturalists' social positioning I shall at times take 
recourse to a survey carried out of 104 natural historians, who published during the period 
1660-1800 (Tab. 1.1-1.4).»
In brief, the following section will be concerned with how the zoological endeavour 
was constituted and how it constituted itself in relation to contemporary 'society.' This is no 
more than a prelude, however -  detailing the nature of the relations between the zoological 
endeavour and contemporary society, and showing their epistemological implications for the 
zoological endeavour will be a recurrent theme throughout the thesis. Here I only attempt to 
sketch the contours of that space which framed the conceptualisation of such relations. 9
99 The figures are based on a survey carried out by searching the British Library external online catalogue for 
authors who published on natural history subjects in the period 1660-1800. The search gave 126 hits, out of 
which I could find no further information on 22 of them. These authors have, consequently, been excluded from 
the sample so that the 104 authors on whom information could be gathered equal 100%. The sources consulted 
include: L. Stephen and others, Dictionary o f  National Biography (1885-1901); C. C. Gillispie, Dictionary o f  Scientific 
Biography (1981); L. Baillie and P. Sieveking, British Biographical Archive (n.d.).
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Biographical S urvey: Natural Historians' Social Positioning, 1660-1800
Sample: 104 natural historians
Table 1.1: Father’s Occupation
Aristocracy 10 11.5%
Professions 23 22.1%
Merchants 7 6.7%
Office holders ■ 4 3.8%
Lowest echelons 5 4.8%
no information 55 52.8%
Table 1.2: Natural Historian’s Education
University 57 54.8%
Apprenticeship 7 6,7%
Apprenticeship + University 3 2,9%
Law 1 0,9%
No formal education 3 2,9%
no information 33 31,7%
Table 1.3: Natural Historian's Occupation
Landed property 5 4.8%
Professions
- physician 29 27.8%
- clergyman 19 18.2%
- draughtsman/illustrator 6 5.8%
- professor/lecturer 10 10.4%
- apothecary 3 2.8%
- other 14 13.5%
total, professions 79 75.8%
Merchants 4 3.8%
Office holders 4 3.8%
no information 8 7.7%
T a b le  1 .4 : M e m b e r s h ip  o f L ea rn ed  S o c ie t ie s  
(the same person m ay be a member of more than one societies)
Total number of naturalists 52 50%
with min. one membership
-FR S 36 34.6%
- College of Physicians 11 10.6%
- Society of Antiquarians 4
- Linnean Society 4
- Royal Med. Soc. of Edinburgh 3
- Royal Society of Edinburgh 3
- Foreign Societies 2
-other 17
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Books in between
We should be wary, as Michel Foucault has reminded us, of approaching a book as an
independent object. 'The frontiers of a book are never clear-cut7, Foucault observes,
beyond the title, the first lines, and the last full stop, beyond its internal configuration and its autonomous form, it is 
caught up in a system o f references to other books, other texts, other sentences: it is a node within a network.100
Furthermore, beyond the intertextual relations, the book can also be seen as a 'node' in an
'intersodal' universe. The author always comes from somewhere and always positions himself
in a specific relation to an audience, which is delimited, if never determined, by the generic
conventions of the book. In this way, a book is also always 'caught up' in a social 'network.' In
the following, I shall start with briefly indicating the contours of the intertextual universe
which the zoological books were related to, and then discuss by which generic means the
zoological books were also distinguished in this universe, and how the author positioned
himself and his book intersodally.
Intertextually, books are always related to other books by way of implidt or explidt 
reference, by shared features, and, to quote William Hanks, by 'common membership in a style 
genre within a given literary tradition/ 'by amplification (where one book elaborates on the 
other), by contradiction or by reinforcement'.101 Such intertextual features tend, as Hanks 
condudes, 'to break down the boundary between what is inside and what is outside, giving it 
the appearance of a mosaic of parts derived from elsewhere.'102
The zoological books were intertextually linked to a large variety of other kinds of 
books and texts, with ramifications in many different directions. They implidtly evoked or 
explidtly named letters and manuscript-notes, theological and moral tracts, natural history 
poems, dassical literature and Renaissance philosophies, contemporary natural philosophical 
tracts, articles in periodicals, the Bible, auto-anthropological and auto-soaological literature, 
travel accounts, philosophical books, as well as, of course and most extensively, other natural 
history and, espedally, zoological books. Throughout the course of this study we shall have 
occasion to pursue some of the more important of these intertextual links. For the present, it is 
important to stress that the zoological books were inscribed in and incorporated elements from 
a much larger textual universe.
However, there were also areas of condensation in this intertextual universe. Even as 
the zoologists referred to Aristotle or Aldrovandi, dted a letter or a natural history poem, they 
also distinguished their own type of work from the rest, and thereby helped to demarcate a 
zoological corpus, a genre.
100 M. Foucault, Archaeology o f Knowledge (1972), p. 23.
101 W. F. Hanks, 'Authenticity and Ambivalence in the Text7 (1986), p. 727.
102 Ibid., p. 740.
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We may take a 'genre' to mean an institutionalised set of practices which, in the words 
of Hanks, specify 'a set of focal or prototypical elements',103 which by different agents may be 
used differently, but which overall define what kind of book one is dealing with. The 
prototypical elements include, for instance, a specification of the different stages in the text -  
headlines, dedications, introductions, main sections, conclusions, bibliographies; the rhetorical 
mode; the positioning and role of the author; the subject matter; the manner of citation; the 
addressee, etc.104 At a more basic level, a genre helps to define how a text should be read. 
Although, in principle, a text, of course, may be interpreted in every way imaginable, 'the 
range of possibilities is never open-ended in the real social world', as Hanks argues.105 The 
reason for this is both that the context of reading plays a constitutive role for the interpretation 
of the text,106 and that by virtue of the generic conventions, the text itself provides some 
guidelines on how it should be read -  in its most general function: as fiction, philosophy, 
zoology, theology, or poetry, for instance.
By the late seventeenth-century zoological books had become dearly distinguishable 
from literature, philosophy, and theological literature.107 Emerging as a sub-field of natural 
history, the zoological books shared many generic features with books on minerals and plants. 
However, although there were some few works, which dealt with all three natural kingdoms, 
the zoological books were in general distinguished from these by subject matter. Among the 
zoological books we might, depending on how one draws fire lines -  and the drawing of lines 
will be my doing since no explidt definitions of genres were given by the zoologists 
themselves108 -  distinguish between two major sub-genres. Firstly, the General Introduction, 
which was usually presented as an 'abridgement' or a 'Collection' of typically the m ost
103 W. F. Hanks, 'Discourse Genres' (1987), p. 681.
104 Cf. Ibid.; N. Fairdough, 'Discourse and Text7 (1992), idem., Discourse and Social Change (1992), pp. 124ff.
105 W. F. Hanks, 'Text and Textuality' (1989), p. 107.
106 Cf. ibid., pp. 106-7. This idea of reading as constitutive for the meaning of a text has not only been advanced 
within literary studies (e.g. D. LaCapra, 'Rhetoric and History' (1985/1998)), and history of reading studies (e.g.
I. Rivers, Books and Their Readers (1982); J. Raven, H. Small, and N. Tadmor, The Practice and Representation o f  
Reading (1996); R. Chartier, 'Texts, Printing, Readings' (1985); R, C. Damton, 'Readers Respond' (1984)), but it  
has also received attention during the last twenty years or so within history of sdence studies. See, for instance,
J. V. Price, 'The Reading of Philosophical Literature' (1982), and A. Johns, 'The Physiology of Reading' (1996), 
on the reading of philosophical literature, and L, Jardine and A. Grafton, "'Studies for action'" (1990), for a  
specific case study of William Harvey's reading of Livy.
107 On the emergence of the distinction between 'science' and 'literature' during the seventeenth century, see G . 
Beer, 'Science and Literature' (1990); on the generic conventions of philosophical writing in general, see R . 
Ginsberg, 'Introduction' (1987), and on Shaftesbury's writings in particular, see R. Markley, 'Style as  
Philosophical Structure' (1987); L. Klein, 'Shaftesbury, politeness' (1993); on 'scientific' poetry, see W, P. Jones, 
The Rhetoric o f  Science (1966); on the special genre of learned journals, see A. Johns, 'Miscellaneous methods' 
(2000), S. Yearley, 'Textual Persuasion' (1981); and on differences in style and class, see C. McIntosh, Common 
and Courtly Language (1986).
108 This, indeed, is often the case, cf. J. M. Swales, Genre Analysis (1990), ch. 1.
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'curious' and 'interesting' things which were already known about the animal kingdom;109 and 
secondly, the Specialised Account, which usually aimed not only to give a more 
comprehensive account of whole or part of the animal kingdom, but which often purported to 
present new discoveries as well.110
The General Introduction and the Specialised Account shared many generic features. 
Essentially, to a very large extent, they make use of the same kind of stages in the structuring 
of the book. Hence, after a title page, and possibly a dedication, we find in both sub-genres, a 
preface or an introduction which usually served metalinguistic purposes, in the sense that the 
author here positioned himself vis-à-vis the public, vis-à-vis nature, and vis-à-vis the natural 
history tradition. After the introduction or preface, a table of contents followed in some books, 
and, next, in all book the main body of the text -  the substantial part of the book in which the 
description and classification of animals were presented, almost always accompanied by some 
engravings of animals, at times lavishly coloured. It is in the positioning of the author vis-à-vis 
the audience and in the delimitation of that audience in the presentation of knowledge in the 
main body of the books that we find the most significant generic differences between the 
General Introduction and the Specialised Account.
Let me start with the author. We might use the presentation of the author on the very 
title page as a prism for examining the positioning of the author vis-à-vis the audience in the 
two sub-genres. Already here crucial information was provided about who the author was (or 
was not), where he came from and how he gained authority to write about the things he did.
While the name of the author, and sometimes also his university degree, fellowships of 
learned societies, and less frequently his occupation, would appear on the title page of the 
Specialised Accounts, the General Introductions would often be published anonymously.111 
Already this signified a difference of intent between the two sub-genres. As I shall return to
109 Quotes drawn from Anonymous, Beauties o f  Natural History (1777), p. xxiv, Anonymous, The Beauties o f  the 
Creation (1790), p. v; F. Watson, The Animal World Display'd (1754), p. ix. Similar terms reappear in General 
Introduction after General Introduction.
110 The Specialised Account may be further subdivided with reference to subject matter into 'global accounts/ 
dealing with a subject in all of its alleged ramifications; 'national accounts/ focusing on the fauna of a specific 
country; accounts on one specific dass of animals (quadrupeds, snakes, birds, etc.); and, lastly and partly 
cutting across these other sub-genres, accounts which only purported to describe specimens or speties, and 
'taxonomic accounts' in which the animals were also dassified. As these sub-genres of the Specialised Account 
differed prindpally with regard to subject matter, but were framed by the same generic conventions, they will 
here be treated together.
111 There is one exception to this pattern, and that is the, in other regards, decisively Spedalised Accounts of 
Thomas Pennant. In his Synopsis o f  Quadrupeds (1771), his name appears, but only at the end of the Preface; in 
his British Zoology (1768-1777), his name does not appear until the end of the dedication of the third volume, 
and again after another dedication in the fourth (there is no dedication in the first two volumes). Pennant, 
however, had such an enormous network of correspondence who were kept up to date with the latest 
developments in his writings, as it dearly appears from his letters, that it seems fair to assume that virtually 
everybody with an interest in zoology, or natural history, would know who the author was well before the 
publication of one of his works -  a specification at the title page was not needed here.
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later (Chapter 3), the credibility of claims to truth was to a large extent, but not exclusively,
evaluated by assessed the veracity of an author,112 and especially when it came to 'discoveries'
of extraordinary animals, it would usually be important to know who the author was in order
to decide whether his propositions could be trusted. This relationship between name and
authority is exposed in the introduction to Edward Bancroft's natural history of Guiana. A t
first, Bancroft had planned to publish the book anonymously, however, his friends had
represented the impropriety of publishing an Account of the unknown Productions of an almost unknown Country, 
on the slender support of anonymous Authority; and the justice of their remonstrance overcoming his juvenile 
timidity, had encouraged him to subscribe his Name to the Dedication; not with a presumptuous expectation o f 
acquiring Honour for the Work, but solely to add to its Credibility.113
Whereas the General Introductions did not need the name of an author because they, as noted 
above, merely aimed to represent and give an abridgement of what was already known, the 
Specialised Accounts, inversely, needed the name of an author in order to gain authority 
because such Accounts purported also to present 'new' knowledge.
In order to understand what role the listing of university degrees and fellowships o f 
learned societies in the Specialised Accounts played in defining the authors' position, we must 
look briefly at these institutions' relation to learning more generally. The universities have, on 
one hand, often been ruled out in histories of science as inconsequential in this period because 
they were decreed by statutes to provide an education based on scholastic learning, 
fundamentally at odds with the basic assumptions of the 'new philosophy/ and hence also 
with the zoological endeavour. And a glance at my survey also shows that it was not all 
natural historians who had a university degree (see Tab. 1.2). However, as recent studies of 
students' notebooks and professors' lecture notes have shown, the new philosophy in some 
measure found its way to the teaching halls during the eighteenth-century,114 and, furthermore, 
the universities also provided their students with such a general education -  especially in 
theology -  which would be crucial for a man of learning.115 In this way, the universities were 
not entirely inconsequential. On the other hand, the learned societies have often been 
portrayed as though they had a monopolising position in the production of knowledge during 
the eighteenth-century, equivalent to that which the universities would get towards the end o f
112 On evaluating an author's veracity, see also S. Shapin, A Social History o f  Truth (1994), ch. 6.
113 E. Bancroft, An Essay on the Natural History o f  Guiana (1769), p. i. Expressing an unwillingness to become an 
author as in this case, was a recurrent theme in seventeenth and eighteenth-century natural history and in  
natural philosophical literature. As Shapin has argued, with reference to an seventeenth-century context, the 
denouncement of a quest for honour by being author was also linked to the building of authority, in  as much as 
such a denouncement signified that one did not publish a book in order to fulfil sordid private ambitions, bu t 
solely in order to represent nature, and, hence, to add to the stock of genuine knowledge. S. Shapin, A Social 
History o f  Truth (1994), pp. 177ff.; on the humbling positioning of the man of learning also in the eighteenth 
century, see S. Schaffer, 'Self Evidence' (1994), p. 68.
114 J. Gascoigne, 'The Universities and the Scientific Revolution' (1985).
115 Cf. H. Kearney, Scholars and Gentlemen (1970), see also L. Stone, 'The Size and Composition' (1975).
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the nineteenth-century.116 In particular, the Royal Society, founded in London in 1662, 
provided an important forum for the 'new philosophy/ as it, especially in the following 
decades, become central both in promoting and consolidating new methods of study, and, as 
Steven Shapin has shown, in validating claims to truth.117 Still, however, it was possible to be a 
natural historian without being a fellow of the Royal Society, or any of the other learned 
societies, which mushroomed around the country during the eighteenth-century (see Tab. 
1.4),118 and the authority of the Royal Society was, moreover, seriously challenged during the 
eighteenth-century.119 Though the societies provided important forums, they did, in fine, not 
monopolise the pursuit of knowledge.
Although neither the universities nor the learned societies, then, possessed the 'right to 
control of the exercise/120 even on the background of this very brief sketch, it might be 
suggested that they could still, for each their different reasons, confer authority upon an 
author's endeavour. It was not necessary to list a university degree or fellowships at the title 
page of a Specialised Account together with a name, but it might still lend authority to the 
name of the author and his claims.
On the very title page the author, then, positioned himself and his work in relation to 
the readers. In both the introductory section and in the main body of the text, inversely, he 
addressed the question of who these readers would ideally be.
'Viewed as a kind of practices/ Hanks says, 'genres are characterised by what Bakhtin 
called their "addressivity"': 'Different genres correspond to different conceptions of the 
addressee'.121 In the zoological books, in some cases, the addressee was designated explicitly in 
introductory statements, but the audience was also, and just as importantly, demarcated 
through the mode of representation and usage in the main body of the text. In both cases, the 
audience addressed differed to some extent between the two sub-genres.
As the name should suggest, the General Introductions were addressed to a 'general 
public.' As was often made explicit in the introductory statements, the public included women, 
young people, as well as the 'learned and curious.' 'In this small volume, alone/ the author of
116 As esp. argued by J. E. McClellan III, Science Reorganized (1985), p. xix, and passim; and, more briefly by L. T. 
Sarasohn, 'Thomas Hobbes and the Duke of Newcastle' (1999), p, 717. For a somewhat different view, see M. 
Hunter, 'The Social Basis' (1976), and for a critique of McClellan's study, see D. S. Lux, 'The Reorganization of 
Science' (1991).
117 S. Shapin, A Social History o f  Truth (1994), see esp. pp. 266-87.
118 For a review of the most important of these provincial societies, see J. E. McClellan HI, Science Reorganized 
(1985), chs. Ill and IV.
119 See for instance Monthly Review, vol. 4  (Feb., 1751), p. 282. Even from the beginning, as Hunter has argued, the 
Royal Society was notoriously London biased, and 'it is clear that it was never central to the scientific activities 
of those based in Oxford, Cambridge, or the provinces rather than London.' M. Hunter, "The Social Basis' 
(1976), p. 13, cf. pp. 13ff.
120 As Ben-Da vid has argued that the universities were later to do, idem., 'The Profession of Science' (1972), p. 363.
121 W. F. Hanks, 'Discourse Genres' (1987), p. 682.
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the Naturalist's Pocket Magazine, for instance, stated, 'we may venture to assert, the most 
intelligent naturalist will discover somewhat that is new, and not altogether unworthy of his 
attention; while, to readers in general, it cannot fail to afford a very considerable fund of 
information and entertainment/122
To 'readers in general': If we take into account the number of people who could not 
read such books -  possibly as many as three quarters of the population, namely the generally 
uneducated people of the lower echelons123 -  sociologically, the targeted audience here became 
the members of Polite Society and above. Among these it might be noted that women, who as 
we later will see for the most of the eighteenth-century were generally denied the opportunity 
to write zoological books, were by no means unimportant as readers. Hence, from the early 
eighteenth century onwards, women of the middle and higher echelons became increasingly 
important as readers of especially General Introductions to natural history and philosophy.124 It 
might appear somewhat surprising to find that the learned also were included in the targeted 
audience for the General Introductions together with the young and females. It could be 
argued that there is two reasons for this. Firstly, the differences between the General 
Introductions and the Specialised Accounts were not any bigger than it was actually possible to 
present knowledge in the General Introductions which could be of interest to specialised 
authors, as is evident from their citation of such works. Secondly, the fact of addressing also 
the learned may be interpreted as a warrant for the credibility of the General Introduction. The 
General Introductions might 'avoid!-..] that technicality of science which is so apt to 
discourage those who read chiefly for amusement/ as one author stated, 'without, in the m ean 
time, neglecting to introduce whatever may be essential, in this respect, to readers of every 
description/125 Being amusing did not necessarily mean that it was untrustworthy.
It is characteristic that the authors of the Specialised Accounts virtually never gave the 
subject of the audience any explicit consideration in the introductory section. It seems as if it 
went without saying who the targeted addressee was. And in a way it did, at least as soon as 
the reader got to the main body of the books, where the sheep were separated from the goats. 
In the Specialised Accounts, the animals, and especially the well-known animals, would here 
often be described in a stenographic style, where sentences would be cut off, verbs would be
122 Anonymous, The Naturalist's Pocket Magazine (1799-1802), vol. I, Preface (unpaged).
123 Leaving the difficulties of defining rates of literacy aside here (but, see R. A. Houston, 'British Society in  the 
Eighteenth Century' (1986); R. S. Schofield, 'The Measurement of Literacy' (1968)), from the late seventeenth 
century to the 1750s, the rate of literacy -  here defined as possessing sufficient literate abilities to write o n e 's 
own name -  raised from 50% for males and 25% for females to 62% for males and 42% for females. Although 
one can only guess about the exact size of the group of people who could actually also read scholarly literature, 
it seems certain th a t though it was much smaller than these figures indicate, it also increased during the period. 
D. Cressy, 'Levels of Illiteracy' (1981); idem., 'Literacy in Context' (1993).
124 G. S. Rousseau, 'Science Books and Their Readers' (1982), p. 213.
125 Anonymous, The Naturalist's Pocket Magazine (1799-1802), vol. L Preface (unpaged).
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left out, abbreviations would be employed, and signs would mainly only be used denotatively. 
Even when animals, and usually more uncommon animals, were described more 
circumstantially, the mode of representation would still be specialised. Through the 
employment of such rhetorical modes in the main body of the text, the potential audience of 
the book was delimited. The specialised descriptions of animals required a reader who was 
familiar with the codes so to say, who possessed a certain amount of knowledge about the 
natural world, and about the tradition of writing about it: the learned and in natural history 
already well-versed.
In the Specialised Accounts, moreover, we find an extended use of citations in the main 
body of the book, most often given in an abbreviated form, like 'Br. Zool.,' or 'Lin. SN/ In 
using such 'coded' citations the author, once again, took for granted that his reader was versed 
in the zoological tradition (as well as literature more generally, since the dted works were by 
no means restricted to natural history), and that the reader thus possessed enough knowledge 
about zoological works to deduce that 'Br. Zool.' stood for Thomas Pennant's British Zoology, or 
'Lin. SN/ for Carl von Linné's Systema Naturæ. The extended use of citations also served 
another function, as through the citations the individual book was explicitly woven into an 
intertextual universe. We might note in passing that although authors also frequently cited 
continental authors -  and especially such 'great7 naturalists as Linné and Buffon -  the majority 
of the cited works were by compatriots. In this way the intertextual universe, explicitly 
demarcated by citations, tended to be nationally biased.
In the main body of the General Introductions, in contrast, we find a more narrative 
style employed in the descriptions of the animals. The tone and objective is set in some 
introductory remarks to The Beauties o f Creation in which the author noted that, 'It has been our 
endeavour to trace more those grand outlines of sublime wonders that elevate the heart to the 
Creator, than to descend to the minute investigation of the mere specularist', that is to say, of 
the specialised author.126 Here, the reader would encounter the animal kingdom in general 
outline, presented in an often entertaining style, and, on any account, always in a narrative and 
hence, an easily decodable mode of language. In the General Introductions, moreover, we 
hardly find any citations in the main body of the text. In the introduction, the author would 
usually stress that, indeed, he had such an acquaintance with natural history books as was 
required to write a proper introduction to zoology. Usually, these books were not specified, 
and hence, the General Introductions were only very vaguely inscribed in an intertextual 
universe in explicit terms. They were presented as if they could stand alone, as if each was the 
only book that a curious reader needed to read in order to obtain all of the useful knowledge 
about the animal kingdom.
126 Anonymous, The Beauties o f the Creation (1790), p. vi.
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In sum, the Specialised Accounts, with their often stenographic style and coded 
representations, with their masses of citations, and specialised descriptions, addressed a 
learned audience. Inversely, the General Introductions, with their more narrative style, lack of 
citations, and more general outline of the animal kingdom, addressed both the learned and the 
polite. We should, however, be wary with distinguishing too sharply between these two sub­
genres. In practice, the writers of the General Introductions not only attempted to bridge the 
gap between the two genres by also targeting the learned as part of their envisioned audience, 
but both 'learned' and 'popular' writers might also employ generic practices from both sub­
genres. Furthermore, even some of the most learned of the Specialised Accounts were read far 
beyond the bounds of a more narrow field of specialised zoologists. Although the addressee 
would in some measure be pre-conditioned in the texts, the behaviour of the actual readers 
could not be controlled.
Rather than radically differentiated, the zoological books might best be seen as placed 
along a continuum bound by the extremes of the thoroughly Specialised and the thoroughly 
Generalised, respectively.127 Although this conception of the relationship between the 
Specialised and the Generalised, or popularised as it has often been called, might hold good 
more generally as well,128 the utter lack of any finite distinction in our period is still significant, 
since it reflects a rather blurred line of distinction between zoologists and non-zoologists. 
Placed between a thoroughly specialised audience and a general public, constituted by the 
middle and upper echelons, the position of the zoological books can, in fact, be seen as 
mirroring the position of the zoologists and the entire zoological endeavour in relation to 
contemporary society. As it shall be argued in the next section, the zoologists themselves were 
closely related to that part of society which constituted the 'general public' for at least part of 
their books, while the zoologists were also distinguished from it in crucial ways, and, in effect, 
partially establishing themselves as a community apart.
Scholars at the Margins of Polite Society
To start the discussion of the relationship between eighteenth-century society and the 
zoologists, I shall at first take one step back in time. In a series of well-known studies, Peter 
Dear and Steven Shapin have shown how the experimental philosopher and his endeavour in 
the seventeenth century was almost completely encapsulated by gentle society.129 Focusing on
127 This is also the reason why in the following in most cases, I shall treat the tw o sub-genres together.
128 Cf. M. Cloître and T. Shinn, 'Expository Practice' (1985), esp. p. 58, who make an analogous argument in 
relation to contemporary scientific and popularised texts in physics,
129 P. Dear, 'Totius in verbs' (1985); S. Shapin, A Social History o f  Truth (1994).
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trust -  on how claims to truth became acceptable as statements about nature -  both authors 
have argued that the scholar merged to a large extent with the gentleman/ because the 
gentleman was the only person in this period who with credibility could position himself as a 
'spokesman for reality/130 Hence, he was also the only one whose statements about nature 
could be accepted as knowledge. Taking my cue from Dear and, especially, from Shapiris 
more comprehensive study of the positioning of the experimental philosopher in the 
seventeenth century, in the following section I shall examine what happened to the 
relationship between learning and society, the scholar and the gentleman, in the face of the 
thorough social changes which occurred in Britain from the late seventeenth century onwards. 
I shall spend some time discussing both transformations in the conceptualisation of the 
gentleman, and some of the core ideas of the emerging Polite Society, which from the turn of 
the century came to provide the primary social context for defining and distinguishing the 
zoological endeavour.
Let me begin by briefly reviewing Dear's and Shapiris thesis. Before the Restoration it 
had, basically, been property that constituted the difference, which made the difference 
between the gentlemen and the rest. As the seventeenth-century political theorist, James 
Harrington, laconically stated: "The man that cannot live upon his own must be a servant; but 
he that can live upon his own may be a freeman/131 Drawing on a civic humanistic tradition, 
property was, in the words of J. G. A. Pocock, conceptualised as 'both an extension and a 
prerequisite of personality/132 The 'servants' or, as they were also called, the 'vulgar' were 
because of their lack of possessions, and because of what was conceived of being an only very 
limited development of their experience and hence, of their ability to understand the world, 
from the outset excluded from the realm of knowledge.133
In contrast, for the aristocratic gentleman, property became crucial in two ways. Firstly, 
property, and usually landed property, would generate a surplus, which meant that the 
gentleman would not, like the vulgar, have to work to earn a livelihood. Neither would he, as 
the vulgar, be dependent on other people in order to survive. The possessions, thereby, 
guaranteed autonomy. This autonomy became the basis of a gentleman's moral integrity, 
which vouched for his credibility. Secondly, it was argued that at a cognitive level, the surplus 
generated by landed possessions gave the gentleman the time and resources needed to develop 
his understanding, both by studying and by expanding his experience of the world, usually
130 S. Shapin, A Social History o f  Truth (1994), p. 192.
131 J. Harrington, 'A  System of Politics' (1977), p. 834 (post-humorously published).
132 J. G. A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History (1985), p. 103; this relationship between property and personality 
is also discussed in idem., Politics, Language and Time (1973); J. Barrell, The Political Theory o f Painting (1986), ch. 
1; S. Copley, 'Introduction' (1984).
133 S. Shapin, A Social History o f Truth (1994), pp. 86ff.
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through travelling.134 Thanks to his property, studies and travels, the aristocratic gentleman, 
then, would be enabled to develop such a generalised rationality which would allow him to 
understand the world, and position himself as a credible spokesman for that world.
It was the chain of associations linking the gentleman to integrity, credibility and 
rationality, which at a political level in the seventeenth century, provided the basis for the 
landowners' almost exclusive ownership of political rights.135 Analogously, it was this chain of 
associations, which turned the aristocratic gentleman into a credible scholar. As Shapin 
concludes: 'Participants [in the field of learning .„1 belonged to a culture that pointed to 
gentlemen as among their society's most reliable truth-tellers, a culture that associated 
gentility, integrity, and credibility/136 The experimental philosopher was first a gentleman and 
then a scholar. These roles had to merge in order for his words to be considered trustworthy as 
knowledge.
Now, from the Restoration to 1800, the social landscape changed quite dramatically 
with the emergence of the middle echelons. As society changed so too did the social com­
position of the learned community, the scholars' social positioning, and their relation to society 
at large.137 Before the Restoration according to Nicholas Hans, more than half of the naturalists 
had been of aristocratic breed.138 During the eighteenth century, this number for natural 
historians dropped to only 5 per cent according to my survey, whereas more than three 
quarters of the naturalists were engaged in one of the professions which came to be associated 
with the middle echelons (see Tab. 1.3).139 To substantiate these figures, and thereby to
134 On education in general, see S. M, Brewer, 'The Design' (1963); J. Barrell, The Politicai Theory o f  Painting (1986), 
esp. eh. 1, and on the importance of the Grand Tour, see C. L, Batten, Pleasurable Instructions (1978); J. Black, V ie  
British and the Grand Tour (1985).
135 ). G. A. Pocock, Politics, Language and Time (1973), esp. ch. 3.
136 S. Shapin, A Social History o f  Truth (1994), p. 241.
137 As also Shapin hints at, ibid., pp. 410-1.
138 N. Hans, New Trends in Education (1951), pp. 33, 34-5.
139 These figures should be compared with the findings of Nicholas Hans in his survey of 680 'scientists' o f all 
denominations who published in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in N. Hans, New Trends in Education 
(1951), pp. 30ff. Hans, searching for social origin of the 'scientists' rather than occupational status, found that in  
the eighteenth century 25% of the 'scientists' belonged to the 'upper dasses' (peers and gentry), 49% were of the 
'middle class' (comprising the same vocational groups as in my survey), and 26% were of the 'lower d ass' 
(farmers, craftsmen, labourers). The difference between these findings and mine might be explained by tw o 
factors. Firstly, in the selection of scholars to use in the sample, Hans has selected 'sdentists' by 'their original 
contributions to the advancement of sdence' (p. 31), whereas my criteria for incorporation has been merely the 
publication of a book on natural history. Now, the 'originality' of a naturalist might be a bit hard to define, b u t 
in Hans's case it appears to have entailed the incorporation of 'sdentists' of relative high'sodai standing, as 
might be indicated by the fact that as many as 79.3% of the total number o f 'sdentists' in Hans's survey, 1662- 
1800, were fellows of the prestigious Royal Sodety, whereas only 34.6% of the naturalists in mine were F.R.S. A s 
is well-known, the Royal Sodety was somewhat biased in their selection of members towards the highest 
echelons of sodety, cf. M. Hunter, 'The Sodai Basis' (1976), pp. 32ff.
Secondly, Hans searched for information on the 'sodai origin' of the 'sdentists,' that is for the 
father's occupation, whereas my figures for the naturalist's own occupation (the figures for the father's 
occupation in my survey are more in tone with Hans', see Tab. 1.1). This has influenced our findings in tw o 
ways; O n one hand, due to the rights of primogeniture, the younger sons of peers and the gentry generally had
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elucidate the sodo-cultural positioning of the natural historians, we have to look more closely 
at the sodal changes which took place after the Restoration, and, at first, at the changed 
definition and conception of the gentleman.
During the long eighteenth century, the notion of the gentleman was to be funda­
mentally altered. In the decades following the Restoration, an additional category of gentlemen 
was added to that of the 'bom,' aristocratic gentleman within the emerging bourgeois sodety: 
The 'breed gentleman/ here described by Daniel Defoe after he had taken note of the /bom/:
On the other hand, the son of a mean person furnish'd from Heaven with an originaU fund of wealth, wit, sense, 
courage, virtue, and good humour, and set apart by a liberal] education for the service of his country; that dis­
tinguishes himself by the greatest and best actions; is made acceptable and agreeable to all men by a life of glory and 
true fame; that hath the natural! beauties of his mind embellish'd and set off with a vast fund of learning and 
acquir'd knowledg [sic]; that has a dear head, a generous heart, a polite behaviour and, in a word, shews himself to 
be an accomlish'd gentleman in every requisite artide, that of birth and blood excepted; I must be allowed to admit 
such a person into the rank of a gentleman [.]140
At first advanced by merchant apologists, especially in the periodical press of Addison, Steele 
and Defoe,141 the notion of 'the breed Gentleman' was soon to be appropriated by those 
'middling sort of people' who came into being as a recognisable echelon in this period. This 
echelon, emerging as an intermediate 'class' between the gentry and aristocracy, on one hand, 
and the labouring poor, and on the other, included people who, as Peter Earle aptly put it, 
'worked but ideally did not get their hands dirty.'142 The vocations where it was possible to do 
that included, in urban areas, commerce and manufacturing of all kinds, independent artisans, 
civil servants, and, as the intellectual fringe of the middle echelon, the learned professions 
(law, clergy, medicine, and teaching), and, in the country side, small farmers and joined 
freeholders. In the eighteenth century, this rather heterogeneous group of people included 
somewhere between twenty and twenty-five per cent of the population.143
to sustain themselves to some extent when they came of age. Many went into one of the learned professions or 
civil offices (see J. Thirsk, 'Younger Sons' (1969); L. Stone and J. C. F. Stone, An Open Elite? (1984), pp. 407ff.). 
This downward movement on the social scale accounts for some o f the discrepancies between our figures. On 
the other hand, those naturalists who were of a lower dass origin, conversely, moved upwards on the sodal 
scale, as also Hans notes, as they generally got an education and became employed in one of the middle 
vocations. N. Hans, New Trends in Education (1951), pp. 35-6.
140 D. Defoe, The Complete English Gentleman (1726), letter XXII, reprinted in S. Copley, Literature (1984), p. 41.
141 On the polite gentleman in the periodical press, see P. Carter, Men and the Emergence o f  Polite Society (2001), pp. 
60ff, and passim.
142 P. Earle, The Mating o f  the English Middle Class (1989), p. 3.
143 As Paul Langford points out, the figures are notoriously difficult to calculate, not least because the exact lim it of 
income at the lower extreme is hard to define, and, moreover, because a large group of families were 
concentrated at the lower margin of the spectra of income; P. Langford, A Polite and Commercial People (1989), 
pp. 61ff. In terms of income, the middling sort of people ranged from people with a personal fortune of a few 
hundred pounds and an annual income of £50, to a very few with fortunes of more than £10.000, The majority 
of the middling sort had an annual income between £50 and £2.000, with the bulk earning from £80 to £150. 
Within the learned professions, from where the majority of naturalists were drawn, in the 1750s the average 
income was between £50 for inferior clergy, £60 for persons professing liberal arts, also £60 for civil officers, and 
£100 for superior clergymen. These figures have to been seen on the background of a female servant earning 
around £2 a year in addition to receiving a room and board, and a day labourer or a journeyman earning
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As Lawrence & Jeanne C. F. Stone have argued, by the emergence of this 'middle class' 
in the post-Restoration period, the previous status hierarchy of, in brief, the (aristocratic) 
gentlemen versus the rest gradually collapsed.144 At the same time, the concept of the 
gentleman was transformed. Imitating their genteel superiors, both in denomination145 and in 
their manners and style of consumption, the people of the middle echelons initiated a process 
of redefinition of the social landscape -  a 'debasement of gentility' as Langford has called it146 -  
by which the close association between property, gentility, understanding, and credibility was, 
in the end, broken.
The bourgeois, or polite, gentleman came to be known rather by his manners than by 
his property or descent: 'The appellation of a gentleman is never to be affixed to a man's 
circumstances, but to his behaviour in them', Richard Steele stressed.147 As it was often 
explicitly underscored in eighteenth-century conduct literature, in contrast to the aristocratic 
gentleman, the polite gentleman was first and foremost a man of the world. True, like the 
aristocratic gentleman of the previous century, he had to assume a humble and modest 
attitude, but also, and just as importantly, he had to be pleasing, witty, and to exert an easiness 
in intercourse and variation in conversation:148 The polite gentleman was essentially a sociable 
creature. Although it was advised that a would-be gentleman should acquaint himself with a 
variety of philosophical, historical, theological, and poetic works,149 a thoroughly literary 
education was not part of his curriculum. On the contrary, the 'gentleman-to-be' was, in fact, 
routinely advised in conduct literature to hide his learning in Polite Society, if he possessed 
any:
between £8 and £30 a year. Even the income of people of the lower middle echelon would be enough to sustain 
a more fashionable lifestyle, with a furnished house or apartment, one or more servants, a coach, a respectable 
wardrobe, books and periodicals etc. The figures are derived from P, H. Lindert and J. G. Williamson, 'Revising 
England's Social Tables' (1982). For an evaluation of the figures in relation to the middling sort of people 
specifically, see P. Earle, The Making o f  the English Middle Class (1989); M. Hunt, The Middling Sort (1996). On the 
learned professions in early modem Britain, see R  O'Day, The Professions (2000); G. Holmes, 'The Professions' 
(1979).
144 L  Stone and J. C. F. Stone, An Open Elite? (1984), pp. 408ff.
145 On changes in denominations during the eighteenth-century, see P. J. Corfield, "Class by Name and Number' 
(1987).
146 P. Langford, A Polite and Commercial People (1989), p. 66.
147 R  Steele quoted in L. Stone and J. C. F. Stone, An Open Elite? (1984), p. 23.
148 E.g. Anonymous, The Polite Philosopher (1760); J. Trusler, Principles o f  Politeness (1784); cf. P. Carter, Men and the 
Emergence o f  Polite Society (2001), ch. 1 and 2.
149 The advice of curriculum given by Edward Thompson to his younger cousin appears to be rather typical in  this 
respect. He was recommended to read Erasmus, Cicero, Justin, Terence, Virgil, Ovid and Horace, some French 
historians like Pere D'Orleans, Cyrus and Telemachque; Don Quixote; 'the History of your own Country', the 
Spectator and the Tatler, as well as 'the Lives of the most eminent men'; of poetry: Dryden, Spencer, Gay, Sw ift 
Pope, Milton; the Bible, as well as sermons of the greatest theologians should be studied, and, finally, natural 
philosophy: 'I would likewise have you apply yourself to the pleasing study of Natural Philosophy, proceeding 
leisurely from the history of meteors, minerals, plants and living creatures, as far as Anatomy'. E. Thompson, 
Sailor's Letters (1766), pp. 160-3; emph. in org.
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The last thing I shall mention, is that of concealing your learning, except upon particular occasions. [...] Pedantry 
proceeds from much reading and little understanding If a man can talk but on one subject, he is also a pedant
upon that subject, let it be what it will, whether on law, arms, books, or any other; bar him his favourite topic, and 
he had not a word to say; in short, a mere courtier, a mere soldier, a mere scholar, a mere any thing, is an insipid 
pedantic character, equally ridiculous amongst men o f sound learning and good breeding, and consequently ought, 
in our behaviour, to be carefully avoided.150
The polite gentleman was a man of the world.
Although in some respects, the gentleman of the eighteenth-century showed a conti­
nuity with the aristocratic gentleman, the polite gentleman was a different creature altogether 
as his very foundation had been redefined. No longer directly defined in terms of property, 
(though certainly also in terms of what money could buy: fashionable clothes, carriages and 
horses, a respectable home etc. did not come cheap151), but primarily in terms of manners, the 
close connection between property, independence and gentility had been broken. "To be 
respectable/ as John Trusler concluded in his Principles o f Politeness, "it is not necessary to live 
in a certain line of life':
A man should give dignity to his situation, and not his situation, to him. Every m an may be considered as the centre 
of a circle; some of a larger, some of a smaller; and in this light, he is of greater or of less importance, according to 
the character he bears. He who has fewest wants, and is most able to live within himself, is not only the happiest, 
but the richest man; and if he does not abound in what the world calls wealth, he does in independency; and it being 
independency only that can make us great, by all means confine your expenses to your fortune, and determine to 
live free from debt.152 153
Not being in debt could now be seen as the mark of a gentleman's independence: The 
'debasement' of the gentleman was complete.
With the new emphasis on manners, polite sociability -  easy, varied, witty, pleasing -  
came to define the core elements of the polite gentleman of the eighteenth-century. With this 
new definition of the gentleman, the relationship between the gentleman and the scholar had 
also been fundamentally altered. We might get a first indication of this by looking into how the 
scholars' learned pursuits were received within Polite Society.
Although the majority of natural historians occupationally and socially belonged to the 
middle echelons, as we saw above, their relation to Polite Society was, at best, precarious. 
Scholars were exposed as narrow-minded pedants in satires such as Jonathan Swift's of the 
ridiculously unpractical and excessively boring learned Laputians in Gulliver's Travels, or in 
Henry Fielding's portray of the equally ridiculous and even harmful Mr. Square and Mr. 
Thwackum in Tom Jones;152 they were ridiculed in pamphlets, plays and poems;154 and made
150 J. Trusler, Principles of Politeness (1784), pp. 114-5, cf. Anonymous, The Polite Philosopher (1760), p. 24.
151 And besides, as Jonathan Swift alias Simon Wagstaff noted in his satirical expose of conduct literature, refining 
ones manners in itself took distinguishing financial means. The Reader, Swift hence stated in introduction, did 
not need to worry that 'the Publication of my Book may, in a long Course of time, prostitute this noble Art to 
mean and vulgar People', as the Art of being Gentle 'requires so much Time, Study, Practice, and Genius' that 
the vulgar never would be able to acquire it. Learning how to be a gentleman or -woman was simply beyond 
their time; S. J. S. Wagstaff, Polite Conversation (1738/1892), pp. 28,30.
152 J. Trusler, Principles o f Politeness (1784), p. 122.
153 J. Swift, Gulliver's Travels (1735/1998); H. Fielding, Tom Jones (1749/1994).
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prime examples of how not to behave in Polite Society in conduct literature, as we saw above.154 55 
The naturalists qua naturalists were not exactly embraced within Polite Society -  with the 
redefinition of the gentleman as a sociable creature, the men of learning became partially 
disassociated from Polite Society.
It was not the scholars' interest in nature in itself that was considered ridiculous or 
impolite. On the contrary. Natural history of a more relaxed variety, and especially botany and 
the more picturesque branches of entomology, became fashionable within Polite Society during 
the eighteenth-century, and especially during its second half, as I mentioned earlier.156 It was 
the way that learned men approached the subject, which was deemed at odds with Polite 
Society, as indicated here by a satirical poet:
[...] turn thee, to admire 
Where Dullness sits in Harlequin's attire:
Mark from her chair Topedo's wonders teem,
And mumbing yawns exemplify the theme.
Here Virtuosi dwell, who strangely wise,
Are leam'd in maggots, and can nick-name flies;
Whose skill defects a mite from mouldy cheese,
Traces his nerves, and even counts is fleas. [...]
All things they prove, and calculations bring,
How many geese are bred in Saturn's ring;
How soon a snipe in Mercury would roast,
And how the sun-beams should prepare the toast.
They'd set the Thames on fire, to dear a doubt.
How many days 'twould take in burning out[.]157
As hinted at here, what did not square well with the maxims of Polite Society was the w ay
naturalists nit-pickingly focused on one obscure topic alone. Doing so, on one hand, the
naturalists violated the crucial demand of variety in Polite Society -  'redundancy' was, as one
author of a book of manners pointed out, always a 'fault' in a polite gentleman.158 On the other
hand, the extensive reading of books, closely associated with the learned man, was identified
as a source of the scholar's bad manners. The scholar might learn a lot about the natural world
from such books, however he would remain absolutely ignorant with regard to the social:
Again, there is another sort of knowledge beyond the power of learning to bestow, and this is to be had by con­
versation. So necessary is this to understanding the characters of men that none are more ignorant of them than 
those learned pedants whose lives have been entirely consumed in colleges and among books; for how ever 
exquisitely human nature may have been described by writers, the true practical system can only be leam t in the 
World.159
154 See for instance Anonymous, An Essay on the Rationality o f Brutes (1752); Anonymous, An Introduction to the A rt 
o f  Lying (1754); cf. W. P. Jones, The Rhetoric o f  Science (1966); J. M. Levine, Dr.Woodward’s Shield (1977).
155 Also cf. P. Carter, M en and the Emergence o f  Polite Society (2001), p. 71.
156 See also K. Thomas, Man and the Natural World (1983), pp. 280ff.; J. Browne, 'Botany in the Boudoiri (1996); D . E. 
Allen, Naturalist in Britain (1994); J. L. Heilbron, 'Domesticating Science' (2000), pp. 1-5.
157 Anonymous, An Historic Epistle (1775), pp. 14-5; notes excluded, emph. in org.
158 Anonymous, The Polite Philosopher (1760), p. 18; cf. pp. 21-4.
159 H. Fielding, Tom Jones (1749/1994), p. 412.
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It was the monotonous pedantry, then, of men who preferred books to the (social) world, 
obscure subjects to pleasing and witty ones, one topic to a variety, which was conceived as 
essentially unbecoming, and if not downright impolite.
It is evident from the recurrent apologetic passages in the zoological literature from this
period that the zoologists were well aware of how their pursuits were received within Polite
Society. In their writings, however, quite a different picture emerged both of their own
endeavours and of Polite Society. Said, for instance, William Brownrigg in a letter to John Ellis:
The Study of Insects, and various other Branches of Natural History have indeed been placed in a very unjust light 
by Steel [sic], Swift, & other late Writs, who took the Liberty to ridicule what they did not understand. But these 
Sciences have withstood all the force of their Baillery, and daily grow into greater repute[.]Ii0
Likewise Benjamin Stillingfleet, in a longer apologetic passage, praised by other natural
historians for raising natural history to honour,160 61 attempted to counter the critique:
1 can scarcely condemn mankind for treating with contempt a virtuoso whom they see employed in poring over a 
moss of an insect day after day, and spending his life in such seemingly unimportant and barren speculations. The 
first and most natural reflections that will arise on this occasion must be to the disadvantage of such pursuits. Yet 
were the whole science of nature laid open to our views, were we admitted to behold the connections and 
dependencies of every thing on every other, and to trace the ceconomy of nature thro' the smaller as well as greater 
parts of this globe, we might perhaps be obliged to own we were mistaken; that the Supreme Architect had 
contrived his works in such a manner, that we cannot properly be said to be unconcerned in any one of them; and 
therefore that studies which seem upon a slight view to be quite useless, may in the end appear to be of no small 
importance to mankind. Nay, were we only to look back into the history of arts and sciences, we must be convinced, 
that we are apt to judge over hastily of things of this nature.162
Some authors, like Thomas Pennant, attempted in some measure to make a place for their 
work within Polite Society, by pleading for the necessity of knowing nature in order to 
appreciate the arts: "an acquaintance with the works of nature is equally necessary to form a 
genuine and correct taste for any of the above mentioned arts' -  painting, sculpture and 
poetry.163
However, most authors, along with Pennant in other places, pointed to broader 
contexts of the utility of their works in order to justify their endeavours. Hence, Pennant 
underscored that 'To exalt our veneration towards the Almighty, is the principal end of this 
sublime science [zoology]; and the next to that, the various benefits resulting from it to human 
society deserve our serious consideration.'164 From the perspective of Polite Society what 
seemed to be looked pedantry were by the naturalists turned into services for God and 
mankind.
We may understand these differing conceptualisations of the men of learning and their 
pursuits as an indication of a partial disassoriation of the learned from Polite Society. By the
160 W. Brownrigg to J. Ellis, 15 June 1753, Linnean Society, London, Ellis Corn, vol. 1.46.
161 See, for instance, T. Pennant, British Zoology (1768-77), vol. IV, pp. iv-vi.
162 B. Stillingfleet, Miscellaneous Tracts (1762), pp. vii-viii.
163 T. Pennant, British Zoology (1768-77), vol. I, p. ix; note excluded, cf. pp. vii-ix.
164 Ibid., vol. L p. vi.
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eighteenth century, the naturalist was no longer self-evidently encapsulated by the gentleman, 
and I shall later in this study suggest that we might, in fact, see in this period the emergence of 
an "intelligentsia/ who vis-à-vis Polite Society, explicitly defined their ability to position 
themselves as spokesmen for reality just as much in terms of an exclusive and excluding 
learning, as in terms of gentlemanly qualities.165
But the disassodation was only partial. On one hand, norms and forms of Polite Soriety 
did, as I shall later attempt to show, decisively helped to frame zoology. On the other hand, at 
a basic sodological level, the category of zoologists would also be drcumscribed by Polite 
Soriety. We might get an indication of this if we take a look at the categories of people who 
were denied access to act as zoologists, and at the reasons for their exclusion.
As appears from my survey no one from the lower echelons published books on 
natural history subjects (see Tab. 1.3), and, furthermore, all of the naturalists in the survey were 
males.166 On one hand (as I shall return to in much more detail in Chapter 6), women were 
unqualified to act as natural historians because they would always be dependent on at least a 
father or a husband and, hence, would be potentially untrustworthy since they were thus not 
free to tell the truth. Moreover, their nature would also in general impede them from becoming 
natural historians because their naturally weak and soft constitution, to put it bluntly here, 
made them more fit for child rearing and the pursuits of the private sphere than for learned 
endeavours.167 On the other hand, the "vulgar" were exduded from the field of learning in the 
eighteenth-century for same reasons that they had been so excluded in the seventeenth- 
century. In part this was because, like the women, they were deemed potentially 
untrustworthy because also the vulgar would always be dependent on someone else, usually 
their superiors, in order to survive. In part, because their mechanical work would leave them 
neither time, nor any opportunity to develop their rational faculties and understanding of the 
world, as John Locke explained:
165 This argument closely parallels Norbert Elias' analysis of the emergence o f a German intelligentsia in the sam e 
period. N. Elias, The Civilising Process (2000), esp. p. 24. For a congenial argument within a British context, 
although the focus is somewhat different, see also P. Harrison, 'Curiosity, Forbidden Knowledge' (2001), esp. 
pp. 288-9.
166 There were some very few women who made it into the field of zoology. The only female writer, who w as 
regularly referred to, was the Dutch Maria Sibylla Merian, who published a book after a tour to Surinam w hich 
mainly became known for its description of a certain metamorphosing frog to which I shall later return. M. S. 
Merian, Metamorphosis Insectorum (1705). Within a British context, Sarah Stone was without doubt the m ost 
prominent, and virtually the only woman in zoology for most of the eighteenth century, though she was not 
known as a writer, but as an illustrator. She made illustrations for such books as J. White, Journal o f  a  Voyage to 
New South Wales (1790); G. Shaw, Museum Leveriani explicatio (1792); T. Pennant, The View o f  Hindoostan (1798- 
1800). For an introduction to Merian, see T. Rice, Voyages (2000), ch. 3; and for a study of Stone and her 
contributions to natural history, see C. E. Jackson, Sarah Stone (1998). Towards the very end of the eighteenth 
century, women also began to write on natural history subjects, mainly in more popular accounts addressed to 
young readers. On this, see B. T. Gates and A. B. Shteir, 'Introduction' (1997), pp. 6ff.
167 Cf. L. Jordanova, 'Natural Facts' (1980); R. Porter, Enlightenment (2000), pp. 334ff.
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T is  not to be expected, that a man, who drudges on, all his life, in a laborious trade, should be more knowing in the 
variety of things done in the world, than a pack-horse, who is driven constantly forwards and backwards, in a 
narrow lane, and dirty road, only to market, should be skilled in the geography of the country.16®
As indicated here, the ability to understand and one's social position were conceived to be
closely related. Adam Smith elucidated the relation in detail:
[T]he understanding of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The man 
whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the effects are perhaps always the same, 
or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanding or to exercise his invention in finding out 
expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and 
generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become. The torpor of his mind 
renders him not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any 
generous, noble, or tender sentiment, and consequently of forming any just judgement concerning many even of the 
ordinary duties of private life.168 69
As here becomes evident, epistemological abilities hinged on sociological position, because it 
was one's place in society which in the first place made it possible to either develop or 
impeded a development of the ability to understand the world.170
It is within this context of a sociologically motivated epistemology -  which will be 
explored further throughout this thesis -  that we have to understand Polite Society's cir­
cumscription of the category of zoologists. Although the polite gentleman did not define the 
naturalist, it was still in practice only the gentleman who, together with his aristocratic 
superiors, possessed the sodo-epistemological potential of becoming a naturalist. Although it 
also took 'learning' to be accepted and trusted as a naturalist, as a credible spokesman for 
nature, being a polite gentlemen was a necessary sodo-epistemological point of departure.
In sum, the distinction between learning and 'sodety* was blurred. The zoological 
books were inscribed in intertextual relations which ramified in many different directions; the 
distinction between a sperialised and a popular audience was only vaguely defined; the 
zoological endeavour was fashionable, yet, particularly in its more spedalised form, it did not 
form an easy part of Polite Sodety; and the zoologist himself was, on one hand, establishing 
himself as a man of exclusive learning and thereby becoming visible as a figure in his own 
right, yet he was, on the other hand, sodo-epistemologically also dosely related to the polite 
gentleman of Polite Sodety.
This blurred relationship between the zoological endeavour and 'society', as we will 
see in the following chapters, derisively marked the concrete practices and cultural 
constellations of assumptions implicated in the zoological endeavour. On one hand, what 
might be seen as more exclusive learned modes of approaching animals were developed, 
whereby the differences between learning and Polite Sodety were substantiated. On the other 
hand, the zoologists also drew on institutionalised practices and cultural assumptions
168 J. Locke, Essay (1706/1997), pp. 623-4/IV,xx,2.
169 A. Smith, The Wealth o f Nations (1776A999), vol. n, pp. 368-9.
170 Cf. J. Barrell, The Political Theory o f Painting (1986), ch. 1.
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entertained within Polite Society more generally. Unfolding at the margins of Polite Society, 
the zoological endeavour of the eighteenth century was neither entirely distinguished from, 
nor wholly encapsulated by Polite Society; it remained as much defined from within, as from 
without.
T h e s is  in O utlin e
I shall return to the question of the relationship between the zoological endeavour and society 
at large in explicit terms in the final chapter. Until then, however, my point of departure will 
be taken in the zoological endeavour itself, although the positioning of the endeavour at the 
margins of Polite Society means that throughout the thesis we will have to take frequent 
detours into that intertextual and 'intersodal' universe which the zoological endeavour, both at 
the level of practices and the level of cultural assumptions, was intimately related to.
As the objective of this thesis is not only to eluddate the twin histories of zoology and 
zoologists respectively, but also to examine how these two histories conditioned each other, in 
each of the remaining chapters I shall oscillate between the two histories, sometimes paying 
more attention to one, sometimes to the other in my analyses. Throughout I attempt to show 
how and in what way epistemology and the positioning of the zoologists had implications for 
the zoological knowledge produced, and vice versa.
The overall framework for my analysis of the two histories will, in general outline, be 
structured by the movement of animals from the field to their incorporation into zoological 
dassificatory schemes. In Part I, I enquire into the transformation of animals into objects of 
knowledge. I analyse how the zoologists created and approached a world of matter, and how 
that matter was turned into zoologically valid facts -  how, in short, an empirical base for the 
study of zoology was established. In Chapter 2, I start with a more general analysis of the 
nature of eighteenth-century natural history, its demarcation from Renaissance studies, and 
with a discussion of some of its core elements -  the notion of 'history/ 'nature/ 'matter/ and 
'facts/ the relation between nature and man, and the ideas about man, and learned men in 
particular, which were preconditioned in the contemporary idea of studying natural history. In 
the following two chapters, I turn to an analysis of the practical modes of introducing animals 
into discourse as learned facts. In Chapter 3, the focus will be on modes of collecting, on the 
social division of labour in this process, in which not only zoologists, but also men and women 
of all echelons of society were engaged, and on the zoologists' distinguished techniques of 
observing and describing animals. In Chapter 4, the attention will be directed towards the 
socio-spatial siting of observing and describing animals -  although at times, animals would be 
observed in the bosom of nature, the zoologist could just as well encounter them in letters,
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private cabinets, public museums, coffee-houses, or at market places. The 'field' was multi- 
sited, and the meanings inscribed on the animals in these fields differed. In these two chapters, 
by examining how the zoologists both in social space and through observational and textual 
means appropriated the animals, I do, on one hand, discuss how animals were turned into 
zoological objects. Moreover, focusing in this analysis on how the zoologists distinguished 
their approach to animals from that taken by other people, whom they encountered in their 
endeavour, I attempt, on the other hand, also to encircle the zoologists' special epistemological 
space of manoeuvring in this process.
In Part II, I turn to the zoologists' quest for transcendental order in their construction of 
taxonomic systems. In Chapter 5, the history of taxonomy -  from Plato and Aristotle through 
Renaissance practices and to Carl von Linne's all-embradng Systema Naturae -  is sketched out 
as a background to an understanding of the British eighteenth-century endeavour. In contrast 
to earlier naturalists, who eruditely had used logic as a handmaid for classification, the 
eighteenth-century British zoologists insisted on an empiricistic method in constructing 
taxonomic systems, and I discuss their exegetical theories of natural systems, as well as its 
epistemological implications. In Chapters 6 and 7 ,1 move on to the construction of taxonomies 
in practice. In Chapter 6, the focus will be on species -  the most important category in the 
British zoologists' taxonomic systems. I trace the steps the zoologists took, not always in 
perfect agreement with their exegetical theories, in creating such immutable, essentially 
defined species, which Darwin found so savage, and I explore the ideas regarding a perfectly 
harmonious and unchanging universe, which informed this formation of species. In Chapter 7, 
I turn to the creation of the entire taxonomic system. In exegetical principle that system -  its 
categories, the taxa, and the relation between them -  should, like God's nature, be simple, and 
unambiguously defined. In practice, however, the British zoologists found it humanly 
impossible to reconstruct God's sublime system, and instead praised 'vagueness' and even 
'inaccuracy' in man-made taxonomic systems. Inquiring into both the structure of the systems 
actually made, and the zoologists' discussions of the differences between their systems and 
Nature's, allow me both to analyse the product of the zoological endeavour, and to consider 
the zoologists', professedly, all too 'human' epistemological space of manoeuvring in creating 
these systems.
Throughout these six chapters, then, I oscillate between analysing the form and the 
content of zoology, and analysing the positioning of the zoologists; I oscillate, in other words, 
between analysing world-fashioning and self-fashioning, and, in both cases, I attempt to 
encircle the point of view from where it became meaningful to fashion self and world in the 
ways in which it was done. In the final chapter, I consider the relationship between zoologists 
and zoology, man and nature, itself. I begin with a discussion of man's place in zoology, and
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turn to zoology's place in contemporary auto-sodology, so to say, in an analysis of the 
interchanges between natural historical and social classification. This, in turn, brings me to a 
more elaborate discussion of the zoologists' place in contemporary society, and, more 
generally, to the ideas of the zoologists' place in the universe, and its implications for the 
production of zoological knowledge, from the natives' as well as from the ethnographer's point 
of view. In the final section an attempt is made to close this ethnographic history of the twin 
histories, by discussing how natural history became transformed into biology in the first half of 
the nineteenth-century, in the process of which the eighteenth-century zoologists' conceptions 
of nature, of animals and spedes, became almost incomprehensibly strange.
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The Matter of Facts
Chapter 2
Natural History beneath the Angels
By the eighteenth century, the concept of "Natural History" had come to figure prominently in 
books dealing with zoological topics: The vast majority of zoological books included "natural 
history" in their title as they presented their studies as a natural history "... of Quadrupeds, "... 
of B irds',"... of English Insects," or of the natural world of geographical locations like Carolina, 
Guiana or Selbome. In the books, the description of animals would be called natural histories 
as well: a natural history"... of the common cow ,""... of the pig-tailed monkey,""... of the crested 
black vulture." Natural history at once defined the entire field of study as well as the specific 
accounts of animals. In the sense of a universally employed and virtually uncontested concept, 
natural history provided an overall framework for the study of animals during the long 
eighteenth century. To understand the implications of this framing for the zoological 
endeavour, we must examine the foundations of natural history itself.
The concept of natural history, and more commonly 'history' -  or its equivalent in 
Greek or Latin -  were actually not new to eighteenth-century studies of the natural world, 
although by the end of the seventeenth-century they reached an unprecedented paramountcy. 
These terms had been in use since ancient times -  part of Aristotle's famous work on zoology, 
for instance, was called History o f Animals; Pliny the elder's encyclopaedic work on astronomy, 
geography, minerals, flora and fauna was titled Naturalis Historia; in the Renaissance, Ulysses 
Aldrovandi commenced a Historia naturalis in 1599, and Ferrante Imperato wrote a book 
entitled Dell'historia naturale (1599). The first reported use of "natural history' in English dates 
from 1567 in J. Maplet's A Greene Forest or a natural Historic, wherein may bee seene the most 
ufferaigne [sic] Vertues in all the whole kinde o f Stones and M ettals; o f Brute Beastes, Fowles, Fishes.1
1 Cf. Oxford Dictionary (1989).
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Although the term itself had been in use in Europe some thousands years, its meaning 
had radically changed as had the kind of study which it designated. To focus only, on the last of 
these changes, which is of more immediate importance to us here,2 during the seventeenth 
century, the Renaissance modes of studying nature were fundamentally transformed, paving 
the way for the zoological studies of the eighteenth century (during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, the concept of natural history would become obsolete as the study of 
nature was reconstructed as biology, as we will see in the last chapter). It is difficult, if not to 
say impossible, to determine a specific date for the last reconstruction of natural history. 
Francis Bacon, lawyer and Lord Chancellor to Charles I, has often received the credit for almost 
single-handily reforming natural history in the beginning of the seventeenth-century with his 
collection of works in The Great Restauration (1620). The Lord Chancellor himself was, at any 
rate, in no doubt as to the groundbreaking novelty of his endeavour. Positioning himself as a 
modem Aristotle by naming his central work on natural history the New Organum, in imitation 
of the ancient sage's work, and, indeed, by choosing The Great Instauration, as the collective title 
for his reforming works, Bacon signalled with the very choice of titles his books what he made 
explicit within them: that, in his humble opinion, his approach constituted 'a new birth of 
science'.3 Quite a few of Bacon's British descendants of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries tended to agree with him, though they did not necessarily agree with every one of his 
creeds.4 However, even Bacon had kindred spirits preceding him,*5 and, for their part, quite a 
number of his contemporaries and descendants in the seventeenth century tended to continue 
the Renaissance tradition of investigation. For the better part of the seventeenth century, the 
debate between what has come to be known as the 'ancients' and the 'modems' raged in 
Britain, and it was not until after the Restoration that something resembling a general 
settlement of approach had been reached within natural historian circles.6
2 On ancient and especially Aristotelian natural history, see D. Hull, 'The Effect of Essentialism on Taxonomy ' 
(1965); G. E. R. Lloyd, 'The Development of Aristotle's theory* (1961); D, M. Balme, 'Aristotle and the 
Beginnings of Zoology* (1970); and for a very detailed account which, in addition, directly addresses the 
question of the difference between ancient and eighteenth-century natural history, see P. Pellegrin, Aristotle's 
Classification (1986). I shall return to Aristotle's zoological corpus in Ch. 5. For other general introductions to the 
emergence and consolidation of natural history during the seventeenth and eighteenth century, see J. Roger, 
'The Living World' (1980); P. R. Sloan, 'Natural History* (1990).
3 F, Bacon, New Organon (1620/1962), p. 94/I.xcvii.
4 See for instance J. Glanvill, Essays (1676), III, p, 23; A. Cowley, 'To the Royal Society* (1722), (unpaged); T. Sprat,
The History of the Royal Society (1667/1722), p. 36.
5 In The Death o f Nature (1980), pp. 164ff., C. Merchant points to some of the predecessors to Bacon's theories, and 
indicates that his merits lie more in his formulation of a 'total program' for natural history, than in him singled- 
handily inventing all of the ideas of this program.
6 See H. Baron, 'The Querelle' (1959), for an outline of the debate between the ancients and the modems 
principally in the seventeenth century; J. M. Levine, 'Andents and Modems' (1981-82), for a discussion of its 
ramifications in the eighteenth century, mainly within the fields of literature and av il history; and S. Shapin 
and S. Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985), for a discussion of some of the rival conceptions to this of the 
'new  philosophy* during the seventeenth century.
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During the seventeenth century, in the often vigorous debates over what natural 
history was and how it ought to be pursued, the foundations of natural history were 
oftentimes made unusually explicit. In often outspoken opposition to Renaissance philosophy, 
the scholars discussed the limits of natural history, the correct definition of a fact, the notion of 
nature, the proper procedures of study, and the appropriate positioning of the scholar. 
Through these exegetical discussions and a simultaneous emergence of a new practical 
approach to nature, the foundations of a new kind of natural history was laid, which made the 
zoological studies of the eighteenth century possible, as I shall argue. Although on a minor 
scale, significant changes were, however, also to take place around the turn of the century, not 
least, as Lorraine Daston has highlighted,7 with regard to the conception of facts and the 
proper means of studying them. A  long period of transition preceded the virtually uncontested 
acceptance of natural history in the long eighteenth century as the framework for the study of 
animals.8
While the seventeenth-century scholars would often be outspoken in their discussions 
of what natural history was and how it ought to be pursued, the eighteenth-century zoologists 
mostly remained silent on the point: They just carried it out. In contemporary dictionaries as 
well as in philosophical works of a more general nature we find, however, the concept defined 
in broad terms, and here we might get a first indication of what natural history in the 
eighteenth century was all about. In broad terms, natural history was subsumed under the 
category of 'history/ and distinguished from both 'philosophy' and 'art.' Hence, mapping the 
fields of knowledge, Sir William Jones observed that
Human knowledge has been elegantly analysed according to the three great faculties of the mind, memory, reason, 
and imagination, which we constantly find employed in arranging and retaining, comparing and distinguishing, 
combining and diversifying, the ideas, which we receive through our senses, or acquire by reflection; hence the 
three main branches of learning are history, science, and a rt  the first comprehends either an account of natural 
productions, or the genuine records of empires and states; the second embraces the whole circle of pure and m ixed 
mathematics, together with ethicks and law, as far as they depend on the reasoning faculty; and the third includes 
all the beauties of imagery and the charms of invention, displayed in modulated language, or represented by colour, 
figure, or sound.9
So, as Jones explained elsewhere, 'science' or 'philosophy' dealt with 'abstract theorems/ 
whereas 'history/ including both civil and natural history, dealt with 'mere facts':10 'in all 
branches of knowledge, we are only historians, when we announce facts, and philosophers, 
only when we reason on them'.11
7 L. Daston, 'The Cold Light of Facts' (1997).
8 Although the designation 'natural history' had existed prior to the period under consideration here, I shall in  
the following for the sake of darity, employ it exdusively in reference to the seventeenth and eighteenth- 
century type of natural history.
9 S. W. Jones, 'A  Discourse' (1784/1993), p. 6; emph. in org.
10 Idem., 'The Tenth Aniversary Discourse' (1793/1993), p. 207.
11 Ibid., p .226.
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Likewise Ephraim Chambers in his Cyclopaedia: or, an Universal Dictionary o f Arts and 
Sciences defined 'history' as 'a recital, or description of things as they are or have been; in a 
continued, orderly narration of the principal facts and circumstances there of.' By extension, 
'Natural history' was 'a  description of natural bodies; whether terrestrial, as animals, 
vegetables, fossils, fire, water, air, meteors, &c. or celestial, as the stars, planets, comets, &c.',12 
as these natural bodies either 'appear [...] spontaneously' to 'our senses/ or 'with the 
assistance of art, as in anatomy, chymestry, medicine; agriculture &c.'13 While the 'natural' in 
'natural history' defined the subject matter, then, 'history' defined the method of study and 
presentation.
These rather conventional definitions of natural history as, with Samuel Johnson's 
concise definition: 'The knowledge of facts and events',14 of course, tell us something about this 
field of study: That it was concerned with occurrences in nature that either could be 
'spontaneously' observed or brought about through experiments, as Chambers stated;15 that it 
was delimited by what could be sensed, and distinguished from what could only be discovered 
through reasoning or invented through imagination; and that the perceptible occurrences 
could somehow be ordered within a literary presentation. However, in this definition of 
natural history just as much was left out, or taken for granted: What was a 'natural body,' for 
instance? or, a 'fact'? What defined the limits of what 'are or have been'? that is, what defined 
'nature'? What defined sensation? What kind of man was it that was capable of sensing natural 
bodies in such a way that they became facts? and what kind of literary presentation did 
'history' entail?
I shall return to the question of literary presentation and the methodology of history in 
later chapters. In the present chapter I mainly attempt to unravel the 'nature' of natural history. 
In so doing, I shall start with giving a very brief sketch of Renaissance studies of nature. While 
it will be difficult to do justice to Renaissance scholarship in such a short analysis, it is hoped 
that it here can serve as an outline of the historical background of natural history, and, hence, 
to highlight both points of continuity and change between the Renaissance and the 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuries studies of nature. Turning to the natural history of the 
long eighteenth century, I shall be concerned with what can be seen as its two main axes. 
Firstly, its ontology, which implied a new definition of nature as material and which in turn, as 
possibly its most important implication for natural history, made the emergence of 'facts' 
possible. Secondly, its epistemology, which outlined a new positioning of man vis-à-vis such a 
material nature, and which in turn, preconditioned a new anthropology. In both cases, I shall
12 E. Chambers, Cyclopaedia (1741), voi, I, HISTORY (unpaged); note exduded, emph. in org.
13 Ibid., voi. I, p. hi.
14 S. Johnson, Dictionary (1755), HISTORY (unpaged).
15 E. Chambers, Cyclopaedia (1741), voi. I, p. hi.
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in this chapter only focus on how the natural world was approached and conceptualised at the 
empirical level within natural history -  the taxonomic part of natural history, the transcending 
of matter and building of systems, will be dealt with in Part II.
Before I start, a brief theoretical note on the demarcation of natural history in time is 
necessary. As should be evident from the remarks above, I do not find it legitimate to 
distinguish natural history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries from Renaissance 
natural philosophy so sharply as to describe them as two discontinuous paradigms or 
epistemes (and neither, as I shall argue in Chapter 8, is it possible to view nineteenth-century 
biology as entirely disconnected from eighteenth-century natural history) as, for instance, 
Michel Foucault has done.16 As I shall attempt to show in the following, despite all the 
transformations, the prolonged period of transition and the continuities on some levels were so 
significant that a theory of sudden disruptions cannot be sustained. On the other hand -  and 
partly for reasons outlined in Chapter 1 -  neither do I find it possible to explain the changes 
taking place within a historic-evolutionary framework. Despite continuities, the differences 
between Renaissance philosophy and eighteenth-century natural history were too extensive for 
the two traditions to be viewed simply as stages in a continuous development of the same kind 
of zoology. I would suggest that in order to account for the temporal demarcation of natural 
history we have, in a sense, to place ourselves in between these two positions, establishing a 
position from where it becomes possible both to accept that a statement, a practice, an event 
always follows and builds on previous statements, practices, and events, but that the patterns 
of practices and the cultural space of assumptions may also change and become fundamentally 
altered.
Returning to the cultural-structural perspective, we might see historical periods as 
closely connected to the cultural order. On one hand, the cultural order helps to integrate 
disparate events taking place during a period of time, by giving a relatively coherent kind of 
meaning to them. In this sense 'history is', as Sahlins says, 'culturally ordered'.17 On the other 
hand, as Sahlins also stresses, the cultural order is also always put at risk in practice. Nature 
under no obligation to 'conform to the categories by which certain people perceive them',18 and 
this may lead to redefinitions of some categories, and their mutual relationships. Moreover, 
despite the censoring contexts, categories can be related to each other in entirely new ways in 
practice, because culture is not a 'mental prison,' not a consistently structured whole 
determining practice, but an octopoid constellation of assumptions which gives meaning to 
practices and censures it, but which is much too complex to imprison it. Through new modes 
of categorisation, categories will gain new meaning, and this, in turn, ultimately, opens up the
16 M. Foucault, The Order o f  Things (1970).
17 M. Sahlins, Island o f History (1985), p. vii; cf. K. Hastrup, Nature and Policy (1990), p. 5.
18 M. Sahlins, Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities (1981), p. 67.
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possibility of a fundamental transformation of the cultural order.19 The succession of events, 
then, cannot be understood without reference to a cultural order; but neither can the cultural 
order and its possible transformation be understood without reference to the succession of 
events. 'History is culturally ordered/ but likewise, 'cultural schemes' are 'historically 
ordered'.20 Disruptions are bom of that, which both at an empirical and at a cultural level of 
implications went ahead of them, and in that sense, at least, they entail continuity.21
To the extent that the cultural order is not a consistently integrated whole, the trans­
formation of a field in time cannot a priori be assumed to rearrange the entire repertoire of 
practices, institutions, concepts, theories, and structural relationships in toto and at the same 
time. Rather, different domains can change in different tempi, though the transformation of 
some domains will, obviously, imply transformations of others.22
From this perspective, the demarcation of a field in time can never be exact or definite, 
A 'period' (such as 'the Renaissance/ 'the eighteenth century/ 'the nineteenth century/ etc.) 
rather becomes a heuristic, a shorthand for such a dispersion of a cultural order over time, 
which gives relatively coherent meaning to practices and hence integrates these practices in a 
temporal space, but which at the same time is fundamentally blurred at its ends.
However, in demarcating a period in time the ethnographer is not left entirely on her 
own. The natives are also active in defining periods. When they contrast their way of doing 
things with what went before them they are engaged in demarcating periods, and thereby they 
become active in instituting breaks, and in making such breaks meaningful from their point of 
view.23 It is with the seventeenth and eighteenth-centuries natural historians' characterisation 
of Renaissance philosophy I shall begin my inquiry into natural history and its prehistory -  it 
is, after all, their point of view I am concerned with in this study.
19 More fundamentally, what causes such changes in the modes of categorisation -  whether they are political, 
economic, sodal, or cultural factors, a production of inconsistencies within the categorial systems themselves or 
a confrontation with new phenomena in the natural world, or a combination of all -  is a question I shall not 
attempt to solve here. For the inquiry into the foundations of eighteenth-century natural history, it suffices to 
trace the changes, which occurred solely at a conceptual level, and to investigate their impact for the study and 
understanding of natural history in the eighteenth century. For a discussion of how change may be approached 
and understood from an anthropological point of view, see K. Hastrup, Nature and Policy (1990).
20 M. Sahlins, Island o f History (1985), p. vii.
21 This also implies that I, as others before me, do not find it convenient to talk about a 'scientific revolution' 
taking place in the seventeenth century. See, for instance, S. Shapin, The Scientific Revolution (1996), esp. ch. 1. 
For a discussion of the history of the concept o f scientific revolutions, see B. I. Cohen, 'The Eighteenth-Century 
Origins' (1976).
22 K. Hastrup has made an analogous argument for general historical changes: 'The general point is that history 
contains several levels of dynamism, and that the relative speed by which history unfolds itself at these levels 
varies from one culture to another and from one period to the n ext' K. Hastrup, Nature and Policy (1990), p. 16. 
Also M. Foucault, in fart, makes an analogous argument for the transformation of epistemic formations in his 
theoretical exposition of the archaeology of knowledge. However, in his empirical analysis, inversely, he tends 
to leave the question of transformations unanalysed. M. Foucault, Archaeology o f  Knowledge (1972), p. 175.
23 Cf. K. Hastrup, Nature and Policy (1990), p, 35.
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Renaissance  Labyr int hs
Repeatedly, the zoologists of the eighteenth century returned to the work of their Renaissance 
predecessors. In the descriptions of animals, the major zoologists of the Renaissance -  such as 
Ulysses Aldrovandi, Conrad Gesner and Pierre Belon -  often figured in the citations. In the 
introductions to the zoological works, however, the Renaissance scholars most often provided 
counter-images to the eighteenth-century zoologists' enterprise. On occasion, the critique could 
be merciless. For instance R. Brookes, in his New and Accurate System o f Natural History, 
described the work of one of the most prominent Renaissance scholars, the Bolognese professor 
Aldrovandi, as 'insupportable tedious and disgusting, filled with unnecessary quotations and 
unimportant digressions'.24 Above anything else, in their critical portrays of their predecessors' 
works, the seventeenth and eighteenth-century scholars delimited and outlined the virtues of 
their kind of natural history. Hence, contrasting contemporary scholars to those of the 
Renaissance, Thomas Sprat underscored how they in contrast to their forbearers had attempted 
to make 'faithful Records of all the Works of Nature, or A rt/ by
separating] the Knowledge of Nature, from the Colours o f Rhetorick, the Devices of Fancy, or the delightful Deceit of 
Fables. They have labour'd to inlarge [sic] it, from being confin'd to the Custody of a few, or from Servitude to 
private Interests. They have striven to preserve it from being over-press'd by a confus'd Hap of vain and useless 
Particulars; or from being straightened and bound too much up by general Doctrines. [...J They have attempted, to 
free it from the Artifice, and Humours, and Passions of Sects; to render it an Instrument, whereby Mankind may 
obtain a Dominion over Things, and not only over one another's Judgments: And lastly, they have begun to establish 
these Reformations in Philosophy, not so much, by any solemnity of Laws, or Ostentation of Ceremonies, as by solid 
Practice and Examples; not by a glorious Pomp o f Words; but by the silent, effectual, and unanswerable Arguments 
of real Productions.25
In this sketch, Sprat highlights succinctly the three main points of disquiet generally voiced in 
the new philosophers' reviews of Renaissance scholarship. Firstly, the Renaissance manner of 
cloaking every fact in endless references to texts, and thereby, according to another author, 
leading the mind into 'the pleasant Labyrinths of ever-fresh Discourse', instead of restricting 
themselves to the 'natural and living Face' of nature herself.26 Secondly, the Renaissance 
scholars' tendency to hide their knowledge from the public were targeted -  their manner of 
closing their museums to everybody other than a distinguished few, publishing their findings 
in expensive books, and concealing them altogether from the majority by letting them only 
circulate in manuscripts. Finally, the inclination to tie the making of knowledge to the interests 
of 'sects' were criticised since this was conceived only to lead to a distortion of knowledge by 
private interests, and to endless disputes. These three points -  putting texts before things, 
hiding knowledge from the public, and shadowing knowledge by private interests -  became 
open to such criticism during the seventeenth-century reformation of the studies of nature,
24 R. Brookes, A New and Accurate System (1763-72), vol. I, p. x.
25 T. Sprat, The History o /  the Royal Society (1667/1722), p . 62, emph. in org.
26 A. Cowley, 'To the Royal Society' (1722), unpaged.
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because they in unison were perceived to corrupt the relationship between knowledge and its 
true and only concern, nature herself. Nature, it was argued, could not be understood through 
the study of books or through the help of private interests. She could only be comprehended 
through a careful study of her own productions:
The Illustrious Lord Bacon hath noted this as the chief cause of the unprofitableness of the former Methods o f 
Knowledge, viz. That they were but the Exercises of the Mind, making Conclusions, and spinning out Notions from its 
own native Store; from which way of proceeding noting but Dispute and Air could be expected. (...] Whereas the 
Knowledge, from which any thing is to be hoped, must be laid in Sense, and raised not only from some few of its 
ordinary Information; but Instances must be aggregated, compared, critically inspected, and examined; singly, and in 
consortP
Although this picture of Renaissance scholarship does not say so much about thé Renaissance 
study of nature, it does tell us quite a lot about the conception of knowledge in our period. The 
new idea of a knowledge 'from which any thing is to be hoped7 as unconditionally based on 
the experience of nature, and completely separated from private interests or dubious theories, 
was founded on a new way of distinguishing between experience and theory, on, it could be 
said, a new distinction between epistemology and ontology. To be able to grasp the emergence 
of this distinction in the seventeenth-century better, I shall in the following take my cue from 
Sprat and his contemporaries' review of Renaissance scholarship, and, from the perspective of 
the historian, take a closer look at what can be said to have characterised Renaissance studies 
of nature.27 8
Renaissance Simples
The idea that natural history should be based on a study of nature was not an invention of the 
seventeenth century. In the Renaissance, the scholastic slogan, nihil in intellectu quod non prius 
in sensu, 'nothing is in the mind which has not first been in the senses/ had been pro'claimed, 
and, in practice, the Renaissance scholars had far from only been occupied with books, 
although they certainly also were preoccupied with them. Renaissance philosophers, such 
Aldrovandi and the Jesuit scholar Athanasius Kircher, accumulated enormous and highly 
praised collections of nature's 'simples,' as they were called -  dried plants, stuffed or skinned
27 J. Glanvill, Essays (1676), HL p. 23, emph. in org.
28 Taking my cue from these authors, and, in addition, focusing only on those parts of Renaissance scholarship 
w hich had consequences -  regardless of whether they are defined in terms of continuity, change or 
reconfiguration -  for eighteenth-century natural history, and, furthermore, doing so in a highly summary 
fashion, also means that I shall leave out many trains of Renaissance thought. Some of these, such a 'nominalist' 
theories of the world as made up of nothing but individuals, were in stark contrast to those outlined in the 
following. For a fuller treatment of Renaissance philosophy, see, esp., L. Daston and K. Park, Wonders and the 
Order o f  Nature (1998); P. Findlen, Possessing Nature (1994); A. Haaning, Naturens lys (1998). I have drawn 
heavily on the work of these four authors in the following sketch of Renaissance philosophy.
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animals, minerals etc. etc.29 Some of the Renaissance naturalists went into the field themselves 
to 'fare esperienza/ as it was called in Italy, in order to observe and collect, and, in the words of 
Erasmus, to hear nature 'speak[...J to us everywhere and teach[...] the observant man many 
things if she finds him attentive and receptive'.30 At the same time, botanical gardens were 
established, first in Pisa in 1543, and quickly spreading out over most of Europe as a 
'laboratory of nature'.31 Experience, then, also had a central role to play in the Renaissance 
study of nature. But the conception of experience, of that nature which was the object of 
experience, and of the experiencing subject differed from the eighteenth-century conception.
In the Renaissance, those 'facts/ which were to form the fundamental building blocks 
of eighteenth-century natural history, did not exist. The word had not been introduced into 
common language,32 and, more importantly, the definitive qualities, which were to characterise 
the 'facts' of natural history, had not yet been introduced into learned discourse. In the place of 
facts, the Renaissance scholars can be said to have had the 'simples.' But their attributes 
differed on fundamental points from those latter accorded facts.
In a basic sense, the simples were not simply simples. Different kinds of simples existed 
which could be used for different purposes in different explanatory contexts. Firstly, there 
were the extraordinary simples, such as a four-legged dragon found in the countryside near 
Bologna in 1572, or a locust with the words IRA DEI written upon its wings, which was 
discovered during the plague of 1542. On one hand, such extraordinary natural productions 
could be read as portents within a preternatural context. Hence, they could be read not only as 
signs of God's existence, but also of his mercy or, more usually, his anger in relation to specific 
groups of people. The locust, for instance, was taken as a certain sign of 'divine wrath'.33 On 
the other hand, some extraordinary simples also possessed healing properties, and would, 
hence, be suitable for materia medica, such as the skin of a viper taken in April, or powdered 
gems.34 The extraordinary simples, the wonders of creation, then, were mainly pretematurally 
and medically significant.
29 On Aldrovandi's and Kucher's collections, and Renaissance collections in general, see P. Findlen, Possessing 
Nature (1994), on the last subject, see also K. Fomian, Collectors and Curiosities (1990), esp. pp. 99ff.
30 Quoted in P. Findlen, Possessing Nature (1994), p, 155, who also in chs. 4 and 5 discusses the virtues of fa r e  
esperienza.
31 Ibid., p. 257, cf. pp. 256ff.
32 According to Oxford English Dictionary, 'fa t f  was introduced into common English during the sixteenth century, 
at first with the meaning of 'a  feat.' From late sixteenth century -  the first reported case is from 1581 -  'fact* w as 
for the first time used in a recognisable early modem sense of 'what has actually happened or is the case; truth 
attested by direct observation or authentic testimony; reality/
33 P. C. Ritterbush, 'Art and science' (1969), p. 564. The example of the four-legged dragon is taken from P. 
Findlen, Possessing Nature (1994), p. 17ff. In the event, the dragon was actually not read as a sign of divine 
anger, but determined to be merely an extraordinary creature. As Daston has stressed, prodigies would not 
always be read as signs, L. Daston, 'Marvelous Facts' (1994), p. 256. For a fuller treatment of Renaissance 
portents, see further J. Mouthan, A Comparatiev Study (n.d.).
34 Cf. P. Findlen, Possessing Nature (1994), ch. 6; see also A. Haaning, Naturens lys (1998).
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They were, however, not of general use to Renaissance philosophy, since this philoso­
phy was mainly concerned with the common and universal operations of the universe.35 A 
second kind of simples became significant in this case. Within the context of philosophy, the 
emphasis was placed on ordinary simples, or 'commonplaces/ Such commonplaces referred 
not so much to a specific thing, but rather to the way things commonly behaved or appeared.36 
Thus, a commonplace designated how dogs, cats, or crocodiles were in general, and not how a 
specific dog, cat or crocodile had acted or appeared on a specific day. In their conception of 
ordinary simples, Renaissance philosophers were hence, with Lorraine Daston's words, 
'empirical without being factual'.37
The Primacy of Philosophy
This interest in simples as commonplaces reflects on the explanatory context of the simples 
within scholastic natural philosophy. The commonplaces were not so much of interest in 
themselves; rather, they were of interest as examples of philosophical theories of universal 
axioms, and as illustrations of philosophical, and especially, ancient texts. Philosophy always 
preceded experience, because philosophy aimed at disclosing universal axioms and Platonic 
ideas of the world. It was directed at revealing the world's 'ontic locus',38 and that was not best 
done through an empirical investigation, but through philosophical inquiry.
This idea of philosophical inquiry hinges on a particular conception of nature and man 
and of the relationship between them. On one hand, the world and all its phenomena were 
taken to be defined by 'ideas' or 'essences' which had been inscribed by God and which 
determined the meaning of things. Such ideas or essences could not be observed, but they 
could be revealed through philosophical inquiry. When it was deemed possible to reveal the 
essential ideas by such means, it was because the ideas not only existed in nature, but also had 
their counterpart in man's mind, in the shape of innate ideas or principles. These innate 
principles made man attuned to truth, in the sense that they made him naturally capable of 
recognising truth when he came upon it through his philosophic investigations. With their 
double existence the ideas were thereby 'tying thought to reality and permitting direct 
knowledge of essences', as Phillip Sloan remarks.39
That the world's phenomena were defined by God-given ideas meant, furthermore, 
that they could never be fortuitous. The productions of nature, as, indeed, of culture, were
35 L. Daston, 'Baconian Facts' (1994), pp. 340-2.
36 Cf. P. Dear, Discipline and Experience (1995), p. 4; W. J. Ong, Ramus (1983), pp. 104ff.
37 L. Daston, 'Baconian Facts' (1994), p. 344.
38 Cf. C. T ay lor, Sources o f the S elf (1989), pp. 160-1.
39 P. R. Sloan, 'John Locke, John Ray* (1972), p. 19.
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rather conceived 'to take the form they d[id] in order to exemplify ideas or archetypes', as 
Charles Taylor has pointed out.40 The simples, thus, could be read as 'Emblems' and 
'Epigrams', which, as the Renaissance scholar Edward Topsell explained with special reference 
to animals,
God hath used [...] as Sacraments or Mysteries to contain his will, (not only in the monstrous treble-headed, or 
seven-homed-shapes) but also in pure, ordinary, natural [illegible: limbs?]: how shall we be able to gesse [sic] at the 
meaning in the secret that do not understand the revealed?41
In a world where visible form referred to invisible ideas, the ordinary simples, then, became 
like 'keys to making the invisible visible'.42 On this account, natural productions, such as 
beasts, could, in the words of Topsell, be approached as 'a natural vision, which we ought to 
see and understand, for the more deare [sic] apprehension of the invisible Majesty of God'.43 
Nature, here, was fundamentally conceived as a normative field, and its simple productions as 
signs of God's hidden paradigm.44
Now, the essential meaning of these observable forms remained secret in the sense that 
it could not be observed empirically. In revealing the hidden paradigm, the Renaissance 
philosopher could either use a method of logical division or (and possible in conjunction with 
this) a method of hermeneutic interpretation. In Chapter 5 I return to the method of logical 
division; here the focus will be on interpretation. The basic modus of interpretation was the 
comparison of simples with simples, signs with signs, forms with forms, and its basic objective 
was to reveal analogies and resemblances, homologies and correspondences between the 
simples.45 Everything in the world formed part of a complex network of sympathies and anti­
sympathies, and hence, everything, from the signs of nature to the signs of books, could, in 
principle, be related to everything else in order to extract the meaning of the signs.46
In writing histories of animals, this method of interpretation was articulated in 
comprehensive accounts of an animal's multiple relations with other things in the world. In 
describing an animal, not only its figure, colours and organs, and the possible resemblance of 
these to other things would be specified, but also the animal's various names and their 
philological meanings, the stories and fables in which it appeared, its treatment by ancient 
authors, its appearance in the Bible and on coats of arms, the usage made of it by man, and its 
medical properties, etc. would be detailed. Through such an interpretation, an animal would, 
in short, be inscribed in a multidimensional web of signification, whereby it's meaning would 
be revealed.
40 C. Taylor, Sources o f  the Self (1989), p. 160.
41 E. Topsell, The Histone o f  the Foure-Footed Beastes (1607/1973), The Epistle Dedicatory (unpaged).
42 P. Findlen, 'Empty Signs?' (1990), p. 513 and p. 515.
43 E. Topsell, The Historie o f  the Foure-Footed Beastes (1607/1973), The Epistle Dedicatory (unpaged).
44 Cf. C. Taylor, Sources o f  the S elf (1989), p. 161; P. Findlen, Possessing Nature (1994), p. 84.
45 P. Findlen, 'Empty Signs?' (1990), pp. 512-3.
46 J. E, Kristensen, 'Det kuriose og det klassificerende blik' (1993), p. 38.
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To give just one example: About the common cat, Edward Topsell, in his translated 
version of Conrad Gesner's Historia animalium liber 1: de quadrupedibus viviparis (1551), started 
by listing all the known names of the cat in a variety of different languages, noting that it in 
Latin was called "catus" because, according to Ovid, the sister of Apollo, Cautus, had laid 'for a 
spy in the likeness of a cat, for a cat is a watchfull and warye beast".47 Further, their reverence 
among the Egyptians was taken note of, before the price of Spanish cats in Germany was 
mentioned, whereupon the cat was compared to a 'Lyonesse' which again was compared to 
Venus who once transformed a cat into a beautiful women, however, she forgot her docile 
nature and turned into a lioness bereft of honour. The moral:
men and beasts, hold nothing by their owne worth and benefit but by the vertue of their creator: Wherefore if at any 
time they rise against their maker, let them looke to loose their honour and dignity in their best part and to return to 
baseness and inglorious contem pt out of which they were first taken, and howsoever their outwarde shape and 
condition please them, yet at the best they are but beasts that perish, for the Lyons suffer hunger.*8
Then, Topsell went on to describe the colours and extraordinary eye-sight of cats, their tongue
and teeth, manner of hunting mice, birds and apes, and methods of preventing cats from
hunting hens. Next, he described their general nature, and the means of keeping a cat at home,
their way of copulation, their dangerous breath etc. etc. until, finally, he recounted their
healing potential (the head of a black cat, burned to powder, should be thrown into an eye
twice a day to cure it from blindness, for instance). All of this was interspersed with numerous
references to the Bible and to andent authors.49
It was through such multidimensional interpretations of animals that those accounts 
came into being, which from the perspective of the eighteenth-century zoologists appeared as 
"tedious [...] unimportant digressions" and 'Labyrinths of ever-fresh discourse". Within a 
Renaissance context, it was precisely such multidimensional readings which constituted 
knowledge, since it was by scrutinising simples for their theological, philological, mythical, 
utilitarian, medical etc. meaning, that the ontic locus behind could be revealed. It was through 
"reading in the book of nature" and by comparing that reading with the books of andent 
authors and with philosophical theories that the ideas inscribed by God on nature and 
imprinted on the mind of man could be made visible.
As Charles Taylor has highlighted, this conception of nature as a normative field and of 
man as possessing an innate faculty, which made him capable of disdosing the essence of 
nature positioned man in a particular way vis-à-vis nature.50 The possession of innate ideas by 
every man, allowed the scholar to approach nature in 'first person/ so to say. Ontology and 
epistemology coalesced, or more accurately, had not yet been invented as two distinct
47 E. Topsell, The Historie o f  the Foure-Footed Beastes (1607/1973), p. 102.
48 Ibid., p. 103.
49 Ibid. pp. 102-7.
50 C. Taylor, Sources o f the Self (1989), pp. 127ff, and 155ff.
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domains,51 because the things to be known -  the ideas, which were embodied in the ontic locus 
-  were made a part not only of the external world, but also of man himself in the shape o f 
innate principles.52 It was these conceptions of nature, knowledge and the knowing subject, 
and their interrelation, which would be thoroughly transformed during the seventeenth 
century. To begin with, the idea of innate ideas would be rejected, and the nature of man and 
his relation to nature would be redefined, as we now shall see.
Natures of Na tu r al  History
The empty mind
The very first book of John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding was dedicated to a
vigorous attack on the notion of innate ideas, or, as Locke commonly designated them, 'innate
principles/ launched in line with previous seventeenth-century philosophers' denunciation of
the doctrine.53 54'It is an established opinion amongst some men/ Locke observed,
That there are in the understanding certain innate principles; some primary notions, tcoicti ew oiai, characters, as it 
were stamped upon the mind of man, which the soul receives in its very first being; and brings into the world with 
i t«
In the next three chapters, the idea of innate principles was demolished. At first, Locke pointed 
out that it was obvious that innate principles could not exist universally, and hence be a quality 
stamped on man's mind upon his creation as had been argued, since such innate principles did 
not exist in 'children and idiots'.55 To preserve the doctrine of innate principles, Locke then 
noted, that some of its adherents had argued against this by pointing out that the innate 
principles could only be discovered by the help of reason, and thus, could not be expected to 
be found in either children or idiots. But such an argument was not reasonable, Locke stated, 
for 'how can it with any tolerable sense be supposed, that what was imprinted by nature, as the 
foundation and guide of our reason, should need fire use of reason to discover it?'56 Finally, 
Locke pointed out that the ideas of exactly which principles were considered universal, 
differed between different societies because man's 'faculties' were 'bounded within the ways, 
modes, and notions of his own country, and never directed to any other, or further inquiries'.57 
If innate principles did not exist universally, and if they could not be discovered without the
51 Also cf. R. Rorty, Philosophy and the M irror o f  Nature (1980), ch. 1,
52 Cf. C. Taylor, Sources o f  the Self (1989), pp, 159ff.
53 See, for instance, F. Bacon, 'Plan of the Work' (1620/1962), p. 27; J. Glanvill, Essays (1676), Essay L pp. 15ff.; T. 
Sprat, The History o f  the Royal Society (1667/1722), pp. 16ff.
54 J. Locke, Essay (1706/1997), p. 59/I,ii,l; emph. in org., editor's notes excluded.
55 Ibid., pp. 60*1/1,ii,5; emph. in org.
56 Ibid., p. 63/Lii,9.
57 Ibid., p. 97/1,iv, 12.
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help of reason they could not, Locke concluded, be innate at all. Rather than coming into the 
world with innate principles stamped upon the mind, man came into the world as a 'yet empty 
cabinet or, as Locke said elsewhere, with a mind as a 'white paper, void of all characters, 
without any ideas'.58 Man was bom, as John Dunn sums up Locke's thesis, as a 'cognitively 
free' being.59
It was not thanks to any innate principles that ideas about the world were formed, then, 
and it was not due to any inward reflection on innate ideas that any true conceptions of the 
world could be formed, as also Isaac Barrow stressed:
The knowledge of such things are not innate, it doth not spring up in our minds, it doth not any-wise incident by 
chance, or infuse by grace (except rarely by mirade).60
Without any notion of innate ideas to substantiate the validity of philosophic contemplation on 
its own, philosophy lost its primacy in the study of nature, and was, in fact, to the extent that it 
did not take its point of departure from observation, relegated to the domain of mere private 
opinion within natural history. Joseph Glanvill explained:
Our Demonstrations are raised upon Principles of our Own, not of Universal Nature; And, as my Lord Bacon notes, we 
judg [sic] from the analogy of our selves, not the Universe: Now many things are certain, according to the Principles o f  
one Man, that are absurd in the apprehensions of many others: and some appear impossible to the vulgar, that are easie 
to Men of more improved Understandings. This is extravagant in one Philosophy, which is a plain truth in another 
and perhaps what is most impossible in the apprehensions of Men; may be otherwise in the Metaphysicks, and 
Physiology of Angles. The sum is, We oondude this to be certain, and that to be impossible from our own narrow 
Frindples, and little Scheams [sic] of Opinion. [...] The ways of God in Nature (as in  Providence) are not as ours are: 
Not the Models that we frame any way commensurate to the vastness and profundity of his Works; which have a 
depth in them greater than the Well of Democritus.‘ l
Where should Man start then, if not within his own mind? Lord Monboddo posed the question
rhetorically in his O f the Origin and Progress o f Language, and answered it himself: 'I answer,
from the source of all our knowledge in our present state of existence, I mean the senses.'62
From the seventeenth-century onward the senses became, in a rather concrete sense and with
great and repeated emphasis, the basis of any knowledge. "The Senses are the Fountain of
natural K n ow ledgeas Glanvill had observed a century earlier in the same vein,
and the surest and best Philosophy is to be raised from the Pheenomena, as they present them to us: when we leave these, 
and retire to the abstracted notions of our minds, we build Castles in the Air, and form Chymerical Worlds, that have 
nothing real in them.63
It was through the senses alone that any knowledge about the natural world could hope to be 
gained.
How exactly the phenomena of the external world were transmitted to the mind -  or, as 
Locke had it a bit more poetically, how the sensations were conveyed 'from without to their
58 Ibid., p. 65/l,ii,15; p. 109/11,i,2.
59 J. Dunn, 'From Applied Theology' (1983), p. 123.
60 I. Barrow, O f Industry (1693), pp. 157-8.
61 J. Glanvill, Essays (1676), Essay L p. 15; emph. in org.
62 L. Monboddo, O f the Origin (1774), vol. I, p. 70, note*.
63 J. Glanvill, Essays (1676), Essay 1,17; emph. in org.
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audience in the brain, the mind's presence-room'64 -  was by no means clear to the authors. As 
Glanvill emphasised in 1676: 'Our eyes that see other things, see not themselves; and the 
Instruments of Knowledge are unknown'.65 6More than a hundred years later, and after numerous 
dissections of the eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin had taken place, the issue seemed as 
unresolvable as ever:
From numberless experiments and observations, it is unquestionable, that the nerves are the instruments both of 
sensation and of animal motion. But, how these effects are produced by the nervous influence is a discovery still to 
be made. [...] But it is needless to dwell upon a subject covered with darkness, and which all the efforts of human 
powers will probably never bring to light.46
However, some authors, among them Glanvill himself, did go on to speculate on how the 
world was made present to the mind. Ideally, man's senses, and most importantly but not 
exclusively, the eyes would allow the material particulars of the external world to imprint 
themselves on the mind, as if they were reflected in a 'mirror' or a 'glass', or, with a more 
tactile metaphor, impressed on 'wax'.67 Using the camera obscura -  that light proof chamber in 
which the rays of light from the objects of the world through a small hole in one side of the 
room would be projected as a reduced and inverted picture on the opposite wall -  as a model, 
Locke explained the operation:
For, methinks, the understanding is not much unlike a closet wholly shut from light, with only some little opening 
left, to let in external visible resemblances, or ideas of things without; would the pictures coming into such a dark 
room but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very much resemble the 
understanding of a man, in reference to all objects of sight, and the ideas of them.68
However, the metaphor of the camera obscura was not entirely accurate. In contrast to the 
entire picture of the world, which would be reflected in the camera obscura, man's mind 
would not reflect the world in its entirety; it would not even reflect everything, which the 
world had to offer. To understand more specifically what kind of world was implied in this 
conception of sensation and mind -  what kind of world it was that could be made an object of 
such a reflection in the mind's mirror -  it is necessary to take a look at the ideas of the external 
world existing in contemporary philosophy.
64 J. Locke, Essay (1706/1997), p. 123/H,iii,l.
65 J. Glanvill, Essays (1676), Essay I, p. 5, emph. in org.
66 W. Smellie, The Philosophy o f  Natural History (1790), vol. I, pp. 80-1.
67 J. Locke, Essay (1706/1997), p. 121/ILi,25; T. Sprat, The History o f  the Royal Society (1667/1722), p. 97; L. 
Monboddo, O f the Origin (1774), vol. 1, pp. 45-6; J. Harris, Hermes (1751), p. 356. Although the metaphors 
generally used in making sense of the sensory experience were mainly visual, and although the eyes certainly 
played a major role in the approach to the world during this period, it is important to bear in mind that the 
visual did not exclusively define the field of perception. 'Hearing, Seeing, Touching, and Smelling', as Beattie 
enumerated, all contributed to providing that 'evidence Ion which] is founded all knowledge of external and 
material things'. J. Beattie, Essays (1776), vol. I, p. 56.
68 J. Locke, Essay (1706/1997), p. 158/ILxi,17; emph. in  org. See J. Crary, Techniques o f  the Observer (1990), ch. 2, for a 
discussion of the frequent use of the camera obscura as a metaphor for the process of sensation in the 
eighteenth-century.
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Everything which existed in the world from the smallest mineral, through plants, 
animals, to man and the angels above, were taken to be defined by an essence or, as it was 
sometimes called, 'primary causes'. As Locke explained, the 'real essence' equalled the 'being, 
of the thing itself, that foundation from which all its properties flow, and to which they are all 
inseparably annexed.'69 The real essence was hence, in the words of another author, to be 
considered a s 'models or archetypes of all material farm s [...]; of which the material is no more than 
a copy.'70 It was the essence which determined the nature and the material outline of a thing, 
and it was the essence which determined the nature of species and, indeed, the very order of 
nature herself, as we later will see in more detail (Chapter 5).
This idea of 'real essences' in some measure resembles the Renaissance conception of 
'ideas'/'essences/ However, at least in one crucial respect, the eighteenth-century idea of 
essence differs from the Renaissance one. As with the Renaissance scholar, the natural historian 
was not considered capable of perceiving essences. With the rejection of the Renaissance theory 
of innate ideas which made man attuned to the ideas of the world, however, eighteenth- 
century man became fundamentally severed from ever obtaining any certain knowledge about 
the essence. Locke highlighted this point when he noted that man cannot 'denominate' things 
'by their real essences, because we know them not':
There is not so contemptible a plant or animal, that does not confound the most enlarged understanding. Though 
the familiar use of things about us, take off our wonder; yet it cures not our ignorance. When we come to examine 
the stones, we tread on, or the iron, we daily handle, we presently find, we know not their make; and can give no 
reason, of the different qualities we find in them. 'Tis evident the internal constitution, whereon their properties 
depend, is unknown to us. [...] The workmanship of the all-wise, and powerful God, in the great fabric of the 
universe, and every part thereof, further exceeds the capacity and comprehension o f the most inquisitive and 
intelligent man, than the best contrivance of the most ingenious man, doth the conceptions of the most ignorant of 
rational creatures [i e  the vulgar and savage].71
What made its way to the presence chamber of the mind through the senses was not the 
essences, but only an impression of the 'secondary qualities' of things. Qualities, which were 
generated by the essences and hence derived from these, but which, like the material copy of 
the archetypical idea, were of a fundamentally different nature. What made its way to man's 
empty mind, then, and what consequently defined the secondary qualities, was only that 
material part of nature which could be made available to the human sensorium, such as, with 
Locke's example of a snowball, it being 'white, cold, and roundZ72 An ideational and, from the 
perspective of man, imperceptible world preceded and defined the perceptible world of 
matter, just like in the Renaissance, but the world's 'ontic locus' was now placed entirely
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69 J. Locke, Essay (1706/1997), p. 375/III.iii.l8. Cf. P. R. Sloan, 'John Locke, John Ray* (1972); M. J. Osler, 'John 
L ock e '(1970), pp. lOff.
70 L. Monboddo, O fthe Origin (1774), vol. I, p. 88; emph. in org.
71 J. Locke, Essay (1706/1997), p. 397/HLvi,9; emph. in org.
72 Ibid., pp. 134f./II,viii,8; emph. in org.
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beyond the reach of man: He was left with only the secondary qualities of things to work with 
in his quest for knowledge.
The secondary qualities presented themselves to the human sensorium as an assem­
blage of particulars: "all things that exist in the world are only particulars', as Locke said.73 Or, 
in the words of Harris: 'Life is merged in a multitude of Particulars'.74 The external world was 
only accessible to man as a world of particular, sensible objects, and what was accepted as 
sensible -  colour, figure, size, movement, etc. -  was to a very large extent what could somehow 
be quantified. The realm of the external world was, as R. G. Collingwood has pointed out, 
restricted 'to a complex of quantities -  quantities spatial or quantities temporal, but quantities 
and nothing more/75
Within the mind, the impressions of the secondary qualities would be transformed into
'simple ideas,' as Locke called them,76 and they would be stored in the faculty of memory from
where they could be brought forward for later inspection. The simple ideas fundamentally
circumscribed thinking, as they constituted the ultimate 'building blocks' of thought:
'perceptions are the only materials from which ideas are formed', as Lord Monboddo observed.77
Man was not capable of forming this material for himself, as also Locke stressed:
It is not in the power of the most exalted wit, or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to 
invent or fram e one new simple idea in the mindf.]78
Thus, both in knowledge and art as, indeed, in fantasies, man was doomed to take his point of 
departure from the particular impressions, which had imprinted themselves on his mind. That 
in turn also meant that, in principle, every man and woman regardless of whether they were 
learned or vulgar, gentle or wild would have the same impressions imprinted upon their mind 
when confronted with the same objects.79
Vis-à-vis the world, man with his mind as blank as a piece of white paper, then, became 
a passive recipient -  'our minds are Passive to the impressions of Sense', as Glanvill 
emphasised80 -  and the world became the agent. In its most basic operation, the mind was 
reduced to a simple instrument of reflection, and the world a supplier of materials for thought.
73 Ibid., p. 368/n,iii,6.
74 J. H am s, Hermes (1751), p. 343; emph. in org.
75 R. G. Collingwood, The Idea o f  Nature (1945), p. 103. A lso cf. T. Frangsmyr, J. L. Heilbron, and R. E. Rider, The
Quantifying Spirit (1990),
76 J. Locke, Essay (1706/1997), p. 121/H,i,25. Other authors had other names for Locke's 'simple ideas/ Hume, for 
instance, called them 'simple impressions/ the meaning, however, being the same, and I shall below employ the 
terminology of Locke. D. Hume, An Enquiry (1748/1988), p. 21.
77 L. Monboddo, O f the Origin (1774), vol. L p- 78; emph. in org.
78 J. Locke, Essay (1706/1997), p. 122/n,ii,2; emph. in org.
79 J. Harris, Hermes (1751), pp. 395-7, discusses this point at some lenght,
80 J. Glanvill, Essays (1676), Essay L p. 21; emph. in org.
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The Light of Facts
With the rejection of the notion of innate ideas, any a priori philosophical principles were made 
relative, as we have seen, and as such unsustainable as a point of departure for studying 
nature. Instead of turning inward, the naturalist of our period would with his empty mind, 
have to start with the only thing which was given -  the perceptible part of nature -  and let her 
material particulars fill the cabinet of his mind. Nature had to take precedence over thought.
Already Francis Bacon had been emphatic on this point: 'the true method of 
experience', he stressed after having criticised the Renaissance scholars' preoccupation with 
universal theories and ancient texts as 'altogether erroneous and impassable', 'on the contrary 
first lights the candle, and then by means of the candle shows the way'.81 If man wanted to 
know anything at all about nature, he had to start with his own experiences of nature, carefully 
distinguishing those experiences from his preconceived theories.
It is in this connection, as a natural historical (and philosophical) definition of what 
could be sensed, that the conception of 'facts' gained its significance during the seventeenth 
century. It was, however, not within a natural history context that the first definition of the 
salient features of facts would be defined. In Elements o f Common Law, Bacon had defined 
'matters of facts' in judicial terminology as that which could be experienced by man in relation 
to a crime, namely, all the circumstances concerning the crime itself. These Bacon sharply 
distinguished from 'matters of judgement': Those conjectures, which could be made on die 
basis of such facts but which under no circumstance formed a part of them.82
Within this juridical definition, facts were, in principle, divorced from any theoretical 
or philosophical framework, and this became one of their salient features within natural 
history. It was such facts that could be recounted in a history without the use of reason or 
imagination; and it was such facts that, indeed, alone ought to be recounted in a history. In 
contrasting this new category of facts to the Renaissance simples, which only became 
interesting as examples of ideas, Nehemiah Grew, thus, mockingly observed that when 
recounting facts, it was more 'proper' simply to 'remarque some of the Uses and Reasons of 
Things', 'instead of meddling with Mystick, Mythologick, or Hieroglyphic matters; or relating 
stories of Men who were great Riders, or Women that were bold and feared not Horses.'83
Sharply distinguished from philosophic contemplation, natural particulars were no 
longer conceived as signs to be interpreted. With the exegetical separation of facts from theory 
and with the rejection of the notion of innate ideas, nature's productions became facts which
81 F. Bacon, New Organon (1620/1962), p. 81/I.lxxxii; p. 80/l.Ixxxii.
82 Francis Bacon, The Elements o f  Common Law (1630), quoted in L. Daston and K. Park, Wonders and the Order o f  
Nature (1998), p. 230. For a discussion of the intimate relationship between Bacon's conception of law, 
statemanship and knowledge, see J. Martin, Francis Bacon (1992).
83 N. Grew, Museum Regalis Societas (1681), Preface (unpaged), emph. removed.
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could, and by definition should, stand alone (quite literally as well: The long eighteenth- 
century witnessed an outpouring of books and journals, most importantly the Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society, in which matters of facts, such as animal specimens, w ere 
simply described, but not in any way philosophically explained. Such publications appear to 
be one dear example of the new approach to nature -  and quite at odds with Renaissance 
philosophy). Detached from a meaningful nature and a textual tradition, the facts came, as 
Daston so aptly has put it, to 'signif[y] nothing at all'.84 The facts gained an epistemological 
autonomy and, at the same time, gained an epistemological primacy in the construction of 
knowledge. Due to the new conception of the mind and nature, facts became the only thing 
given, and consequently, the only thing solid to build any knowledge upon.
Tracing the (alleged) etymological meaning of the 'real' to the 'royal/ Bacon under­
scored this point by way of analogy, as he displaced the supreme autonomy of the King to the 
natural realm. Knowledge of facts, i.e. natural history, was not only, in prindple, freed from  
theory, but also 'elevated within the hierarchy of knowledge', as Solomon points out.85 No 
longer merely serving as examples of universal axioms, the matters of fact became the 
treasured basis for any knowledge of the perceptible world. '[Wjithout a natural and 
experimental history such as I am going to prescribe no progress of the human race could have 
been made or can be made in philosophy and the science', Bacon concluded.86 Nature, like the 
King, came before anything else.
It was not only the relationship between nature and philosophy that had been 
redefined. The nature of experience itself or -  to remain at a discursive level -  at least the w ay 
in which it had to be represented in order to be considered an acceptable experience in natural 
history had been altered as well. As we saw above, a philosophically relevant simple in 
Renaissance scholarship had been a commonplace, and hence, as Dear put it, an experience 
amounted to 'a  statement of how things happen in nature'.87 During the seventeenth century, this 
conception changed, as experience was increasingly tied to the specific act of experiencing. In 
the following chapter I shall return to an analysis of this act; for now it suffices to note the 
implications of this conception of experiencing on the notion of facts. While the untying of 
nature's particulars from theory had made them epistemologically autonomous, the tying of 
them to a specific historical act of experiencing made them factual as well. Facts became 
thereby, as Daston says, 'small nuggets of experience.'88
84 L. Daston, 'Marvelous Facts' (1994), p. 250.
85 J. R. Solomon, 'Prologue' (1998), p. xviii.
86 F. Bacon, Preparative (1620/1962), p. 252.
87 P. Dear, Discipline and Experience (1995), p. 4; emph. in org.
88 L. Daston, 'Baconian Facts' (1994), p. 343.
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There is one more feature of natural history's facts that we have to take into account. As 
we saw, during the Renaissance, a qualitative difference existed between different types of 
simples -  between the extraordinary and wondrous simples which within a preternatural 
context could be read as portents, and the ordinary simples, which as commonplaces could be 
used in philosophy as examples of universal axioms, and read as signs of God's hidden 
paradigm. Within natural history, all facts became equal in principle; the wondrous and the 
extraordinary were here, in theory, to be treated on an equal footing with the ordinary and 
trivial. In the New Organum, Bacon stressed this as he made an eulogy for the 'trivial and 
commonly known' in natural history. Earlier on, Bacon noted, men 'had been accustomed' to 
focus on 'the causes of things which rarely happen while of those which happen 
frequently they never ask the cause but take them as they are for granted/ This thinking was 
flawed:
But I, who am well aware that no judgment can be passed on uncommon or remarkable things, much less anything 
new brought to light, unless the causes of common things, and the causes of those causes, be Erst duly examined 
and found out, am of necessity compelled to admit the commonest things into my history. Nay, in my judgment 
philosophy has been hindered by nothing more than this, -  that things of familiar and frequent occurrence do not 
arrest and detain the thoughts of men, but are received in passing without any inquiry into their causes; insomuch 
that information concerning things which are not known is oftener wanted than attention concerning things which 
are.89
This emphasis on the common did not mean that natural historians should no longer take note
of what appeared extraordinary. Nor did it imply that genuinely extraordinary occurrences in
the natural world were not thought to have occurred. A simple look at the Bible would affirm
that genuinely extraordinary things in the shape of miracles indeed had taken place, and that it
at times, indeed, had pleased God 'to overrule or control the established course of things in the
world by his omnipotent hand'.90 However, it was commonly agreed that God had chosen not
to reveal himself in this way any more, as there was not longer any need for miracles:
God never yet left himself without Witness in the World: And it is observable, that he had commonly chosen the dark 
and ignorant Ages, wherein to work Miracles; but seldom or never the Times when Natural Knowledge prevail'd: For 
he knew there was not so much need to make use of extraordinary Signs, when Men were diligent in the Works of 
his Hands, and attentive in the Impressions of his Foot-steps in his Creatures.9l
Miracles -  i.e. genuinely inexplicable natural occurrences -  had their place in time, but in the 
present enlightened age what appeared to a researcher to be out of the ordinary course of 
nature was likely to appear extra-ordinary due to a lack of experience on man's part, rather 
than due to any intervention in the common course of nature by God. The extraordinary 
became in principle ordinary, as Bacon stressed:
For we are not to give up the investigation, until the properties and qualities found in such things as may be taken 
for miracles of nature be reduced and comprehended under some Form or fixed Law; so that all the irregularity or 
singularity shall be found to depend on some common Form, and the miracle shall turn out to be only on the exact
89 F. Bacon, New Organon (1620/1962), p. 106/I.cxix.
90 R. Boyle, A Free Enquiry (1686/1996), p. 14.
91 T. Sprat, The History o f  the Royal Society (1667/1722), p. 350; emph. in org.
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specific differences, and the degree, and the rare concurrence; not in the species itself; whereas now the thoughts o f 
men go no further than to pronounce such things the secrets and mighty works of nature, things as it w ere 
causeless, and exceptions to general rules”
Though, as Daston has highlighted,92 3 extraordinary and ordinary phenomena would only 
gradually come to be treated as equally important facts during the seventeenth century, by the 
final decades of this century, extraordinary animals had within zoology either been excluded 
altogether from the field of study if they were interpreted as abnormal (such as a five-legged 
pig, or a three-tailed snake). Or, in cases where more than one animal shared the sam e 
extraordinary features, their extraordinarity would be considered as a function of m an's 
ignorance, rather than be seen as a quality o f the animal. '[W]onder is the child of rarity', as 
Bacon had observed,
and if a thing be rare, though in kind it be no way extraordinary, yet it is wondered at. While on die other hand 
things which really call for wonder on account of the difference in species which they exhibit as compared w ith 
other species, yet if we have them by us in common use, are but slightly noticed.94
The rare and extraordinary were now in principle placed on an equal footing with the common 
and normal as no more and no less than matters of facts.
The inclusion of all natural phenomenon -  except for the anomalous individuals -  into 
the category of facts hinged on a new conception of the explanatory context of facts. As Bacon 
had it, it was the 'common Form' or 'fixed Law7 of nature, or in other words, the regular 
workings of nature, which came the principal object of natural studies, and which all facts 
equally well could illuminate.95 The notion of 'laws of nature' was not new to the seventeenth 
century. It had also been in use in Medieval and Renaissance philosophy, here usually 
denominating nature's regular mode of working as opposed to her 'accidental' procedures. 
While the Renaissance conception certainly paved the way for the seventeenth and eighteenth- 
centuries usage, marked differences can also observed. What, in brief, separated the latter, and 
especially the eighteenth-century conception of 'law  of nature/ from the former was, primarily, 
an idea of nature as 'governed by immutable laws' which ensured 'that natural phenomena 
were always regular and uniform': By the eighteenth century, nature had become entirely 
regimented by its laws.96 In principle, vis-à-vis such a regular order of nature, all facts became 
equal, because they were all a product of, and hence all equally well pointed back to, this 
regular order.
92 F. Bacon, New Organon (1620/1962), p. 168/II.xxviii.
93 L. Daston, 'Baconian Facts' (1994); idem., 'The Cold Light of Facts' (1997).
94 F. Bacon, New Organon (1620/1962), pp. 171-2/II.xxxi.
95 Ibid., p. 168/II,xxviii.
96 L. Daston and K. Park, Wonders and the Order o f  Nature (1998), p. 351, cf. p. 120. See j .  R  Milton, 'The Origin and 
Development' (1981), for a detailed discussion of the development of the notion of natural laws from Ancient to 
early m odem  times; and J. E. Ruby, 'The Origins of Scientific 'Laws" (1986), for a partly different reading; see L. 
Crariberg, 'Law ' (1968), for an impressionistic sketch of the relation between scientific and juridical laws.
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In summing up the indigenous notion of facts, it could be said that what had taken 
place during the seventeenth century was a 'universalisation' of the category of the fact, 
entailing a trivialisation, a materialisation and a historisation. Each and every one of nature's 
phenomena could be identified as a fact, but this identification was, in turn, based upon certain 
preconceptions regarding the category of facts. First and foremost a fact was, as we have seen, 
defined as a perceptible entity, which came into being as a result of a historically situated 
experience. This meant, on one hand, that in contrast with the Renaissance concern with 
'commonplaces' which, properly speaking, could not be observed, natural history was 
concerned only with 'individuals, which are circumscribed by time and place', in the words of 
Bacon.97 98On the other hand, it meant that only those qualities which could be sensed in such 
individuals -  if necessary with the help of instruments such as the telescope, microscope, 
measure sticks, weights or the like -  such as a specific body's colour, shape, movement, weight, 
measures, smell, taste, sound etc., that is, only the secondary qualities of things would form 
part of a fact. The limits of sensations, hence, came to define the limits of a fact.
Moreover, this definition of facts as perceptible entities determined how facts could be 
specifically distinguished from each other. The categorial definition of facts placed limits on 
the way specific facts could be differentiated, and thereby also classified, as it was only on the 
basis of the perceptible characters that it was possible to describe and hence distinguish facts 
from each other. As we will see in the following chapters, this definition of facts and the 
consequent framing of the axes of differentiation, had a direct influence on the eighteenth- 
century conceptualisation of animals.
Finally, with man equipped with a mind which, in principle, only reflected what was 
given, facts became, by definition, indisputable. As Dr. Johnson laconically stated in his 
definition of the category in the Dictionary, facts were: 'Reality; not supposition; not 
speculation'. With a quote from South's Sermons Johnson cemented this indisputable reality of 
the fact: 'Matters of fact breaks out and blazes with too great an evidence to be denied.'96 As 
small nuggets of experience facts had become something over which 'no dispute could be 
possible', in the words of Simon Schaffer.99
Such a conception of facts implies a social exclusion, as Schaffer and Shapin have 
shown in an experimental context. Within zoology, not everybody agreed on what was a 
matter of fact. In eighteenth-century Britain there were, for example, people who believed in 
the existence of mermaids, dragons, and unicorns, in other words, in animals that most natural 
historians did not regard as matters of facts. However, rather than treating these people as 
natural historians, they would be treated as 'Vulgar' people who loved 'what is strange, rather
97 F. Bacon, The Dignity (1623/1962), p. 292.
98 S. Johnson, Dictionary (1755), FACT (unpaged).
99 S. Schaffer, 'Making Certain' (1984), p. 141.
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than what is true', in the word of one author who was careful to position himself as a natural 
historian.100 Those who did believe in the reality of such 'non-existing facts' were likely, as 
here, to be excluded from the ranks of natural historians. The construction of facts, then, 
implied a social dimension, as Schaffer and Shapin conclude. As facts defined the boundaries 
of assent, by extension, they also defined the terms of exclusion from the group of people who 
gave their assent. Matters of facts, hence, became, 'both an epistemological and a social 
category'.101
The Nature of Nature
Although, as we have seen, a distinction analogous to Bacon's, between matters of facts and 
matters of judgement, can be discerned in the Renaissance distinction between simples and 
universal axioms, the 'Baconian distinction' between natural history and philosophy was new 
both in its very insistence on the epistemological autonomy and philosophical importance of 
the matters of fact,102 and in its catégorial definition of facts as trivial, historical and material. 
As alluded to above, in tandem with the emergence of the category of facts, the conception of 
nature herself was transformed. No longer inherently meaningful (or in any case, no longer in 
possession of a humanly conceivable meaning), to the eyes of the human observer, nature 
became a purely material thing (however, to the understanding of man she would still also be 
treated as in possession of an ideational order. An idea to be further discussed in Part II).
In existing analyses of seventeenth-century natural history and philosophy, a mecha­
nisation of nature has commonly been identified as the most decisive feature of the new 
conception of nature.103 And this is, of course, far from wrong. After all, the seventeenth 
century witnessed not only René Descartes' development of a mechanical framework for 
understanding nature, which was inspired not least by the descriptions of the universe by 
Galileo Galilei, but also Robert Boyle's physical experiments, and Newton's physico- 
mathematical research, which were both based on an explicitly formulated mechanical 
conception of die universe. As Boyle stated in Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notions o f  
Nature, 'universal nature' ought to be conceived of as
the aggregate of the bodies that make up the world, framed as it is, considered as a principle by virtue whereof they 
act and suffer according to the laws of motion prescribed by the author of things. W hich description may be thus 
paraphrased: that nature, in general, is the result of the universal matter or corporeal substance of the universe,
100 F. Watson, The Animal World Display'd (1754), p. 300.
101 S. Shapin and S. Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985), pp. 2 5 ,69ff., cf. S. Schaffer, 'Making Certain' (1984), 
pp. 142-4.
102 Cf. L. Daston and K. Park, Wonders and the Order o f  Nature (1998), p. 237.
103 See, for instance, C. Taylor, Sources o f the S elf (1989), esp. pp. 159ff; R, Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror o f  Nature 
(1980), ch. 1.
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111. 2 .2  M e r m a i d  a n d  -M A N  (U . A ldrovandi, M on stru m  H istor ic  1642). In  the Renaissance scholar 
U lysses Aldrovandi's M onstrum  historia  m erm aids an d  m erm en w e re  depicted and described together 
w ith  a range of other m onsters. By the end o f th e  seventeenth century, i t  w as agreed am ong those 
w ho called them selves, an d  w ould be  know n as 'n a tu ra l h istorians' that su ch  m onsters w ere  nothing 
bu t 'creatures of im agination .' C onsequently, they w ere  excluded from  the w orld  of zoology.
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considered as it is contrived into the present structure and constitution of the world, whereby all the bodies that 
compose it are enabled to act upon, and fitted to suffer from, one another, according to the settled laws of motion.104
Upon this view, nature -  like 'a ship furnished with pumps, ordnance, etc. is an engine as
comprises or consists of several lesser engines'105 -  became a machine upon which God had
'impressed' his general laws of motion.106 Nature, then, was a combination of corporeal matter
and divine, natural laws, where the principle of motion was inherent to matter itself.107
The mechanic conception of nature was, however, not the only conception of nature in
currency in the period, even though it dominated physics and chemistry. In particular within
the field of physiology during the second half of the eighteenth century a rival vitalist
conception of nature -  or at least of plants and animals -  was advanced which challenged some
of the assumptions of mechanism. "The notion that animals are machines, is perhaps too
absurd to merit refutation',108 the zoologist William Smellie hence ventured:
The idea of a machine implies a select combination of the common properties of matter. The regularity o f its 
movements is a proof that they are totally distinct from animal or spontaneous motion. A machine has nothing 
analogous to sensation, which is the lowest characteristic of an animal. An animated machine, therefore, is an absurd 
abuse of terms. It confounds what Nature has distinguished in the most unambiguous manner.109
Firstly, vitalism rested on a fundamental distinction between animate and inanimate matter. 
With regard to the former, the mechanical frame of explanation was generally accepted. As 
regards the latter, however, it was another matter: 'Animals and vegetable substances differ 
from common matter in having power superadded, totally different from any other known 
property of matter, out of which arises various new properties', as one of the most prominent 
spokesmen for vitalism in the second half of the eighteenth century, John Hunter, stressed.110 
Secondly, then, with regard to animate matter, it was argued that such matter had a 'vital 
principle' superadded to the living organism. This vital principle, which conferred a power of 
self-preservation and action, was absent in inanimate matter, and did consequently, account 
for the life of such organisms: 'Mere composition of matter does not give life; for the dead body 
has all the composition it ever had.'111 12In order to explain life, one had to reckon with 'the idea 
of spirit, viz. a species of intelligent quality that presides over and directs the actions of 
[animate] matter.'117 The vitalist conception of (animate) nature was, then, based on a 
fundamental distinction between 'that which acts and that which is acted upon', as Hilde Hein 
says: 'That which receives action is itself inert and passive, lacking the spontaneity of self­
movement. That which acts imposes form upon matter and is itself wholly external in nature to
104 R. Boyle, A Free Enquiry (1686/1996), p. 36.
105 Ibid., p. 40.
106 Ibid., p. 90.
107 Also cf. H. Hein, 'The Mechanism-Vitalism Controversy' (1972), pp. 174f.
108 W . Smellie, The Philosophy o f  Natural History (1790), vol. I, p. 247.
109 Ibid., vol. I, p. 249; emph. in org.
110 J. Hunter, quoted in S. J. Cross, 'John Hunteri (1981), p. 37.
111 J. Hunter, quoted in ibid., p. 36.
112 J. Hunter, quoted in ibid.
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the matter upon which it acts/ Hence, a basic dualism between life and matter, absent in the 
mechanic conception of nature, became central to the vitalist conception of nature.113
These two different conceptions of nature laid different frameworks for the legitimate 
natural philosophical explanations of matter, and in that sense they were meta-theoretical. This 
in turn meant, as Hein also points out, that they did not usually concern debates over "matters 
of description" -  in this basic approach to nature the adherents of the different philosophies 
usually agreed -  but debates over "matters of explanation", over how matters of facts should be 
understood.114 What the two theories shared in their approach to, and, consequently, in their 
description of matters of fact, was a conception of perceptible nature as material, because the 
force of motion in mechanism, or the vital spirit of life in vitalism, alike were placed outside 
the reach of the human observer. Regardless of whether that motion or vital spirit was placed 
within nature, as in the case of the mechanical laws, or distinguished from nature, as in the 
vitalist approach, in both cases they were only accessible through contemplation on matters of 
fact. In addition, both approaches converged in treating matter as if it acted according to 
universally valid, regular laws, which at the same time made nature a uniform whole and also 
explained that uniformity, although the two approaches diverged in defining and locating 
these laws. Rather than a mechanisation of nature in itself, then, it was a "materialisation" and 
"régularisation" of nature, which was basic to both approaches, and which became foundational 
for natural history: It was the materialisation of nature, or "empiricistic" understanding of 
nature as I shall call it, which allowed the observer to approach nature as a collection of 
perceptible facts which, devoid of any meaning in themselves, could only be registered on the 
mirror in the empty cabinet of the mind. As indicated earlier, it was, furthermore, the 
"régularisation" of nature that allowed natural historians to treat each and every fact -  common 
or extraordinary -  as equal parts of the great natural order.
In brief, it was this triple redefinition of natures -  of the mind's, which having been 
emptied of innate ideas became, at least in principle, like a mirror through.which the par­
ticulars of nature could be reflected; of nature's, which drained of any perceptible meaning had 
become materialised and at the same time entirely regular; and of the facts", which had become 
universalised as trivial nuggets of indisputable experience -  which, I will argue, became 
foundational for eighteenth-century natural history. It was this definition of the nature of the 
mind, of nature, and of the fact that made it possible to stage natural history as a purely 
empirical and factual recounting of nature's particulars, and which, in . turn, made it 
meaningful to position this factual natural history as the only possible basis for any knowledge 
at all.
113 H. Hein, 'The Mechanism-Vitalism Controversy' (1972), pp. 163-4, notes excluded. For a further discussion, see 
also T. M, Brown, 'From Mechanism to Vitalism' (1974).
114 H. Hein, 'The Mechanism-Vitalism Controversy' (1972), pp. 160-1.
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There was an aberdabei, however. Although man might be bom  cognitively free, not 
only was he bom with passions and a faculty of imagination as well, he was also bom with 
senses which did not always convey the particulars of the world to his mind's cabinet 
accurately and transparently. Furthermore, from the time of his birth to the time of adulthood 
when he might embark on studies of the natural world, he would have developed theories 
about the world which were not necessarily true, and he would have developed interests in the 
world as well. There were constitutive cracks in the mirror, then, as also Bacon pointed out in 
the preface to The Great Instauration. Due to the failure of the senses and the 'idols' of the mind 
-  i.e. the various preconceptions that men would develop during their life -  the mind would 
become
as an uneven mirror [which] distorts the rays of objects according to its own figure and section, so the mind, when it 
receives impressions of objects through the sense, cannot be trusted to report them truly, but in forming its notions 
mixes up its own nature with the nature of things.1*5
'[W]e see but in part, and as in a glass darkly/ as Joseph Addison stressed, quoting the Bible to 
the same end.15 16 Thus, man was never an empty cabinet or a perfect mirror when approaching 
nature in practice. He himself formed an impediment to knowledge, and it is to this 
impediment and the precautions taken against it that we must now turn in an attempt to more 
fully grasp the anthropology preconditioned in natural history.
i T he Human Predicament of Know ledge
i
I It was not only the Renaissance scholars who played the part of counter-image to seventeenth
and eighteenth-century natural history and philosophy. So too did the angels. Only, they 
tended to place the learned endeavours in the negative: Where the discussion of Renaissance 
scholarship tended to highlight the, from the natives' point of view, accomplishments of 
natural history, the descriptions of the angels underscored its limitations. To appreciate this 
human predicament of knowledge, which also played a constitutive part in natural history, we 
must turn our gaze to the heavens.
Homo Duplex
As we have seen, man was not considered capable of obtaining any knowledge about the real 
essences of things, because his senses only allowed him to receive knowledge about secondary
115 F. Bacon, 'Plan of the Work' (1620/1962), p. 27.
116 J. Addison, reprinted in G. A. Aitken, The Spectator (1898), vol. I, p. 331. The quotation from the Bible is from I 
Cor. xiii 12.
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qualities. 'The World of God' was, as Glanvill concluded after having discussed the limited
abilities of Man, 'no doubt [...] an other thing, than the World of Sense is; and we can judg but
little of its amplitude and glory by the imperfect Idea we have of it'.117 18Indeed, vis-à-vis the
world of God men appeared but as * Atoms o f Imperfection', as another author stressed:
If we compare ourselves [...]  with the Almighty powerful Being, it will be impossible but that our Actions, with 
respect to him must be full o f inconsistent Absurdities[.Jni
Not all creatures were found as unfit to approach God's nature as man. As the encyclopaedist
Ephraim Chambers pointed out, there were always the angels above: 'where we leave off, there
possible some superior order of beings may take it up'.119 By the nature of things, man could
not actually know  anything about these superior, invisible beings -  'Angles of all sorts are
naturally beyond our discover/, as Locke observed.120 However, by employing the
cosmological notion of the Great Chain of Being, the existence of angels and their place in the
universe could be inferred from the 'analogy of Nature/ as Joseph Addison here explains:
If the Scale of Being rises by such a regular Progress, so high as Man, we may by a Parity of Reason suppose that it 
still proceeds gradually through those beings which are of a Superior Nature to him, since there is an infinitely 
greater Space and Room for different Degrees of Perfection, between the Supream [sic] Being and Man, than 
between Man and the most despicable Insect.121
Man was linked, then, to the angels because by virtue of his mind and soul he was a spiritual 
being like them; what distinguished man from the angels and, inversely, linked him to the 
brutes was the fact that man was also a corporeal being. On this chain, man's basic nature 
becomes evident. As an intersection of spirit and matter, the eighteenth-century man was a 
'Centaur', as Locke said,122 or, with a concept borrowed from Count de Buffon, a 'homo 
duplex'.123
In relation to knowledge, it was precisely the corporeal existence of man that accounted 
for the difference between his absurdities and the purer knowledge of the angels. In contrast to 
man, the real essences and hence the order of nature was not beyond the sensory capacity of 
the angels, and this constituted their first and fundamental advantage over man. We have 
already seen Glanvill taking note of this in passing as he, in his critique of the Renaissance 
scholars' reliance on philosophy, suggested that, 'perhaps what is most impossible in the 
apprehensions of Men', namely the comprehension of the essences, 'may be otherwise in the 
Metaphysicks, and Physiology of Angles/124 Locke gave an explanation for this difference
117 J. Glanvill, Essays (1676), Essay I, p.17; emph. in org.
118 G. Edwards, A Natural History o f  Birds (1743-51), voi. VI, Preface (unpaged); emph. in org.
119 E. Chambers, Cyclopaedia (1741), voi. I, p. xxi.
120 J. Locke, Essay (1706/1997), p. 494/IV,iii,27.
121 Addison, The Spectator, no. 519, Oct. 25, 1712, reprinted in R. J. Allen, Addison and Steele (1970), p. 437. For a 
more elaborately developed conjecture on extra-terrestrial life, see also J. Wilkins, The Discovery (1638/1973); cf. 
A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain o f  Being (1948).
122 J. Locke, quoted in J. Dunn, 'From  Applied Theolog/ (1983), p. 124.
123 G.-L. L. Buffon, Histoire naturelle (1777-89), voi. I, pp. 69ff.
124 J. Glanvill, Essays (1676), Essay I, p. 15, emph. in  org.
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between angels and man, as he pointed out that the angels, not being limited by corporeal 
sense organs, might be so created that they could 'frame, and shape to themselves organs of 
sensation or perception, as to suit them to their present design, and the circumstances of the 
object they would consider'.125
It was not only man's incapacity to perceive the real essences that made him absurd 
vis-à-vis the angels. Even with respect to the secondary qualities of things his sensorium might 
fail him as well. Due to fundamental limitations in the human sensory organs they might 
supply the mind with a distorted idea of the external world (as when a straight stick under 
water appeared gnarled to the eye; a church tower at a distance appeared to be at the size of a 
thump; or the earth, from the point of view of man, appeared to be flat126). Moreover, 
| sensations could be corrupted by, in Harris' words, 'Inattention, Idleness, the turbulence of
Passions; Education, local Sentiments, Opinions, and Beliefs'.127 Man might have come into the 
j world as a tabula rasa, but he certainly did not remain like that until the time he took up natural
j history studies. He would develop ideas of his own and interests in the world around him, and
i | both of these tended to distort the pure perception of the senses (as when the sailor saw a
j mermaid in place of a sea-cow, or the hyena was perceived to be a 'terrible monster' with the
| face of a human being,128 or when the philosopher vainly thought that every occurrence in
| nature agreed with his chimerical ideas129). Although the human sensorium would often work
I as smoothly as the camera obscura, the very possibility of a distorted representation of theJ external world in the mind instituted a fundamental uncertainty. Man's sensory organs were,
| as Glanvill concluded, 'too narrow for the vastness o f  things, and too short for deep researches:
| They make us very defective and unaccurate Reporters, and many times very deceitful and
I fallacious on es/130 In brief, the limitation of the senses and the existence of all kinds of privateJ interests constituted a principle impediment to man's knowledge.
j  The angels, moreover, were considered to be in possession of extended faculties of
j memory and reason, and hence, when contemplating on past observations of primary and
125 J. Locke, Essay (1706/1997), p. 275/11,xxiii,13.
I 126 These examples are drawn from L. Monboddo, O f the Origin (1774), vol. L pp. 25ff., and J. Glanvill, Essays
I (1676), Essay I, p. 18. Both authors discuss the problématique at length,
j 127 J. Harris, Hermes (1751), p. 406.
I 128 Examples drawn from F. Watson, The Animal World Display'd (1754), pp. 300ff., where a review of some of the
1 most common 'creatures of imagination' is given.
129 T. Sprat, The History o f the Royal Society (1667/1722), pp. 103ff. I shall return to this example below.
130 ]. Glanvill, Essays (1676), Essay I t  p. 23, emph. in org. It was this uncertainty as to the status of the sensations 
vis-à-vis the world, which the 'sceptics' were to draw to the extreme in their theories of understanding. See, for 
instance, D. Hume, A Treatise o f  Human Nature (1739-40/1978), esp. pp.66ff./I,ii,6, and pp. 180ff./Liv,l-2; and 
idem., An Enquiry (1748/1988), pp. 135ff. I shall omit the intricacies posed by the Scottish enlightenment thinkers 
to the theory of understanding here, as the problem highlighted by them in the relation between sensations and 
the world never became acute within natural history during the eighteenth century. In general, as I shall return 
to later, it was generally accepted here that what was sensed, referred to an object in the world. See J. Richetti, 
Philosophical Writing (1983), for a more general discussion.
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secondary qualities/ they would probably be enabled to, in the words of Locke, 'retain together, 
and constantly set before them, as in one picture, all their past knowledge at once'.131 A s if 
responding to Locke's characterisation of the angels' capacities, Thomas Sprat (although some 
years prior to Locke's statement) lamented the limitations to man's ditto:
How can it be imagined, that any single Mind can comprehend and sustain long enough the Weight of so m any 
different Opinions, and infinite Observations; when even the best M athematicians are soon tir'd with a long Train o f 
the most delightful Propositions, which were before made to their Hands? Or, if there could be a Man of that vastness 
of Sou!; yet how can we be assur'd, that he should hold the Seale even?132
Although the portraits of angels usually remained rather airy, their recurrent appearances in 
learned literature from the period points to two important co-ordinates for man's relationship 
with knowledge in our period.133 Firstly, at a conceptual level, a particular definition of 
knowledge was implied. Knowledge was not, as it later would be, restricted to being a human 
accomplishment. Rather than being a product of human enterprise, knowledge was 
conceptualised as a thing existing in itself, as something to be discovered, more or less 
perfectly, according to the abilities and constitution of those who sought to discover it. Truth, 
the ultimate perfection of knowledge, was a given in God's world, as the professor of moral 
philosophy and logic, James Beattie, underscored after having drawn the reader's attention to 
the distinction between truth and falsehood:
Whosoever is sensible of that distinction, and is willing to acknowledge i t  must confess, that truth is something 
fixed and determinate, depending not upon man, but upon the Author of nature.134
Knowledge constituted an ontological, rather than an epistemological category.
Secondly, at an epistemological level, in the learned literature the angels became icons 
of an unattainable perfectibility of knowledge. They highlighted a specifically human 
predicament of knowledge, where the corporeal existence of man was singled out as the source 
of his limited abilities to understand the world. The ultimate purpose of natural history might 
be to comprehend God's nature, but that world was bigger, both in extent and in depth, than 
man naturally was capable of understanding. By placing the essential dimension of the 
external world, its constitutive essences, outside the reach of man, and, at the same time, by 
making the corporeal existence of man an epistemological impediment, imperfectability 
became a premise of human knowledge.
With the emergence of such an awareness of a human predicament of knowledge 
natural, history and philosophy took, in the words of Richard Rorty, an 'epistemological
131 J. Locke, Essay (1706/1997), p. 151/11,x,9.
132 T. Sprat, The H istory o f the R oyal Society (1667/1722), p. 102; emph. in org.
133 It was not only in learned texts that angels made their appearance in this period. Also in depictions of scholars 
at work, and particularly o f the experimental philosopher at work in the laboratory, angels frequently appeared 
as divine assistants. For an analysis of the iconography o f puttis, see J. L. Heilbron, 'Domesticating Science' 
(2000), pp. 5ff.
134 J. Beattie, Essays (1776), vol. I, p. 120.
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turn':135 The fusion of epistemology and ontology, which had been possible in the Renaissance 
due to the idea of the double existence of ideas in the world and in the mind, was no longer 
sustainable with the rejection of the doctrine of innate ideas and the consequent limitation of 
man's access to the world. With the introduction of this fundamental distinction between the 
world and man, man himself and his ways of approaching the world arose as a problem.
In part, the consequences of the human predicament of knowledge were taken account 
of in that gradation of knowledge that became universally embraced in this period. On an 
analogous scale, knowledge was gradated into different types according to their 
approximation to the impossible Truth. With Truth as the ultimate extreme at one end, the 
scale ranged, within human society, from the 'morally/ or, as it was sometimes appropriately 
called, the 'humanly certain/ such as mathematical demonstrations, which could be reached by 
employing the spiritual department of reason alone, over the 'probable' and the 'plausible/ 
which included all those branches of knowledge which, like zoology, depended also on 
sensations, to knowledge's antithesis, 'opinion' and 'hearsay.'136
In part, the epistemological implications of the predicament was attempted controlled 
though the development of a rigorous self-government; of, one might say following Taylor,137 
an unprecedented disciplining of the learned persona and his way of approaching the world. 
In the following, I shall, firstly, specify the causes of the possible distortions of nature in the 
human realm, and then, turn to a discussion of the self-disciplinary precautions taken against 
such predicaments.
Self-Government
Those of the senses' deceptions which arouse as a result of limitations in the sensorium alone, 
could to some extent be rectified by the use of instruments, or, in other cases, by using other 
sensations or reason and experience as a supplement to observation (the distant sight of the 
thumb-high church tower could thus, both be corrected by touching the tower whereby its true 
dimensions would become evident; or by using reason and experience, the true size of the 
tower could equally well be inferred from a distance138). The deceptions caused by man's 
interests and preconceived notions were, in contrast, much harder to overcome.
In the History o f the Royal Society, Sprat vividly described the dangers that lurked inside 
man, threatening to overturn his ability to understand the world. Alone in his study, a scholar
135 R. Rorty, Philosophy and the M in or o f Nature (1980), p. 126.
136 Cf. B. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty (1983); I. Hacking, The Emergence o f Probability (1975).
137 C. Taylor, Sources o f the Self (1989), pp. 159ff.
138 This example is drawn from L. Monboddo, O f the Origin (1774), vol. I, pp. 25 ff.
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would naturally be inclined to delude himself in his encounter with the external world, as 
Sprat lamented: 'Such is the universal Inclination of Mankind, to be misled by themselves'.139 
Although the scholar would begin his inquiries 'with all the Sincerity imaginable', as his 
observations started to confirm his theories, he would grow 'by little and little warmer in his 
Imagination' and the corruption of knowledge would start:
the Delight of his Success swells him; he triumphs and applauses himself for having found out some im portant 
Truth: But now his Tryal begins to slacken; now Im patience and Security creep upon him; now he carelesly [sic] 
admits the whole crowd of Testimonies, that seem any w ay to confirm that Opinion, w hich he had before establish'd; 
now he stops his Survey, which ought to have gone forward to many more Particulars; and so at last this sincere, this 
invincible Observer, out of Weariness, or Presumption, becom es the most negligent in  the latter part of his Work, in 
which he ought to have been the most exact140
'Warmth of Imagination' and 'Delight of [...] success': These were the vices, as it were, which 
made the scholar go astray in his pursuit of knowledge by making him 'wear/, 'careless', and 
'presumptuous', and thus utterly unfit for discovering the Truth. 'Quod volumus, facile  
credimus', as both Glanvill and Locke141 concluded in the same vein: 'What suits our wishes is 
forwardly believed.'
In his investigation of the causes of 'common Errour' Thomas Browne made the source
of such erring perfectly clear: They were inherent to man himself, as they could be
unequivocally linked to a 'common infirmity of human nature'.142 Already in the Garden of
Eden, with Adam and Eve standing before the Tree of Wisdom, it had been obvious that
the inservient and brutall faculties controle the suggestion of reason: Pleasure and profit overswaying the in­
structions of honesty, and sensuality pertubing the reasonable commands of vertue.143
Once again, imperfections of man surfaced. And once again, the imperfections were linked to 
his corporeal existence, because the passions and self-interests, which led man astray led him 
astray so that he could gratify his private 'appetites'.144 The body's working in the private 
threatened to 'cloud minds', as Barrow claimed, and hence, to pervert the course of 
knowledge.145
There were disciplinary remedies taken against this, however. One was conceptualised 
in terms of the 'public/ Construed as ideally both a guard and a judge, the purpose of the 
learned public became to counterbalance the perverting powers of the private: '[A]bove all', as 
Sprat explained cl propos the weekly meetings of the fellows of the Royal Society, 'they have 
guarded themselves against themselves, lest the strength of their own Thoughts should lead 
them into Error'.146 The principal reason why the Renaissance scholars' practice of keeping
139 T. Sprat, The H istory o f the Royal Society (1667/1722), p. 103.
140 Ibid., p. 103, emph. in org.
141 J. Glanvill, Essays (1676), Essay I, p. 23; J. Locke, Essay (1706/1997), p. 630/IV,xx,12.
142 T. Browne, Pseudodoxia Epidem ica (1646), p. 1.
143 Ibid., p. 3.
144 Ibid.; cf. J. Locke, Essay (1706/1997), p. 630/IV,xx,12.
145 I. Barrow, O f Industry (1693), p. 155.
146 T. Sprat, The H istory o f the Royal Society (1667/1722), p. 92.
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their findings to themselves was found unacceptable by the late seventeenth century was that 
such secrecy amounted to an altogether suspicious confinement of knowledge to the private 
sphere. By the last decades of the seventeenth century it was universally agreed that 
knowledge had to be made public, not only in order for it to be shared -  which was also an 
important impetus, as we will see in the following chapters -  but also, in a sense, for it to 
become knowledge at all. With corporeal, private man made potentially untrustworthy, he 
needed a public to check his natural inclination to put the 'love [of] ourselves' before the 'love 
of Truth', in Glanvill's words.147 From this perspective, the public was made the agent, which 
guaranteed a probable knowledge, which, in a sense, kept die learned man on the right track in 
spite of his human nature.148
To counteract man's natural weaknesses, a learned public was not only required but
also a strict self-government was introduced. Barrow summed this up nicely as he
simultaneously outlined the human predicament of knowledge and its remedies:
Our business [as scholars] is to find truth; the which (even in matters of high importance) is not easily to be 
discovered; being (as a vain of silver, encompassed with earth, and mixed with dross) deeply laid in the obscurity of 
things, wrapt up in false appearances, entangeld with objections, and perplexed with debates; being therefore not 
readily discoverable; especially by minds douded with prejudices, lusts, passions, partial affections, appetites of 
honour and interest; whence to decry it requiieth the most curious observation, and solicitous drcumspection that 
can be; together with great pains in the preparation and purgation o f our minds toward the inquiry of i t 149
'Only by great pains':150 15With knowledge thus concealed as a vein of silver in the earth, a
special kind of man was required to recover it, even in a more imperfect form.
The necessary 'purgation' of the mind could only be reached by a rigorous self- 
government, as described by Glanvill after he had also emphasised the scholar's need to 
control his brutish urges:
[0]ne of the first Rules in the Art o f  Self-Government, is, to be m odest in Opinions: And this Wisdom makes Men 
considerate and wary, distrustful of their own Powers, and jealous of their Thoughts: He that would rule himself, 
must be circumspect in his Actions; and he that would be so, must not be hasty, and over confident in his Conclusions. 
'Tis Pride, and Presumption of one self that causeth such forwardness and assurance; and where those reign, there is 
neither Vertue nor Reason; No regular Government, but a miserable Tyranny of Passions and Self-will.™
The art of self-government had been developed within the conduct literature of the court, and
later in polite bourgeois society.152 In broader terms, the idea of self-government within
147 J. Glanvill, Essays (1676), Essay I, p. 23.
148 On the role of the public in early modem learning, see also S. Shapin, 'The House of Experiment* (1988), esp. 
pp. 399ff., idem., 'Stience and the Public* (1990); D. Zaret, 'Religion, Science and Printing* (1992), and for a more 
general discussion of the relation between the 'private' and the 'public* in this period, see J. Bairell, *The Public 
Prospect and the Private View* (1990).
149 I. Barrow, O f Industry (1693), p. 155.
150 Barrow was far from the only one to portray the scientific endeavour as painful: That was a common assertion. 
See also, for instance, T. Sprat, The History o f the Royal Society (1667/1722), p. 94; R. Brookes, A New and Accurate 
System (1763-72), vol. I, p. xiv.
151 J. Glanvill, Essays (1676), Essay I, p. 30; emph. in org.
152 Cf. N. Elias, The Civilising Process (2000); A. Bryson, From Courtesy to Civility (1998); P. Carter, Men and the 
Emergence o f Polite Society (2001), pp. 60ff., and passim.
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philosophy arouse simultaneously with the dispersion of new inodes of discipline in a w ider 
range of institutions: The workhouses, schools, armies, hospitals, etc.153 As Charles Taylor has 
argued, this new emphasis on self-disdpline articulated a 'growing ideal of a human agent [ ...]  
who is able to remake himself by methodological and disciplined action':
What this calls for is the ability to take an instrumental stance to one's given properties, desires, inclinations, 
tendencies, habits of thought and feeling, so that they can be worked, on, doing away with some and strengthening 
others, until one meets the desired specifications.154
Within the workhouses, schools, armies, and hospitals, the new modes of discipline m ainly 
entailed controlling and making effective subjects out of the worker, the pupil, the soldier, the 
insane. Within Polite Society, the emphasis was placed upon the social implications of self- 
government as a way to become an agreeable interlocutor in intercourse -  'A man must be 
Master of himself, his Words, his Gestures and Passions, that nothing must escape him, to give 
others a just occasion to complain of his Demeanour', as one author of a manual of manners 
underscored.155 Within learned society, the stress was laid upon the epistemological 
implications of self-discipline. As it appears from Glanvill above, the intellectual self-discipline 
had two objectives: In part, its objective was to overcome the Tyranny of Passions and Self- 
will/ in other words, to subdue all the corporeal surges. In part, self-disdpline was directed at 
making the scholar aware of his 'presumptions/ or as Barrow had it, his 'prejudices' -  all of the 
presupposed ideas and theories about how the world worked which by the time the natural 
historian commenced on his study, he would already have formed. In order to ensure that 
natural history remained a pure registration of facts, and, consequently, to ensure that no in- 
prindple polluting theories took precedence over the collecting of facts, in a sense, the natural 
historian had to strive to overcome his humanness through self-disdpline in order to act, in 
effect, as if he was an angel. Pursuing knowledge was, as Barrow wrote, 'a calling, which doth 
not employ us in bodily toil, in worldly care, in pursuits of trivial affairs, in sordid drudgeries; 
but in those angelical operations of the soul, the contemplation of truth, and attainment of 
wisdom/156
As Taylor has pointed out, such a disdplining of the learned involved both dis­
engagement and objectification.157 As the scholar himself during the seventeenth-century had 
been turned into the prindpal impediment for knowledge, he had to objectify himself and 
through self-disdpline detach himself from those prejudices, interests and passions that 
impeded the course of knowledge. With natural history defined as a study built solely on facts 
external to man, and with man turned into a homo duplex, the natural historian had to govern
153 C. Taylor, Sources o f the S elf (1989), p. 159; cf. M. Foucault, Overvâgning og straf (1977).
154 C. Taylor, Sources o f the S elf (1989), pp. 159-60.
155 Quoted in P. Carter, M en and the Emergence o f Polite Society  (2001), p. 65.
156 I. Barrow, O f Industry (1693), p. 163.
157 C. Taylor, Sources o f the S elf (1989), p. 160.
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himself in order to subdue the human weaknesses associated with corporeal existence, so that 
his spirit could work uncorruptedly in understanding matter. Only through such an 
epistemological disciplining could he approach the matters of facts -  those unbreakable, 
indisputable nuggets of experience of which material nature was made from -  as a true natural 
historian: without entertaining any opinions about them at all. Only in this way, the autonomy 
of nature and of facts could be secured. Only by this means, finally, could natural history be 
presented as the basis of zoology.
In the following two chapters I shall look more dosely into the practices of gathering 
and handling facts in order to analyse how these practices also framed the constitution of 
zoological natural history. With the advantage of the historian's hindsight I shall argue that in 
spite of the strict self-government the zoologists did not, maybe not too surprisingly, manage 
to erase themselves and their culturally framed notions in the process. Indeed, as I have tried 
to show in this chapter, already the exegetical definition of the nature of man, of nature and of 
facts only became meaningful on the background of assumptions entertained within a 
culturally integrated period, however blurred it was at its beginning (and end). Although 
incorporating ideas of a Renaissance origin -  most importantly, the idea of an invisible essence, 
which defined nature -  by the latter decades of the seventeenth century, a new and virtually 
uncontested point of view on nature, had been introduced with the advent of natural history. It 
was also through that advent that the zoological endeavour was constituted as a 
distinguishable field. Distinguished by subject matter from other branches of natural history -  
most importantly, botany and mineralogy -  the study of animals was, like botany and 
mineralogy, virtually unchallenged defined in terms of natural history from the final decades 
of the seventeenth century onwards.
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From Nature to Facts
T ransforming  Nature  into Fa c ts
In the field of natural history, impartial observation of nature herself was preferred to private 
philosophies or descriptions in books, then. In exegetical theory, facts, existing as they were 
presumed to do as indisputable nuggets of experience in nature itself, could be brought into 
light by the purged mind's simple act of observing nature. Given this conception of natural 
history one might be led to assume that the zoologists of the eighteenth century invariably 
went out into the field to see for themselves, and that hence, it was out in the wild that they 
obtained their information about the animals to be described in their books. This, however, 
was most often not the case. In practice, the transformation of 'raw nature' into learned facts 
involved more than unmediatedly letting animals free in the wild to imprint themselves on the 
mind's mirror, as we will see in the present chapter. To begin with, we may note that 
'observing' and 'describing from nature' did not necessarily equal going out into the bosom of 
nature to observe for oneself, but in practice could have a much more extended meaning.
It is not that the zoologists, nor, indeed, gentlefolk more generally, not occasionally 
roamed the countryside and the coast, the mountains and the woods.1 Richard Brookes, for 
instance, made a plea for his six volumes on the three kingdoms of nature by pointing out that 
he himself had visited a 'variety of countries' both in America and Africa, and hence, had been 
enabled to make 'some improvements' in zoology, since he was thereby 'less liable to be
1 The popularity among gentlefolk of spending time in nature, and here also collecting flowers or butterflies, was 
closely connected to a new taste for nature in the wild, often conceptualised in terms of 'picturesque landscape' 
and 'sentimental sensibilities/ which arose within Polite Society during the eighteenth century. For an analysis 
of the changing conception of nature, see K. Thomas, M an and the N atural W orld (1983), esp. pp. 254-69; on the 
advent o f picturesque landscape, see M. Andrews, The Search fo r  the Picturesque (1989); E. Hirsch, 'Introduction' 
(1995); K. W. Jorgensen, 'Fittoreske prospekter' (1997).
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imposed upon by the hearsay relations of credulity'.2 George Edwards emphasised that he had
drawn and described the birds and animals in his books 'directly from nature', stressing,
moreover, that he 'chose [sic] to have old Descriptions farthest from my mind, when I describe
any thing, because I thought Nature herself the best Director'.3 Mark Catesby was grateful to
'the kind dispensation of Providence' for having allowed him to collect 'materials' for his book
'from the living subjects themselves, and in their native abodes' in North Carolina and the
Bahamas, because this was 'so very essential to a Natural Historian'. As he explained:
(T]he Picture of an Animal, taken from its stuffed skin or case, can afford but a very imperfect idea of die creature, 
compared with what is done from the Life, not only as to what regards their Shape, Spirit, and Gesture, but also 
their beautiful colours.4
Turning from the statements of the virtues of observation to the action itself, we find, for 
instance, in the manuscript remains of William Anderon, careful descriptions and some 
drawings of beetles, leeches, caterpillars, butterflies, 'the water sou/ die 'pediculus anquaticus/ 
different worms and various animalculae.5 Likewise, we find meticulous observations made by 
Gilbert White in the columns of the pre-printed The Naturalist's Journal during a six-year 
period, where almost everyday, he took note of the changes in temperature, barometer 
readings, and the weather in general, the foliation and defoliation of trees, the flowering of 
plants, the migration of birds, the appearance and disappearance of insects, and the life of 
animals more generally. To give just one more example, we find Thomas Pennant who set out 
on a tour to Scotland because, as he said in the introduction to the travel account later 
published, it had appeared to him to be 'far more prudent to visit the whole than part of my 
country' in order 'to speak with more precision of the subjects' which were dealt with in his 
zoological works.6
In the zoological literature, it is notable, however, how small a part of the descriptions 
of animals were actually based on an author's own observations in the field. With regard to the 
general, taxonomic works, this might, of course, be explained by the fact that it was practically 
impossible to observe all of the world's animals by one self, or even just one branch of them -  
regardless of whether it was quadrupeds, birds, insects or fishes. But even such naturalists as 
Edwards, Catesby or White who underscored the fact that they had taken their descriptions 
'from real nature', as Edwards put it elsewhere,7 actually more often than not did not stand in 
the middle of the field, taking notes and making drawings in the bosom of nature. The vast 
majority of Edwards' birds and other animals were either caged or, more often as it appears,
2 R. Brookes, A New and A ccurate System (1763-72), vol. I, xiv.
3 G. Edwards, A Natural H istory o f  Birds (1743-51), vol. I, pp. xix, xvii.
4 M. Catesby, The Natural H istory o f Carolina (1731-43), vol. II, p. 20.
5 W. Anderon, Manuscript remains, British Library, Add. 27,966, ££.184.
6 T. Pennant, A Tour in Scotland (1772), p. iv.
7 G. Edwards, Gleanings o f N atural History (1758-64), vol. II, p. x.
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dried and stuffed; Catesby, who in his book praised Providence for enabling him to observe 
live specimens in their "native abode/ as it appears from one of his letter, bought a "Negro boy" 
for 20 pounds Sterling because he found it too hot to go out collecting for himself in the North 
Carolinean summer;8 White had numerous specimens "procured" -  killed by and brought to 
him by servants; and Pennant did not set out on his tour of Scotland until after he had finished 
three volumes of his British Zoology (a work, it should be noted, which was not organised 
geographically, but taxonomically).9
This is not to suggest that the natural historians did not ever base their descriptions on 
'genuine observations made in the field," for certainly they did that at times. This is rather to 
suggest that for observation of nature to take place, and hence essentially for facts to emerge, it 
was not necessary to go out into the field oneself. It could just as well be done in other ways and 
in other places, and one could still legitimately claim that one was describing "directly from 
Nature." The field did not necessarily equal nature, and facts were not necessarily bom through 
an encounter with an animal in its natural habitat.
In this chapter, I shall examine how facts were bom  in practice. The contemporary 
ideas of what observing nature involved were important in framing the formation of facts, and 
I shall discuss these as I go along. But questioning the very idea of the possibility of 
transparent observation and representation, and arguing that we have to look at the 
structuring practices through which categories, like that of "facts," are constructed and made 
meaningful from the natives" point of view, as I did in Chapter 1, means that we also have to 
turn our attention to what happened at the level of practices in the transformation of raw 
nature into facts, and how these practices contributed to the conceptualisation of facts.
To begin with, a transformation of raw nature into facts could be said to imply a 
selection. Out of the infinitude of natural productions, which potentially could be observed, 
some would, in the first place, be selected as objects to be actually worked on. Not only 
eighteenth-century zoology, but, as Lorraine Daston and Peter Gallison have argued, every 
science which confronts this problem of "selecting and constituting ""working objects/" as 
opposed to the too plentiful and too various natural objects": "No science can do without such 
standardized working objects, for unrefined natural objects are too quirkily particular to 
cooperate in generalisations and comparisons/10 In exegetical theory, the zoologists" field of 
objects might be each and every animal in the world, but in practice, they, as other scientists
8 M. Catesby to W. Sherard, Royal Society, London, Sh. 165.
9 Often rather than describing the animals he met on his tour 'from nature,' Pennant, moreover, usually referred 
the reader of the Tour in Scotland to his zoological works when an animal appeared to be in need of a 
description at all. This tendency to refer to books rather than to describe from nature, though not the rule, was 
by no means uncommon in travel accounts from the period, see, for instance, also W. Paterson, A Narrative o f 
Four Journeys (1789), e.g. pp. 9 ,12 ,13 .
10 L. Daston and P. Gallison, 'The Image of Objectivity' (1992), p. 85.
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also do, restricted this unmanageably larged and particularised field drastically, by delimiting 
a field of objects, and by turning these objects into standardised and, thus, manageable objects 
which they could work on. In this way, delimiting a field and constructing working objects 
entails selection.11 The selection of working objects, on one hand, involves a mere choosing of 
some of raw nature's phenomena, of, say, one animal rather than another, among all of 
nature's productions. It involves a selection of animals, which for one reason or another are 
deemed to be worth the attention of the zoologists. On the other hand, these selected 
phenomena are further fashioned in the representation as standardised working objects as 
certain traits in them here are highlighted, while others are ignored, and, furthermore, as they 
are described as objects of a particular kind. The natural objects are hence in representation 
construed in specific ways, whereby becoming working objects, facts, suitable for zoology.
Secondly, working objects not only need to be selected and through representation 
construed as a particular kind of objects, they also need to be validated as matters of facts to 
become acceptable for scientists as credible building blocks which can be worked on in science, 
as other authors have pointed out.12 Practices of authorising matters as facts are, then, also at 
work in the fashioning of working objects.
Finally, a social dimension is also at play in this transformation of raw nature into facts. 
In the process, multiple different people may, as was the case in eighteenth-century zoology, 
be involved each with their different roles to play.
From this perspective, facts never simply existed in nature in order to be observed. 
Although part of the nature of facts in eighteenth-century natural history was certainly also 
defined by the indigenous idea of facts as actually existing in nature waiting to be observed, 
they were in practice only introduced into zoological discourse through a complex 
epistemological and social process. In practice, the observation of nature was not only framed 
by exegetical theory, but also mediated by practices of selection, of validation, and of a sodal 
division of labour in this process.
It is this complex process that I shall attempt to untangle in the present chapter by 
examining these three dimensions in the act of transforming raw nature into facts. I shall, 
firstly, discuss a certain bias in the zoologists' mode of selecting individual specimens, which 
set the stage for deciding what was interesting to choose and, hence, to collect from nature. 
Then, zooming out, I shall examine the social division of labour in the process of collecting 
such specimens, as well as the modes of validating matters of facts brought into play here. 
Turning to the representation of specimens in both writing and illustrations I then examine 
how the animals in the zoologists' accounts were standardised as working objects through
FROM NATURE TO FACTS
11 Ibid.
12 Cf. esp. S. Shapin, A Social H istory o f Truth (1994); P. Dear, 'Totius in verba* (1985).
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different modes of representation -  as zoological facts, characterised by particular attributes. In 
conclusion I shall, finally, return to the question of why it was that nature could equally w ell 
be observed in, as well as away from the field.
Collecting  A nimals 
Selecting Specimens
Something like an urge for information about animals of all kinds, and espécially for 'non­
descripts' -  animals that had never before been described (by any learned European, in any 
case) -  seems to have prevailed among eighteenth-century zoologists. All kinds of people w ere 
called upon to observe, describe and draw, collect and preserve. In letter after letter, zoologists 
implored correspondents at home and abroad to send them information about animals. Gilbert 
White of Selbome, for instance, had written to an acquaintance at Gilbraltar, and as he told 
Thomas Pennant,
urged him to take up the study of Nature a little; to habitude his mind to attend to the migration of birds & fishes; 
and to the plants, fossils, & insects of that part of the world,13
Thomas Pennant himself, notoriously asking for some kind of information or another in every 
single one of his letters, confessed his thirst for specimens to Lord Lyttleton, after the Lord in 
response to a previous letter had gone through numerous hardships in order to collect some 
shells and muscles for Pennant in a distant North England river:
my thirst after natural history is unquenchable, & should I give loose to my wishes I should request your Lordship 
& every Prelate on the Bench to give in charge to their Qergy to collect everything uncommon in the animal 
Kingdom & and to transmit it to my museum.
But I shall have modesty and moderation enough left to suppress my desires; and I say that should 
anything rare fall in the way of your friends, the communication would be extremely acceptable.14
As we have seen in the previous chapter, in exegetical theory, all natural productions,
regardless of their extraordinarily or triviality would be equally interesting to the natural
historian. In zoology, every animal (except for the monstrous, anomalous ones) from the
smallest animalcula to the orang-utan, from the armadillo to the mole were, in principle,
entitled to equal attention, and ought to be collected all alike. This doctrine of 'the importance
of everything'15 is apparent in contemporary guidebooks on how to collect. John Woodward,
for instance, giving directions for the general collection of natural history items, pointed out
that,
13 G. White to T. Pennant, Nov. 28,1768, British Library, Add. 35,138, f.22.
14 T. Pennant to Lord Lyttleton, June 28,1768, British Library, Stowe 754, f.247.
15 The concept is taken from M. Abenius, 'Allt àr viktigt' (1971), who analyses the representational implications of 
this doctrine in the works of Linné in this article.
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fa the Choice of these Things, neglect not any, tho' the most ordinary and trivial; the Commonest Peble or Flint Cockle 
or Oyster-shell, Grass, Moss, Fern, or Thistle, will be as useful, and as proper to be gathered  and sent, as any the rarest 
productions of the Country.16
In practice, however, a certain pattern of selectivity is evident. In some preliminary thoughts 
on the collecting of birds in foreign places, George Edwards suggested that every traveller 
should make himself thoroughly acquainted with the natural history of his native country 
before he went abroad, in order not to 'expose himself, as many have done, by going abroad, 
telling us at their return many such things as were already known, or might have been easily 
discovered in our own Country/17 In particular, in travel accounts from the period this demand 
for the unfamiliar and unknown was taken ad notam. John Barrow, for instance, in his Account 
o f Travels into the interior Parts o f Southern Africa, mentioned solely the already well-known 
animals he encountered by name, and only gave a more elaborate description of 'non­
descripts/ the slightly or insufficiently described animals, or such animals as would appear to 
have a lasting attraction for the public's imagination (for instance, the lion and the ostrich).18 
The same pattern can be observed in John Bell's description of animals he encountered on his 
travels in the Asian parts of Russia. Near Astrachan, for instance, he met with 'a great variety 
of uncommon birds, whereof I shall describe a few that seemed most extraordinary'.19 Four 
birds, three of which were so extraordinary that they did not even have a name, were then 
described, before Bell, not untypically, noted that "There are also partridges and bustards, 
which need no description I...]'.20 There was no chance of exposing one's ignorance here.
This does not mean that animals already known were never collected or described 
anew. Obviously they were. But it does mean that although every animal, in principle, was 
claimed to be as interesting as the next, the high value put on the new and uncommon -  and 
the accompanying exposure of those who were not familiar with the limits of what was 
common within zoology -  in practice came to undermine the doctrine of 'everything is 
important' at this practical level of collecting. It was this preoccupation with the new and the 
rare that often guided the actual mechanism of inclusion and exclusion of animals in the 
process of selection in the field.
The most valued of all were the non-descripts. Zoologists would congratulate each 
other on the 'discovery' of one;21 and they would present them as gifts to patrons,22 or to 
friends.23 The non-descripts might not quite make the world go round for the zoologists as one
16 J. Woodward, B rief Instructions (1696), p. 10; emph. in org.
17 G. Edwards, A Natural History o f Birds (1743-51), vol. I, pp. x-xi.
18 For a particular poignant example of this mechanism of in- and exclusion, see J. Barrow, An Account o f Travels 
(1801-04), vol. I, pp. 217-31.
19 J. Bell, Travels (1763), vol. I, p. 40.
20 Ibid., p. 41.
21 See for instance G. White to T. Pennant, Jul. 25,1768, British Library, Add. 35,138, f.16.
22 E.g. M. Catesby to H. Sloane, May 10,1723, British Library, SI. 4046, ff.352-3.
23 E.g. D. Skene to J. Ellis, Jul. 5,1765, Linnean Society, London, Ellis Corr., vol.II.95.
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satirical author suggested;24 but they do indicate a certain, systematic bias towards the rare in 
the practiced selection of animals. This quest for the rare even spilled over into at least some of 
those zoological books, which were primarily concerned with the description of specimens. 
Balancing on a knife's edge between the unacceptable marvels, associated with the 
Renaissance, and the acceptable appreciation of the non-descripts and the rare, we find 
zoologists presenting their books with titles such as: A Natural History o f Uncommon Birds, and  
o f some Other Rare and Undescribed Animals, Quadrupeds, Reptiles, Fishes, Insects, &c (Edwards, 
1743-51); New Illustrations o f Zoology, Containing Fifty Coloured Plates o f New, Curious, and non- 
descript Birds, with a Few Quadrupeds, Reptiles and Insects. Together zoith a Short and Scientific 
Description o f the Same (Brown, 1776); or still more discreet: A Natural History: Containing many 
not common Observations (Blount, 1693).25
This practice of selection might, of course, not be so surprising given the fact that the 
unknown within the logic of taxonomic zoology would correspond to 'missing links' in the 
taxonomic schemes and hence be especially valuable in elucidating the Great Chain of Being, 
as we later shall see. The downright exposure of those who dwelled upon the familiar, 
however, indicates that there was more to this than simply a search for missing links. Being 
able to determine something as unknown, and something as known, some animals as worthy 
of description, and others as not, indicated that a man was learned and familiar with the field 
of zoology. Describing the non-descripts as non-descripts, and the common as common, a man 
could position himself, and would be more likely to be accepted as a man of learning whose 
accounts would more readily be trusted, as also Edwards intimated above. Although, in 
principle, all natural productions were equally interesting there were good reasons, then, to 
ignore Woodward's and Bacon's command and choose some of the more uncommon creatures.
Although the common animals would also be collected, if not always so eagerly, or 
quite so frequently as the non-descripts and rare, there was one category of animals which, 
entirely in tune with Bacon's commands, only rarely would be picked out at all: the deformed, 
anomalous individuals. In Chapter 6 ,1 shall return to the question of why these were virtually
24 Tw ice happy he whose ten years search decries 
Some Non descript, a silbert maggot's size:
Though ign'rance think, that since this globe has run 
So many a stated circle round the sun,
So many a year had held compact and fair,
Unblest with knowledge of this insect rare.
It might perchance, had it not yet been found,
Have held together still, and still gone round/
Anonymous, An H istoric Epistle (1775), p. 17; emph. in org.
25 An analogous pattern of selectivity can also be observed in descriptions of species. Although every known 
species would obviously be mentioned in a taxonomic account, there was a d ear tendency to pass over the most 
common animals very quickly, with such phrases, as -  in this case with reference to the common mouse -  'An 
animal that needs no description/ T. Pennant, Synopsis o f Quadrupeds (1771), p. 229.
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excluded from zoology altogether. For now it suffices to observe that at the level of individuals 
it would be the common and the extraordinary, with the emphasis on the latter, which were 
generally chose from the infinitude of nature's productions, as zoologically interesting animals.
The Gatherers
So far I have talked as though the choosing of animals in nature happened by itself. Obviously 
it didn't. Although the zoologists' ideas of what was zoologically interesting phenomena 
framed the actual process of collecting, the animals had, in a concrete and trivial sense, to be 
collected by someone as well.
We have already seen above that while the zoologists at times would go out into the 
bosom of nature to collect, they were far from alone in this endeavour. Indeed, the zoologists 
relied on a wide range of people to collect and convey either specimens or information about 
specimens to them. We might get a first indication of the extent of gatherers in the large 
networks of correspondents maintained by the zoologists. Hence Pennant, for instance, made 
frequent references in all of his zoological books to multiple people both at home and abroad 
that had contributed in some way or another with information. Likewise, John Ray had 
numerous helpers both all over Britain and abroad who sent him information on every parts of 
natural history.26 Sir Joseph Banks, to give one last example, though not a significant author 
himself, became eminently important in the latter part of the eighteenth century as one of the 
period's greatest collectors. According to David Mackay, he had at least 126 persons collecting 
for him outside Europe in the period 1770-1820, and, it seems reasonable to assume, probably 
also a fair number within.27
Although it was primarily, but not exclusively, the contributions of male helpers of 
some social standing that would be acknowledged in die printed accounts, it is noteworthy 
that, in practice, also people of the lower echelons were engaged in the gathering of specimens. 
The enterprise of gathering cut through social strata. Hence, the Royal Society addressed their 
Directions on how to observe and collect abroad to seamen in general.28 Likewise, John 
Woodward stressed in his manual of collecting, after having detailed how different animals 
should be collected and preserved, that there
are many of these things, especially the gathering and preserving of Insects, Shells, Plants, Minerals, &c. [that] may be 
done by the Hands o f Servants; and that too at their spare and leisure times.29
26 Some of the helpers are explicitly thanked in J. Ray, 'The Preface' (1728) (unpaged); others have been detected 
by C  E. Raven, John Ray (1986), passim.
27 D. Mackay, 'Agents of Empire' (1996), p. 39; cf. D, P. Miller, 'Joseph Banks' (1996).
28 Royal Society, 'Directions for Sea-Men' (1665).
29 J. Woodward, Brief Instructions (1696), p, 16; emph. in org.
89
CHAPTER 3
Likewise, in the letters and notebooks of naturalists we find servants, peasants, women, black 
people and even slaves collecting, and contributing information. White, for instance, appears to 
have had a horde of 'procurers/ as they were called, engaged in collecting for him, among 
these some were his own servants, and some peasants from the neighbourhood. 'One of m y 
procurers', he told Pennant in letter, had brought him 'a new Salicaria' which the procurer had 
recently shot;30 another day a procurer brought him a 'Gallincula ochra' and a 'Blalus porzaha'. 
and so on.31 Both John Ellis and David Skene hired people to collect for them at the seaside -  in 
Ellis' case, some fishermen, and in Skene's case, a parson.32 The Reverend William Borlase had 
his wife out collecting.33
At the margins of the known world, natural history became intermingled with the 
colonial enterprise as colonial agents opened up new land not only for exploit and commerce 
but also for research. Often the two enterprises went hand in hand. As Bernard Smith notes 
regarding colonial-explorative ships like Captain Cook's, they 'combined the values of a 
fortress and a travelling laboratory'.34 To some extent, the exotic fields opened up by the 
colonial expanse would be brought under investigation if not by state organised research, then 
at least by state patronised researchers.35 Such was, most spectacularly, the case with the three 
expeditions of Captain Cook to the South Sea. On each expedition instructions were carried 
from both the Admirality and the Royal Society on how to carefully and accurately observe all 
kinds of natural phenomena and collect specimens.36 In addition, the ships had been equipped 
with facilities and a natural historian crew to take care of this research.37 In addition to Cook, a 
number of other expeditions where scientific explorations played at least a part were launched 
during the eighteenth century, although none rivalled the gathering of zoological specimens of
30 G. White to T. Pennant, May 29,1769, British Library, Add. 35,138, ff. 27-8,
31 G. White to Royal Society, Nov. 4,1774, Royal Society, London, L&P.VI.95; underlining in org.
32 J. Ellis, A Description o f the Mangostan (1775), p. xi; D. Skene to J. Ellis, Dec. 5, 1765, Linnean Society, London, 
Ellis Corr., vol.II.97.
33 W. Borlase to J. Ellis, May 25,1754, Linnean Society, London, Ellis Corr., vol.1.34.
34 B. S. Smith, European Vision and the South Pacific (1960), p. 2. For a discussion of relations between science and 
colonialism, see ibid., passim; M. L. Pratt Im perial Eyes (1992), Part I; and for an analysis of the political and 
military-strategic motivation to scientific exploration, see A. Frost, 'Science for Political Purposes' (1988); D. A. 
Baugh, 'Seapower and Science' (1990).
35 See J. Gascoigne, Science in the Service o f Empire (1998), for an analysis of the emergence of more organised and 
comprehensive research under the auspices of the state around 1800.
36 B. S. Smith, European Vision and the South Pacific (1960), pp. Iff.
37 Each expedition carried several natural historians -  Sir Joseph Banks as the natural historian in charge, and 
Daniel Solander and Herman Sporig as assistants on the first expedition; John Reinhold Forster and his son 
George Forster and the astronomer and the meteorologist William Wales on the second one; and, finally, the 
two Forsters on the third. In addition also one or two artists, engaged with, among other things, making 
drawings and paintings of natural specimens were brought along (Alexander Bucham and Sydney Parkinson 
on the first, William Hodges on the second, and John Webber on the third). For a more elaborate treatment of 
the Cook-expeditions seen in relation to natural history and art, see B. S. Smith, European Vision and the South 
Pacific (1960), esp. chs. 2-4.
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111. 3.1 M e t h o d s  o f  CATCHING BIRDS (F. W illughby and ƒ. Ray, The O rn ithology, 1678/1972). W illughby 
and R ay  not on ly  described  and classified a w id e  range of b irds in  their influential ornithological 
w ork ; they also offered  ad vice  on how  to catch b ird s w ith this engraving. T hough devising m ethod s 
for catching b ird s m ay h av e  been the learned m en 's  task, the actual act o f catching them  -  th e  
d ressing  up in anim al m ask s (see the lower left co m er), or the hunting d ow n  o f birds w ith  dog an d  
nests -  w as the servan ts' jo b .
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the Cook expeditions,38 and few were as lavishly equipped: Dampier, Wallis, Vancouver. 
Under the auspices of the East India Company (though a private company, it obtained state­
like functions in India in the latter part of the eighteenth century39), research was carried out 
into the natural history of India under the auspices of the Asiatic Society in Calcutta and later 
also at the College at Fort Williams.40
However, most of the zoological investigations abroad would be carried out under 
more informal circumstances. Travellers, who voyaged for a number of different reasons and 
usually with some kind of connection to the colonial expanse, gathered information and 
specimens that came to play a crucial role in the zoological enterprise. In Aleppo, Syria, 
Alexander Russel collected and described fish, among other things,*41 at the Cape of Good 
Hope, the Lieutenant William Paterson and John Barrow, auditor-general of public accounts, 
spent their spare time collecting information about South African nature, among other things;42 
in New South Wales, the Surgeon General John White and the Captain of the marines William 
Tench were both collecting around Sidney Cove, Port Jackson;43 in South American Guiana, the 
physician Edward Bancroft was gathering all kinds of information about the natural history of 
that area,44 etc. Innumerable people were engaged or engaging themselves in the collecting of 
information and the gathering of specimens abroad.
Men such as these could communicate their observations, or even specimens, in letters 
and boxes to zoologically interested friends in Britain. They might also present their findings 
themselves in published accounts, and in that case most often as part of a travel account. 
Indeed, during the eighteenth century, information on the natural history of an area visited 
became an almost obligatory part of any travel account.45
Furthermore, Travellers of a high social standing would at times engage local people to 
help them in their endeavour as well. We have already heard of Mark Catesby who bought a 
'Negro Boy' to collect for him in the hot Carolinean summer. In Guiana, Bancroft paid every 
Indian who brought him a dead snake a glass of rum, and was thus enabled to collect more 
than three hundred snakes in just three months,*46 and at the Turkish sea side, Mordach
38 On the zoological specimens collected on Cook's expeditions, and on their fate in Britain, see P. J. P. Whitehead, 
'Zoological Specimens' (1969).
39 P. Spear, The British in India' (1961).
40 D. Kopf, British Orientalism  (1969), pp. 48ff.; D. Mackay, 'Agents of Empire' (1996), p. 43; cf. S. W. Jones, 'The 
Tenth Aniversary Discourse' (1793/1993).
41 A. Russel, 'An Account' (1756).
42 W. Paterson, A Narrative o f Four Journeys (1789); J. Barrow, An Account o f Travels (1801-04).
43 C. W. Tench, A Narrative o f the Expedition (1789); J. White, Journal o f a Voyage to New South Wales (1790).
44 E. Bancroft, An Essay on the Natural History o f Guiana (1769).
45 M. L. Pratt, Imperial Eyes (1992), pp. 27-8.
46 E. Bancroft, An Essay on the Natural History o f Guiana (1769), pp. 220-1.
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Mackenzie and the British ambassador in Constantinoble hired some fishermen 'to rag for 
some rock Oysters'.47
Lords and gentlefolk, men and women, travellers, black people and white people, 
servants, savages and slaves -  they were all involved in the gathering of specimens and 
zoological information. At this level, the zoological enterprise was generously inclusive.
The Credibility of Collectors, the Truth of Facts
As previously indicated, 'the vulgari and the women were not regarded as the trustworthiest 
of people. We might, in passing, also note that the same held true for travellers in general. 
'[Travellers', John Millar hence observed, had a 'character and situation in literature [which] 
neither set themselves above the suspicion of being easily deceived, nor of endeavouring to  
misrepresent the facts which they have related.'48 Fuelled by the exposure of a number o f 
frauds, similar fears were voiced time and again of the travellers filling out the space between 
the known and the unknown with fabrics of their own. As it was also often explained, this w as 
done in order to make their accounts more saleable.49 Nevertheless, the zoological information 
presented in the travel accounts, just like that received from common people, was frequently 
made use of by the zoologists.50
As mentioned in Chapter 1, in recent decades, especially within studies of seventeenth- 
century experimental philosophy it has been argued that credibility was intimately tied to 
social position.51 We saw there, furthermore, how this relation between the gentleman and the 
natural historian was weakened in some measure during our period, as the natural historians 
increasingly defined their position in terms of learning. We also saw, however, how being a 
gentleman still was virtually a prerequisite for being a scholar, even if being so was no longer 
enough, because the gentleman was still rather, much rather, to be trusted that 'the vulgari or 
women for that matter. In h e  face of this conception of credibility as defined if not exclusively, 
then at least still partially in terms of social position, how was it possible within eighteenth- 
century zoology to allow such untrustworthy people as the vulgar and the travellers to 
contribute information? How could they offer credible information on animals?
47 M. Mackenzie to J. Ellis, Jan. 3,1758, Unnean Society, London, Ellis Com , vol.II.15.
48 J. Millar, Observations (1771), p. xiii.
49 For a more general discussion of the precarious relation between travellers and the truth in eighteenth-century 
Britain, see C. L. Batten, Pleasurable Instructions (1978), pp. 4ff., 38ff., 63ff., and passim .
50 For a more general discussion of what kind of knowledge was provided by and appropriated from travel 
literature, see D. Carey, 'Compiling Nature's History' (1997); P. J. Marshall and G. Williams, The Great Map o f 
Mankind (1982), ch. 2.
51 P. Dear, 'Totius in verba' (1985); S. Shapin, A Social H istory o f Truth (1994).
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I shall suggest, firstly, that the inclusion of these 'unlearned' people into the zoological 
endeavour at this level of gathering had something to do with the particular kind of facts that 
the zoologists were dealing with. This becomes especially dear if we compare the zoological 
type of facts with those of the experimental philosophers, because, in contrast to the zoologists, 
their type of facts would also during the eighteenth-century require a man of learning as their 
explidt originator in order for them to become valid as matters of fact at all.52
As Lorraine Daston reminds us, facts 'are protean creatures [...;] the salient properties 
of, say, statistical and anomalous facts differ crucially'.53 So, I will suggest, did the salient 
properties of experimental facts and zoological facts differ as well. The facts of experimental 
philosophy were, in a fundamental sense, not given from the outset. They had to be produced 
in some way or another in the laboratory, often through complicated experiments which could 
not always be reproduced in other laboratories by other experimental philosophers, and which 
would, in any case, not be attempted reproduced by the vast majority of readers. There was 
something transient, less tangible about this kind of experimental facts. The experimental 
philosopher not only had to be trusted on his observation of a fact; he had also -  and the 
importance of this is dearly evident in the detailed laboratory reports, which emerged in this 
period, redting every step in the course of the experiment54 -  to be trusted on his word that his 
way of manipulating matter through the experiments actually revealed the facts.
In contrast, the facts of zoology were not predicated on that kind of manipulation of
matter. As we shall see, although zoologists might have applied a particular gaze, their facts
were of a kind which, on their own account, could be readily observed: "The nature of things',
one writer observed, 'depends on their properties, alike discernible by all who will examine
them with equal care and with the same Degree of Attention.'55 Moreover, as we have seen in
the previous chapter, that kind of readily observable facts, regardless of whether one was
gentle or vulgar, learned or traveller would invariably be reflected on one's mind. A common
man or a traveller might distort the impressions made upon his mind's mirror when
communicating them by colouring his account with his private interests or general ignorance.
But as eighteenth-century men and women all alike had minds that reflected the objects of the
world in the same manner, they might also simply be telling the truth. As Sprat pointed out, in
some ways the vulgar might even be better observers than some of the learned men would be,
since the unlearned did not have any private, philosophical schemes of their own to pursue:
If we cannot have a sufficient Choice of those that are skill'd in all D ivine and Humam  [sic] Things [to gather 
information...] it suffices, if many of them be plain, diligent, and laborious Observers: such, who though they bring
52 For an analysis of the ways such authorisation could work, see S. Schaffer, 'Self Evidence' (1994).
53 L. Daston, 'Historical Epistemology' (1994), p. 284.
54 On such laboratory reports, see P. Dear, Discipline and Experience (1995), pp. 13ff.; S. Shapin and S. Schaffer, 
Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985), pp. 60f.
55 Anonymous, Memoirs o f the Revolution (1760), p. 2.
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not much Knowledge, yet bring their Hand, and their Eyes uncorrupted: such as have not their Brains infected by  
false Images, and can honest assist in the exam ining and registering  what the others represent to their View.*6
If ideal collectors could not be found in sufficient numbers, then, one would have to do w ith
those who were at hand: the slaves, the servants, the travellers.56 7 But this was only possible
within zoology, in contrast to experimental philosophy, because the facts dealt with in  the
latter case were of a different kind.
Secondly, the zoologists did not simply leave it at that, as is evident from the zoological 
books themselves. The possibility of frauds and distortions w as countered by a num ber o f 
strategies of critical appropriation of information that emerged in this period. To begin with, 
the contents of a report itself could be evaluated. By comparing a reported observation on a 
novel subject to the stock of knowledge already at hand, or, just as often, to one's idea of 'the 
common course of nature/ the truth of a proposition could in some cases be determined. Thus, 
Thomas Browne, for instance, related how some authors had claimed that the offspring of the 
bear was bom 'informous and unshapen', and that it was the mother bear who after their birth 
'fashioneth (them] after by licking them over\ This report, however, had to be rejected. Not 
only had other authors reported the bear to conceive fully-fashioned offspring; what was more, 
the very idea of the newborn bear as a formless bundle was also in conflict with the way nature 
was known to work:
It is moreover injurious unto reason, and much im pugeth the course and providence of nature, to conceive a birth 
should be ordained before there is a formation!.]58
In the idea of nature's common course, two principle dimensions merged. Firstly, the idea, as is 
dearly indicated here, implied a normative dimension, an idea of nature as following some 
settled standards in her mode of producing animals that precluded the production of certain 
kinds of creatures (such as formless bear babies). The idea of nature's common course was, in 
addition, also based on a notion of normativity -  it relied on ideas about what normal as 
opposed to abnormal among the animals actually living in the world (a one-headed snake as 
opposed to a two-headed snake, for instance). While the last dimension became of importance 
in the formation of species, as we shall see in more detail in Chapter 6, it was the first 
dimension which was of significance in the evaluation of second hand reports, as knowledge of 
nature's common standards of production could be transposed from the realm of the known to 
the realm of the unknown. The difficult thing with relying on such a transposition in the 
evaluation of reports was, however, that the zoologists did not always know all of nature's 
ways of working. 'I  am far from thinking that the Operations of Nature should be limited by 
the very little that we know of them/ Davis Skene hence underscored in a letter to John Ellis:
56 T. Sprat, The H istory o f the Royal Society (1667/1722), pp. 72-3; emph. in org.
57 Also cf. D. Carey, 'Compiling Nature's History' (1997).
58 T. Browne, Pseudodoxia Epidemica (1646), p. 116.
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She may have produc'd many modes of Existence of which as yet we are entirely ignorant -  but for fear of being 
confin'd in our way of thinking we should not run mad -  Where the proofs are nearly equal, the probability I think, 
is always on the side of whatever is most analogous to the common course of Nature.59
Although knowledge of nature's common course might help to determine what were matters
of facts, it did not work invariably, then. At times reports on animals defying any of nature's
known standards turned out to be true. Such was the case with the giraffe, for instance, which
Thomas Pennant himself had to see a stuffed specimen of in Leyden in order to believe in its
existence: 'otherwise', as he admitted after having described it in his Synopsis, '[I] might
possibly have entertained doubts in respect to the existence of so extraordinary a quadruped.'60
Relying on nature's common course did not always suffice in evaluating zoological
information.
When it was not possible for the zoologist himself to verify the existence of extra­
ordinary creatures, more witnesses than one would sometimes do the trick. Having described 
how some snakes at Cape Horn would lure birds into their vicinity by charms of their eyes so 
that they could catch them, John Barrow, himself a traveller in South Africa but not having 
been lucky enough to witness such an event, assured his readers that they might believe such 
snakes existed as many other people had witnessed their peculiar way of catching prey:
When a fact is mentioned of so extraordinary a nature that the generality o f mankind could not have observed it, 
individual testimony is not always of sufficient force to establish general belief. [...V ]ery few of the peasantry will 
hesitate to vouch for the truth of it from personal observation.61 62
Likewise Henry Smeathman, describing the extraordinary 'commonwealths' of some African 
white ants, he had occasion to observe on a journey in Africa (and to which we shall later have 
occasion to return), stressed:
The sagacity of these little insects is so infinitely beyond that of any other animals I have ever heard of, that it is 
possible the account I have here communicated would not appear credible to many, without such vouchers and 
such corroborating testimony as I am fortunately able to produce, and are now before you. There are also many 
living witnesses in England to most of the extraordinary relations that I have given, so that 1 hope to have full credit 
for such remarks as no one but myself has properly had time and opportunities enough to make, and which are not 
susceptible of demonstration, except in those places where the insects are found.“
In the same vein, and as the most frequently used method of validating other people's claims 
about extraordinary animals in the zoological literature, an author might compare descriptions 
of the same animal in a number of sources in order to determine the matter of the fact63 
Probability was linked to frequency.64
59 D. Skene to J. Ellis, Jim. 5,1765, Linnean Society, London, Ellis Corn, vol.II.95.
60 T. Pennant Synopsis o f Quadrupeds (1771), p. 21.
61 J. Barrow, An Account o f Travels (1801-04), vol. L p. 178; the same snakes were described in Anonymous, 77« 
N aturalist's Pocket M agazine (1799-1802), vol. L Rattle Snake (unpaged). Also here the question of the existence of 
these extraordinary creatures was discussed.
62 H. Smeathman, 'Some Account of the Termites' (1781), p. 140.
63 See, for instance, T. Pennant on the size of the American elk, reported by some as being more than 12 feet high, 
in his Synopsis o f Quadrupeds (1771), p. 41-2. For a more general statement see also J. H ilt A General Natural 
H istory  (1751-58), vol. Ill, Preface (unpaged).
64 Cf. I. Hacking, The Emergence o f Probability (1975).
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The social standing of the reporter could, indeed, also be evaluated -  and here we find 
that logic at play of social standing vouching for credibility, as pointed to by Dear and Shapin. 
Hence, Bancroft, for instance, when describing a two-headed snake (see HI. 3.2), stressed that, 
"This Serpent was a perfect monster, of whose existence I should strongly doubt, did I not think 
the veracity of the Gentleman, from whom  I have this information, and by whom it w as 
actually killed, unquestionable/65 6Although non-gentle people could also be telling the truth, a 
gentleman was certainly more likely to do so. The accounts of gentlemen, as Sprat pointed out, 
'bring with them a good Assurance of Likelihood, by the Integrity of the Relators' .“
Often, however, it was not the gentility of a man that would be foregrounded in 
evaluations of the credibility of a reporter, but rather the extent of his learning. Thus, to give 
just one example, before citing a letter at third hand, as it were, from the well-known natural 
historian Emanuel da Costa, in which da Costa quoted a Father Torrubia's account of the 
'vegetating Wasp/ Edwards made explicit the connection between extraordinary reports and 
the reporter's extent of learning. Having determined Father Torrubia to be a 'man of letters/ 
though liable to some 'vulgar errors/ Edwards noted: T remark this the rather, as characters 
are necessary to be noted, when extraordinary phaenomenons are set forth/ Except for the 
vulgar errors, Torrubia proved by and large to be a credible man whose report could be 
accepted.67
With regard to the accounts, a zoologist would have received from other people -  
whether they were gentlemen, travellers or common people -  he might, then, position himself 
as a judge to determine the truth of a matter by reviewing the social standing of the reporter, 
his extent of learning, the number of witnesses, and by examining how a report tallied with his 
ideas of the regular working of nature.68
It is noteworthy, however, that in the overwhelming number of cases, a report would 
not be accompanied by any evaluation at all in the zoological literature. The further out of the 
ordinary a second hand description appeared to be, the more likely it was to be explicitly 
evaluated in the zoological works. Although social standing and the reporter's extent of 
learning certainly played its role, the idea of the 'ordinary course of nature' became the most 
important criteria for deciding whether a report needed an evaluation at all in order to be 
accepted as a matter of fact or not. In conjunction with the idea of natural phenomena 
invariably imprinting themselves alike on all m en's minds, I will suggest that this allowed for
65 E. Bancroft, An Essay on the Naturai H istory o f G uiana (1769), p. 215.
66 T. Sprat, The H istory o f the Royal Society (1667/1722), p. 195; emph. in org.
67 G. Edwards, Gleanings o f Natural History (1758-64), vol. IV, pp. 265-6. This evaluation is, in fact, a direct quote 
from da Costa's letter to Edwards, E. da Costa to G. Edwards, Mar. 5,1761, British Library, Add. 28,536, f.250.
68 See S. Shapin, A Social History o f Truth (1994), pp. 21 Iff., for a more thorough discussion of the evaluation of 
testimonies.
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111. 3.2 A TWO-HEADED SNAKE (E. Bancroft, An Essay on the Natural History o f Guiana, .1769). Natural 
historians often doubted reports on monstrous animals, like this two-headed snake, which disobeyed 
the 'common course of nature' with their extra limbs, and consequently, authors often took elaborate 
precautions in order to warrant the truth of their accounts. To authorise the existence of this snake, 
the traveller, E. Bancroft, stressed both in the text and on the engraving that a man who could be 
trusted on his word, the Lieutenant Moses Park, had observed it
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the much more generous inclusion of information from women and people of a the lower 
echelons within zoology than was possible in experimental philosophy.
The Social Division of Labour
Even though the ideal collector might have been a male of some social standing,69 -  a melange 
of people from all ranks of society were, then, in practice incorporated into the compilation of 
material for zoology. This "promiscuous"70 incorporation did not, however, mean that everyone 
took part in the enterprise on an equal footing. While contributions of gentlefolk, both women 
and more often men, would be acknowledged in the printed accounts, as noted above, the 
contributions of the vulgar would most often only leave faint traces. Frequently their work 
would only be acknowledged by implication in statements such as "I had procured../, "I was 
informed...'.
The vulgar collector and the gentle collector tended to play asymmetrical roles in the 
accounts of the gathering of specimens, then. The vulgar were, to the extent that they were 
mentioned at all, generally portrayed as mere vehicles for the conveyance of animals from the 
field to the zoologist. Gilbert White's explanation in a letter, for instance, of the way some locks 
came into his possession is typical in this respect: "I sent a Servant over to that town 
[Ambresbury], & procured several living specimens of locks, which he brought safe & brisk in 
a glass-decanter/71 As the initiator White, like the other zoologists, tended to be represented as 
the active whereas the vulgar would be portrayed as merely passive instruments for the 
bringing about of animals.
This division of roles was underscored in the published accounts by a tendency to 
highlight the more heroic moments, not least of hunting, of the writer's own involvement in 
the gathering of specimens. William Paterson, for instance, recounted of all the hardships that a 
naturalist had to go through in order to collect in South Africa. He described how he had had 
to cross trackless land of stony desert, filled with deadly, venomous snakes and scorpions in 
order to be finally able to shoot a Camelopardalis, a giraffe that is, 'a beast so little known to the
69 In a letter to Lord Lyttleton Pennant suggested that the dergy in particular would be suited for this task in 
Britain, since they were well dispersed throughout the country, and presumably would know their parish well. 
T. Pennant to Lord Lyttleton, Jun. 28, 1768, British Library, Stowe 754, £247* Pennant restated this call for 
dergymen, and in addition 'Gentlemen' of all sorts, to collect in a manual of queries in condusion to his A Tour 
in Scotland (1772). He listed 27 questions here 'with a View of exiting them to favour the World with a fuller and 
more satisfactory Account of their County. The questions covered everything from the location of bridges and 
burial places over interesting pictures in the houses of gentlemen to the natural and dvil history of the county. 
Ibid., pp. 302-13.
70 As Daniel Carey has termed it in a discussion of the indusion of travellers' accounts into the stock of material 
the Royal Sodety found it legitimate to work on, around 1700, D. Carey, 'Compiling Nature's H istory (1997).
71 G. White to T. Pennant, Jul. 25,1768, British Library, Add. 35,138, f. 15.
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Europeans'.72 In India, Charles Ives not only had to arm himself with patience, but had a lso  to  
overcome the superstitions of his vulgar palanquin bearers in order to get within shooting  
range of a specimen of 'an extraordinary species of birds' outside Calcutta (the Hindu b earers  
believed, according to Ives, that the birds were possessed by Brahmin souls, and were h en ce , 
reluctant to assist him in this endeavour). After several attempts, when he finally succeeded, 
the event was narrated in detail.73 Finally, regarding Sir Joseph Banks, White rhetorically ask ed  
at a time when he had disturbing intelligence about the first voyage of Captain Cook, if  i t  
would not have been better if Banks had sent 'a proxy7 on the tour, but answered himself: 'B u t  
then he would have foregone the honour & praise due to such a disinterested hazarding o f h is  
life/74
For their part, the vulgar not only brought physical specimens, but also provided 
information about animals, though also in this respect their position as originators of su ch  
information remained only faintly visible in the published accounts. Paterson used the n am es 
by which some animals and animal poisons were 'distinguished in their native regions' a t the 
Cape of Good Hope to designate these objects;75 so did the traveller in Barbary, Thomas Shaw , 
and, moreover, he occasionally intimated that he had obtained further information about the 
animals from the natives.76 Bancroft, who as we saw was having snakes procured in Guiana for 
a glass of rum, made the relationship with the natives more transparent as he at one and the 
same time made use of the information provided by them, and put them in their place. In  h is 
book he noted that, 'To have the names and properties of these Snakes, I have recurred to the 
assistance of the Indians'.77 Rather than in the same place telling the public what he had learned 
from the Indians, however, Bancroft went on to recount some of the 'fables' -  of innocent 
snakes being poisonous to the highest degree, for instance -  which the Indians had also told 
him:
I am on these occasions, entertained by these people w ith many fables, which are so absurd, that I am in no danger 
of being deceived by them. But the vulgar, in all nations, are exposed to errors, and the Indians are all vulgar.78
By portraying the Indians as vulgar and as such 'exposed to errors' rather than straightaway
reporting their 'useful' information, the zoological information was partly disassociated from
its point of origin, the Indians. Thus, when recounting the names and properties of the snakes,
although the Indian names were mentioned, the description was kept in third person, singular,
72 W. Paterson, A N arrative o f Four Journeys (1789), pp. 167f., 124ff.
73 E. Ives, A Voyage (1773), pp. 183-4.
74 G, White to T. Pennant, Nov. 28,1768, British Library, add 35,138, f.21. It was, indeed, dangerous to go abroad 
collecting, as Sverker Sorlin highlights in his portrayal of all the young men who died abroad, collecting 
specimens for Carl von Linné, S. Sorling, 'Offer for en  samler' (1993). Thanks are due to Kirsten Marie Raahauge 
for sending me this disturbing article.
75 W. Paterson, A N arrative o f  Four Journeys (1789), pp. 161ff.
76 T. Shaw, Travels (1738), see, for instance, p. 251, and pp. 238ff., plus idem., A  Supplement (1746), pp. 66ff.
77 E. Bancroft, An Essay on the Natural History o f G uiana (1769), p. 221; emph. in org.
78 Ibid., pp. 221-2; emph. in org.
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impersonal: a description 'from nowhere/79 The information obtained from and the natural 
objects procured by the vulgar, though probably extensive, were ever so silently incorporated 
into the field of facts, indeed, almost without leaving a trace.
Although a multitude of different people were engaged in the gathering of specimens, 
it was the zoologist or his gentle companions, then, who were portrayed as the active agents in 
the published accounts, and even at times as the heroic collectors, while the vulgar were 
reduced to little more than mediums for the specimens' procurement. In the first place, the 
facts became gentlemen's facts because the zoologists in their representations appointed the 
vulgar an insignificant role as sheer means of procurement, if any role or place at all.
The fact that people of all echelons were more or less promiscuously included into the 
zoological endeavour as gatherers did not mean that the fashioning of facts was a collective 
affair as well, then. The common people could partake in procuring specimens and providing 
information, but as we have seen, it was the zoologists who, in the first place, determined what 
was, and what was not credible information. Moreover, as we now shall see, the zoologists did 
not leave it at that. In their own accounts, specimens observed at first or second hand were 
further refined, and thereby transformed into zoologically standardised facts.
S tandardising  Animals
Collecting animals with all that implied in terms of the selection of individual specimens, of 
the social division of labour in the process, and of critically evaluating, or not evaluating, 
second hand reports constituted a crucial step in the transformation of the animals of raw 
nature into objects of knowledge. However, this act of collecting was in itself not enough to 
turn the animals into standardised working objects. Confronted with the collected specimens, 
the zoologists systematically highlighted some traits in the specimens in their representations, 
while ignoring others altogether. Hereby the specimens were turned into standardised facts of 
a particular kind, which were characterised by specific attributes. In this section I shall examine 
how this fashioning of zoological facts unfolded in practice by looking into how animals were 
represented in both the zoologists' written accounts and illustrations, and, furthermore, how 
they were authorised as matters of facts in the representations. In both writing and illustrating, 
the fashioning of facts was closely tied to the indigenous conception of what both writing and 
illustrating implied, and I shall thus, in both cases start out with some general remarks on the
79 Ibid., pp. 203ff. Not altogether unlike the servants-technidans of Boyle who carried out many of Boyle's 
experiments, but who were also disassoaated from the knowledge they produced and made anonymous and 
silent in Boyle's representations, see S. Shapin, A Social History o f Truth (1994), ch. 8. The idea of a 'perspective 
from nowhere' is taken from T. Nagel, The View from  Nowhere (1986).
99
CHAPTER 3
indigenous conception of representation before I look more dosely into the modes of 
representing specimens.
The Representing Potential of Language
It was a fundamental tenet of early modem language theory, marking a break with the Re­
naissance Adamic theories of a divine language given by the beginning of time and naming all 
tilings according to the divine will, that words, or signs, were arbitrary vis-à-vis the world.80 As 
John Locke, in accordance with contemporaries, stressed, when dealing with language one had 
to be wary of the 'cheat of words'- of falling into the trap of believing that the relation between 
a word and an object of the world was natural.81 Nothing could be more wrong. Words were, 
argued Locke, removed from the external world by a double separation. In the first place, 
words did not refer directly to the material objects of the world itself, but merely to the ideas of 
the mind. Moreover, the relationship between words and ideas was perfectly arbitrary:
Thus we may conceive how w ords [...] come to be made use of by men, as the signs o f  their ideas; not by any natural 
connection, that there is between particular articulate sounds and certain ideas, for then there would be but one 
language amongst all men; but by a voluntary imposition, whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the mark of 
such an idea. The use then of words, is to be sensible marks of ideas; and the ideas they stand for, are their proper 
and immediate signification.82
Words, then, were human inventions, coined through the ages and framed by the 'customs and 
manners of life'.83 The objects of the world could imprint themselves on the mind but were 
silent as to how they should be communicated: It was man's task to name.
Ideally, the act of naming would work through the help of a 'double conformity/ as 
Locke had it.84 A double conformity which, firstly, tied the object or a collection of objects to an 
idea in the mind and which, secondly, tied that idea to a sign: Object-Idea, Idea-Sign. As Locke 
emphasised in a manuscript note to his Essay, it was only by virtue of such plain ties that man 
in his representations could begin to approach the transparent discourse of the angels.85 86It was 
only thus, that the world could be represented true to nature.
As Foucault points out, as the signs, ideally, served as pure representations of the 
external world, language emerged as a transparent medium:
From an extreme point of view, one might say that language in the Classical era does not exist But that it functions: 
its whole existence is located in its representative role, is limited precisely to that role and finally exhausts it.88
80 On the break between the Renaissance and early modem conceptions of language, see N. Hudson, W riting and 
European Thought (1994), esp. chs. 1 and 2.
81 J. Locke, Essay (1706/1997), p. 365/m,ii,4-5; cf. H. Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure (1982), p. 43.
82 J. Locke, Essay (1706/1997), p. 363/in,ii,l; emph. in org.
83 Ibid., p. 387/in,v,8.
84 Ibid., p. 347/11, xxxii,8.
85 Locke quoted in H. Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure (1982), p. 79; cf. J. Locke, Essay (1706/1997), III,x.
86 M. Foucault, The Order o f Things (1970), p. 79.
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Signification became (in principle, as I will add) unproblematic.*7
In practice, signification might not be so unproblematic, however, and language might
j manifest itself and impede an angelic transparency. This became obvious not least in the
f seventeenth and eighteenth-century scholars' reading of Renaissance literature. 'Who can
1 behold, without Indignation', Sprat asked with reference to Renaissance texts,
how many Mists and Uncertainties, these species of Tropes and Figures have brought on our Knowledge? (...) And in 
, a few Words, I dare say, that of all the Studies of Men, nothing may be sooner obtain'd, than this vicious Abundance
I of Phrase, this Trick of Metaphor, this Volubility of Tongue, which makes so great a Noise in the World.“
The indignation on the part of Sprat was due to the fact that figurative language confused the
I relationship between the sign and its object of reference as it directed the attention away from
I the object to language itself. John Ray also underscored this point:
I those arts [of 'polishing and adoring language') are by wise men censured, as far inferior to the study of things,
j words being but the pictures of things; and to be wholly occupied about them, is to fall in love with a picture, and
I neglect the life; and oratory, which is the best of these arts, is but a kind of voluptuary one, like cookery, which
sophisticates meats, and cheats the palate, spoiling wholesome viands, and helping unwholsome.“9
' The representative potential of the sign, then, was contingent upon its use:
Language, like light, is a medium; and the true philosophic style, like light from a north-window, exhibits objects 
clearly, and distinctly, without soliciting attention to itself. In painting subjects of amusement indeed, language may 
gild somewhat more, and colour with the dies of fancy: but where information is of more importance, than 
entertainment, tho' you cannot throw too strong a light, you should carefully avoid a coloured one.87 90
The 'true philosophic style' was, of course, equal to that 'plain style' which from the seven­
teenth-century was championed as the style in relating matters of knowledge. In an oft-dted 
passage from the History o f the Royal Society, by giving an account of the usage of the fellows of 
the Royal Society, Sprat described the ideals of the plain style:
it has been a constant Resolution, to reject all the Amplifications, Digressions, and Swellings of Style; to return back 
to the primitive Purity and Shortness, when Men deliver'd so many Things, almost in an equal Number of Words. 
They have exacted from all their Members a dose, naked, natural way of Speaking; positive Expressions, dear 
Senses; a native Easiness; bringing all things as near the mathematical Plainness as they can; and preferring the 
Language of Artizans, Countrymen, and Merchants, before that of Wits, or Scholars.91
The philosophic style, then, was that in which the words depicted the world as closely as 
possible, one to one, one by one, it was that in which the sign was safely tied to its object of 
reference.
We might note here that not only was the (philosophical) system of signs thereby 
construed as a pure system of representation; but the world was also assumed to be fun­
damentally 'representable.' I will suggest that this only became possible because the world, as 
we have seen, was conceived of as a simple assemblage of material facts with essentially 
quantifiable features. Nature was not only essentially perceptible but, for the same reason, also
87 Ibid., p. 66.
88 T. Sprat, The History o f the Royal Society (1667A722), p. 112.
89 Ray to Dr. Robinson, Dec. 1690, reprinted in W. Macgillivray, Lives o f Eminent Zoologists (1834), p. 162.
90 W. Gilpin, Three Essays (1792), Essay I, p. 18; emph- in org.
91 T. Sprat, The History o f the Royal Society (1667/1722), p. 113; emph. in org.
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essentially describable: 'Natural History, like that of other Sciences, has its peculiar language, 
and the criterion, like that of Nature's operations, is simplicity'.92 Although the signs were 
arbitrary vis-à-vis the world, one could still reproduce nature in representation by help of the 
double conformity. This was precisely the objective in representing specimens in zoological 
texts.
Animals in Language
In practice, however, not quite every single feature of a specimen was reproduced one to on, 
one by one, in the zoologists' representations. Practices of selection were also at play here, as 
we will see. Furthermore, the 'plain style' of writing was in practice, translated into two 
different modes of representation, into what may be termed a 'circumstantial mode of 
representation,' and a 'concise mode of representation,' respectively, with each their different 
implications for the fashioning of facts. I shall take these two modes as my point of departure 
for the discussion of how zoological facts were fashioned in the following. To avoid any 
confusion, it must be stressed from the outset that these two different modes of representing 
specimens do not correspond to the different generic styles of representation in the two 
zoological sub-genres, as discussed in Chapter 1. Focusing in the following on how the 
specimens were construed through these two modes as standardised and credible working 
objects, the focus will be on how animals were initially brought into learned discourse, and I 
shall consequently leave out of focus the later reworkings of such working objects within the 
frame of the General Introduction or the Specialised Account. What I am after here is, in other 
words, not what characterised these two genres, but, in a sense, what went before both of 
them.
Let me start with the circumstantial mode of representation. In the introduction to his 
first volume on The Natural History o f Birds, George Edwards gave some advice concerning the 
description of animals:
Authors, Naturalists especially, should consult, first o f all, the outward Forms of things in order farther to explain 
them by Descriptions and other Marks; and deliver them down to Posterity [...]. In describing natural Things 
nothing ought to be omitted, that is any way remarkable, and may fix and establish the Character of the thing 
described, so as plainly to distinguish it from all other things: This may be done without following the minute Steps 
of some Authors, who have wrote large Books on single Birds or Plants, for long Descriptions lead the Mind into 
Mazes and Confusion, and tire rather than instruct. On the other hand too brief Descriptions should be avoided; for 
very often these are found to consist only of such general Forms and Colourings that are common to many things of 
the same Genus, with the things so briefly described, which makes the Description uncertain, or rather no natural 
Description at all.93
92 E. Bancroft, An Essay on the Natural History o f  Guiana (1769), p. 118.
93 G. Edwards, A  Natural History o f Birds (1743-51), vol. I, p. xiv; emph. removed.
102
FROM NATURE TO FACTS
As Edwards later summed up, the naturalist had to keep a 'medium'94 between an explosion of 
words -  it is probably the Renaissance representations Edwards had in mind here -  which 
would only confuse, and provide a too brief description which would be useless. Useless, that 
is with regard to zoological classification. As it is here indicated, the description of specimens 
was only a prelude, foreshadowing a classification at a later stage. I shall later return to what 
kind of classification was implied in the description, but let us first take a closer look at what 
was actually communicated and how it was communicated in such circumstantial descriptions.
The circumstantial description would at times, but not always, be communicated in 
first person singular. A typical example of such an account is to be found in a letter read at the 
13th of March 1745/6 at the Royal Society.
Being at Killeamstadt in Holland and having procured some Eels taken out of the River Maese to shew a gentleman 
of My Acquaintance the Circulation of the Blood in the Finny part of their Tails, He a short while afterwards 
surprized me by telling Me he could see die Motion of the Blood with his naked Eyes. Without the Assistance of my 
Microscope; this I found True upon Inspection that part o f the Tail which is Connected to the Abovementioned 
Finny part, and which was Transparent enough In most of the Eels I examin'd to afford a View of the Phaenomenon. 
I could observe the Blood moving from the Tail, not in A Continued Stream, as it does in the Veins, but by starts, as 
it were; And Taking up my microscope and Viewing it, I Discover'd a kind of a Musculus Cavus or Muscular Sac 
from which it proceeded, and which by Alternate contractions and Dilatations caused that Interrupted Motion I 
observed in the Blood.95
By recounting a phenomenon from an observer's point of view as here, the phenomenon were 
-  not unlike those of the experimental philosophy96 -  tied to a particular person's discrete 
experience at a specific time and place, whereby, to the extent that the observer was deemed 
trustworthy, they gained authority as a matter of fact. As Peter Dear has observed with regard 
to such a strategy of representation: 'Located, explicitly or implicitly, at a precise point in space 
and time, the observer's reported experience of a singular phenomenon constituted his 
authority.'97 It is as if the mode of representation itself communicates: T was there, I saw this, 
hence the described was there/ The objects of description were securely tied to an existence in 
the external world, as the 'double conformity' between sign and referent was authorised by the 
presence of an experiencing subject.
Quite often, however, a specimen would not be described from a first person per­
spective in the circumstantial mode of representation, but would be divorced from a specific 
person's historical act of experiencing in the description. Although the distinction is not 
absolutely dear cut, a dear tendency can be observed in describing animals which were 
relatively well-known from a third person perspective, and to describe exotic or unfamiliar 
animals from a first person perspective. As in the case of the evaluation of second hand 
information, some phenomena appear to have been too obvious or well known to need the
94 Ibid.; emph. removed.
95 W.B. to M. Folkes, Mar 13,1745, Royal Society, London, L&P.I.466.
96 Cf. P. Dear, 'Totius in verbet (1985), pp. 152ff.
97 Ibid., p. 159.
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attestation of a trustworthy person to become facts -  no author ever attested to having seen a 
sparrow or a common fox, for instance. Such animals could be presented as facts from a 
perspective from nowhere, while other usually more exotic animals needed an observer in 
order to become valid as matters of fact. The line of distinction between these two classes of 
facts was never made explicit in the representations, but it was closely linked to proximity. 
Like the blood in the tail of the Dutch eels, the Surinam 'frog-fish/ to give another example, 
described by Maria Sybilla Merian and the Dutch pharmacist and zoologist Albertus Seba as an 
animal which allegedly metamorphosed from fish to frog and back again to fish, was in 
contrast to the fox or sparrow very much in need of a trustworthy observer. As Henry Barker 
stated, after having cited a letter from Dr. Mounsey who had seen Seba's specimen of the frog- 
fish preserved in spirits in the Chamber of Rarities in St. Petersburg:
However it must be confessed, that our Knowledge of this Animal is hitherto very imperfect. Seba's Account seems 
taken from common report, which we find so frequently erroneous that it is not to be credited on a Case so 
extraordinary; Dr M ounsev's Letter only gives us his ow n Opinion: and all we can collect from having seen the 
Animal itself, is so little Satisfactory, that it still remains very uncertain, whether, as to Form, it does or does not 
undergo any of the Changes imputed to it: nor can this Point I think be reasonably determined, but by careful 
Observations made in Surinam .*
The farther away, and the more out of the ordinary an object was conceived to be, the greater 
the need to expressly validate the fact, to author-ise the link between the sign and its object of 
reference by describing it from a specific perspective. The choice of perspective in the 
circumstantial descriptions, whether first person or third person, depended on an evaluation of 
the familiarity of the animal described.
Regardless of which perspective was chosen, a zoologist had to economise in his 
description of specimens, as everything could not be described, nor as Edwards stressed, was it 
desirable to have everything described. That would only confuse. Even though what was 
actually described differed between accounts we might note more general patterns of 
selectivity in the circumstantial mode of representation. All descriptions contained an account 
of the morphology of the animal -  we saw also Edwards emphasise the importance of this 
above. That was the sine qua non of the factual description. In general, the figure, often die size 
and colours would be described. In addition, a number of different morphological traits were 
likely to receive special attention within different classes of animals. This would often include 
number, kind and position of teeth, kind of feet (hoofed, cloven, claw), number of toes or claws 
and their position in quadrupeds, and, in addition, with regard to the hoofed and cloven 
animals also horns or antlers or the lack of them; fins and tail and their position, teeth or lack of 
teeth in fishes; wings, tail, beak, the composition of feathers in birds; number and position of 
wings, number and position of feet, and patterns on wings in insects.
98 H. Baker to T. Birch, Apr. 17,1760, Royal Society, London, L&P. IV.5; underlining in org. 
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Besides morphology, an animal's number of offspring and their way of bringing them 
forth would at times be described. Less frequently, an animal's 'manners' would be mentioned 
-  for instance, whether it was a fierce or a docile animal. Regarding the beaver, for example, 
one would almost invariably hear about its way of building houses and manner of living in 
'communities/ The nature and movement of some specimens, especially cats, would also often 
be described; as would the manners of apes, and most particularly the human-like manners of 
'great apes/ In addition, an animal's food and their way of foraging would occasionally be 
commented on. At times its anatomy, or part of it, would be mentioned, and, finally, at times 
the usage made of an animal by the people at its native abode might be mentioned. On rare 
occasions extra-visual traits might also be described -  the smell of the musk or the corallines, 
the sound of birds' song, the touch of a fur.
We might, inversely, observe what was not, or only very infrequently, described in the 
zoologists' circumstantial representations of specimens: The relation of the animal to its 
habitat, including the climate and vegetation of its surroundings; an animal's relation to other 
animals (except for the chance mentioning of its food, and at times the relation between hunter 
and prey); with the possible exception of insects and frogs, the different stages in an animal's 
life would neither be described, nor would its behavioural patterns (with the exception of the 
rather meek descriptions of some animals' 'manners'). Other traits generally excluded from the 
descriptions could easily be listed, but these will serve to make my point. The systematic 
selection of certain traits and the equally systematic neglecting of others in the representations, 
indicate a cultural framing of the facts. The animal represented as a matter of fact in the 
circumstantial representations was, first and foremost, a discrete, visual creature, primarily 
characterised by its morphological gestalt, and secondarily characterised by its anatomy, 
manners and habits, and in the third place characterised by the use put to it by man.
Thus the circumstantial description preconditioned certain ideas about what was 
essential in an animal -  evidently, especially its morphology. At the same time, it also helped 
to construe animals as a specific kind of creature in the representations by institutionalising 
specific practices of selecting traits to be described. Thereby, a horizon for an explanatory space 
was demarcated: such descriptions of animals would be more suitable for some kinds of 
explanations than others.
We can specify the idea of the 'implied explanatory space' further, if we compare the
circumstantial accounts with the 'concise' representation of specimens. Take, for instance, this,
by no means uncommon description of the 'Silk Starling' by Peter Brown, which he had seen in
the collection of Marmaduke Tunstall:
SIZE, of the common Starling.
BILL, deep orange.
HEAD, entirely of a fine pale grey; the whole plumage glossy, and of a silky look.
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WINGS, black, with a single bar of white.
TAIL, black.
LEGS, of a reddish yellow.
PLACE, China.»
Or take this account by Pennant, which was made in his private journal while on a Grand Tour 
on the Continent in 1765, of that giraffe which he saw at the 'Physick Garden' in Leyden and 
led him believe in the existence of such 'an extraordinary animal/ The only reference to the 
giraffe in the journal reads as follows:9 100
The rarest [in the Physick Garden] is a Rhinocerous bird, quite entire, and a young Giraffa, -  the horns of which are 
about two inches long, covered with hair, and on their ends is a thick tuft of hair in length two inches; it has also a 
short mane that runs quite to the middle of the back; in the lower jaw it has eight broad teeth: the two outmost are 
divided thus co
We might, at first, observe that this concise mode of representation entailed a pointed gaze. 
The circumstantial mode of representation also implied this, but in contrast to that, the gaze 
here was expertly pointed, singling out only a very few traits of the animal as worthy of 
description. Such a pointed gaze, as Ludwig Fleck has indicated, though in another empirical 
context,101 require experience. Only a person who was familiar with eighteenth-century 
zoology would probably consider highlighting 'bibolated' teeth, a short mane, and two inches 
long horns with hair on their ends in a description of a giraffe (others might, for instance, have 
focused on its long neck). This exclusive selection of traits in the concise representations, in 
turn, points to a narrowly defined idea of what was the 'key to the essence' of such animals.102 
Within eighteenth-century zoology, that 'key' was defined to a very large extent by the 
prevalent modes of classification. In the concise mode of description a definite classification was 
anticipated -  it was exactly as an animal with two hairy horns and eighth teeth in the lower 
jaw, the two outmost bibolated, that the giraffe would later be distinguished as a species in the 
taxonomic scheme of Pennant's Synopsis o f Quadrupeds (to be fair, Pennant did here also 
mention its long neck).103 In the concise mode, the animals were brought into discourse as facts 
predisposed to be classified in a very specific way.
The circumstantial mode of representation also put restrictions on the kinds of classi­
fications that a described animal could enter into. It would be hard, for instance, if not 
impossible, to classify animals described in this mode according to an evolutionary, 
environmental or behavioural scheme. Yet, this mode of description did not anticipate any 
single classification because a much broader variety of traits would be described here, though it 
foreshadowed a certain kind of classification: the eighteenth-century taxonomy. As Daniel
99 P. Brown, New Illustrations o f  Zoology (1776), p. 48.
100 T. Pennant, Tour on the Continent 1765 (1948), p. 156.
101 L. Fleck, Uppkomsten (1997), p. 94.
102 L. Daston and P. Gallison, 'The Image of Objectivity' (1992), p. 85. Daston and Gallison's remark is not made in 
connection with zoology, but in a discussion of the implications of selection more generally.
103 T. Pennant, Synopsis o f  Quadrupeds (1771), p. 20.
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Solander indicated, though in connection with botanical descriptions rather than zoological 
ones, the more minutely described something was, the more general the application of the 
description:
D. Solander has taken care to describe all those [botanical specimens] so minutely, that any Botanist whatsoever, 
may range them according to his own favourite System.104
Animals circumstantially described could thus be put to use in more -  but by no means 
infinitely different -  ways, than was the case with the concisely delimited ones. The cir­
cumstantially described animals entered discourse as facts with a broader application.
In sum, what the concise and the circumstantial modes of representations had in 
common, to sum up, was that they both tended to foreground such traits as would work to 
construe the animal as an almost lifeless conglomerate of mainly visual, material traits. The 
zoological fact was in both cases bom of an experienced gaze and a 'plain style' of repre­
sentation, whether it was circumstantial or concise. The experienced gaze allowed the observer 
to select what within the context of eighteenth-century zoology was deemed the essential traits 
-  in the circumstantial mode, a large range of morphological, and less frequently extra- 
morphological traits, and in the concise mode, a much more limited selection of mainly 
morphological traits. The plain style allowed the zoologist to depict these one to one in his 
representation.
Animals Illustrated
Words did not always suffice to capture the essential traits of an animal. In particular, some of 
those zoologists who had specialised also in illustrating specimens went at times so far as to 
claim that illustrations actually provided the reader with a better guide to nature than 
descriptions did. Said, for instance, Mark Catesby:
The illuminating Natural History is so particular Essential to the perfect understanding of it, that I may aver a 
dearer Idea may be conceived from the Figures of Animals and Plants in their proper Colours, than from the most 
exact Description without them: Wherefore [sic] I have been less prolix in the Description, judging it unnecessary to 
tire the Reader with describing every Feather, yet I hope sufficient to distinguish them without confusion.105
Although Edwards in his books on birds stressed that 'the Descriptions and Figures served to
explain each other',106 nevertheless, in tune with Catesby, he pointed also out that 'real
representations of animals, &c. properly delineated and coloured, are characters that all
nations are taught by nature to understand; and, in many respects, good figures from nature
104 Daniel Solander, Reports and Diary, June 29,1765, British Library, Add. 45,874.
105 M. Catesby, The Natural History o f  Carolina (1731-43), vol. L p. xi. For a not entirely complete list of zoological 
illustrations in eighteenth-century England, see C. Nissen, Die zoologische Buchillistration (1978), vol. Q, pp. 136- 
44.
106 G. Edwards, A Natural History o f  Birds (1743-51), vol. HI, Advertisement (unpaged).
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surpass the best verbal description/107 Such illustrations could thus even 'save such curious 
persons as have not leisure, the trouble of reading the descriptions/108
Although there might not have been a general agreement as to the primacy of figures 
over descriptions within eighteenth-century zoology, there appears to have been a general 
appreciation of a particular communicative value of illustrations. This appreciation hinged on 
a conception of visual representation as imitative. J. Harris explained, contrasting pictures with 
words:
if Pictures and Images are all of them Imitations, it will follow, that whoever has natural faculties to know the 
Original, will by the help of the same faculties know also its Imitations. But it by no means follows, that he who 
knows any Being, should know for that reason its Greek or Latin name.
The Truth is, that every Medium thro' which we exhibit any thing to another's Contemplation, is either 
derived from Natural Attributes, and then it is an IMITATION; or else from Accidents quite arbitrary, and then it is a 
SYMBOL.109 10
In contrast to words, which stood in an entirely arbitrary relation to the world, pictures, then, 
were believed to imitate the world.
In general, the shortcomings of arbitrary words and, inversely, the advantages of 
imitative art became especially clear in an inability of words to capture the fine nuances of 
colours and the precise shapes of things:
Language is very Imperfect: There are innumerable Colours, and Figures for which we have no name, and an 
infinity of other Ideas which have no certain Words universally agreed upon as denoting them[.]no
Within zoology, the lack of words became especially evident in descriptions of exotic and
colourful specimens. 'The form of this Fish', as Catesby complained while describing an
'acataune' or 'angel fish/ 'is so odd and singular, that without exhibiting its figure, it would be
difficult to give an idea of it by words only'.111 For the majority of zoologists, the solution to the
problem was to give both a verbal description and an engraving of the animal: The
accompanying pictures not only served as ornaments -  though they certainly at times also did
that -  but also as illuminations, which with their analogous code of representation could
supplement the information on specimens given in the digitised textual accounts.
While pictorial language might be conceived as 'universal' because it was 'imitative,'
naturalists were not blind to the fact that there were different ways of using this language.
William Hunter pointed out two different modes of pictorial representation in relation to
anatomical illustration, which appear to be just as valid for zoological illustration:112 'One is a
simple portrait in which the object is represented exactly as it is seen'. Characteristic of this
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107 G. Edwards, Gleanings o f  Natural History (1758-64), vol. II, p. x.
108 Ibid., vol. H, p. xi.
109 J. Harris, Hermes (1751), p. 330; emph. and cap. in org.
110 J. Richardson, An Essay (1725), p. 3.
11 1 M .  Catesby, The Natural History o f  Carolina (1731-43), vol. II, Preface, p. 31.
112 Also L. Daston and P. Gallison, 'The Image of Objectivity' (1992), pp. 8$ff., discuss these two modes of 
illustration.
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ni. 3.3 T h e  o r a n g -o u t a n g  o r  p y g m ie  a p e  
( E. Tyson, O rang-O utang, 1699).
H1.3.4 T h r e e  b ir d s  o f  p a r a d ise  (R. Bradley, 
A Philosophic A ccount o f  the W orks o f  N ature, 
1721).
Although m any illustrations w ere made from  
dead, dried and som etim es stuffed specim ens, 
the anim als w ould  m o st often b e  depicted as 
alive in the zoological illustrations, like in  E. 
Tyson's o f  the Pygm ie A pe above. It w as only 
rarely that the an im als would b e  depicted as 
dead, like in  R. B rad ley 's  illustration below .
J
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mode of pictorial description was that a particular object, even though "somewhat indistinct in 
some parts", was depicted with all its blemishes and imperfections, one to one. The other mode 
of illustration, Hunter went on, "is a representation of the object under such circumstances as 
were not actually seen, but conceived in the imagination". This mode of illustration would thus 
"exhibit in one view, what could only be seen in several objects."113 This mode, then, entailed a 
transcending of the particular material at hand, and thus a generalisation.
Through the first mode of illustration, the 'warts-and-all style' as I shall call it following 
Martin Kemp,114 a specific specimen would be depicted without any attempt to ignore its 
peculiarities. Edwards described this mode of illustration within zoology en. detail as he 
compared it to historical painting:
They who draw after Nature, on account of Natural History, should represent things justly and according to Nature, 
and not strive to exalt or raise her above herself; for by so doing, instead of instructing, they will lead the World into 
Errors The historical Painter, especially he that would represent the Fictions of Poets, may take greater 
Liberties, and study all Methods to elevate his Subject by adding the highest Strokes of Art, in order to please the 
Eye [ ...] : Yet everyone who reads Natural History, and sees Figures and Descriptions of things in Nature, supposes 
they are, or ought to have been immediately drawn and described from Nature. [...I]n drawing after Nature a most 
religious and scrupulous Strictness is to be observed, and by this means only we can demonstrate, that Nature is or 
is not the same through all Times.115
An example of such a "warts-and-all" style is, at least in one respect, to be found in Edward 
Tyson's or rather in his artist's, William Cowper's, figure of a "pygmy ape," which Tyson 
dissected. As Tyson explained, the figure was not entirely true to the living ape, because the 
"Figure being made after he was dead, the Head seems too much fallen in between the 
Shoulders, as if it had a very short or little or no Neck?, which not only took "off from the Beauty 
of the Figure?, but which also gave an inaccurate idea of the ape when alive (see 111. 3.3 and 
3.4).116 The very short neck was reproduced, nevertheless.
However, this example of Tyson's also shows that depicting a specimen with warts- 
and-all did not necessarily involve depicting it as it 'really' was at the time of portraying. 
Tyson's ape was raised from the dead in the illustration, and placed in the middle of an 
agreeable landscape, though it was given a stick 'to support him/ 'weak' (dead, in fact) as he 
was at the time of drawing, as Tyson explained.117 The same interpretation of the warts-and-all 
style was given by Edwards, and I would suggest by a host of other zoologists also.118 Edwards 
explained how, when drawing birds from stuffed or dried specimens, he took care to render 
them alive according to their nature by getting inspiration from birds of a similar "genus" that
113 William Hunter, Anatomia uteri humani graoidi (1774), Preface; quoted in M. Kemp, 'The Mark of Truth' (1993), p. 
113.
114 Ibid., p. 117.
115 G. Edwards, A Natural History o f  Birds (1743-51), vol. I, p. xv.
116 E. Tyson, Orang-Outang, sive Homo Sylvestris (1699), p. 16, emph. in org.
117 Ibid., p. 16.
118 If we compare the illustration of an animal with the notes on the original that it was made from, it appears that 
the animals illustrated as alive would quite often be taken from dead specimens.
109
CHAPTER 3
he had been able to observe alive.119 Elsewhere, Edwards similarly told how he, "for variety's 
sake' had given some birds 'as many different Turns and Attitudes as I could invent/120 Warts- 
and-all were not -  especially when it came to life and death -  quite all warts, then.
Even though matters such as life and death, attitude and posture, might be 
manipulated for the sake of variety or with a view to depicting animals alive rather than dead, 
the important traits of an individual specimen, its morphological features were -  at least 
according to the illustrators themselves -  not subject to 'invention,' to use Edwards' term. In 
this respect, the warts-and-all style entailed a basic 'anti-generalising' mode of representation, 
and that, I will suggest, was its distinguishing feature.
In contrast to the warts-and-all style, the second and more common mode of repre­
sentation within zoology allowed for a generalisation from the level of specimen to the level of 
species. As the imagination was put to work in making a fusion of 'what could only be seen in 
several objects' in one depiction, the typical specimen came into being which could be posited 
as a representative of a species. Most often the zoologists did not comment on this transition 
from the specimen to the species in the illustration. Usually, it was only made apparent in the 
text accompanying the picture, as the animal illustrated would be presented as a species (see 
111. 3.5, 3.6). This mode of illustration was thereby generalising, often silently making the move 
from the level of specimen to the level of species, and, hence, in the very act of illustrating, 
introducing the species as a fact.
Regardless of which style was chosen, the animal would often be depicted in some kind 
of setting -  often just a scene of nature, but at times also in a landscape with houses or 
artefacts. Some authors, like Catesby, emphasised how they had taken care to place the animals 
in some kind of environment which was true to nature: 'where it would admit of', as Catesby 
states in the introduction, 'I  have adapted the Birds to those Plants on which they fed or have 
any relation to/121 We find other authors following suit, such as the author of Naturalist's Pocket 
Magazine who had a 'sea unicorn/ which he had seen as a stuffed specimen at the 
Mecklenburgh coffee-house at Charing Cross, placed on a small sand bank at sea in the 
illustration (111. 3.6, see also 111. 3.7).122 An animals' place of origin would, moreover, at times 
also be communicated by means of some iconographically recognisable building in the 
background -  a mosque for Arabia, a hut for Africa etc. (111. 3.8).
Somehow making an animal's place of origin explicit in the illustration did, however, 
not become widespread, nor, indeed, did it become a more generally voiced requirement, until
119 G. Edwards, A Natural History o f  Birds (1743-51), vol. II, pp. 111-3.
120 Ibid., vol. I, p. xix.
121 M. Catesby, The Natural History o f  Carolina (1731-43), vol. I, p. xi.
122 Anonymous, The Naturalist's Pocket Magazine (1799-1802), vol. V, (unpaged).
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HI. 3 .5  T h e  z e b r a ,  t h e  A m e r ic a n  fo x ,  t h e  
CARIBOU AND THE CARCAJOU ( R. Brookes, A  
N ew  and A ccurate System ,  v o l. 1 ,1763-72).
i
ni. 3.6 H o r n e d  N a r v a l ;  o r  s e a  u n ic o r n  (A n o n y m o u s , Naturalist's P ocket M agazine, v ol. V , 
1799-1802). In both these illustrations, a generalising mode o f representation was 
employed, whereby the animals depicted were presented as representatives of the 
species as such.
n i. 3.7 T h e  V ir g in ia n  OPOSSUM (G. Shaw, Museum Leveriani explicate, 1792). Like the 'sea unicorn' in 
m. 3.6, also the family of Virginian opossums in this illustration were placed in a 'natural setting/ 
Towards the end of the eighteenth century, it became increasingly more common to use the 
backgrounds in zoological illustrations to communicate something about the geographical place of 
origin of a species.
HI. 3 .8  (left) T h e  OSTRICH a n d  t h e  c a s s o w a r y  (F . W illughby and J. Ray, T h e Ornithology, 1678/1972). 
III. 3 .9  (right) T h e  w a t e r  o u z e l l ,  t h e  h o o p o e ,  t h e  k in g f ish e r ,  t h e  b e e -e a t e r , t h e  g u ir a  g u ia i-  
NUMBI, AND THE IAGUACATIGUACU (F. W illughby and J. Ray, The O rnithology, 1678/1972). A t tim es, an  
an im al's  place o f  origin  w ould  be com m unicated b y  an iconographically recognisable build ing in  th e  
backgrou nd, lik e  the pyram id  signalling E g y p t behind the ostrich an d  the cassow ary in  the  
illustration  to the  left. Characteristically, how ever, this was the only one p la te  out of 78 in W illughby 
and  R ay 's book w here the place of origin w as com m unicated in the illustration . U sually, anim als 
w o u ld  stand alone, as in  the  illustration to the right.
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111. 3.10 T h e  z e b r a  (G. Edw ards, G leanings o f  N atu ra l H istory, v o l. 1 ,1758-64). For the b etter part o f the 
eighteenth century, in  th e  m ore lavish ly  illu strated  zoological books, i t  w as not unusual, as  in  this 
illustration , to  see  an  anim al placed  in  an in v en ted , b u t agreeab le landscape. Backgrounds, the 
illustrator G . E dw ard s claim ed in th e  m id dle o f  th e  century, did not fo rm  a part o f  the zoological 
illustration proper; on ly  the anim als did. A ccord ing  to Edw ards, the so le  fu nction  o f the backgrounds 
w as to p lease the v iew er w ith  their variety.
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the end of the eighteenth century.123 For the better part of our period, an animal would either 
not be placed in any setting at all (111. 3.9, see also 3.5), or else, it would be placed in a 
landscape which did not bear any resemblance in the least to its native abode, and which, it 
appears, was not intended to do so either (111. 3.10). As Edwards observed regarding the 
backgrounds in his engravings:
I observed [in the illustrations by another animal illustrator] in his Trees, Stumps, and Grounds, a poorness [sic] of 
Invention; therefore to amend that Part in mine, I have taken the Counsel and Assistance of some Painters my 
particular Friends, in order to make the Work not only as natural and agreeable as I could in the subject Matter, but 
to decorate the Birds with airy Grounds, having some little Invention in them: The better to set off the whole, I have 
in a few Plates, where the Birds were very small, added some foreign Insects to fill up the naked Spaces in the 
Plates; these I esteem to be no part of the proposed Work[.]124
There were foregrounds and backgrounds, subject matter and foreign matter, then. Although 
an animal might be placed in some kind of natural setting, this was by no means a requirement 
for a zoological illustration for the better part of the eighteenth-century. An animal could just 
as easily, and would indeed much more commonly, be placed in an agreeable setting provided 
by art, and the representation would still be regarded as true to nature. With the zoological 
specimen defined as a principally morphological being, and with this definition reinforced 
alike through both these modes of pictorial representation, the background became 
zoologically insignificant. It could just as well be filled out by delightful inventions.
In the illustrations, then, the animals were even more thoroughly construed as 
generally detached, morphological creatures, than in the textual representation. Regardless of 
whether they were represented as specimens in the warts-and-all style, or as representatives of 
species in the generalising style, it was their colours and shapes that were brought into focus. 
Although their relationship with their place of origin might be communicated occasionally, the 
animals were more likely to stand alone in the illustrations, or, what amounted to the same 
thing, be placed in an imagined, but agreeable setting.
Co m pilin g  Zoology ' s  Natural Hist o r y
In exegetical theory, to recapitulate, facts were indisputable nuggets of experience, matters in 
the world that could be observed and transparently represented, one to one. In practice, it took 
more than just observation to compile zoological facts -  it took collecting, validating, selecting, 
and specific modes of representation. As I have argued in this chapter, these practices added in 
crucial ways to the construction of facts: The process of collecting not only, trivially, brought 
the animals from the field to the hands of the zoologists, but also helped to distinguish the
123 Cf. B. S. Smith, European Vision and the South Pacific (1960), ch. 1.
124 G. Edwards, A Natural History o f Birds (1743-51), vol. I, p. xix.
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zoologist within the broader social context of people involved in the collecting of animals. The 
practices of validating, both in terms of critical appropriation of reports, and in terms of 
representational strategies of authorising information, worked to turn observations, and 
especially those of more uncommon animals, into what facts in theory was preconditioned 
always to be: credible nuggets of experience. The practices of selection and representation 
added to the constitution of facts by subtraction: By selecting some animals, over others, and 
by highlighting some traits in representation, and not others, specimens were standardised and 
turned into working objects proper to zoology.
Through this process, raw nature was transformed into a particular standardised type 
of facts. By singling out principally morphological features in both pictorial and written 
representation, and, at the same time, by severing the animals from their place of origin, the 
specimens were, in practice, construed as discrete and detached morphological creatures. As 
such, on one hand, they put limits on the kind of explanations that they could be put to. At the 
same time, the explanations prevalent in eighteenth-century zoology, on the other hand, also 
put limits to the way animals were construed as zoological facts. As we have seen, the general 
explanatory context -  the taxonomic system (be that one's own, or taxonomic schemes in 
general) -  would inform the process of selection of traits to be represented, and thereby the 
fashioning of facts.
In practice, then, there was more involved in the construction of zoological facts than 
simply an empty mind mirroring nature and a transparent representation, which brought 
nature's productions into discourse one by one, one to one. Theories about what was 
interesting and meaningful to know about nature, and ideas about which traits were of key 
significance to explain it, were implicated in the very construction of working objects for 
zoology. There was, then, also much more to 'observing nature' than a mere encounter with 
animals in the bosom of nature, returning to the problématique touched upon in the 
introduction to this chapter. Indeed, these practices of transforming raw nature into zoological 
facts helped to shape the semantics of the categories of 'observing' and 'nature' in crucial ways.
Compiling zoological facts involved, as we have seen, a collective effort, but not 
everyone was included in this enterprise on an equal footing: 'some must gather, some must 
bring, some separate, some examine', as Sprat observed:
and to use a similitude I...]  it is in Philosophy, as in Husbandry; wherein we see, that a few Hands will serve to 
measure out, and fill into Sacks, that Com, which requires very many more Labourers, to sow, and reap, and bind, 
and bring into the bam.125
Although some of the information received by the zoologist in the bam would be critically 
evaluated by the zoologist turned judge, quite a lot of the information would not be evaluated 
at all. This relatively easy incorporation into zoological works of a host of information obtained
125 T. Sprat, The History o f  the Royal Society (1667/1722), pp. 20-1; emph. in org.
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second-hand, to return to indigenous linguistics, took the working of the 'double conformity7 -  
the tying of an impression of an object to an idea to a sign -  in the representation of such 
information for granted. According to James Beattie:
When we believe the declaration of an honest man, in regard to facts of which he has had experience, we suppose, 
that by the view or perception of those facts, his senses have been affected in the same manner as ours would have 
been, if we had been in his place. So that faith in testimony is in part resolvable into that conviction which is 
produced by the evidence of sense; at least, if we did not believe our senses, we could not; without absurdity, 
believe testimony; if we have any tendency to doubt the evidence of sense, we m u st in regard to testimony, be 
equally sceptical.1“
When the reports of other people on animals were accepted uncritically, the double conformity
of the reporter's representation was, in effect, simply reaffirmed by being doubled in the re-
representation: Objectl-Ideal Ideal-Signl, Signl-Idea2 Idea2-Sign2. For all practical purposes,
Sign2 came to represent Objectl. In the credible second hand accounts, the zoologist would
consequently, as Chambers explained, be observing nature itself 'by proxy7:
By means of language our ideas and notices, though things in their own nature merely personal, and adapted only 
to private use, are extended to others, to improve their stock. And thus, by a kind of second sense, a man gets 
perceptions of the objects that are perceived by all mankind; and is present, as it were by proxy, to things at all 
distances from him: we hear sounds made a thousand years ago, and see things that pass a thousand miles off. If the 
eagle really sees, the raven smell, and the hare hears, farther and better than man; their sense, at best, is but narrow, 
in comparison with ours, which is extended, by the artifice o f language, over the whole globe. They see with their 
own eyes only; we with those of a whole species. -  In effect, by language, we are upon much the same footing, in 
respect to knowledge, as if each individual had the natural sense of a thousand: an accession, which, alone, must 
have set us far above any other animals.137
Thanks to language, then, animals could be observed at a distance.126 728 129Ironically, the reading of 
books hereby was also rehabilitated (and even Renaissance books could be plundered for 
information as well). 'By whim the world in all its view is shown,/Our guide through Nature's 
work, and in our own,' George Crabbe hence stated in praise of natural history books,
These are thy volumes; and in these we look,
As abstracts drawn from Nature's larger book119
To the extent that they complied with the common course of nature and were plain, other 
people's representations of animals were far from seen, in practice, as obstacles to learning, but 
rather approached and used as descriptions of the world which read as observations.
It was, however, not only the possibility of observing by proxy that made it possible for 
the zoologist to observe animals away from the bosom of nature. A certain idea about the 
nature of animals was also involved. By defining an animal as an ensemble of basically 
observable and hence, representable traits, among which none or only some more insignificant 
concerned the relation to its habitat, the animal was made, essentially, transferable. Its
126 J. Beattie, Essays (1776), p. 113-4.
127 E. Chambers, Cyclopaedia (1741), vol. I, p. viii.
128 This idea of observing by proxy should be compared to the mode of 'virtual witnessing' experiments within 
experimental philosophy, S. Shapin and S. Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985), p. 60.
129 G. Crabbe, The Library (1788), p. 11,
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principal nature did not depend on its relation to its place of origin, but it was rather 
incarnated in the animal-as-an-ensemble-of-morphological-traits itself. As a zoological fact the 
animal could, indeed should, stand alone. Sometimes it might be more convenient to observe 
an animal alive — so that, for instance, its natural posture could be studied and reproduced in 
an illustration. Sometimes it might be more convenient to have observations on extra- 
morphological traits of an animal, especially, as we will see in Chapter 6, to determine 
differences between some species and varieties. However, such traits were not a sine qua non of 
the zoological fact. With the sine qua non defined as the animal's morphology, in general 
animals could fairly easily be conveyed in some form or another -  alive, dead, and maybe 
dried and stuffed, represented in words or pictures -  from the field to the study without losing 
any crucial meaning. It was this idea of the animals as essentially transferable, because defined 
primarily by their morphological traits, then, which made it possible to bring 'nature' into the 
study of the zoologists, or, as we shall see in the following chapter, into a variety of other 
places, where the zoologists could also observe and describe them 'from nature.'
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The Social Life of Animals
So, nature's animals could be transformed into facts of natural history -  lifeless, detached, 
moveable -  by a series of hands, eyes and pens which worked together in introduce the 
animals into the social world. For the specimens to be actually put to use in zoological studies, 
however, the individual zoologists had to somehow and somewhere encounter the specimens. 
In a very basic and even trivial sense, the animals had to be encountered by a zoologist, before 
they could be incorporated into a zoological work. So far I have taken the trajectories of 
animals from the field to the study for granted, merely noting that it was relatively easy to 
move animals, in some form or another, and possible to observe them at a distance. Often, 
however, the animals did not arrive directly at a zoologist's study, but travelled to a host of 
other places where the zoologist would have to go in order to encounter them. It is time to take 
a closer look at the impact of the sites of encounter on the animals and the way in which the 
zoologists received them.
Within contemporary experimental philosophy, the production of knowledge was to a 
very large extent limited to one location -  the laboratory, even if the exact definition of that 
space remained intricate.1 In the laboratory, the production of facts coalesced with their study, 
even if a certain division of labour was found in the laboratory between the servants or 
assistants who often operated the laboratory equipment, and the scholars who made the 
philosophical conclusions on the basis of the facts thus produced.2 Within zoology, there did 
not exist any analogous single and relatively clearly defined location in which specimens, in 
one form or another, could both be encountered and studied. The trajectories of some animals 
were, indeed, fairly direct from the field to the study, as we have seen in some examples in the 
previous chapter: as when a servant was sent into the field to collect mice, an acquaintance
1 S. Shapin, T h e  House of Experiment' (1988); O. Hannaway, 'Laboratory Design' (1986).
2 S. Shapin, A Social History o f  Truth (1994), ch. 8.
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abroad sent descriptions home to a zoologist-friend, or the zoologist himself went into the 
field. But in many cases, the animals' way to the zoologists would be much more complicated, 
and the places of encounter far transcend the zoologist's study. The zoologist would hence, 
encounter animals, which would be incorporated into his work, not only in letters circulating 
in the Republic of Letters, but also in connoisseurs' cabinets and in public museums; in fur 
shops in London's Hast End and retail stores with exotic animals at the Tower Dock, at freak 
shows at market places, and in taverns and coffee-houses. Obviously, with the exception of the 
Republic of Letters, at most of these locations the animals would not be introduced into the 
social world as objects of knowledge, but they could be converted into facts and used by the 
zoologists, nonetheless. Even those animals which were introduced into discourse as matters of 
fact from the beginning, circulated through different routes in the social world of the learned, 
before they would finally be made use of in a study. The animals, in one form or another, went 
round and around in the social world of the eighteenth century, being put to different uses, 
being incorporated into different kinds of displays, and somewhere along their trajectories, the 
zoologist would encounter them, use them for his purposes, and often let the merry-go-round 
continue. Using a metaphor introduced by Arjun Appadurai in a study of commodities, we 
could say that the animals got 'a social life' of their own.3 As the animals travelled around in 
the social world and were displayed in different contexts, different kinds of meanings were 
inscribed on them, and hence they would, in a sense, emerge as different kinds of creatures.
As Steven Shapin has argued, the location of the production of knowledge has impli­
cations for what kind of knowledge is produced.4 Within different social contexts, or 'spheres' 
as I shall be call them in the following, practices were institutionalised in partly different ways; 
different social spheres -  such as the private cabinet, the public freak show, or the Republic of 
Letters -  were organised differently, instituting different sets of norms and forms of conduct. 
Moreover, the animals were used for various purposes within the different spheres, and hence, 
they were conceptualised in widely differing ways. The sodal spheres, consequently, framed 
not only the conceptualisation of animals, but also the different kinds of activities that took 
place within their realm.
With the exception of the Republic of Letters and a few museums, none of the social 
spheres in which the zoologists would encounter animals were exclusively dedicated to 
learning. In the private cabinets, the public museums, the coffee houses, and at the freak 
shows, the zoologists entered social spheres which were framed by extra-zoological concerns, 
in which the zoologists had to conform to the social conventions at play there in order to gain 
access to the animals, and, finally, in which the zoologists shared space with a variety of non­
3 A. Appadurai, 'Introduction' (1986).
4 S. Shapin, 'The House of Experiment' (1988), pp. 373-5. See also A. Ophir and S. Shapin, 'The Place of 
Knowledge' (1991) for a more general discussion of space and knowledge production.
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zoologists, from the vulgar at the freak shows to the noble connoisseur in the private cabinets. 
Even the Republic of Letters and those few museums, which were directed solely towards 
learning, were not entirely autonomous institutions of learning either. As we will see, the 
norms and forms guiding the social interaction in these places were drawn to a large extent 
from Polite Society. As there was no professional zoologist, neither was there, then, a single 
location dedicated solely to the study of zoology. The social spheres the zoologists moved in as 
zoologists were multifarious; their ways of actually encountering animals intricate.
It is to an analysis of these spheres and their implications for the zoologist's study of 
animals that the present chapter will be devoted. In the following quite a few of the places, 
where animals would also be encountered in some form or another in the eighteenth century 
will left out of view -  the stable, the kitchen, the dinner table, for example -  as none of these 
places played any role or -  as with the breeding of animals in the stable -  only an insignificant 
role in the zoological literature.5 Instead, the emphasis will be placed on the places where the 
animals gained a social life of interest to the zoologists. Starting with the Republic of Letters, 
we shall move on to an analysis of the private cabinet and the public museum, and then 
consider the freak shows, coffee houses, and different kinds of shops in which animals were 
also encountered. Although the zoologists -  again with the exception of the Republic of Letters 
-  most often shared the space of encounter with many different kinds of people, this did not 
mean that they took the same stance vis-à-vis the animals as the non-leamed. Following the 
zoologist as he moved between the different locations of display will, hence, on one hand, 
allow us to elucidate his means of appropriating the animals as he turned them into matters of 
fact, and thereby, to further specify the construction of zoological facts. At the same time, 
enquiring into how the zoologist positioned himself vis-à-vis the other people taking other 
kinds of interest in the animals at these sites will, on the other hand, make it possible to situate 
this construction and the zoologist himself within the wider social world. It will hence, finally, 
allow us to encircle what was conceived to be particularly zoological, or learned, about both 
the zoological fact, and the zoologist's position in the construction of such facts.
Animals in the Republic of Letters
Letters appears, in conjunction with books, to have been the zoologists' main source of 
information about animals. In almost every single letter between naturalists -  and their 
correspondence were usually extensive, as indicated in the previous chapter -  some kind of 
information was offered, some kind of acknowledgements were given for information
5 Others have dealt with animals in such places. See especially, K. Thomas, Man and the Natural World (1983).
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previously received, and in the packages, occasionally accompanying the letters, preserved 
specimens were sent around in Britain. The network of correspondents constituted 'the vital 
sinews' of eighteenth-century natural history, as David E. Allen has observed.6 It was one of 
the most important means through which the animals travelled around.
The trajectories of animals in the Republic of Letters were usually quite mundane, if at 
times intricate. An 'inquilinus moth,' for instance, was taken towards the end of July 1779 in 
Bunhill Fields, London, by a gentleman, who communicated it to a Mr. Ellis, Mr. Ellis in turn 
sent it to Mr. Frandllon, a renowned collector, who incorporated it into his collection, from 
where the entomologist Moses Harries was allowed to take a drawing and description, which 
again was used as the basis for the description in The Naturalist's Pocket Magazine.7 A 'spotted 
tringa' and a 'pine-creeper' were sent to George Edwards as preserved specimens from Mr. 
William Bartram of Pennsylvania, who appears to have been a keen hunter of American 
animals for various friends in Britain.8 As was Mr. Aston Blackbume, who 'with indefatigable 
industry and great judgement, annually enriches the cabinets of his friends with the rarest 
natural productions' of North America. Among these was a 'wolverene' that Pennant had 
received.9 In July 1770, from that young man in Gibraltar, whom Gilbert White had 'urged to 
take up the study of Nature a little', White received a box of Spanish curiosities -  Iberian birds, 
fishes, and insects -  some of which were forwarded to Pennant, who also received, among 
other things, a falcon and some non-descript mice from White at Selbome.10 The mice were 
later incorporated into the second edition of Pennant's British Zoology as the 'less long tailed 
field mouse'.11 More spectacularly, a parcel of birds from Terra Firma considered 'so very rare' 
that one of the greatest authorities on ornithology in the eighteenth century, George Edwards, 
could not 'recollect ever to have seen a single bird of them/ fell into the hands of the said 
ornithologist. Originally intended for Madame Pompadour, the parcel was taken by an English 
ship of war from a French merchant ship and communicated to Edwards by the commander of 
the English ship, Captain Shirley, later Earl Ferrers.12 And so on and so forth -  the animals 
went round and round in the Republic of Letters, providing zoologists with their essential 
means for study: Facts.
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6 D. E. Allen, Naturalist in Britain (1994), p. 17.
7 Anonymous, The Naturalist's Pocket Magazine (1799-1802), Inquilinus Moth (unpaged).
8 G. Edwards, Gleanings o f  Natural History (1758-64), vol. II, pp. 139-42.
9  T. Pennant, Synopsis o f  Quadrupeds (1771), p. 196.
10 G. White to T. Pennant, Mar. 14,1768, and Jul. 12,1770, British library, Add. 35,138, ff.9, and Aug. 1,1770, ibid. 
ff.37,39.
11 T. Pennant, British Zoology (1768-77), vol. II, p. 498.
12 G. Edwards, Gleanings o f  Natural History (1758-64), vol. HL Dedication (unpaged); G. Edwards to Lord 
Willoughby, May 10, 1759, Royal Sodety, London, L&P.HI.383. For examples of other trajectories of animals, 
almost exclusively from  the seventeenth-century, see W. George, 'Alive or Dead' (1985), pp. 183ff.
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The animals did not get around by themselves, of course. The circulation of animals 
within the Republic of Letters was mediated by a set of social practices. To understand the 
circulation, it might be useful to take a doser look at the Republic of Letters itself.13 The 
Republic of Letters was an amorphous institution without any dearly defined beginning or 
end. It neither had any explidtly defined rules for entering, nor any offidal requirements of 
admission. It had tadt ones, though. To enter, one had to commence correspondence with 
someone who was already a partidpant, and that would often be someone with whom one had 
some acquaintance. This person could then act as a broker for the novice, introducing him to 
other correspondents, whereby his network of correspondents would gradually evolve. Not 
only the novice needed a broker, however. Even scholars who were well established within the 
Republic of Letters would most often use a broker to make the necessary introductions to new 
correspondents. Hence, Dr. Peter Canvane, for instance, introduced Emanuel da Costa to Dr. 
Limbourgh in Achen;14 John Ellis introduced Thomas Pennant to Dr. Hope and Dr. Skene,15 and 
Ellis also introduced Dr. Skene to Carl von Linné, with whom Ellis had been corresponding for 
some time.16
The first letters exchanged would as a rule be very polite, epitomising the, within Polite 
Society, cherished art of letter writing.17 The sender would position himself humbly, often 
pointing to his own innumerable faults and, inversely, praise the supreme qualities of the 
recipient. A good example of this can be found in Gilbert Whited first letter to Thomas 
Pennant. Here White first explained humbly that he only dared to 'enter into a 
Correspondence' with Pennant because when the two of them had met in London the previous 
year, Pennant had expressed an interest in some of White's observations, and had later had 
mentioned his name to White's brother. Then, before turning to a description of the passage of 
birds and other natural history subjects, White once again stressed his humble position by 
noting that while he himself would probably not be able to send Pennant 'any Information 
worthy of your attention', White would surely profit greatly by such a correspondence.18
The first letter would usually also include some kind of gift. It might be a non-descript 
coral, as in the case of Skene, who offered this in his first letter to Ellis, the great coral 
researcher of the mid-eighteenth century;19 it might be a small tract on a natural history subject, 
like Patrick Blair offering a two page Manualo Pharmaco Botanicum to Sir Hans Sloane in his first
13 The following outline of the commerce de lettres draws on the detailed study of the Republic of Letters in A. 
Goldgar, Impolite Learning (1995).
14 E, M. da Costa to P. Canvane, Jan. 6,1767, British Library, Add. 28,536.
15 T. Pennant to J. Ellis, Sept. 14,1769, Linnean Society, London, Ellis Corr., vol.II.40.
16 D. Skene to J. Ellis, May. 16,1765, Linnean Society, Ellis Corr., vol.II.94.
17 Anna Bryson discusses the art of letter writing, in her From Courtesy to Civility (1998), ch. 5
18 G. White to T. Pennant, Aug. 10,1767, British Library, Add. 35,138, ff.1-3.
19 D. Skene to J. Ellis, Mar. 15,1765, Linnean Society, London, Ellis Corr., vol.II.92.
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letter;20 or it might, as in the case of White to Pennant, be some new observations on the birds 
of passage (a topic Pennant had been keenly interested in). What was explicitly denied by the 
humble way of positioning oneself in the first letter was indirectly demonstrated by the initial 
gift: That one would, indeed, be a worthy correspondent in the Republic of Letters.
As time passed in a correspondence relationship, the polite phraseology of the intro­
ductory and final sections of the letters tended to become shorter until the correspondents 
reached a point where the exchange of niceties were almost dispensed with. One thing, which 
was not to be dispensed with, however, was the exchange of information. In fact, in most cases 
all that was left in the letters after the niceties had been truncated, was the recounting of 
information of relevance to the correspondents' scholarly fields of interest.
Anne Goldgar has argued, in her study of the eighteenth-century Republic of Letters, 
that the commerce de lettres was framed to a large extent by a code of exchange. A pure 
Maussian reciprocity, in fact -  an observation for an observation, a specimen for a specimen, a 
book for a book.21 As in the Kula ring, the information about animals was passed around in the 
Republic of Letters because each gift received needed to be reciprocated. Often the ethos of 
exchange was made quite explicit, as when White sent Pennant those non-descript mice and a 
falcon and in return, asked for some Tampetra caeca', which could be found in the streams 
near Downing in Flinshire where Pennant lived;22 or, when Skene sent three non-descript 
corallines to Ellis, humbly asking him to 'adopt and christen them', in exchange for Ellis 
having been so kind as to pick out a suitable microscope in London for Skene who, due to 
living far off the beaten tracks in Aberdeen, could not take hand on that matter himself;23 or 
when Pennant, after having asked John Strange, a British resident in Venice and a keen 
collector, for Adriatic fish, crabs, lobsters, tortoises, birds, and, in general, 'anything you favour 
me with', offered any help he could provide in exchange;24 or, when William Borlase sent Ellis 
some plates of fishes, to be included in a future book by Borlase, asking Ellis for their names 
and for his opinion of whether some of them might be 'too common to be inserted' in the book, 
and stressed that he was hereby 'desiring you to do no more for me than I shall always be 
ready to do for you on like occasion.'25
Valued within Polite Society as a whole, the willingness to do services in exchange for 
services was further underscored within the Republic of Letters, where it became not only one
20 P. Blair to H. Sloane, Sept. 10,1705, British Library, Sloane 4040, f.66.
21 A. Goldgar, Impolite Learning (1995), pp. 19-26, and passim ; M. Mauss, The Gift (1969).
22 G. White to T. Pennant, Nov. 6,1767, British Library, Add. 35,138, ff.4-5.
23 D. Skene to J. Ellis, Jul. 5,1765, Linnean Society, London, Ellis Com, vol.II.95-6.
24 T. Pennant to J. Strange, Jun. 11, 1771, British Library, Egerton 2001, ff.31; on John Strange's collections and 
involvement in Venetian natural history, see K. Pomian, Collectors and Curiosities (1990), pp. 214-5,219.
25 W. Borlase to J. Ellis, Sept. 16,1756, Linnean Society, London, Ellis Com , vol.1.35.
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of the principal means of forging and maintaining bonds between men of learning, but also, as 
Goldgar points out, a crucial way of obtaining 'took of scholarship'.26
The importance of the information obtained by letter for the zoological work becomes 
apparent if the information about animals communicated through letters is compared with the 
descriptions in the printed accounts. Even to the point of citing whole letters, the information 
was extensively incorporated into the zoological books. As Thomas Pennant noted in the 
introduction to the second edition of British Zoology:
[W]e own with pleasure that we have been greatly aided by the lovers of natural history, who since the appearance 
of the first edition have contributed to enrich the present with several valuable observations; by collecting and 
digesting these materials, we have not only rendered the work more complete, but are also encouraged to trace the 
British Zoology thro' some of the remaining dasses, with all possible speed.27
The circulation of animals in some form or another within the Republic of Letters became vital 
for zoology.
In the letters, the animals would be represented according to the representational 
modes I have already analysed in the previous chapter. In general, they would either be 
circumstantially described, if it was a relatively unknown animal, or it would be described in a 
concise mode or even just mentioned by name if it was a fairly well known animal. In either 
case, it would invariably be treated as an object of knowledge -  as a zoological creature with 
definable features which could be made an object of observation and representation one to one, 
and which through the communication in the letters would be made available for an 
observation by proxy.
In the Republic of Letters, then, animals were transformed into gifts, and facts were 
turned into tokens of exchange. In order to gain access to these, a naturalist would not only 
need a broker, but would also have to master the art of writing polite letters, and, finally, and 
maybe most importantly, he would have to have something to offer himself -  some specimens, 
some observations, some thoughts -  in order to engage other naturalists in an exchange with 
him. It was the implied ethos of reciprocity which to a very large extent made the natural 
history world of the Republic of Letters go round, as it crucially enabled and at the same time 
reinforced the circulation of facts.
Within the Republic of Letters, the animals would remain within a restricted social 
sphere, marked by a basic agreement on the conception of animals -  the circulating animals 
were from the outset presented as objects of knowledge. In the museums and private cabinets 
the meaning of animals became multifarious. The animals were here put on display for a 
variety of reasons -  of which learning usually would be just one, and in many cases only a 
secondary one -  and used in exhibitions, which would more often than not be organised with
26 A. Goldgar, Impolite Learning (1995), p. 26.
27 T. Pennant, British Zoology (1768-77), vol. I, p. xii; emph. in org.; see also Appendices in vol. II and III, 
respectively.
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different purposes rather than learning itself. Meanings were, hence, inscribed on the animals 
that differed, at times radically, from the zoologist's factual conception of animals as facts. At 
the same time and in close connection to this, the museums and cabinets would in many cases 
be populated by a variety of people, whose primary concern would be neither learning, nor, 
indeed in most cases, specialised zoology, but who in some way or another conditioned the 
work of the zoologist within this sphere. It is to these social spheres, partly established outside 
the confines of learning and marked, to a large extent, by other kinds of institutionalised 
practices, I shall now turn to investigate how zoologists made facts out of the animals on 
display. By way of situating the eighteenth-century museums and collections, I shall give a 
brief review of the history of museums, move on to the eighteenth-century private cabinets 
and, finally, consider the public museums, which emerged during this period.
Animals in Museums
'[L]arge sums of mony [sic] have been expended in our own and other countries of Europe, in 
the formation of those collections which do honour to the taste of a refined people, and mark 
the munificence of an enlightened age', Richard Kentish observed at a speech given at the 
inaugural meeting of the Societas nature studiosum in Edinburgh, 1782, before he identified a 
dual usage of such collections:
The attention o f foreigners has been constantly attracted by these repositories of curiosities, and though the greater 
part of travellers are admitted but to gaze with wonder on the strange appearances presented to their view, yet to a 
philosophical enquirer, the effect is widely different.28
There was nothing new about the museum as a locus of both 'wonder7 and 'philosophical' 
enquiry. So had it been throughout the Renaissance as well. However, the separation between 
the two, and the conception of wonder as the response of the unlearned was new. That 
separation resulted not only in the emergence of a new type of museum, but also in a new way 
of using the museum, and most importantly for this study, in a new way of approaching and 
dealing with the objects in the museum.
Although by the eighteenth century, the museum had a history of some 400 years in 
Europe,29 its history in Britain was quite a lot shorter. In contrast to the Renaissance and 
predominantly Italian, but also French, Spanish and German princes, patricians and clergy 
who had been collecting valuables in their palaces or monasteries since the last decades of the 
fourteenth century, collecting only got under way on any grand scale in Britain during 
Elizabeth's reign, and it was not until well into the seventeenth century that the appetite for
28 R, Kentish, An Essay on the Method (1787), p. 8.
29 Pomian traces this history of the museums as well as its antecedents in the much longer history of collection in 
his Collectors and Curiosities (1990), ch. 1; and idem., 'Museet' (1993).
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collecting had become more widespread among the higher echelons.30 There had been 
collections of relics in the medieval churches in Britain, but these collections had neither been 
as grand and miscellaneous as those found in places on the Continent, nor had more than just a 
handful of the relics survived the Reformation and the iconoclastic campaign that followed.31 
The immediate ancestor to the British early modem collections was not to be found in Britain, 
but in the Renaissance museums on the Continent.
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The Renaissance Cabinet of Curiosities
Although the Renaissance cabinet had been encyclopaedic in its scope, the emphasis had been 
on the rare, the extraordinary and the wondrous -  with regard to animals, for instance, five­
legged pigs, two-headed cats, sea cucumbers, razor shells, ostrich eggs, the chameleon, the 
unicorn, or the crocodile.32 It was first and foremost a cabinet of curiosities. Alongside with 
these natural wonders, however, one would at times also find more mundane natural objects, 
such as comprehensive hortus siccus, stones and fossils from the vicinity of the cabinet, 
common birds and snakes. In the displays, these natural objects were mixed with different 
kinds of crafted natural curiosities -  such as gold-rimmed ostrich eggs, finely carved ivory, or, 
as Philip Hainhofe's masterpiece at the Uppsala cabinet, a centrepiece consisting of 'a carved 
coconut, coral, and silver drinking vessels with statues of Neptune and Venus [and] a top a 
distinctive montage of minerals [...] and shells'.33 Besides these, one would also find artificial 
curiosities -  mirrors, telescopes and microscopes, and other kinds of scientific instruments and 
man-made 'machines' -  as well as, finally, antiquities, coins, pieces of art, books and 
manuscripts.
With this generous inclusion of anything curious, the Renaissance cabinet of curiosities 
aimed at displaying the universe in its entirety, as Krzysztof Pomian has stressed. With its 
heterogeneous contents, it aimed at encompassing 'the entire contents of the universe: the 
sacred and the secular, the natural and the artificial, the animate and the inanimate, the far and 
the near.'34 Bringing the Renaissance practice of interpretation into play, natural and artificial 
curiosities would be placed side by side, in order to display the correspondences, resemblances
30 Arthur MacGregor gives a review of some of the most important cabinets and collectors in the seventeenth- 
century Britain, in 'The Cabinet of Curiosities' (1985). See also R. Altick, The Shows o f  London (1978), pp. 8-9; and 
B. J. Balsiger, The Kunst- und Wunderkammem (1971), for a comprehensive Catalogue Raissonne of European 
cabinets of curiosities in the early modem period.
31 R. Alticfc, The Shows o f  London (1978), p. 6.
32 The following sketch draws heavily on P. Findlen, Possessing Nature (1994); L. Daston and K. Park, Wonders and 
the Order o f Nature (1998); and K. Pomian, Collectors and Curiosities (1990).
33 P. C. Ritterbush, 'Art and science' (1969), pp. 568-9.
34 K. Pomian, Collectors and Curiosities (1990), p. 49.
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and analogies between the objects, and thereby to highlight the plentitude of nature and 
subvert 'the boundaries of familiar categories'.35 In the Renaissance cabinet, as in the 
Renaissance zoological work, the animals never stood alone. They gained their meaning by 
being incorporated into a network of analogies and correspondences by being placed next to 
antique sculptures, mirrors, books, plants.
The things on display were arranged to arouse in the spectator the 'wonder of 
astonishment'.36 It was a wonder of the virtuoso, who in the face of the unknown and rare 
would acknowledge its extraordinarily, and hence, manifest his taste and erudition with his 
response of wonder; it was the wonder of preternatural philosophers who in the extraordinary 
would find signs of God's intent; and its was the wonder of the philosopher because it led him 
to mediate on the order and meaning of the universe.37
The Renaissance cabinet was, as Findlen and Pomian have shown, a place of learning, 
also of zoological learning.38 But this was far from the only, and often not even the principal, 
function it served. Privately owned as the Renaissance cabinets invariably were -  by princes 
and patricians, members of the urban elite, wealthy scholars and by the (mainly Catholic) 
church -  the cabinets, as exclusive sites of the elite, became in addition, as Daston and Park 
point out, reservoirs of both economic, symbolic and magical power.39 Economic, because the 
curiosities, rare and exceptional as they were, often represented a notable value which could, 
and indeed would, be realised in times of need. Symbolic, because the possession of valuable 
wonders reflected their owners' position and enhanced their status. Magical, because at least 
some of the objects in the museums could be used in materia medica. The cabinets of all these 
multifaceted, potent and wondrous curiosities were, finally, closed for the majority of people. 
Their owners strictly guarded the access to the cabinets, in general by only allowing members, 
and mainly male members, of the social elite in. The exclusivity of their wonders was guarded 
also at a social level.
During the seventeenth century, collecting gained momentum, not only on the Conti­
nent, but also among the well-to-do in Britain, to whom I shall now turn. As Allen notes, the 
possession of a cabinet came 'to be regarded as one of the essential furnishings of every 
member of the leisured class with claims to be considered cultivated/40 The seventeenth 
century, hence, witnessed the establishing of a range of new cabinets. Some carried on the
35 L. Daston and K. Park, Wonders and the Order o f  Nature (1998), p. 273; cf. ch. 7. K. Pomian, Collectors and 
Curiosities (1990), p. 47; E. Hooper-Greenhill, Museums (1992), pp. 82-4.
36 L. Daston and K. Park, Wonders and the Order o f Nature (1998), p. 276.
37 Ibid., pp. 120ff., 170; P. Findlen, Possessing Nature (1994), pp. 54ff.; cf. S. Greenblatt, Marvellous Possessions (1991), 
pp. 14ff.
38 P. Findlen, Possessing Nature (1994); 1C Pomian, Collectors and Curiosities (1990), ch. 7.
39 L. Daston and K. Park, Wonders and the Order o f Nature (1998), pp. 74-7.
40 D. E. Alien, Naturalist in Britain (1994), p. 26.
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tradition of the Renaissance with regard to the manner of ownership, contents and 
organisation. But at the same time new kinds of museums arouse: With the foundation of the 
Ashmolean Museum at Oxford in 1683, what has often been considered the first public 
museum in Europe came into being.41 42With the establishment of the Royal Society's Repository 
at Gresham House in the 1660s, one of the first museums solely dedicated to learning of the 
'new philosophy' kind was founded. These different museums housed animals that were 
sought after by the zoologists, although the meaning inscribed on the animals would vary 
greatly from one kind of museum to the next.
The notable rise in the number of cabinets and museums, which housed zoological 
specimens in this period, was also made possible through the introduction of partly new 
techniques of taxidermy. I shall look at this technological prelude to the spread of zoological 
specimens within the cabinets and museums, before turning to the cabinets and museums 
themselves.
Taxidermy
From the seventeenth century onwards, the art of taxidermy became increasingly important for
zoology because the introduction of new ways of preserving animals allowed for the animals
to be transported from far away places to Europe, and hence, allowed the zoologist at home to
get some kind of first-hand observation of these exotic creatures. As one author poetically
observed regarding the specimens on display in collections:
What in this world can more delight
Than the nobility of creatures studied as they really are?
What can excite joy and wonder in the soul
More than viewing the reality of nature?43
Another zoologist, Frederick Watson, exemplified the advantages of such observations, while
describing sloths and noting the difficulties in the past in determining the various species:
O f late, however, it has become a Fashion to preserve the Animals which are curious in Foreign Nations; and instead 
o f Descriptions of them, to send the Creatures themselves preserved in Spirits into Europe. To this excellent Custom 
has been  owing a great deal of the present Improvement o f Natural History. Those who saw so slow and unwieldy 
an A nim al in the East, and had heard of such an one in the West, would not doubt their being the same; but by those
41 The definition of 'public' is, of course, intricate, and depending on the definition, the honour of being the first 
public museum can be placed at different places and times, as Pomian has shown in Collectors and Curiosities 
(1990), ch. 8. For a discussion of other candidates to the title in Britain, all preceding the Ashmolean museum by 
only a few decades, see R. F. Ovenell, The Ashmolean Museum (1986), pp. 28-9. The notion of 'public museums/ 
as I shall use it in the following, is to be understood as museums which gave access to a general public, 
although not necessarily to the entire population (no museums in Britain allowed this during our period), 
usually by payment of a fee, regardless of whether the museum was owned by the public or n ot Hence, they 
differed from the private cabinets in the sense that access to the latter could only be gained by different kinds of 
social means, as we will see.
42 Quoted in P. C. Ritterbush, 'Art and science' (1969), p. 576.
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sent over from Madagascar and Ceylon, w e  find that the Sloth of the East Indies, though very like that of America, is a 
different Species.43
The same point could be made more generally: The accumulation of preserved specimens in 
the museums and cabinets not only entailed a broadening of the empirical basis of zoology, but 
also allowed the zoologists to observe and hence, compare preserved animals from all over the 
world. As Lawrence Faber has shown with special reference to ornithology, this became crucial 
for the development of specialised zoological studies.44
Generally speaking, taxidermy did not become a professional craft in the period under 
consideration here. It was the traveller, or his servants as we might wonder,45 who generally 
performed the task. When travelling with a natural historian intent, part of a gentleman's 
luggage -  or, as Mark Catesby intimated, rather his servant's luggage46 -  would hence be filled 
with at least some of the instruments and paraphernalia necessary for the catching and 
preserving of animals: knives, scissors, pincers, needles, thread, gun, gauze net, bottles, boxes, 
putty, camphor, mercury, arsenic, and rum or brandy.
The methods of taxidermy varied not only between different kinds of animals, but also 
over time.47 In 1663, Robert Boyle had suggested using alcohol for preserving animals,48 and 
this method became crucial for the augmentation of preserved specimens. Smaller animals and 
molluscs, such as fish, snakes, as well as small lizards, small birds and ditto quadrupeds, were 
preserved in bottles filled with rum, brandy or other sorts of cheap alcohol. Although the 
animals would keep well for some time when preserved in alcohol, this method had the 
disadvantage that the colours of the animals quickly fainted, and that their feathers or fur and 
flesh disintegrated after having been immersed for some time in the alcohol.49 Nevertheless, it 
remained an important taxidermic method throughout the entire period.
Larger birds and quadrupeds would have to be skinned, the taxidermist being careful, 
as J. R. Forster stressed, not to stain the fur with blood or make a bigger hole than needed for 
skinning the animal.50 Their skins would be dried, often for hours or even days in an oven, and 
the skin had then to be tanned in some way. Throughout most of the period, insect pests 
proved to be a severe threat to the collections of preserved animals, literally destroying them as
CHAPTER 4
43 F. Watson, The Animal World Display'd (1754), p. 49; emph. in org.; cf. pp. 48-9.
44 P. L. Farber, 'The Development of Taxidermy' (1977); and idem., 'The Development of Ornithological 
Collections' (1980).
45 Cf. J. Woodward, Brief Instructions (1696), p. 16.
46 M. Catesby, The Natural History o f  Carolina (1731-43), vol. I, p. viii.
47 Where nothing else is noted the following outline o f taxidemic methods is drawn from J. R. Forster, A Catalogue 
o f the Animals o f  North America (1771), pp. 35ff.; E. Bancroft, An Essay on the Natural History o f Guiana (1769), pp. 
183-5, 219-20; J. C. Lettsom, Naturalist's and Travellers's companion (1772), pp, 2-19; J. Woodward, Brief 
Instructions (1696), pp. 14ff.; P. L. Farber, 'The Development of Taxiderm/ (1977); idem., 'The Development of 
Ornithological Collections' (1980).
48 5. Atran, Cognitive Foundations o f  Natural History (1990), p. 190.
49 Cf. P. L. Farber, 'The Development of Taxidermy' (1977), p. 553.
50 J. R. Forster, A Catalogue o f  the An irrtals o f  North America (1771), pp. 35-6.
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they ate their way through the stuffed animals.51 A variety of different kinds of preparations 
were tried on the skins -  for example, a solution of sal-ammoniac and mercury, embalming 
with different kinds of herbs, or soaking in alcohol for a period of time before drying etc. 
However, it was not before arsenic was introduced into the preparations in the later part of the 
eighteenth century that the insect pests could be brought under control in some measure.52
Regardless of which method was used, after the animals had been skinned and tanned, 
the taxidermist would either leave it at that -  also skins could be valuable for collections -  or 
else they would attempt to stuff them, with a view to reconstructing the animal in some 
'natural posture/ As a Swedish naturalist's emphasis on taking down the measures of the 
animal before beginning the process of preservation indicates, in the stuffing of animals 
taxidermists were not always faithful to the live original.53
Insects would be caught with a gauze net or a pair of forceps covered with gauze, or 
better still, as John Coakley Lettsom advised regarding butterflies, they should be collected as 
larvae or caterpillars and brought up in a box by the collector himself. This being the 'best 
method of having the most perfect butterflies', as they would, hence, not be damaged in the 
hunt.54 When caught, whether out in the open or in the box, a pin should be stuck 'thro' the 
middle of one of the hard wings, and pass[ed...] through the body'55 (see 111. 4.1).
In sum, through taxidermy animals would, again, be detached from their place of 
origin -  in this case by being killed and preserved -  before they would enter the private 
cabinets and public museums in the eighteenth century. As a result of such technological 
means here, the zoologist together with a variety of other people could view precious birds of 
paradise, stuffed crocodiles, skinned polar bears and a variety of other animals which 
otherwise belonged to another, more exotic world. Exotic animals that, as is evident from the 
numerous references to them in the zoological literature, became crucial to the zoological 
endeavour.
51 F o r complaints of insect pests, see, for instance, J. C. Lettsom, Naturalist's and Travellers's companion (1772), p. 12; 
cf. P. L. Farber, 'The Development of Taxidermy' (1977), pp. 551ff.; A. C. Chitnis, 'The University of Edinburgh' 
(1970), p. 86.
52 T h e  French apothecary Jean-Baptiste Béooeur is often attributed with the honour of being the first to introduce 
arsenic into taxidermy, e. g. P. L  Farber, 'The Development of Taxidermy' (1977), pp. 557ff. His formula of 
arsenic soap was, however, not revealed until after his death in 1777, and at least as early as 1771, J. R. Forster 
had  suggested using arsenic in the preparation of skins; J. R. Forster, A Catalogue o f  the Animals o f  North America 
(1771), pp. 35-6.
53 P. G. Lindroth, Underràttelse (1796) (unpaged).
54 J. C. Lettsom, Naturalist's and Travellers's companion (1772), p. 7-8.
55 Ibid., p. 7.
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Eighteenth-Century Cabinets and Museums
As the conception of nature and of facts changed with the advent of natural history and 
philosophy during the seventeenth century, so too did the cabinets, or in many instances, as 
Findlen has underscored, the rhetoric surrounding the cabinets -  for the objects and also the 
arrangement of the cabinets in many cases remained unchanged well into the eighteenth 
century.56 As we will see, the changes took place in different tempi and in different ways. Until 
the end of the eighteenth century, the zoologist could easily find himself in a private cabinet 
where the animals, together with a range of other miscellaneous objects, would be displayed in 
a way reminiscent of the Renaissance cabinet of curiosities. He might, on the other hand, also 
find himself in museums where the animals were put on display according to the newest 
taxonomic standards of the day. In the following, I shall attempt to encircle and contextualise 
the new learned rhetoric surrounding the museums by following the zoologist studying 
animals in the private cabinets and public museums.
Private Cabinets
As had been the case in the Renaissance, the majority of collections in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century were privately owned, most often by male and sometimes by female 
members of fire aristocratic or bourgeois elite. For the zoologists, entering a private cabinet 
meant entering a social sphere that was foreign to the majority of zoologists, middling sort of 
people as they generally were. It also often implied entering a cultural sphere where the 
animals would be inscribed with meanings often entirely at odds with the zoologists' con­
ceptions. I shall return to question of how access to the elitist sphere was negotiated below, but 
let us first take a closer look at what the cabinets had to offer.
During the seventeenth century, in best Renaissance style the emphasis in the private 
cabinets had been rather undiscriminating on everything rare and curious from all ranks of 
nature and art alike. During the eighteenth century, however, while the stress was certainly 
still on the extraordinary and rare, a new hierarchy of objects gradually evolved, as John 
Brewer has pointed out:
At top were the materials of the connoisseur paintings, sculpture, prints and drawings, metals and gems, valued 
both for their taste and for what they revealed about the exquisite sensibility of the ancients; at the bottom were 
natural and manmade objects that had been the pride of the seventeenth-century Wunderkammer.: shells and items of 
curiously wrought and exquisite workmanship.57
Although art, antique and contemporary, was now receiving the main attention, natural 
curiosities would still find their way into the private cabinets. Though it might not have been
56 P. Findlen, Possessing Nature (1994), pp. 393ff.
57 J. Brewer, Pleasures o f  Imagination (1997), p. 256.
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the top of fashion, some of the private collectors even paid special attention to natural 
curiosities and these, obviously, became the most valuable places to visit for the zoologists.
Among these we find Sir Hans Sloane's cabinet. Having married a wealthy widow and
in addition having earned considerable wealth on the sale of chocolate among other things,
Sloane built up an enormous collection that was later to form the basis of the British Museum.
Situated within an extraordinarily extensive network of correspondents, and being in an
economic position to buy objects on a large scale as well as to dispatch collectors to various
parts of the world,58 59Sloane built up a collection, which was unprecedented within Britain.
Reflecting on his luck in being allowed into this cabinet, George Edwards in the dedication to
Sloane of the second volume of his Natural History o f Birds, highlighted its magnificence:
I have often reflected on my own good Fortune, when I have considered that the Benefit which I enjoy has for many 
Years been an improvement and pleasant Entertainment, not only to the greatest of our Nobility, but even to the 
Royal Family of these Kingdoms, as well as to all Foreigners of Distinction who have visited this Kingdom, of which 
Number some are Sovereign Princes and Princes of Sovereign Houses: In the Front of the latter may be placed his 
present Imperial Majesty, whose great Taste for Natural Knowledge, and other Sciences, led him several Times to 
indulge his Curiosity in viewing such valuable Rarities as are no where to be met with but in your Compleat 
Museum, and at the same Time honoured their worthy Possessor with his Visits, during the short Stay he made in 
London.M
Being sought after by men of distinction and visited even by royalties, this private cabinet was 
prestigious, indeed.
Although Sloane's cabinet might have been without comparison in extent and un­
commonly distinguished by noble visitors, its contents, as they appear from the codicil to 
Sloane's will, still give us some idea of the objects which were considered worthy to collect at 
this time: 347 volumes of drawings and illuminated books, 3516 volumes of manuscripts, 
which 'together with the Books of Prints, consists of about 50,000 volumes'; medals, coins, 
antiquities, seals, stones, fossils, flints, metals, earths, sands, salts, sulphurs, ambers, shells (in 
sum 5,843 items), corals, sponges, etc. (1,421), echini, echinites, etc. (659), astriae, trochi, 
entrochi (241), crustacean, or crabs (363), stellae marinae (273), fish, and their parts-(1,555), birds 
and their parts, eggs and nests (1,172), vipers, serpents (521), quadrupeds (1,886), insects 
(5,439), anatomical preparations (756), vegetables, seeds, gums, woods, roots, etc. (12,506), 334 
volumes of Hortus siccus, miscellaneous natural things (2098), pictures and drawings (310), 
and some mathematical instruments.60 Sloane's collection, like that of most of his 
contemporaries, was wide ranging.
58 Such as Mark Catesby who was sent to Carolina in America in 1722 on a collecting tour, jointly paid by Sloane 
and some of the other major collectors at the time such as Richard Mead, Charles Dubois, and W. Sherard. 
Catesby7s job was to gather both botanical and zoological specimens, which were to be sent home with proper 
descriptions at regular intervals. M. Catesby, The Natural History o f Carolina (1731-43), vol. I, p. vi; M. Catesby to 
H. Sloane, British Library, Sloane 4046, ff.352-3, Sloane 4047, ff.90, 213, 290; M. Catesby to W. Sherard, Royal 
Society, London, Sh.163,164,170,176,184.
59 G. Edwards, A Natural History o f  Birds (1743-51), vol. IL pp. iii-iv; emph. in org.
60 H. Sloane, Authentic Copies of the Codicils, British Library, Add. 36,269, ff.33-5.
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Second only to the collection of Sloane's, was Lady Margaret Cavendish Bentinck's 
collection. In 1734, she married the second Duke of Portland, and from then on, she spent the 
rest of her life and the better part of her fortune forming a collection, which included all 
branches of natural history and fine art. In addition, the Duchess established a botanical 
garden and a menagerie, which were all housed in her mansion and park at Bulstrode, 
Buckinghamshire, where she also received zoologists and other natural historians on visits.61
Beside these collections, w e find among the more sought after privately owned 
collections that of James Petiver, consisting of all kinds of natural and artificial specimens from 
all over the world;62 Marmaduke Tuns tail's significant collection of birds,-63 and, later in the 
eighteenth century, William Hunter's collection which included, besides papers and books, 
anatomical preparations, fossils, minerals, natural history objects, including specimens from 
the first voyage of Captain Cook, insects, and even the corpse of a zebra and an elephant 
donated to his collection by Queen Charlotte;64 towards the end of the eighteenth century, 
James Edward Smith came into possession of a major collection when his father bought him 
the collection of Carl von Linnet5 at the same time, the brother of William Hunter, John, built 
up a collection of mainly zoological and anatomical specimens; and Sir Joseph Banks, not least 
as a result of his extensive network of collectors around the globe, established one of the 
greatest late eighteenth-century collections of natural curiosities, although these were mainly 
botanical.66
Though they differed in scope, collections such as these -  together with many more of a 
similar kind -  had a number of things in common. To begin with, they were all private 
collections and as such guarded by their owners. It was at the owners' discretion alone, that a 
zoologist could gain access to the exotic treasures of the private cabinets and hence, to often 
essential specimens for their work -  the overwhelming majority of zoologists in this study 
made use in one way or another of specimens in one or more private collections in their works. 
Some like Peter Brown and George Edwards based most of their work on specimens in private 
cabinets,67 while the majority of zoologists supplemented the information they obtained 
through other channels with visits to private collections.
61 D. E. Allen, Naturalist in Britain (1994), p . 25.
62 Ibid., p. 33.
63 P. L. Farber, The Emergence o f  Omitology (1982), p. 52.
64 C. H. Brock, 'D r W illiam Hunter's Museum' (1980). On the distribution of the specimens from Cook's three 
voyages, see P. J. P. Whitehead, 'Zoological Specimens' (1969).
65 P. J. P. Whitehead, 'Museums in the History of Zoology* (1970), p. 156.
66 Ibid., pp. 156-7; on John Hunter, see also J. Dobson, 'Curiosities of Natural History* (1970); S. J. Cross, 'John 
Hunter* (1981); on Banks, see J. Gascoigne, Science in the Service o f  Empire (1998); D. Mackay, 'Agents of Empire' 
(1996); D. P. Miller, 'Joseph Banks' (1996).
67 P. Brown, New Illustrations o f  Zoology (1776); G. Edwards, A  Nature/ History o f  Birds (1743-51); idem., Gleanings o f  
Natural History (1758-64).
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As we saw in the introductory chapter, the zoologists mainly belonged to the middle 
echelons, and hence, in social terms, generally ranked under the owners of the collections — 
entering the private cabinets, the zoologist entered a social sphere of another social strata. In 
contrast to the fairly egalitarian ethos of exchange in the Republic of Letters,“  the zoologist 
would have to engage in an exchange of an entirely different sort as he entered the private 
cabinet. Usually conceptualised in terms of patronage, the zoologist would enter into a 
relationship of unequal exchange with the collector "your patron', as Richard Steele observed 
in an article in The Spectator, 'is of a species above you' in relation to whom the patronaged 
became 'a sort of creditor[.
A patron of such high standing could usually not be approached by a naturalist 
himself, if he was not previously acquainted with the owner. Access to a privately owned 
collection could be gained, though, through an introduction -  also here a zoologist would often 
be in need of a broker. In exchange for access, the zoologist turned creditor would have to pay 
his debt. The repayment would often take the form of a reference or a dedication to the patron 
or patrons in the published work. Hence George Edwards, for instance, in the general 
introduction to A Natural History o f Birds underscored the invaluable 'help' of a number of 
gentlemen who 'by furnishing me with matter' had enabled Edwards to bring his work 'into a 
Length, that I at first imagined, it could never attain/68 970 In a letter to Dr. Birch, the secretary of 
the Royal Society, Edwards once again stressed his debt to these 'Pattrons [sic] and Friends', 
making his method of repayment explicit. It was his intention to lay before the Royal Society 
fifty two coloured prints, later to form the third volume of Gleanings o f Natural History, and in 
connection to that he wrote:
to Remind the Society of the Particular Benefactors to this Work, I have wrote the names of each Noble and 
Generous Person to whom 1 am Obliged for the subject matter contain'd in each Print, in the Blank Pages oposit [sic] 
to the Prints.71
In the volume itself, each patron was specifically mentioned in connection with each 
description of the animal originating from his collection, as was often the case in zoological 
books more generally.72
68 'Fairly' because, as Anne Goldgar reminds us, even though an ethos of egalitarian exchange would be upheld, 
the number of correspondents, renown in the circles of learning, and access to patronage, certainly helped to 
differentiate status between scholars and to frame the terms of the actual exchange. A. Goldgar, Impolite 
Learning (1995), pp. 28ff.
69 Steele, TTie Spectator, no. 214, Nov. 5,1711, reprinted in G. A. Aitken, The Spectator (1898), vol. Ill, p. 220. On 
patronage more generally in relation to the production of knowledge in this period, see also J. Gascoigne, 
'Politics, Patronage and Newtonianism' (1984); L  Stewart 'Public Lectures and Private Patronage' (1986); A. J. 
G. Cummings and L. Stewart, 'The Case of the Eighteeenth-Century Projector' (1991); and on patronage in the 
seventeenth-century, see L. T. Sarasohn, 'Thomas Hobbes and the Duke of Newcastle' (1999); M. Biagioli, 
'Galileo's System of Patronage' (1990); and on patronage in broader contemporary society, see G. E. Aylmer, 
'From Office-Holding to Civil Service' (1980).
70 G. Edwards, A Natural History o f  Birds (1743-51), vol. L General Introduction (unpaged).
71 G. Edwards to T. Birch, Oct. 9,1762, Royal Society, London, L&P.IV.125.
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As is here made dear, the granting of access to animals in privately owned collections 
was repaid with a public acknowledgement. The significance of this exchange, from the 
collector's point of view, is evident when the symbolic prestige assodated with possessing 
such collections is taken into account. Although there would have certainly been more non­
utilitarian motives for permitting a zoologist into a cabinet, one obvious consequence of this 
exchange was that by allowing his or her specimens to be drawn or described, a patron would 
be publidy recognised as an important collector. As the zoologists praised the collections of 
extraordinary predous animals in their works, the zoologists were hence reinforcing their 
prestige.
The second common feature of the private collections was their heterogeneous 
character, as is also apparent from the short sketch above. Although in general, art, metals and 
gems were appredated the most, and although a collector might overturn this hierarchy and 
also concentrate on one or more areas of natural curiosities in their collections -  such as Banks 
on botany, or Tunstall on birds -  their collections usually also induded a wealth of other 
miscellaneous items, thus, nevertheless keeping something of the encyclopaedic nature of the 
Renaissance collection.
The vast majority of collectors, moreover, would still select the extraordinary for their 
cabinets. With regard to animals, exotic specimens were still preferred to domestic, the rare 
still preferred to the commonplace, the beautiful to the trivial.72 3 In this way, the world of 
animals represented in the cabinets was still a world of extraordinary specimens.
A few collectors, such as Hans Sloane, would organise their displays according to the 
methods of taxonomy, and other collectors, like the Duchess of Portland, would hire naturalists 
to make taxonomic order in a catalogue of the objects in the collection.74 In most collections, 
however, the objects on display would rather follow the layout of the Renaissance cabinet of 
curiosities, than any 'methodical order/ as it were, comparable to that of the tree of knowledge 
or, with regard to the animals, that of the zoologists' taxonomies. Alongside the crocodile or 
bird of paradise, as in the Renaissance cabinet, one was more likely to find here medals, 
paintings, chinaware, dried flowers, and various manuscripts, for example, rather than their 
neighbouring creatures on the Great Chain of Being.75
As this inclusion of a variety of objects and the mode of display indicates: the agenda of 
the owner and his relation to the objects differed from that of the zoologist. With few 
exceptions the items of a collection would be arranged in a display in order rather to please by
72 See also, for instance, P. Brown, New Illustrations o f  Zoology (1776); G  Owen, An Essay towards a Natural History o f  
Serpents (1742).
73 R. Altick, The Shows o f  London (1978), pp. 8ff. Cf. D. E. Allen, Naturalist in Britain (1994), pp. 24ff.; K. Pomian, 
Collectors and Curiosities (1990), pp. 271ff.
74 D. E. Allen, Naturalist in Britain (1994), p. 25.
75 Cf. R. Altick, The Shows o f  London (1978), p. 15.
132
THE SOCIAL LIFE OF ANIMALS
its beauty and delight by its variety, than to satisfy the quest of the natural historian. The 
cabinet was the connoisseur's creation. The connoisseur, as a figure, was first and foremost 
distinguished by his good taste and certain judgement. By his ability to determine with a 
glance the artistic worth of a painting, the predousness of a gem, or the extraordinarily of a 
natural curiosity: The connoisseur was a man who was able to make proper distinctions.76 That 
kind of taste which would allow one thus to distinctively identify the merit of objects equalled, 
as Thomas Pennant had it, 'a quick sensibility of imagination refined by judgement', which 
was 'directed by experience', and such experience in turn was 'another term for knowledge.'77 
The connoisseur's appredation of objects hence hinged on learning but it was learning, or 
'erudition' as it was more commonly called, of another kind than that of the naturalist, with 
another objective in view. The 'connoisseur's gaze/ as Ann Bermingham has called it,78 would 
be educated through a general study of philosophy, history, dassical literature, rhetoric, 
religion and even natural history, and, as the final and indispensable touch, it would be 
sharpened by visiting all the andent and modem sites of fashion on the Grand Tour at the 
Continent.79 Moreover, the objective of this general education of the connoisseur was not so 
much learning for knowledge's sake, but for the sake of educating his sensibilities: The aim 
would exactly be to create such a connoisseur who, in an entirely non-utilitarian fashion, 
would be able to judge and distinguish between objects (and women among them80) and to 
take a reasoned delight in those which (or who) were judged worth it. As a result of this 
education, the connoisseur would, finally, be able to approach the objects and appredate them 
as things in themselves: 'Coins or pictures, shells or insects, none are valued for use,' as Walter 
Houghton remarks of the connoisseur's relation to his objects, 'neither for the advancement of 
learning nor for immediate gain: they are valued in themselves because they arouse curiosity 
and stimulate delight'.81 In the connoisseur's universe, the objects would became self- 
referential: they would, in a word, become fetishes82 -  but only after they had been judged 
extraordinary enough to be deemed worthy of the connoisseur's attention.
76 A. Bermingham, 'Elegant Females and Gentlemen Connoisseur' (1993), p. 503.
77 T. Pennant, British Zoology (1768-77), vol. I, p. ix.
78 A. Bermingham, 'Elegant Females and Gentlemen Connoisseur' (1993), p. 492.
79 J. Barrell discusses the education of the gentleman at length in his 'The Public Prospect and the Private View' 
(1990). For the assets of the Grand Tour, see J. Black, 77« Bn’iish and the Grand Tour (1985); A. Wilton and I. 
Bignamini, Grand Tour (1996).
80 A. Bermingham, 'Elegant Females and Gentlemen Connoisseur' (1993), and J. Brewer, Picas «res o f Imagination 
(1997), ch. 6, discuss this sensual aspect of connoiseurship.
81 W. E. Houghton, 'The English Virtuoso' (1942), p. 56.
82 Ann Bermingham has introduced the concept of the fetish into the analysis of the connoisseur in her 'Elegant 
Females and Gentlemen Connoisseur' (1993), esp. pp. 402, 502-9. But whereas Bermingham understands the 
concept in a psychoanalytical sense, following Inger Sjorslev, I do here use it in a more general sense to signify 
that approach to objects which turns the objects into an 'irreducible materiality': 'The fetish does not refer to 
anything, it is hence, a representation 'which has become a signifier, something in itself, which does not convey
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Such a 'fetishsation' of the objects in the private cabinets was entirely at odds with the
zoologists' way of approaching the stuffed curiosities. In the cabinet, the zoologist met a
display, which was organised to satisfy tastes other than his. Although the difference in
approach received less attention in the zoological literature than it did in the artists' writing
where an analogous distinction was discerned,83 the zoologists commented on it from time to
time, using the portray of the connoisseur's approach to situate their own endeavour.
It was principally the 'idleness/ as it became known, of the connoisseur's approach to
objects that was targeted by the learned -  their manner of valuing objects for pure delight. The
'pleasure, sensuality and dissipation' which naturalists came to associate with such idleness,
was contrasted with 'the spirit' of 'learning',84 and the connoisseurs' interest only in 'such as
bring with it immediate Profit or sensual Pleasure' was opposed to the pursuit of making
'Discoveries and Knowledge.'85 Ultimately, it was the utility of the zoologist's enterprise, which
emerged most strongly against the fetishism of the connoisseur. 'Happy the man!' as Gilbert
White wrote to Thomas Pennant, who was a gentleman of fortune and decent himself,
who knows like you how to keep himself innocently and usefully employed; especially where his studies tend to 
amusement of knowledge, and the benefit o f Society. And happy would it be for more men of fortune if they knew 
what to do with their time; if they knew how to shim 
'The pains and penalties of Idleness'
how much dissipation, rito, and excess would they escape; not without the complacency of finding themselves 
growing still better neighbours & better commonwealth-men?86
As indicated here, engaging in such useful pursuits as the study of zoology might even make 
the zoologist a man of more propriety than the idle connoisseur:
A habit of observation refines our feelings. It is a source of interesting amusement, prevents idle or vicious 
propensities, and exalts the mind to the love of virtue and rational entertainment.87
At base, this contrast of natural history to connoisseurship, of the zoologist to the connoisseur, 
rested on their different approaches to the animals. Where the connoisseur would value the 
extraordinary objects as fetishes, the zoologist would put them to use for the sake of 
knowledge. However, doing that meant emptying them of their extraordinary potential as 
objects of delight.
As we saw in Chapter 2, within natural history the extraordinary had, in principle, 
been reduced to frequency: every single animal had been made trivial vis-à-vis a uniform 
nature. But as we also saw in Chapter 3, in practice, extraordinary specimens, or 'non-
any meaning nor represent anything beyond itself.' In approaching an object as a fetish, then, one 'stops by the 
thing.' I. Sjorslev, 'A t standse ved tingen' (1990), pp. 31,39; emph. in org.
83 Cf. J. Brewer, Pleasures o f  Imagination (1997), ch. 6; J. Barrell, The Political Theory o f Painting (1986), ch. 1. On 
connoisseurship in arts in general, and on Richard Payne Knight in  particular, see also M. Clarke and N. Penny, 
The Arrogant Connoisseur (1982).
84 G. Edwards, Gleanings o f  Natural History (1758-64), vol. I, pp. vi-vii.
85 G. Edwards, A Natural History o f Birds (1743-51), vol. I, p. xiv.
86 G. White to T. Pennant, Nov 28,1768, British Library, Add. 35,138, f.21.
87 W. Smellie, The Philosophy o f  Natural History (1790), vol. I, p. vii.
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descripts' as they were matter-of-factly rephrased within zoology, did not entirely lose their 
appeal within eighteenth-century zoology. Indeed, the observation of non-descripts was often 
die main reason for the zoologists to visit the private cabinets of the connoisseur. But as the 
rephrasing also indicates, the extraordinary character of these animals did not have any 
bearing on the meaning inscribed on the animal an sich. In turning the non-descript into a 
zoological fact, it would be transformed into a lifeless, and principally morphological creature, 
just like the most common of animals. Herein lay the main difference between the zoologist's 
and the connoisseur's appropriation of die animal. An example of this can be found in 
Pennant's description, quoted in full below, of a visit to the Prince of Orange's cabinet, 
renowned among connoisseurs in the second half of the eighteenth century for its 
extraordinary contents:88
Visited the Prince's Cabinets, under the direction of M. Vosmaer [the Cabinet's director!, a frenchified Dutchman, 
extremely ignorant The curiosities are kept in five rooms and are very fine; the animals in spirits are numerous, 
among them Lizard with a fin on its back engraved by Seba.
There is a skeleton of a vast Antelope.
Among the birds is the male and female Cormorant; the former has a white spot on the chin and crest and 
a white spot on each thigh.
Anas dunca shot near the Hague is black except a white spot under the bill and the quill feathers, which 
are white.
In another room is the large scull of some beast; in the upper jaw are two Indsors, two Canine and fine 
Molares, in the lower all the same except the Indsores, which are four in number. The minerals and shells in his 
cabinet are very good.89
Although a zoologist might, just as the connoisseur in his way, display his learning by dis­
tinguishing some animals as non-descripts, and others as common, the zoologist did not dwell 
on that distinction with 'idle pleasure/ and leave it at that. Rather, the fetishized animals of the 
private cabinets would be reduced, as Pennant did, to morphological, and in a sense, 
meaningless creatures, which at a later stage would obtain their principal meaning as part of a 
species in a taxonomic scheme by being incorporated into a zoological work and here being 
related to other animals. In contrast to the connoisseur, the zoologist did not stop at the thing. 
That was the whole point of the zoological endeavour.
Ironically, the zoologist, by the same token, undermined the very conditions, which 
made these collections prestigious within elite society. He emptied the connoisseur's objects of 
their extraordinary symbolic potential by incorporating them into the taxonomic scheme on an 
equal footing with the common animals, though possibly offering a few more words on them 
than the common in the descriptions: A panther would here be placed next to the common cat, 
an armadillo next to a mole. However, this was not done without recognition. The zoologist 
entering the social world of the affluent connoisseurs still needed to appreciate the symbolic 
potential of the extraordinary animals as signs of the collectors' prestige as the zoologists,
88 Cf. F. F. J. M. Pieters, 'Notes on the menagerie's (1980).
89 T. Pennant, Tour on the Continent 1765 (1948), pp, 155-6.
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indeed, also did publicly in their dedications, in order to, through the right means of 
negotiating a relation of patronage, gain access to the extraordinary/non-descript animals in 
the first place.
Public Museums
If the zoologist had to share space with the connoisseur in the private collection, he had to 
share space with the vulgar in at least some of the public museums to which I now shall turn. 
One of the first museums to emphasis its public character was the Royal Sodety's Repository. 
Its status as a public museum might be considered debatable,90 or at least it depended on a 
strict definition of the 'public' as the learned public -  in practice, it was only open to the 
Society's fellows, and besides these solely to men of learning or consequence by appointment. 
It is worth taking a look at the motives given for envisioning this museum as public upon its 
foundation in the 1660s, as these illuminate some of the basic reasons for making museums 
public.
In the History, Thomas Sprat acclaimed the 'heroick Intention' of the Royal Society to 
make public what had previously been 'dose lock'd up in Cabinets'. By purchases or through 
gifts91 the Sodety intended 'to bring' such things 'into one common Stock, which shall be upon 
all Occasions expos'd to all Men's Use'.92 This intention fit well, of course, with the general 
assertion that knowledge should be public -  in the Repository everybody should be able to 
observe the matters of fact for themselves.
It was not only with regard to the idea of 'public' access that the Repository departed 
from the Renaissance and connoisseur model. Also with regard to its contents and organisation 
the founders envisioned a new style more in tune with contemporary learned ideals: every 
object of art and nature, rather than just the rare, would be allowed into the Repository. 
Displaying the Sodety's 'Disposition to be [...] universal', the Repository hence 'propos'd to 
accomplish [...] a General Collection of all the Effects of Arts, and the Common, or Monstrous 
Works of Nature.'93 It should be a complete collection. The collection would, furthermore, be 
organised along taxonomic lines. As Sprat explained, the first 'curator' of the Repository, 
Robert Hooke, 'has begun to reduce [the objects] under its several heads, according to the exact
90 Michael Hunter describes the Repository as occupying 'an intermediate position between private cabinets and 
public museums', in his 'The Cabinet Institutionalized' (1985), p. 159. Strictly speaking, Hunter's 
characterisation is more correct than mine. Since, however, the natives themselves emphasised the 'public1 
character of the Repository, it still seems legitimate to inquire into what being 'public' meant from their point of 
view. For a review of continental 'institutional collections,' predating the Royal Society's Repository, see W. 
Schupbach, 'Some Cabinets of Curiosities' (1985).
91 T. Sprat, The History o f  the Royal Society (1667/1722), p. 251; emph. in org.
92 Ibid., p. 75.
93 Ibid., p. 251; emph. in org.
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Method of the Ranks of all the Species of Nature, which has been compos'd by Dr. Wilkins'\w In
stark contrast to the displays at the private cabinets, with a complete collection and such a
mode o f ordering it was hoped that in time the Repository would be able to display the very
Chain of Being with all its links and intermediate spedes. Here the scholar should be on home
ground. Indeed, as Hooke stressed, these displays should be for men of learning alone:
The use o f such a Collection is not for Divertisement [sic], and wonder, and Gazing, as 'tis for the most part thought 
and esteemed, and like pictures for Children to admire and be pleased with, but for the most serious and diligent 
study o f the most able proficient in Natural Philosophy.94 5
Divorced from delight, open to the (learned or aristocratic) public, being complete and 
organised according to 'natural prindples' the Repository should, in brief, be no more and no 
less than a display of nature itself, as it looked from the natural historian's point of view.
In the event, the Repository failed according to its own standards. Although the 
Repository certainly was used by zoologists -  Richard Bradley, for instance, induded a 
description of some shell fish found in the Repository into his book,96 Charles Owen described 
some snakes from there97 -  it never succeeded in making a complete inventory of nature, nor, 
indeed, in displaying the trivial productions of nature to any significant degree. Depending 
mainly on gifts, the acquisitions of the Repository remained generally rare, not to say curious: 
'Stones taken out of Lord Belcarre's heart in a silver box' and 'a bottle full of stag's tears' were 
thus among the gifts, the Sodety received.98 One suspect that the prestige assodated with 'the 
extraordinary' in the private cabinet also clung to the gifts bestowed on the sodety.99 10The 
miscellany of rare objects becomes evident in the catalogue over the Repository's contents that 
was drawn up by Nehemiah Grew in 1681.100 Though in the catalogue he did his best to 
categorise the items according to the taxonomic standards of the day, rare objects clearly 
outnumbered the trivial in these tables: the foot of a polar bear, the skull of a hippopotamus, a 
pig-headed armadillo, the skeleton of a crocodile, and a swan's egg containing another egg 
within it were among the things to be seen at the Repository.101
The Royal Sodety's Repository might have failed, but the idea that was so eagerly 
advocated of making knowledge, or at least facts, publidy accessible spread during the 
eighteenth century. At the same time, the idea about how this public should be defined also 
changed. Linked to a more general, and by no means unambiguous nor all-encompassing,
94 Ibid., p. 251; emph. in org. It is the classification in J. Wilkins, An Essay (1668), which Sprat is referring to here. 
This classification was, in fact, not made by Wilkins himself, but by John Ray.
95 Robert Hooke, Posthumous Works (1705), quoted in P. Findlen, Possessing Nature (1994), p. 400,
96 R. Bradley, A philosophical account o f  the works o f nature (1721), p, 57.
97  C. Owen, An Essay towards a Natural History o f  Serpents (1742), pp. 91,102.
98 E. Hooper-Greenhill, Museums (1992), p. 160.
99 As also Hunter suggests, in 'The Cabinet Institutionalized' (1985), p. 165.
100 On the cataloguing of the collection, see also A. D. C. Simpson, 'Newton's Telescope' (1984); M. Hunter, 'The 
Cabinet Institutionalized' (1985), pp. 164ff.
101 N. Grew, Museum Regalis Societas (1681), pp. 1-3,14-5,18-9,42, 79.
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movement to reform and educate the vulgar, it was suggested that even the vulgar might leam 
something from, or at least be sensibly amused by, natural history collections.102 Although this, 
as we will see, was not a straightforward reformation, some museums were, at least in 
principle, opened up to a more general public than the Royal Society's Repository had been 
(and as time passed, even the items of the Repository would be exposed to a more general 
public. After years of complain of neglect, the Repository was removed to the British Museum 
in 1781 103): The scholars once again had to share the space with other people.
The first museum to open its doors to a general public was the Ashmolean Museum at 
Oxford, opened in 1683. Based on one of the greatest collections in the first half of the 
seventeenth century, John Tradescant's 'A rk', the collection, once again, consisted of 
miscellaneous things, although the emphasis was on botany (Tradescant had been a gardener, 
first to Queen Henrietta Maria at Oatland, and later keeper of the physic garden at Oxford).104 
Upon the death of Tradescant's son, Elias Ashmole inherited the collection and donated it to 
Oxford University, and from the beginning the plan was to create an institution of natural 
historical and philosophical learning, In the building specifically made to house it, there was 
not only made room for the collection, but also for a lavish laboratory, and a 'School of Natural 
History, where the professor of chymestry [...] reads three times a week'.105 And used it was by 
the zoologists. Thomas Pennant, for instance, appears to a have been an eager visitor: No less 
than 23 of the quadrupeds described in his Synopsis o f  Quadrupeds were taken from the 
Ashmolean Museum.
However, from the beginning the Ashmolean Museum was also open to the general 
public. For a sixpence, even 'women [were] allowed up', the German traveller Zacharias 
Conrad von Uffenbach sourly noted, as he had to give up visiting the museum: 'it was market 
day and all sort of country-folk, men and women, were up there (for the leges that hang upon 
the door parum honeste & liberaliter allow everyone to go in). So we could have seen nothing 
well for the crowd'.106
The scholars and the gentlefolk would have to leam to share the space with the crowd. 
How this worked out and how the scholars positioned themselves in such a situation, becomes 
still clearer if we take a look at the next major public museum which opened.its doors to the 
general public: the British Museum.
The British Museum was originally envisioned by Hans Sloane, and founded thanks to 
the Government's purchase of his huge collection for £ 20,000 upon his death in 1753 -  money
102 Porter discusses the various attempts at such reformations, R. Porter, Enlightenment (2000) pp. 371ff.
103 Daniel Solander, Diary + Occurrence-Book of the British Museum, June 15,1781, British Library, Add. 45,874; 
cf. M. Hunter, Science and Society (1981), p, 189.
104 R. F. Ovenell, The Ashmolean Museum (1986), pp, 1 -2 ,7 ,56 .
105 Ovenell describes its construction and outline in some detail, ibid., pp. 18ff, for the quotation, see p. 23.
106 Uffenbach, Oxford in 1710, quoted in P. Findlen, Possessing Nature (1994), p. 147.
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raised by the government through a lottery (the common people were not, to some extent, only 
let in, but also contributed to the British Museum's establishment).107 The money thus raised 
totalled £  100,000, and besides being spent on purchasing Sloane's collection, it was also used 
to buy the Harleian collection of books and manuscripts, and Sir Robert Cotton's collection of 
antiquities, and to acquire buildings to house these collections.108 In the Codicils to Sloane's 
will, he had not only offered his collection to the nation, but also defined the terms of its use. 
The British Museum should be a public institution with the dual objective of gratifying the 
curiosity of common people as well as tire inquiries of the scholar:
And I do hereby declare, that it is my desire and intention [...] that the same [the museum] may be rendered as 
useful as possible, as well towards satisfying the desires of the curious, as for the improvement, knowledge and 
information of all persons; and it is for this purpose I have hereby reposed a sincere trust and confidence in my right 
honourable, honourable [sic], and other trustees and visitors hereby appointed.10*
From the beginning, the collection was beyond comparison the greatest in Britain, and in the 
following decades, it grew steadily with new acquisitions and gifts. These included gifts from 
the Earl of Hillsborough who gave 'Natural curiosities' collected at the New Cedeal Island; 
John Hunter who presented a 'Transvene Section of the Electric Eel'; John Reinhold Forster 
who donated 'Skins of Quadrupeds from Cap of Good Hope' and a number of stuffed birds 
from the East Indies after returning from one of Captain Cook's voyages; and a Mr. Braun who 
offered 'The upper-part of the Cranium of the ¿Ethiopian Hog', just to mention a few of the 
donations.110
As is evident from the lists of donors, a host of different men of the middle and upper 
echelons contributed to the British Museum's collection. The British Museum had become, at 
least from the point of view of many of the higher echelons, a matter of national interest. 
Benjamin Stillingfleet made this explicit in his dedication of his Miscellaneous Tracts to George 
Lord Lyttelton, Baron of Frankley. The Lord had been instrumental in the foundation of the 
British Museum, and the dedication was written to him in acknowledgement of 'the zeal which 
You shewed in Parliament for securing to this Country that noble collection of natural 
curiosities now reposited in the British Museum'. In this matter, 'the reputation and interest of 
the nation were highly concerned'.111
This chain of associations linking the British Museum to 'die nation' and 'pride' gave a 
new meaning to the idea of 'the public/ No longer defined by just a small number of learned or 
virtuous citizens, but conceptualised as a 'nation/ towards the end of the eighteenth century,
107 For the history of the foundation of the British Museum, see J. M. Crook, The British Museum (1972).
108 R. Altick, The Shows o f  London (1978), p. 25.
109 H. Sloane, Authentic Copies of the Codicils, British Library, Add. 36,269, ff.19-20.
110 Daniel Solander, Reports and Diary of Occurrences in the Natural History Department, Sept. 26, 1766, British 
Library, Add. 45,874; Daniel Solander, Diary + Occurrence-Book of the British Museum, June 16, 1775, Sept. 8, 
1775, March 16, 1781, British Library, Add. 45,874. For a more thorough list of the acquisitions and gifts, see 
British Museum (Natural History), Separate Historical Account (1906).
111 B. Stillingfleet, Miscellaneous Tracts (1762), Dedication (unpaged).
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the 'general public' came to include all of the inhabitants on the British Isles. The idea of the 
nation as an 'imagined community' encompassing all of the inhabitants within a geographical 
area was beginning to take shape,112
It is worth dwelling for a moment on this emerging idea of the nation, epitomised in 
the envisioning of the British Museum, at least to indicate the consequences of this idea for 
zoology as well.113 At the same time as the British Museum was established, objects in the 
domestic natural world also started to attract attention. In at least some collections, domestic 
and commonplace things would be accorded an unprecedented interest and be advanced to 
more prominent places in some of the displays.114 Similarly, within zoology the national faunas 
would be compiled both within Britain and throughout Europe, including Fauna Svecica, Fauna 
Danica, and in Britain, books such as Pennant's British Zoology, or Berkenhout's Synopsis o f  the 
Natural History o f Great-Britain and Ireland, or still more locally, White's Natural History o f  
Selborne. Pennant made the lure of the national explicit in the introduction to British Zoology. 
After having noted that Carl von Linne already had made 'an eulogium on Sweden',115 Pennant 
made his objective clear: 'we shall here attempt a parallel, and point out to the British reader, 
his native riches; many of which were probably unknown to him, or perhaps slightly 
regarded,'116 Because, Pennant went on to reason,
Do the heights of Torsburg, or Szoucku [in Sweden] afford more instruction to the naturalist than the mountains of 
Cumberland, or Carnarvonshire? whose sides are covered with a rich variety of uncommon vegetables, while their 
bowls are replete with the most useful minerals. [ . . .]  Sweden can no where produce a parallel to that happy 
combination of grandeur and beauty in Keswickt vale, or Killamy% lake; nor can Europe shew a natural wonder equal 
to the Giant's causeway in the north of Ireland.
+ In Cumberland.
t  In the County of Kerry.117
Such a 'neglect' of the national fauna and flora was an outrageous 'shame'.118
In the second half of the eighteenth century, the emerging idea of Britain as a nation 
was, then, echoed within the context of learning, with the subject matter of some zoological 
books being delimited by the nation, with a new interest in collecting things domestic and 
common, and, finally, in the establishment of a British Museum which was designed to open it 
doors for the general public. That the idea of including all people of the British Isles in the
112 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities (1983), p. 15; Linda Colley examines the 'forging' of the British nation, 1707- 
1837, in detail, L. Colley, Britons (1996).
113 Within a British context John Gascoigne has traced some of the links between knowledge and the nation, in J. 
Gascoigne, Science in the Service o f Empire (1998); for perspectives from abroad see K. Pomian, Collectors and 
Curiosities (1990), pp. 217ff., and L. Koemer, Linnaeus (1999).
114 D. E. Allen, Naturalist in Britain (1994), pp. 25ff,; cf. K. Pomian, Collectors and Curiosities (1990), pp. 271ff.
115 Linné published a Flora Svecica in 1745 and a Fauna Svecica in 1746.
116 T. Pennant, British Zoology (1768-77), p. ii; emph. in org.
117 Ibid., pp. ii-iii; emph. in org.
118 Ibid., pp. v-vi.
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'public' was flawed in practice becomes evident if we return to the British Museum and see 
how the inclusion operated in practice.
Even before the British Museum opened, its trustees had made it clear that the 
museum's primary objective was the advancement of 'Science and the Arts', and not the 
gratification of 'the curiosity of [...] multitudes [...] in quest of amusement.'119 While scholars 
would be admitted to the museum by means of a recommendation, common people had, to 
begin with, to 'be decent and orderly in their Appearance and Behaviours' to be admitted in.120 
They had, furthermore, to apply for a ticket, by signing their name, social rank and address in 
the porter's lodge, and then some days, weeks or even months later when the application had 
been processed, a prospective visitor could finally pick up his or her ticket and enter the 
museum. Not surprisingly, given this tedious procedure, the British Museum only had on 
average sixty ordinary visitors a day during its first years.121 In practice, as Richard Altick 
concludes, 'such ordinary Londoners as had some desire for additional knowledge were 
hardly better off after the British Museum opened than they had been before.'122 For a while, 
the learned would also have the British Museum to a large extent to themselves.
However, there was more to these precautions than merely a desire to tum the British 
Museum into a site of learning, as it was hinted at in the museum's Regulations: 'it might be 
dangerous, in so populous a Metropolis as London, to admit perfect Strangers [in]'. Hence, the 
necessity of knowing the name and social standing of the visitors in advance.123 124The basis of 
this fear of the general admission of the public was made dear by Dr. John Ward, professor of 
rhetoric and one of the museum's trustees:
a general liberty to ordinary people of all ranks and denominations, is not to be kept within bounds. Many 
irregularities will be committed that cannot be prevented by a few librarians who will soon be insulted by such 
people, if they offer to control or contradict them If any such people are in liquor and misbehave, they are 
rarely without their accomplices who out of an Idle vanity in exerting what they will call their liberty will side
w ith them and promote mischiefs that are to be more easily suppressed than [...1 prevented. [...] No persons of 
superior degree will care to come on such days [...1. If public days should be allowed, then it will be necessary for 
the Trustees to have the presence of a Committee of themselves attending, with at least two Justices of the Peace and 
the constables of the division of Bloomsbury [...] supported by a guard such a one as usually attends at the Play- 
House, and even after all this, Accidents must and will happen.114
A committee of Trustees, two Justices of Peace, a patrol of constables, and a guard from a Play 
House posted at the British Museum: the reluctance to allow the general public in en masse 
evidently reflected a fear, voiced more generally among the higher echelons in this period, of
119 Quoted in J. M. Crook, The British Museum (1972), p. 65.
120 British Museum, Regulations for General Admission into the British Museum, 17??, British Library, Add.
36.269, f.194.
121 R. Altick, The Shows o f  London (1978), p. 26.
122 Ibid., p. 27.
123 British Museum, Directions Respecting the Reading Room of the British Museum, 17??, British Library, Add.
36.269, f.193.
124 Quoted in R. Altick, The Shows o f  London (1978), p. 26.
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the general public turning into a 'mob/ The actual or, as in this case, the potential gathering of 
individual members of the nation's lower echelons in a crowd caused fear because it had 
become widespread to associate such a crowd with disorder, riots, chaos: 'a great concourse of 
ordinary people will never be kept in order7, as Dr. Ward also stressed.125 The idea of the nation 
of which the British Museum reflected, the nation of which the zoologists proudly discoursed 
in their works on British fauna proved difficult to come to terms with in practice. Even within 
the confines of the 'nation' there was ample space to distinguish between the gentle, the 
learned, and the rest.
As the trustees guarded the British Museum, at the same time, they also maintained a 
space of learning in which the zoologists could work relatively undisturbed by the tumults of 
the vulgar. There were some places, however, in which the zoologist could not so easily escape 
the vulgar. Among these was the Leverian Museum, which housed an inestimable collection of 
zoological specimens, among many other things.
From 1760 onwards, Ashton Lever build up what was to become one of the major 
museums of the late eighteenth century first in Manchester and later from 1773 in London, and 
ruined himself in the process. As is evident from contemporary descriptions, the museum 
consisted of all kinds of natural and artificial curiosities -  armours and guns, 'dried sea- 
monster/ a stuffed elephant, apes impersonating humans, minerals and metals, musical 
instruments and porcelains, some of the precious specimens from Captain Cook's voyages, and 
according to James Edward Smith, the first president of the Linnean Society of London, also an 
'unrivalled' collection of 'birds and quadrupeds' at the time (see HI. 4.2 and 4.3).126 With its 
miscellaneous collection and its emphasis on the rare, the Leverian museum had direct 
pipelines to the Cabinets of Curiosities. However, it was open to the public on payment of a 
fee. Run as a commercial though losing enterprise, the collection was carefully arranged to 
evoke the wonder of the spectator. One visitor described the spectacle:
When the big door to the main apartments opened, and we stood in a large marble hall at the foot of a handsome 
staircase, in the midst o f a heap of old armour and guns from every age and comer of the globe, displayed as 
trophies. This high wall o f the well-hole are hung w ith dried sea-monsters of every description, and at the top of the 
flight of stairs in front of the first room an excellently stuffed young elephant bids one welcome. On leaving him one 
enters the room, hung w ith sea-green damask, curtains of the same, and with sweet little benches by the windows. 
Lining three walls there are nothing but neat glass cases containing all species of sand, earth, stones, metals, resins 
and fossils. Meadrepores [sicl come next; after these all kinds of birds from every dime, from the ostrich to the 
humming-bird, whole families of some of them, old and young, eggs and nests. A  room full of fish is equally fine
125 Ibid.; on the crowd and the patriaans' fear of it, see E. P. Thompson, Customs in Common (1993), esp. chs. 2, 4 
and 5; R, Porter, Enlightenment (2000), ch. 16.
126 J. E. Smith, 'Introductory Discourse' (1791), p. 52; cf. R. Altick, The Shows o f  London (1978), p. 30. On the Museum 
in general and on the tragic story of Sir Ashton Lever, in particular, who, after having ruined himself on 
collecting specimens and been unable to sell his collection lost it in a lottery to a Mr Parkinson, and on 1st 
February 1788 he committed suicide, see C. E. Jackson, Sarah Stone (1998).
142
ni. 4 .2  C a se  w it h  s t u f f e d  b ir d s ,
SPECIMENS FROM. THE LEVERIAN
M u s e u m .
111. 4 .3  T h e  r o t u n d a  f r o m  
t h e  L e v e r ia n  M u s e u m . In  the 
final decades of the eighteenth  
centu ry , the Leverian M u seu m  
op ened  its doors to  a general 
p u blic, entering on  the p ay ­
m en t o f a fee. T he exquisite  
co llection  o f natural cu riosities 
w as carefully arranged to  e n ­
terta in  the spectator, w ith  the 
ro tu nd a as the centre p iece . 
T h e  case in 111. 4 .2  above is 
m ad e  b y  V iscount de B ard e. 
A cco rd in g  to de Barde, the 
b ird s  in  the upper half o f the 
p ictu re  were draw n from  
sp ecim ens in the L everian  
M u seu m , w hereas the rest 
orig inated  from  M r B u llo ck 's 
m u seu m .
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and perfect, another containing curious kinds of snakes and reptiles; all the rare quadrupeds of the known world; all 
manners of apes and insects.127
Though certainly appealing to the wonder of the uneducated, this did not preclude the learned 
from appreciating its worth. It attracted zoologists such as Thomas Pennant, Gilbert White, 
George Shaw, and John Latham, who came, in particular, to observe and describe the birds and 
quadrupeds in the collection. As Pennant, in agreement with Smith, stressed: The Leverian 
Museum possessed 'the most astonishing collection of the subjects of natural history ever 
collected in so short a space by one individual/128
That the scholars' shared space with the vulgar in the public museum was something 
new, indeed unthinkable in the Renaissance museum or the connoisseur's cabinet, and even, as 
we have seen in the sketch above, as it became thinkable in this period it was often, to say the 
least, impractical. The vulgar and the learned might be sharing a physical space in public 
museums such Lever's or, as I shall return to below, at the freak shows and in the coffee 
houses, but, at least from the point of view of the scholars, they did not share a conceptual nor 
even an experiential space.
As noted by Richard Kentish in the introduction to this section, what distinguished the 
common observer from the learned in the museum, was the response of wonder from the 
former upon viewing the rarities in contrast to the latter's philosophical attitude of inquiry; as 
we saw Hooke stress in the same vein with regard to the Royal Society's Repository: The things 
put on display there were not for 'Divertisement and wonder' but for 'the most serious and 
diligent studies'. The wonder, which had played such an important role in the Renaissance 
cabinet of curiosities, had become entirely disassociated from learning by the eighteenth 
century. At the same time, wonder had come to be closely associated with the vulgar.129 Not 
uncommonly compared to beasts by zoologists and others,130 the vulgar was, in the words of 
Sir Thomas Pope Blount, Tike the Serpent, [who] lye hissing and groveling upon the Earth'. 
Like the serpent, 'at the best' they would be 'but Des-Cartes's AUTOMATA, moving Frames 
and Figures of Men, [who] have nothing but their Outsides to justifie their Titles to 
Rationality/131 Ignorant and 'governed', as the vulgar were thus considered to be 'by mere 
instinct and sensual appetite',132 the unmediated, strong emotional response of the 'blind 
amazement' of wonder came to be intimately associated with them.133 The 'vulgar* were, as 
Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, remarked,
127 S. v. La Roche, Sophie in London 1786 (1933), pp. 112-3.
128 Pennant, quoted in P. J. P. Whitehead, 'Museums in the History of Zoology' (1970), p. 158.
129 Cf. L. Daston and K. Park, Wonders and the Order o f Nature (1998), p. 350.
130 Keith Thomas gives a summary of the most common animal metaphors in general use within 'Polite' Society, K. 
Thomas, Man and the Natural World (1983), pp. 45ff.
131 S. T. P. Blount, A Natural History (1693), Preface (unpaged); emph. removed, cap. in org.
132 G. Edwards, Cleanings o f  Natural History (1758-64), vol. I, p. ix.
133 Thomson quoted in R. Porter, Enlightenment (2000), p. 368.
143
CHAPTER 4
like Dutch travellers in a foreign country. Everything they meet had the grace o f novelty: and they are fond of 
every thing that is new. They wander about from one object, to another, of vain curiosity, or inelegant pleasure.134
As the Viscount went on to explain, what in comparison to the vulgar the gentle possessed was
an ability, edified by experience, to take a more reasonable, distanced, and discerning stance
towards the world:
The latter [the gentlemen] come into the world, or at least continue in it after the effects of surprize and inexperience 
are over, like men who are sent on more important errands. They observe with distinction, they admire with 
knowledge. They m ay indulge themselves in pleasure; but as their industry is not employed about trifles, so their 
amusements are not made the business of their lives.135
The resulting difference in the approach to tire animals between the vulgar and the learned, as
it was described by the learned, was made dear in Borlase's portrayal of the scholars'
hardships at the British Museum in a letter to Ellis. Responding to Ellis' dedsion to offer his
papers to the Royal Sodety instead of to the British Museum, Borlase commented:
I think you will be right in placing the Originals with the R:S: especially, if the present unaccountable predusion of 
the Literati equally with the ignorant & sauntering continues at the British Museum. Should there not be medals, or 
introductory tickets granted to those who want to consult what is now lock'd up, and the access too operose & 
distressing to the Learned? Surely, those who labour for the publick, and generally represent the fruits of those 
labours to the Museum merit every kind of indulgence, and ought not to be level'd with those who come only there 
to stare at millions of things, without carrying off any thing but amazement w hich expires in half an hour at the next 
coffee house.136
The learned going to museums and the vulgar going to museums involved, then, two entirely 
different kinds of experiences, according to the learned. Let us explore this difference a bit 
further, by at first darifying the conception of the vulgar and of their relation to the animals 
further.
At a first view this description of the common people's utterly unlearned amazement at 
the sight of strange animals appears not to fit well with the inclusion of them as providers of 
information in the collection of specimens, as discussed in Chapter 3. As we saw there, the 
common people's involvement in this part of the zoological endeavour was predicated on the 
idea that nature invariably was reflected in the same way on every man's and woman's mirror 
in the mind. Hence, the possibility that the vulgar might communicate credible information, 
which, at the zoologists' discretion, could be induded into the stock of zoological knowledge. 
But although, with the idea of the mind's mirror, it was given that the same impressions would 
be imprinted on everyone's mind, it was by no means given that everyone would make the 
same out of these impressions. As we also have seen earlier (Chapter 2), there was always the 
possibility that the impressions would be distorted in the mind, and, furthermore, it was 
always possible that the impressions would be distorted in representation (cf. Chapter 3). What 
the learned accentuated when they contrasted the common people's experience at the
134 Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, Letters on the Spirit c f  Patriotism, reprinted in S. Copley, Literature (1984), 
pp. 47-8; emph. in org.
135 Ibid., p. 48.
136 W. Borlase to J. Ellis, Feb. 22,1764, Linnean Society, London, Ellis Coir., vol.1.41.
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museums with their own, was exactly the cause, and the result, of the possible distortions of 
impressions as they passed through the human mind and mouth (and thereby they also 
illustrated why the vulgar were far from always to be trusted on their words, even if they at 
tim es could be so). The cause of such distortions was, as we saw above, identified in a lack of 
experience and, more importantly, in the common people's frequent lack of ability to transcend 
the brutish faculties in man. The result was a blinding amazement that impeded the vulgar 
from  appreciating animals as matters of facts.
Returning to the zoologists, we might observe that what the contrast of the zoologists' 
experience in the museums to the common people's most significantly highlighted was the 
crucial importance of 'detachment' for the zoologists' construction of facts. Highly praised 
w ithin learned community, detachment signified the very opposite of the common people's 
amazement. Having made all facts in-principle trivial, having instituted self-government and 
learning as the prerequisites for non-distorted 'observation,' the zoologist should, in contrast, 
gaze at the strangest of animals without a feeling. It was basically only in this way, as objects of 
an impartial gaze, that the natural objects in, as well as outside, the museum would emerge as 
m atters of facts: as a sheer ensemble of perceptible traits.
By thus treating the animals as nothing more, nothing less than zoological facts, the 
zoologists, in a sense, cancelled out everything that the private cabinets and the public 
m useum s attributed to the animals, through their specific modes of display. In case of the 
private cabinet: their extraordinary qualities in which the connoisseur could take delight. In 
case of public museums such as Lever's: their ability to awake wonder and amazement in the 
spectator.
A nimals in Commerce
There were places where animals were put on display without a view to learning at all; there 
w ere places where animals would be exhibited first and foremost with the objective of 
gratifying the wonder of the vulgar, but where the learned came, nevertheless. During the 
eighteenth century, inns, taverns and coffee-houses shot up especially in London, in which part 
o f the attraction, besides ale or coffee, became curiosities on display. Here, the guests could see 
a variety of curiosities, such as for instance exotic birds, stuffed sea unicorns, sword-fish and 
mermaid-fish and a giant's tooth, Queen Elizabeth's strawberry dish, clocks and other artificial 
curiosities, a fifteen inch long frog, a starved cat, petrified rain, Muscovy gloves, and a learned 
pig, 'well versed in all Languages, perfect Arethmatidan [sic], and Composer of music [and] in 
his day a far greater object of admiration to the English nation than ever was Sir Isaac Newton',
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as one contemporary claimed (see HL 4.5).137 With regard to the extraordinary nature of the 
curiosities, the displays at the coffee-houses and inns did not fall short of the connoisseurs' 
cabinets. Indeed, as Altick has noted, the cabinet of curiosities had here been displaced into a 
popular context.13®
An advertisement for Don Saltero's coffee-house in London, one of the most spec­
tacular of its kind and from 1712 located in Cheyne Walk next to Hans Sloane's Manor House 
from where Don Saltero allegedly received duplicates, sets the terms of such displays:
Monsters o f all sorts here are seen,
Strange things in nature as they grew so;
Some relics of the Sheba Queen,
And fragments of the famed Bob Crusoe.
Knick-knacks, too, range round the wall,
Some in glass-cases, some on shelf;
But, what's the rarest sight of all.
Your humble servant shows himself.139
Although the animals, and all of the other curiosities, at the coffee-houses and inns were 
clearly displayed in order to attract a popular audience -  not necessarily, as here indicated, 
solely for their amusement, however, but also for instruction140 -  this did not mean that 
gentlemen did not attend. Not only did the coffee-house become a cherished place of meeting 
for (male) members of Polite Society and men of commerce;141 but, as is evident from references 
in the zoological literature, zoologists came here as well, if not for anything else then at least to 
observe exotic animals. Thus, Richard Bradley, for instance, described and provided 
engravings of a sword-fish, a saw-fish and a mermaid-fish, all taken from 'Mr; Slater's Coffee­
house at Chelsea' (see III. 4.4);142 and in the Naturalist's Pocket Magazine a sea unicorn, of which 
an illustration has already been given (111. 3.6), was described after a stuffed specimen in the 
Mecklenburgh coffee-house at Charing Cross.143
Besides at the inns and coffee-houses, animals, and a host of other things, were also 
displayed at fairs and in the streets. Although the display of live animals was not exactly new
137 Robert Southey, Letters from England, quoted in R. Altick, The Shows o f  London (1978), p. 40, cf. p. 18. Also James 
Boswell mentions this intelligent pig, J. Boswell, Life o f  Samuel Johnson (1791/1999), p. 956.
138 R. Altick, The Shows o f  London (1978), p. 21.
139 Mist's Weekly Journal (1723), quoted in ibid., pp. 17-8.
140 During the eighteenth century, the coffee-houses had a reputation as 'the poor man's university'. Not only were 
exotic animals to be seen there. In addition, public lectures on natural history and philosophical subjects would 
also be given at times here, and, especially some of the more spectacular experiments of experimental 
philosophy would be shown. On coffee-houses in general, see L, Klein, 'Coffee-House Civility* (1997), who 
traces their intricate relation to Polite Society. On coffee-houses as 'poor man's university*, see A. Ellis, The 
Penny Universities (1956); on the public display of experiments, see S. Schaffer, 'Natural History and Public 
Spectacle' (1983); and on public lectures, see L. Stewart, 'Public Lectures and Private Patronage' (1986); J. 
Money, Teaching in the Market-Place' (1993).
141 L. Klein, 'Coffee-House Civility' (1997).
142 R. Bradley, A philosophical account o f  the works o f  nature (1721), p. 61.
143 Anonymous, The Naturalist's Pocket Magazine (1799-1802), vol. V, unpaged.
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111. 4.4 T h r e e  f is h e s  fr o m  M r  S u i t e r ' s  
COFFEE-HOUSE (R. Bradley, A  Philosophi­
cal Account o f  the Works o f  N ature, 1721)
There was not only coffee on offer at 
the coffee-houses, but in m any places 
there were also natural curiosities o f 
the more rare and extraordinary kind, 
such as stuffed fish, like those to the 
left, and an intelligent pig, below , w ho 
allegedly w as a very good arithm eti­
cian.
111. 4 .5  T he w o n d e r f u l  PIG (R. Altick, The Shows o f  London, 1978, made 1785)
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in the eighteenth century -  the Tower of London had housed the Royal menagerie since the 
sixteenth century -  the number of freak shows exploded after the Restoration. The emphasis 
once again was almost exclusively on the extraordinary and monstrous. In the streets of 
London, tame bears danced, while apes and wild animals like tigers were put on display. 
Although probably an exaggeration, the remark of one spectator shows that such animals were 
not an entirely uncommon sight in early eighteenth-century London: '[tigers were] grown now 
so common they are scarce worth mentioning/144
Itinerant showmen, furthermore, brought exotic animals around in the country. One of 
them, apparently, brought an elephant to Dublin in 1681 which, upon its 'accidental death' had 
to be guarded by the 'Musqueteers' to prevent the common people who came in their 
multitudes -  'by reason of the great rates put upon the sight of him' -  from destroying it before 
it could be eventually properly cut into pieces in the dissection of the surgeon Allan Mullen.145 
It was itinerant showmen who in 1706 brought yet another elephant to Dundee where, also 
following an accidental death, it was likewise transformed into an object of knowledge, this 
time in the hands of Patrick Blair who thereby shot off his carrier within the Republic of 
Letters.146
At the fairs, the learned would intermingle with the ignorant in order to see a variety of 
strange creatures. The description of Wordsworth (only quoted in part) of the Bartholomew 
Fair in 1802 gives an idea of its scope:
The silver-collared Negro with his timbrel,
Equestrians, tumblers, women, girls and boys,
Blue-breeched, pink-vested, and with towering plumes. -  
All moveables of wonder, from all parts,
Are here —  Albinos, painted Indians, Dwarfs,
The House of knowledge and the learned Pig,
The Stone-eater, the man that swallows fire,
Giants, Ventriloquists, the Invisible Girl,
The Bust that speaks and moves its goggling eyes.
The Wax-work, Clock-work, all the marvellous craft 
O f modem Merlins, Wild Beasts, Puppet-shows,
All out-o'-the way, far-fetched, perverted things,
All freaks of nature, all Promethean thoughts 
O f man; his dullness, madness, and their feats 
All jumbles up together to make up 
This Parliament of Monsters.147
Quite a few of these 'monsters' made their way into the learned literature. Not only did the 
Philosophical Transactions conscientiously give space to descriptions of a large number of them 
in their pages through the long eighteenth century.148 The more 'normal' of the exotic animals
144 Ned Ward in The London Spy Compleat, (1700); quoted in R. Altick, The Shows o f  London (1978), p. 35.
145 A. Mullen, An Anatomical Account (1682), pp. 4-6.
146 P. Blair, Osteographia Elephantina (1713).
147 Wordsworth, The Preclude (1805 version), VII, 662-94.
148 R. Altick, The Shows o f  London (1978), p. 37.
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at least made their way into the zoological literature as well. Hence, we find descriptions of 
opossums and elephants, zebras and speaking parrots, enormous vultures and birds of 
paradise, lions and lionesses, spotted hyenas, and of a variety of apes and among these, finally 
but not exhaustively, a number of descriptions of that 'Madame Chimpanzee' which was 
brought from Angola to London in 1738 where it amazed the general audience by its good 
table manners at the Tea-table and gave quite a few zoologists material for thought on the 
relationship between man and ape (more on that later).149 In these accounts, the zoologists 
remained as philosophically detached as they had been in the private cabinets and public 
museums. However, one thing had changed. Whereas the animals displayed in the cabinets 
and museums seem to have been generally accepted as genuine specimens, the zoologist could 
never be sure if the appearance of a specimen displayed at a show had not been somehow 
manipulated in order to enhance its value. As animals were turned into commodities, they 
became inherently untrustworthy.
Zoologists were confronted with the same problem when they went into shops that
traded in exotic animals. Judging by the number of advertisements for all kinds of exotic
animals in newspapers, there appears to have been a considerable trade in exotic animals in
Britain in the eighteenth century. Take for instance this notice in the Post Boy:
There is newly brought over a parcel of choice Canary birds, white, mottled, Ash colour and Grey, also fine talking 
Parrots and large Pheasants of diverse colours, Poland Hens and Cocks, small India Fowls, fine Geese from the East 
India, Amedaites [sic], fine small monkeys and Tuttle Doves from Barbary; also a fine Tyger from the East Indies, 
and several other Rarities are to be sold by Mich. Bland, at the George at Tower-Dock near Great Tower-Hill, 
London.150
The zoologist would visit, buy or simply observe animals at such retailers' shops. Hence, 
Tyson, for instance, got a male opossum from Arthur Bayle, a merchant in London, and 
Pennant described the blue goat from a skin he had bought in Amsterdam.151
The incorporation of such animals did not always come easy. As the zoologists pointed 
out frequently, the merchants and the show masters always had an interest in lying about the 
animals in order to maximise their profits. The more exotic an animal was, the higher a prize 
could be demanded when selling it or putting it on display. Hence, according to zoologists, 
merchants had been known to have 'mutilated and bereaved [birds of paradise] of their feet'152
149 P. Blair, Osteographia Elephantina (1713); T. Pennant, Synopsis o f  Quadrupeds (1771), p. 57; F. Watson, The Animal 
World Display'd (1754), p. 55; E. Bancroft, An Essay on the Natural History o f  Guiana (1769), p. 174; Anonymous, 
The Naturalist's Pocket Magazine (1799-1802), Female zebra (unpaged); G. Edwards, Gleanings o f Natural History 
(1758-64), vol. I, pp. 6-8. On Madame Chimpanzee, see also R. Yerkes and A. Yerkes, The Great Apes (1929), p. 18; 
L. Schiebinger, Nature's Body (1993), p. 101.
150 Post Boy, no. 1,582 (Feb. 16-19,1705/6); see also, for instance, Daily Courant (Feb. 28,1719; Mar. 5,1719); London 
Gazette, (Jan. 21-4, 1705/6); P. L. Faiber, The Emergence o f  Omitology (1982) discusses aspects of this sale in 
relation to birds.
151 E. Tyson, 'Carigueya' (1704), p. 1565; T. Pennant, Synopsis o f  Quadrupeds (1771), p. 25.
152 F. Willughby and J. Ray, The Ornithology (1678/1972), p. 2.
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in order to make them truly heavenly, moving solely by the power of their wings in the sky;153 
relatively ordinary birds from relatively ordinary places would be claimed to 'be Natives of 
Places very distant and unknown' whereby they would be made 'more rare';154 ordinary 
racoons would be turned into the more rare beavers, and relatively common 'beeve hogs' 
would be presented under exotic names:
Those that made a shew of it pretend it was brought from the East Indies, and that the true name of it is a Bonasus, 
than [sic] which nothing can be more unlike. It is the business of those sort of people to impose upon the vulgar, and 
therefore they seldom give the right name to those animals that are well known; thus one of these people in his bills 
pretended there were two Beavers among his collection, which were nothing else than Racoons.1“
Although some zoologists sometimes unmediatedly used the information about the animals
provided by a merchant or a keeper,156 they seem more often to have critically evaluated the
information and, in some cases, the animals themselves before incorporating them into their
works. Transgressing the border between learning and commerce meant entering a world
where animals had a value which was primarily to be counted in gold, where 'private interest'
hence, by definition, was always at play: transforming an animal-qua-commodity into an
object of knowledge, involved, then, often a critical appropriation of the animal which was
directed at cancelling out all those meanings which, at times quite literally, might have been
inscribed on them in order to gratify private interests.
T h e  Z o o lo g ist 's S pace
So, animals of an also zoological interest had a social life in a variety of different social spheres 
in which they through the different uses that they were put to, and the different displays that 
they were made to take part in, gained a variety of different meanings: As trivial facts in the 
Republic of Letters, as prestigious objects of a fetishtic delight in the connoisseurs' cabinets, as 
objects of both learning and wonder in the public museums, and as objects-qua-commodities of 
principally wonder and amazement in the coffee-houses, fairs and shops.
The incorporation of this medley of animals into the zoological literature highlights the 
basic inclusiveness of the zoological enterprise with regard to empirical sources also at this 
level. At the same time it also points to a basic element of randomness in the compilation of 
zoological history. Without any institutional setting, which at the time could only be dreamt of,
153 The idea of the birds of paradise without feet was, in fact, prevalent in Europe well into the seventeenth 
century. See B. Jorgensen, 'Paradisfuglene' (1998), for an outline of the cultural and natural history of birds of 
paradise from the Renaissance to the present.
154 G. Edwards, A Natural History o f Birds (1743-51), vol. H, p. 111.
155 R- Brookes, A New and Accurate System (1763-72), vol. I, p. 38.
156 E.g. E. Tyson, Orang-Outang, sitre Homo Syloestris (1699), p. 14; T. Pennant, Synopsis o f  Quadrupeds (1771), pp. 171-
2.
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to organise the quest for specimens,157 the zoologists took what came at hand. Although the 
zoologist, by sending his servants into the field, inquiring in letters to a wide range of 
correspondences, going on tour himself, or drawing up guidelines for travellers abroad or the 
curious at home, might attempt to direct the inquiry, his control over the empirical field 
remained only partial. Basically, one strongly suspects, due to a lack of funds in the natural 
history department which were present in other social spheres -  like that of the private cabinet, 
the public museum, and the commercial market -  the zoologist would have to turn to the, to 
some extent, random miscellany of animals circulating in these spheres. As Daniel Carey has 
pointed out, though focusing on natural philosophy and travel literature, this had the 
implication that 'Knowledge of nature was not an organized and structured entity but a 
diverse field [...]. The character of natural philosophy, viewed in this way, is episodic and 
miscellaneous rather than ordered and predictable, the pattern more of a peregrination rather 
than a rigorously organized enterprise.'158
The use of animals horn a variety of spheres meant, furthermore, that the endeavour of 
zoology, also at this level of gathering of information, came to overlap with a diversity of other 
social spheres. The zoologist had to master the norms and forms of these social spheres -  he 
had to know how to approach the rich and position himself as a client, he had to move in the 
inns and coffee-houses and at the fairs -  in order to get to those specimens which would enable 
him to do his zoological work. This also meant that the zoologist would have to share social 
space with a number of people who did not view animals as trivial specimens, spanning the 
whole range of British society from the elite's connoisseur to the vulgar at the lower end of the 
social scale. Also in this sense zoology was, indeed, intermingled with society at large.
But the way the zoologist positioned himself vis-à-vis these 'others' in the various 
different spheres he moved in in quest of specimens indicates something of the exclusiveness 
of the zoological enterprise at the level of approach. George Edwards might have stood next to 
the Duke of Richmond in his museum, Thomas Pennant have stood next to a Mr Jones at the 
Leverian Museum, and Richard Bradley have sat next to a Mr Smith at the Slater's coffee­
house, but, at least from the zoologists' point of view, that did not mean that when viewing the 
animals on display there they were experiencing the same thing, as we have seen the zoologists 
insisting on. In a sense, the difference lay in the eyes of the beholder: where the vulgar saw a 
monster, and the connoisseur a fetish, the zoologist would see a simple specimen. But, more 
basically, from the point of view of the learned, that difference in gaze stemmed from a
157 Most notably, the founders of the Royal Society hoped that some day they might turn the Society into an 
institution organising research into all domains of nature, cf. D. Carey, 'Compiling Nature's History' (1997), pp. 
271 ff. Before them, almost a century earlier, Bacon had hoped that an entire natural history could be compiled 
according to his standards under the auspices of the King, F. Bacon, Preparative (1620/1962), p. 251.
158 D. Carey, 'Compiling Nature's History* (1997), p. 276.
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difference in discipline. Where the connoisseur would indulge in idle delight at the sight of his 
extraordinary stuffed animals, and where the vulgar like a beast or a child would respond with 
wonder and amazement at the new and strange, the zoologist had learned to overcome such 
deceptive passions through his self-government and to take a more reasonable stance towards 
the animals. Thanks to the virtues of philosophical detachment, he could gaze upon them 
without passion as if he saw them from beyond. He saw what everybody in principle would 
see, if they only had the discipline and knowledge to transcend their bodily urges and assume 
a perspective from nowhere. What this contrast of the learned to the vulgar and the 
connoisseur, in brief, elucidates is the ideal transparency of philosophical detachment: the 
zoologist's perspective from beyond was not too unlike the pure perspective of the angels.
Maintaining an attitude of 'philosophical detachment' towards the animals not only 
allowed the zoologist to transform extraordinary birds of paradise or wondrous sea unicorns 
into trivial facts. By virtue of this very appropriation of the animals, the zoologist also, in a 
sense, created a space of his own throughout all the social spheres which he moved in: a space 
for the registration of zoological facts. Although the zoological endeavour was inclusive at the 
empirical level, the zoologists positioned themselves and hence, also their field as exclusive at 
an experiential and conceptual level. There might not have been a single location for the 
production of zoological knowledge, but throughout all the social spheres the zoologists 
moved in they, nevertheless, managed to create a unified space for the natural history study of 
animals.
The ability of the scholar to observe rarities without being aroused by the feeling of 
wonder or delight might be one way of making a distinction between him, the connoisseur and 
the vulgar. Even more pertinent was his ability to transcend the matter of the empirical world 
and place the animal within an abstract order, once a specimen had been impartially grasped 
in all its detached, meaning-less materiality and been recreated as a zoological working object, 
a fact. It is to an analysis of this act of making order I shall turn to in Part II.
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Chapter 5
Transcending the Empirical Maze
'[T]he things which will be set forth in this history are not collected on their own account7, 
Francis Bacon stated by way of explaining why not only the common and the most trivial, but 
also the most extraordinary ought to be recorded by the natural historian. '[A]nd therefore7, he 
continued, "neither is their importance to be measured by what they are worth in themselves, 
but according to their indirect bearing upon other things, and the influence they may have 
upon philosophy/1 The gathering of specimens of all kinds, in a range of different places and 
in a number of different ways which has been traced in Part I was only a prelude to natural 
history proper. In a sense, knowledge about such material, individual specimens was not 
knowledge at all. As Lord Monboddo stated hundred and fifty years after Bacon's death, in 
order to obtain "knowledge7 about "a single or monadic thing7, such as an individual animal or 
plant for example, it had to be compared to the "general ideas [...] already formed' in the mind 
about other such things:2 "we have no knowledge", Monboddo concluded, "but of the relations 
which things have to one another/3 It was only when the zoologists began to compare 
specimens to one another, determined similarities and differences between them and thereby 
were enabled to class them together in abstract categories, transcending both space and time, 
that knowledge, at least of a superior kind, could be attained about the animal kingdom.
Within zoology, as in related disciplines, the way to draw relations between animals 
would be through classification. It was, as Richard Kentish in his speech to the Sodetas Naturae 
Studiosorum at Edinburgh stated "by the aid' of classification that "the study of nature is 
facilitated, the various appearances of bodies, which at first sight seem innumerable, are
1 F. Bacon, Preparative (1620/1962), p. 259/aphr. vi.
2 L. Monboddo, O f the Origin (1774), vol. I, p. 57, note*; cf. pp. 57ff.
3 Ibid., vol. I, p. 69, note*.
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brought under our review7.4 It was classification that allowed the zoologist to transcend the 
material level of infinite and fugitive specimens and commence approaching nature's singular 
order:
When we take a view of the number of animals which exist in every part of our earth, we shall be ready to 
acknowledge, that it must be a matter of real difficulty to attain a tolerable acquaintance with them. The 
appearances of nature are not immutable. Many of her external forms are fugitive, and it is only by serious attention, 
and minute investigation, that we can fix upon points which she has characterised as indelible.
When such characteristic marks are once discovered, we may proceed to system, and attempt the 
classification even of infinitude. Multiplicity will no longer constitute difficulty. It is by method that we facilitate 
study[.]5
Within eighteenth-century British zoology, classification was equated with taxonomy. It was 
within the bounds of a taxonomic order that even 'infinitude' could be classified, and that 
proper knowledge about animals could be obtained.
In general terms, a taxonomy may be defined as that particular mode of categorisation 
in which categories or taxa (as I shall call this particular type of categories) are created so that 
they on a horizontal level are mutually exclusive; where taxa on one horizontal level are 
included into more general taxa on a higher level; and where each horizontal series of taxa is 
located on a specific level of generality. Taxonomic classification, then, orders phenomena in a 
pyramidal structure.
As obvious as this conception of classification might appear to be, it was, in fact, 
relatively new in the eighteenth century. Even though hierarchic classifications, resembling 
those of taxonomies, can be extrapolated from folk-biologies of innumerable societies across 
the world and through the ages6 7(where, moreover, other kinds of classifications structuring 
phenomena according to other principles also existed7), the eighteenth-century conception of 
taxonomy was still peculiar in the sense that no extrapolation here was needed, so to say. The 
eighteenth-century natural historians not only equated classification with taxonomy, they also 
gave taxonomic classification an explicit theoretical foundation, and -  as we will see, in the 
works of some natural historians more than others and with respect to some concepts more 
than others -  they made the generic concepts of the taxonomy explicit. This was something 
new, which allowed for an entirely new way of making sense of the natural world.
4 R. Kentish, An Essay on the Method (1787), p. 12.
5 Ibid., pp. 71-2.
6 The classic studies of folk biology indudes Bret Berlin and partners' investigations among the Tzeltal Maya of 
southern Mexico, and the Aguaruna Jivaro of north and central Peru, B. Berlin, D. Breedlove, and P. H. Raven, 
'Covert Categories' (1968); B. Berlin, 'Ethnobiological dassification' (1978); Ralph Bulmer and M. J. Tyler's 
studies from Papua New Guinea, R. Bulmer, 'Why is the Cassowary Not a Bird?' (1967); R. Bulmer and M. 
Tyler, 'Karam Classification' (1968); and E. Hunn's studies also from Mexico, E. Hunn, Tzeltal Folk Zoology 
(1977). For a critique of these studies, see R. Ellen, 'Introductory Essay* (1979), esp. pp. 5ff; for a critical 
reassessment and review of folk biological dassifications, see S. Atran, Cognitive Foundations o f  Natural History 
(1990), chs. 2 and 3.
7 R. Ellen, 'Introductory E ssay  (1979), pp. 12ff., reviews some of these.
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We have already seen in the previous chapters, and especially in Chapter 3, how certain 
kinds of taxonomic classifications were foreshadowed in the fashioning of facts. In the present 
and following two chapters, we shall look into how these facts were put in order, so to say, in 
the taxonomic schemes, by examining the construction of taxonomies in theory, as well as in 
practice. In this chapter, in order to encircle the peculiarities of the eighteenth-century 
conception of taxonomy as well as to elucidate its historical preconditions I shall commence 
with a brief outline of the history of taxonomic classification in European thought through a 
closer reading of three of its main protagonists -  Aristotle, Andrea Cesalpino, and Carl von 
Linné -  and by discussing the use and conceptions of taxa in Renaissance thought prior to 
Cesalpino more generally. The focus here will be not exclusively on zoology but also on 
botany. Especially during the Renaissance, botany was studied as part of medicine and 
received much wider attention than zoology, and it did to a significant extent, in particular, at 
the level of classification, as Émile Guyénot has observed, provide 'de modèle aux zoologistes 
et les guider dans leurs efforts/8 In the remainder of the present chapter, I zoom in on 
classification in eighteenth-century British zoology. I shall discuss the epistemological 
framework of taxonomic classification in broad outline and, for reasons which hopefully will 
become fully apparent as I go along, here give a more detailed analysis of the exegesis of 
species -  the beyond comparison most important category in the British zoologists' 
taxonomies. In the following chapter, I turn to the practices of species formation, which were 
not always executed in perfect accordance with the theoretical formulation and which, 
furthermore, brought a whole cosmology into play which was not detailed in the definition of 
the species concept. In Chapter 7 I, finally, turn to the ways in which the entire taxonomic 
systems were established in practice.
Cl a ssific a t io n  in  Hist o r y
When the British zoologists were to tell the history of zoology, it was virtually always Aristotle 
who was honoured with being the 'father/ At the inaugural meeting of the Linnean Society in 
London, James Edward Smith, for instance, praised Aristotle for
rising so superior to the darkness in which he lived, darting his penetrating glance through all natural, and 
establishing principles which a long course of ages o f enquiry have but confirmed. With Aristotle begins the real 
history of science; and how much so ever he may have erred on particular points, the greatness of his conceptions 
and the justness of his ideas on the whole, entitle him to our high veneration, and we should correct his mistakes 
with awe. His labours in the investigation of the animal kingdom have laid the foundation of the knowledge we 
now possess[.]9
8 É. Guyénot, Les Sciences de la Vie (1941), p. 7.
9 J. H. Smith, 'Introductory Discourse' (1791), p. 5.
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Not only revered as a founding father, Aristotle's zoological works were still uses by the 
eighteenth-century zoologists. On an equal footing with contemporary descriptions, his 
descriptions of animals were incorporated into that stock of empirical knowledge, which the 
zoologists drew from. What was, furthermore, read as Aristotle's general classification of 
animals 'laid a foundation', as Kentish said, 'upon which the classification of the first 
methodological naturalists, as Gesner, Aldrovandi, Johnston, Charleton, Ray &c, have been 
founded/10 Moreover, it was Aristotle who most often received the honour of having 
introduced the concepts of species and genus, eidos and genos with his Greek concepts, into 
natural history and thereby had made it possible to reduce the multitudes of natural objects 
into a taxonomic order. Now, as I shall argue, following Pierre Pellegrin, a translation of 
Aristotle's eidos and genos into the taxonomic concepts of species and genus does not appears 
to be completely in accordance with the meaning Aristotle gave to his concepts: Reading 
implied interpretation. However, it still seems appropriate to begin this outline of the history 
of classification in European thought with Aristotle. Considered as a 'father' by both 
Renaissance and eighteenth-century descendants, Aristotle's classification signifies one 
beginning. Considered on its own, his classification would also seem to offer us an opportunity 
to become acquainted with a radically different way of making sense of the animal kingdom 
which, as a contrast to the eighteenth-century taxonomies, will allow us to specify the nature of 
taxonomic classification with more precision.11
Classical Classification
In the following, I shall concentrate, in particular, on two aspects of classical classification, 
which will be of importance to us as we move on to discuss Renaissance and early modem 
classification. Firstly, I shall discuss Aristotle and Plato's notion of classification through the
10 R. Kentish, An Essay on the Method (1787), p. 72.
11 M y reading of Aristotle, obviously, also implies an interpretation which, moreover, is not even my own. 
Aristotle's zoological works have received considerable attention in the history of ideas during the last hundred 
years, and the interpretations of his work, and not least of his concepts of eidos and genos, differ radically, at 
some points. In the following I shall draw heavily from Pierre Pellegrin's interpretation, and my reason for 
doing so is that Pellegrin, as far as I can determine, offers the most coherent analysis of Aristotle's work. Where 
other historians and philologists have had to postulate the existence of rather rudimentary inconsistencies in 
Aristotle's work -  most notably that he employs eidos and genos in an incoherent fashion -  Pellegrin manages 
to show in his reading that Aristotle's use of these terms are actually coherent within the framework of 
Aristotle's work, if we accept Aristotle's definition of these terms on their own, rather than translate them into 
contemporary notions of 'species' and 'genus'. P. Pellegrin, Aristotle's Classification (1986); for alternative 
readings, see D. Hull, 'The Effect of Essentialism on Taxonomy ' (1965); D. M. Balme, 'Aristotle and the 
Beginnings of Zoology7 (1970); G. E. R. Lloyd, 'The Development of Aristotle's theory7 (1961); A. L. Peck, 
'Introduction' (1965), and to some extent S. Atran, Cognitive Foundations o f  Natural History (1990), pp. 86 ,102,104 
and passim. Usually, 'eidos' and 'genos' are rendered as 'species' and 'genus' in  translations of Aristotle's work, 
which is also the reason why these words, rather than the Greek terms, will appear in my quotations below.
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method of logical division, developed within logic, and the definition of eidos and genos 
which this method gave rise to. Next I turn to an examination of Aristotle's classification of 
animals. Although in this case, Aristotle maintained the concepts of eidos and genos, he also 
criticised the method of logical division, and advocated another method of classification.
Classification in logic first: In the Metaphysics, Aristotle, following the rules laid down 
by Plato in the Sophist and Statesman, defined a 'method of division/ diairesis, and, in relation to 
that, eidos and genos as concepts of logic:
We must first inquire about definitions reached by the method of divisions. There is nothing in the definition except 
the first-named genus and the differentiae. The other genera are the first genus and along with this the differentiae 
that are taken with i t  [...] And in general it makes no difference whether it [the definition) includes few terms or 
simply two; and of the two the one is differentia and the other genus; e.g. in 'two-footed animal' 'animal' is genus, 
and the other is differentia.12
The genos, then, signified a whole, which by means of logical division could be divided into 
two opposed eide. The divisions produced by this 'dialectical art', as Plato had it, would be 
made on the basis of only one criteria of differentiation in which 'the manifold diversities 
which are seen in a multitude of things' would dialectically be reduced to 'the bounds of one 
similarity [which] embraced them [i.e. the eide] within the reality of a single kind [i.e. genos].'13 
In this way, logical division defined its eide monothetically.14 Applied to the animal kingdom, 
the animals could thus by means of logical division, according to Plato, be broken down into 
bipeds (two-footed) and quadrupeds (four-footed) on the basis of the number of die feet. The 
bipeds, including both birds and men, could be again divided into those with feathers and 
those without, etc.15
As it becomes evident here, by help of the method of logical division, a whole series of 
divisions could be made where a genos (e.g. animal kingdom) at one level of generality would 
be subdivided into two eide (e.g. bipeds and quadrupeds), one of these eide would in turn 
come to act the part of a genos (e.g. bipeds), which would be again subdivided into another 
two eide (man and birds), and so on. In each case, an eidos would be defined by its genos -  
what it had in common with the eidos it was opposed to -  and by a differentia -  that one 
feature by which it was distinguished from the other eidos in the genos. Performing this series 
of logical divisions until an eidos allowed for no further subdivisions, made it possible to 
define the essence of a thing by way of a definition within logic:
But we have a definition not where we have a word and a formula identical in meaning (for in that case all formulae 
or sets of words would be definitions; for there will be some name for any set o f words whatever, so that even the 
Iliad will be a definition), but where there is a formula of something primary; and primary things are those that do
12 Aristotle, Metaphysics (1968-69), p. 516/VIL12.1037b.
13 Plato, "The Statesman' (1961), p. 595/285.
14 My usage of 'monothetic definition' of taxa -  the definition of a taxon by only one trait -  here, and, later, of 
'polythetic definition' -  the definition of a taxon by more traits -  are drawn from R. Needham, 'Polythetic 
Classification' (1975).
15 Plato, 'The Statesman' (1961), p. 585/266.
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not imply the predication of one element in them of another element Nothing, then, which is not a spedes of a 
genus will have an essence — only species will have it, for these are thought to imply not merely that the subject 
participates in the attribute and has it as an affection, or has it by acddent[.p
It was this way of dialectically defining the essence of eide through a series of divisions 
proceeding downwards from the most general to the most specific, which later became known 
in its Latinised version as defining a species per genus et differentiam, by genus and difference. 
Through Andrea Cesalpino's and Carl von Linné's reinterpretations, a variant of this method 
of logical division would greatly influence the concept of spedes in early modem natural 
history, as we will later see. In contrast to their concepts, however, the Platonian-Aristotelian 
genos and eidos did not imply a specification of a level of generality on which the categories 
existed, as Pellegrin emphasises:
the concept of genos is dassi£catory but not taxonomic as the term does not designate a fixed level of classification, 
to say of a collection of objects that it makes up a genes is not, from a dassificatory point of view, to say anything 
more than that it is subdivided into eide. Similarly, to say of a being that it is an eidos is to say nothing more than that 
it had been carved out of a genos by slicing according to a specific difference, and says nothing at all about its 
absolute degree of similarity.16 7
Genos and eidos, then, were not anchored at a spedfic level of generality. They could move up 
and down, so to say, so that the category which had formed an eidos in one case, would form a 
genos in the next act of logical division which could then be divided into two other eide, and so 
on. The 'pair eidos/genos# only worked, as Pellegrin condudes, as 'a diairectical tool 
functioning at any level of generality at all',18 and employed with a view to establishing a 
definition of the essence of the things concerned.
Although in the Metaphysics, Aristotle exemplified the method of logical division with 
zoological examples, in contrast to Plato, he did not find such monothetic divisions adequate 
for defining the essence of animals. Employing logical division within the zoological world 
resulted not only in the splitting up of 'natural groups/ Aristotle argued, but would also 
produce divisions by 'accident/ and furthermore brought about repetitions.19 Instead, Aristotle 
argued, on one hand, one should rely on a 'common sense' experience of animals, and this, on 
the other hand, implied taking a greater number of 'axes of divisions'20 into consideration in 
the definition of the zoological eide and gene:
The proper course is to endeavour to take the animals according to their groups, following the lead of the bulk of 
mankind, who have marked off the group of Birds and the group of Fishes. Each of these groups is marked off by 
many differentiae, not by means of dichotomy. By dichotomy [...] either these groups cannot be arrived at at all 
(because the same group falls under several divisions and contrary groups under the same division) or else there 
will be one differentia only, and this either singly or in combination will constitute the ultimate spedes.21
16 Aristotle, Metaphysics (1968-69), p. 552/VII.4.1030a; emph. in org.
17 P. Pellegrin, Aristotle's Classification (1986), p. 69; emph. in org.
18 Ibid., p. 69; cf. E. Mayr, The Growth o f Biological Thought (1982), p. 255.
19 Aristotle, Parts o f  Animals (1968), pp. 79-89/I.1.642b.5-3.643b.
20 P. Pellegrin, Aristotle's Classification (1986), p. 28, cf. p. 29.
21 Aristotle, Parts o f  Animals (1968), p. 89/13.643b; emph. in org.
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The objective of zoological divisions, like in logic, was still to identify the essence of animals by 
dividing them into gene and eide. But in contrast to logic, according to Aristotle such division 
had, then, to be based on a number of differentiae, including the "parts of animals/ such as 
hooves, bones, feathers, blood, flesh, heart, organs of reproduction, colour and shape, their 
"manner of life, their activities, and their dispositions',22 as well as their basis, i.e. their "blend' 
in the physical composition of heat, cold, fluidity and solidity.23 Some of these differentiae 
were, however, more essential than others. The heart, blood and respiratory organs as well as 
the reproductive organs were considered to be the material loci of the animal soul, and 
therefore they more readily provided access to the definition of an eidos' essence than the other 
parts of an animal.
In order to understand what Aristotle meant by "essence" -  another concept which 
through reinterpretations were to be taken up in Renaissance studies, as we already have seen 
indications of earlier (Chapter 2) -  we need to take a closer look at his more general 
conceptualisation of nature. In simple terms, this conceptualisation relied on a doctrine of 
hylomorphism, in which every substance existing in the universe was taken to be a "composite 
of immaterial form and a material substrate/24 "Matter" was "neither a particular thing nor a 
certain quantity": it was nothing in itself except that upon which the form would work in order 
to bring forth beings.25 The "form," in contrast, was immutable, incorporeal and eternal, and it 
was this form which determined how the material particulars would combine and hence, be 
organised into complex structures, like that of an animal. The form defined the "principles of 
change and becoming."26 It was this form, which was captured in the definition of a category of 
animals by genos and eidos, as the genos defined the 'transmissible type/ and the eidos what 
was "actually transmitted in generation."27
In sum, in logic, Aristotle, like Plato, employed a method of logical division, whereby a 
given category, a genos, would be divided into two, and only two, opposing eide. The essence 
of these eide could be then defined in terms of what they had in common, that is by their 
genos, in conjunction with the one differentia, which differentiated the two eide from each 
other. This monothetic definition of an eidos was what became known as defining per genus et 
differentiam in the Renaissance. Pointing out that logical divisions in the animal kingdom 
would not lead the student to natural groups, although employing the concepts of eidos and 
genos, in his zoological works, Aristotle classified animals polythetically, defining each eidos
22 Aristotle, History o f  Animals (1965-91), p. 7/L1.487a.l0ff.
23 A. L. Peck, "Introduction" (1965), p. xv.
24 P. R. Sloan, 'John Locke, John Ray" (1972), p. 15.
25 Aristotle, Metaphysics (1968-69), p. 551/VL3.1029b.
26 S. Atran, Cognitive Foundations o f  Natural History (1990), p. 94, cf. ibid., p. 98; D. M. Balme, 'Aristotle and the 
Beginnings of Zoology" (1970), p. 277.
27 P. Pellegrin, Aristotle’s Classification (1986), p. 110.
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along a number of axes. This classification, in turn, provided Aristotle with a means of 
constructing a definition of the essence of an eidos, according to their genos and the eidos 
differentiae. It was such definitions rather than any all-embracing classificatoiy, and much less 
taxonomic concerns, which, as Pellegrin convincingly argues, appear to have been the objective 
of Aristotle's zoological work.
That was, however, not how it would be read by descendants in the Renaissance and in 
the early modem period. As already indicated in the quotations from Smith and Kentish 
above, Aristotle's zoological books could easily be interpreted as a taxonomic classification in 
spe; his relative concepts of eidos and genos could be translated into the taxonomically fixed 
concepts of species and genus; and as we shall see in the works of Cesalpino and Linné, the 
method of logical division could, just as easily, be transformed into a ruling taxonomic method. 
Before we turn to these reinterpretations of the classical authors it will, however, be useful to 
consider what went before that in the Renaissance.
Renaissance Implications
Although Aristotle, of course, got a renaissance in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and 
although what would be read as his grand division of the animal kingdom into five classes was 
appropriated by some Renaissance zoologists, it is noteworthy that it was only towards the 
very end of the sixteenth century with the botanical work of Andrea Cesalpino that any 
systematic attempts were made to apply Aristotle's, or indeed any explicitly defined concepts 
of classification within studies of nature.28 Renaissance students of nature were certainly 
engaged in classifying natural objects also well before the time of Cesalpino, but for most of the 
Renaissance they did not concern themselves with discussions of methods of classification, nor 
did they offer any explicit definitions of the taxa of their classificatoiy systems.
Although, in many cases, classification itself was not necessarily the objective of 
Renaissance scholars' natural philosophy, but merely a means to satisfying other end, for the 
purpose of the present study it is still necessary to take a closer look at how plants and animals 
were classified during the Renaissance. At times, the classification of animals or plants would 
be entirely 'arbitrary/ as the eighteenth-century zoologists would later call it, as the plants and 
animals would simply be alphabetically listed in books, as Conrad Gesner did, for instance, in
28 Aristotle's zoological corpus became available to European scholars during the first decades of the thirteenth 
century, through the translation of Arab versions by Michael Scot and, later again in the same century, by 
William of Moerbeke. A. L. Peck, 'Introduction' (1965), pp xl-xlii. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 
Theodore Gaza's translation of Historiae animalium (minus book 10), De partibus animalium, and De generatione 
animalium became the principle Latin version of Aristotle's works. On this and on Gaza's often veiy liberal 
translations, see J. Monfasani, 'The Pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata' (1995).
161
Sflrtflftnrtm iü ü flflflaB gg
CHAPTER 5
each volume of (his own Latin version of) Historiae animalium (1551-87), or as Leonhart Fuchs 
did in his work on German plants. Often, however, groups of plants or animals would be 
organised along less 'arbitrary' lines. On one hand, the scholars would use traits of the plants 
or animals themselves, such as form, size, odour and/or colour in order to divide them into 
categories; on the other hand, the relation between an animal or a plant and something exterior 
to that would be utilised in the categorisation, as for instance its place of growing or living, its 
resemblance in form to other extra-botanical or extra-zoological objects, its use in medicine or 
as human food, etc. In most cases, a scholar would employ different axes of division when 
dealing with different groups of animals or plants and thereby far transcend the narrow limits 
of the monothetic logical division. Hence, Jerome Bock, minister and medicus in Hombach, in 
his study of German plants, for instance, grouped them in such categories as plants with 
purple flowers, odorous herbs, those with medical roots, plants belonging in the vegetable 
garden, and cattle feed.29 Likewise Giambastista della Porta in Phytognamina (1588), divided 
plants -  and I am here paraphrasing Guyénot's description -  into those which resembled the 
lung, those resembling the teeth, the heart, veins, fingers; those which looked like the horse, 
those with roots like a scorpion, those with flowers like a fly, and those with fruits like horns; 
others were classified according to their similarity with different human illnesses: some having 
fruit like dandruff, others like warts, some with roots like varicose veins. Other plants were 
classified according to their qualities, hence some beautiful plants would be grouped together 
because they all possessed the ability to make man beautiful, others were joined in a category 
because they being fertile made men fertile, etc. Finally, there was a group of plants with a 
special rapport with different planets.30
Referring to the classifications of della Porta, Bock and other contemporary herbalists, 
Guyénot concludes that, 'Les classes ne résultaient pas d'une analyse méthodique des 
caractères et ne reposaient sur aucune définition précise.'31 And that, I will argue, was neither 
their purpose. Given the kind of knowledge that the Renaissance scholars were concerned 
with, this arrangement of plants should not come as a surprise. On one hand, botany was 
closely allied with medicine during this period and quite a number of botanists were 
physicians or apothecaries first, and herbalists next. The classification of plants according to 
etiological criteria served its purposes. On the other hand, and more generally, these 
classifications also became meaningful in relation to that interpretive mode, discussed in 
Chapter 2, of making sense of objects by inscribing them in a web of signification, of reading 
natural productions as analogies to, or signatures and resemblances of other things within as 
well as far beyond any narrowly defined domain of 'natural objects/ Within that scheme, the
29 É. Guyénot, Les Sciences de la Vie (1941), p. 11.
30 Ibid., p. 11.
31 Ibid., p. 16.
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categories, their definition and boundaries, were not important in themselves -  their relations, 
by way of resemblance or use, to other things were.
Building upon an unprecedented wide survey of some 6,000 forms of plants, in Pinax 
theatri botanici, published in 1623, Caspar Bauhin introduced a categorisation of plants based on 
a more exclusive examination of the plants themselves. With the help of the textual division of 
the book into sections, subsection and sub-subsections, the plants were grouped in hierarchic 
classes resembling those that would later be called 'families/ 'genera/ and 'spedes/ although 
in Bauhin's work, these categories did not have a name. In many cases, the contents of the 
classes, as well as their place in the hierarchy also appeared to foreshadow the taxonomic 
classifications of Ray, Toumefort and Linné in the late seventeenth and eighteenth century. 
However, as Scott Atran has argued, Bauhin's division of plants differed in crurial ways from 
those of later taxonomists. Hence, Bauhin did not offer any familial designations, spetify any 
generic definitions, and nor attempt to distinguish the spedes by any characteristic marks as 
the taxonomists would do.32 3 Furthermore, many taxa were not even named.33 Atran condudes: 
'To the modem eye, family-level and generic-level chains of spedes can be discerned in Bauhin 
-  the most accomplished of the herbalists -  [but] for him there is yet no dear distinction, nor 
conception of, spedes, genus or family/34 Here, as in the work of his Renaissance predecessors, 
taxa remained covert categories.35
If we turn to Renaissance zoological studies, the same pattern, albeit with variations, 
repeats itself. Less prone to make use of many of the relations entirely external to the field of 
animals in the dassification (though as we saw in Chapter 2, not in the descriptions), the 
animals were still classed without any attempt at making the terms of the dasses, or of the 
method of classification, explidt. Usually, it would be the figure, size, place of living and/or 
foraging that would form the basis for the divisions. Fish, for instance, would usually be 
defined as 'simplement animal vivant dans l'eau', hence, the category induded not only what 
we would as fish, but also musdes, crayfish, worms, etc.36 In Pierre Belon's Histoire naturelle des 
Oisseaux (1555), which was frequently dted by eighteenth-century zoologists for its empirical 
descriptions, we are given a dear example of the mode of division. In this book, birds were 
divided into six classes mainly with reference to feet, habitat and mode or place of foraging: 1) 
Birds 'qui vivent de rapine', 2) birds 'acquatiques à pied plat*, 3) 'ceux qui hantent les rivages 
de lacs, marais, étand, rivières, qui n'ont le pied plat et qui ne nagent sur l'eau', 4) birds 'de
32 S. Atran, Cognitive Foundations o f  Natural History (1990), pp. 135-6.
33 E. Guyenot, Les Sciences de la Vie (1941), p. 14.
34 S. Atran, Cognitive Foundations o f Natural History (1990), p. 137.
35 The notion of 'covert categories' in connection with classification is drawn from B. Berlin, D. Breedlove, and P. 
H. Raven, 'Covert Categories' (1968), and R. Bulmer and M. Tyler, 'Karam Classification' (1968), pp. 335,379-80, 
and passim.
36 6. Guyenot, Les Sciences de la Vie (1941), p. 42.
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campagne qui font leur nid sur terre', 5) birds 'qui habitent indifféremment en tous les lieux et 
se paissent de toutes sortes de viandes', and, finally, 6) 'oysiiions qui hantent les hayes, 
buschettes et buissons'.37 Though Belon did not make use of such relations of resemblances as 
for instance della Porta did in his botanical classification, Belon's classification of birds, as was 
also more generally the case in contemporary classifications of animals, was still not only based 
upon polythetic divisions, but also upon a recognition of the animal's relation to an exterior 
world. Most importantly, finally, the Renaissance scholars' zoological classification, like the 
botanical, was not made an object of theoretical contemplation and neither was their method of 
division addressed in explicit terms. 'Nulle part/ Guyénot observes with the hindsight of those 
who look through an evolutionary optic, 'on ne voit se dessiner le principe d'une méthode.'38 
The generic categories of classification remained tadt; the method of dividing was only 
revealed at the level of practice.
In a sense, the taxonomic concepts of 'spedes,' 'genus/ and 'families' -  or whatever the 
taxa at different levels would be later called -  did not exist for the better part of the 
Renaissance. It is true that the Renaissance scholars certainly took the existence of a basic level 
as well as one or two higher-level taxa for granted. But though taxa on different levels of 
generalisation were at work in the dassification, as undefined, unspecified and unnamed 
categories they made their presence felt only by functioning covertly. That, however, was to 
change with the work of Andrea Cesalpino.
Andrea Cesalpino's Explications
Towards the end of the Renaissance, Andrea Cesalpino, professor of medicine and botany at 
the Universities of Pisa and Rome and an erudite scholar well-versed in Aristotle, picked up 
the thread from Aristotle as he himself declared, and explidtly addressed the concepts of 
species and genus in relation to the study of nature in De plantis, libri XVI (1583). In the 
eighteenth-century, Cesalpino was with this work to be singled out as 'the first in line of 
systematists', in the words of Carl von Linne.39
Aristotle's Latinised concepts of species and genus did not come unmediated to 
Cesalpino, however. Though the concepts as yet had not been developed to assist in the 
taxonomic classifications of natural phenomena, they had been important concepts in logic 
through the Medieval Ages and Renaissance, as we might get a clear indication of in the work
37 Ibid., pp. 45-6.
36 Ibid., p. 62.
39 Linné, Philosophia Botanica (1751), § 54; quoted in A. Cain, 'Logic and Memory ' (1958), p. 151.
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of the mid-sixteenth-century Parisien scholar, Pierre de la Ramée or Petrus Ramus.40 Like Plato,
logic, and hence, of philosophy. By dialectically organising the world's phenomena in a series 
of dichotomous categories, according to Ramus, the essence of each category could be 
demonstrated and hence defined, whereby man was provided with a window to God's ideas, 
i.e. to the defining ontic locus of the world. In this scheme, 'genus' was employed in reference 
to the general category that provided the starting point for the dialectic distribution, while 
'species' referred to the parts that would be derived from the genus by the logical division. 
Ramus explained:
[The genus is] the whole essential to its parts, as the species is the part of a genus; thus genus occurs for animals and 
for m en, because it is a whole essential to parts; thus animal is the genus of singular animals, man is the genus of 
singular men, because it is a whole essential to parts; thus man is a species of animal, and Socrates a species of 
man.41
As it becomes evident here, the concepts of genus and species were in Renaissance logic, just 
like in the Classical, relative concepts which could be applied at different levels of generality, 
and which were generated in a dialectic process through which genus and species, and, in turn, 
genus and species, etc. would be distributed into an often tabulated scheme, thus:
and since every spedes could always come to act the part of a genus in a new series of 
divisions, the table of things did not have any centre, or any boundaries. It rather established 
itself as a dialectic continuum, as Ramus stressed: 'its centre every place and its drcumference 
nowhere/42 As Walter J. Ong condudes in his analysis of Ramism, such decentred and in 
prindple, unlimited tables established 'an ethereal contact among all items in a pulverised 
world/43
Although Andrea Cesalpino dearly drew on this scholastic-Platonic dialectic method, 
in De plantis he also gave a new meaning to 'genus' and 'spedes' which made it possible for 
him to fix the categories and put dear boundaries to his distribution of plants into categories.
The purpose of De plantis was, as Cesalpino noted in the dedication of the book to 
Frandsco dei Media, to establish 'the collection of similar [plants], and the distinction of 
dissimilar, and the distribution of these into genera and spedes like armies, according to the
40 The following sketch draws on W. J. Ong, Ramus (1983).
41 P. Ramus, quoted in ibid., p. 207.
42 P. Ramus, quoted in ibid., p. 207.
43 Ibid.
Ramus identified dialectics, or the method of logical division, as the most important method of
k Men ■<
 ^ All other men
In prindple, this dialectic distribution of things could be pursued in many different directions,
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differences indicated in the nature of things'.44 Through the help of 'classes/ 'genera' and 
'species' nature would be ordered into a hierarchic regime. To facilitate this classification 
Cesalpino from the outset, and in accordance with the ancient rules of logical division, set out 
to determine one criterion for the division. In the case of the most general taxa, the classes, 
drawing on a prevalent Renaissance analogy between animals and plants/5 Cesalpino made 
use of what he considered to be the 'heart' (cor) of plants: the pith where the root and stem 
meet. With regard to the genera and species, the reproductive organs of the plants -  the 
number, location, shape and structure of the parts of fructification -  were settled upon as the 
fundamentum divisicmis.46 In both cases, the choice of fundamentum was legitimised by, in a 
neo-Aristotelian vein, referring to the essence of plants. Hence, the heart of the plants, on one 
hand, was regarded the locus of the 'vegetable soul'.47 On the other hand, the reproductive 
organs were seen as cardinal for the transmission of that soul and hence also essential. As 
Cesalpino himself hinted and Scott Atran has highlighted,48 though there might have been also 
more practical reasons for choosing the reproductive organs as the fundamentum for 
classification, Cesalpino's mode of justifying this choice still places him securely within a neo- 
Aristotelian scholastic tradition.
The singling out of a fundamentum for the division, provided Cesalpino with a basis 
for weighing the characters of plants, distinguishing unimportant or as they were called, 
'accidental' differences from essential ones. By employing a -  in some measure rather relaxed -  
method of logical division, on the basis of these essential characters Cesalpino was enabled to 
draw out his plants in a hierarchical order. At first, strictly following the precepts of logical 
division, the entire kingdom was divided into two classes, those with a hard cor, Arbores, and 
those with a soft one, Herbx.49 Relaxing the rules of logical division somewhat, Cesalpino then 
broke the classes down into genera and species, not by a simple dichotomous division, but by 
making multiple divisions of each class into numerous genera, and of each genus into 
numerous species. In accordance with the rules of logical division Cesalpino, however, 
proceeded from the most general level towards the most specific through the help of divisions, 
and thereby, was enabled to define the species per genus et differentiam, according to genus and 
species difference. Unlike in the series of logical divisions as laid out by Plato and Aristotle 
where class (as a genus summus), gene and eide would be purely relative concepts, in
44 A. Cesalpino, De plantis (1583), Dedicatory Epistle (unpaged).
45 Cf. P. R. Sloan, 'John Locke, John Ray' (1972), p. 12, n. 31.
46 A. Cesalpino, De plantis (1583), p. 29.
47 Ibid., p. 25.
48 Cf. Ibid., p. 28; S. Atran, Cognitive Foundations o f  Natural History (1990), p. 156. See also C, E. B. Bremekamp, 'A 
re-examination o f Cesalpino' (1953), who has attempted to reconstruct the procedure of Cesalpino's 
classification.
49 A. Cesalpino, De plantis (1583), p. 25.
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Cesalpino's reinterpretation class, genera and spedes had, like soldiers in the army, been 
transformed into fixed categories at specific levels of generalisation in a hierarchical system.
Though Cesalpino only sporadically contemplated on spedes, genera and dasses as 
generic concepts, nevertheless in Cesalpino's work they were thus turned into explidt 
categories of thought. As Phillip Sloan has observed, such an explication only became possible 
as the study of plants was separated from 'the utilitarian concern of the herbalist and 
apothecaries',50 and disassodated, I would add, from the Renaissance interpretive mode of 
m aking sense of natural objects by inscribing them in a web of signification. It was only as 
nature was made autonomous and natural objects disassodated from the rich context of 
resemblances and usage that it became meaningful to consider plants an sich and classify them 
solely on the basis of characters inherent to the plants themselves. What characterised 
Cesalpino's departure from common Renaissance practice was not only that the hitherto 
m ainly implied, the covert taxa, had been made explidt. The very process of explication had 
involved a rethinking of the categories, their terms of definition and the relations between 
them as well. The explication had involved a transformation. In a word, what had been 
achieved were the establishment of a taxonomic system and the introduction of dasses, genera 
and spedes as taxonomic concepts, though still in an embryonic form.51
Linné's Orders
Cesalpino did not win many adherents in his own time.52 But as we have already seen in­
dicated above, he was later to be courted by eighteenth-century natural historians. Among 
these, the most notable continuities can be discerned in the work of Carl von Linne.
In the introduction to Systema Naturae, linne dogmatically laid down the rules for 
natural history classification thus:
M ethodical order, which is the soul of science, denotes every natural body at the first sight, so that it may be known 
by its ow n name; and this name indicates whatever the industry of the age has discovered with regard to the group 
to w hich it belongs: accordingly, despite the greatest apparent confusion of things, the order of Nature retains 
exactness to the highest degree. This systematic arrangement is most appropriately divided into branches, 
subordinate to each other, which have been given different appellations:
G ass Order Genus Species Variety
Highest genus Intermediate genus Proximate genus Spedes Individual
Province District Parish Ward Hamlet
Legion Battalion Company Mess Soldier.
Linné ended this description of the methods of classification with a quote from Cesalpino,
which we have already encountered in part above:
50 P. R. Sloan, 'John Locke, John Ra/ (1972), p. 13.
51 Cf. S. Atran, Cognitive Foundations of Natural History (1990), p. 157.
52 Ibid., p.158.
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'For, unless the collection of similar plants are made, and the distinction of dissimilar, and the distribution of these 
into genera and species like armies, according to the differences indicated in the nature of things, every thing that is 
known concerning them must remain in confusion and uncertainty'.*
•Caesalpinus.53
Method must reign! Taking the thread up from Cesalpino as well as from Renaissance 
scholasticism,54 Linné declared that method, understood as a (relaxed) kind of logical division, 
had to take precedence in the study of nature in order to establish a Sdentici Naturæ, a certain 
knowledge about nature's productions.55 Linné's most explicit formulation of his method and 
of his taxonomic concepts was made in his tracts on botany, and I shall therefore start with 
these before turning to his zoological classification.
Species and genera, Linné stressed in Genera Plant arum, were God's creation made by 
fiat at the beginning of time:
1. In the beginning the thrice exalted CREATOR covered the medullary substance of the plant with the 
principles of which the various kinds of cortex consist, and in this way as many individuals were formed as there 
are now Natural Orders.
2. The vegetable prototypes of §1 were mixed w ith each other by the Almighty, and there are now so many 
Genera in the Orders as in this way new plants were formed.
3. The generic prototypes of §2 were mixed w ith each other by Nature, and in this way in every Genus so 
many Species were formed as at present exist.56
In the beginning, then, God had made the various forms of the medulla and the cortex, and 
mixing these, he had formed the various genera, and out of these, by another mixture, God 
created the species. For most of his life, Linné maintained that the species and the genera had 
been created once and for all and hence, were immutable: "There are as many species as the 
infinite being created diverse forms in the beginning/57 Genera and species, then, were granted 
an ontological existence.
Like Cesalpino, Linné gave primacy to fructification in his classification of plants. He 
also maintained that the organs of reproduction contained the essence of a plant: 'fructification 
is the only true foundation'.58 Therefore, also Linné reasoned that the fructification organs (in
53 C. Liimé, Systema Naturæ  (1766-68), vol. I, p. 13.
54 Lindroth goes as far as to conclude that Linné 'w as a natural historian in the old-fashioned sense of the word, 
an inheritor and a consummator. [...] W ith Linnaeus an era in the history of botany reaches its culmination and 
conclusion: it is the end of scholastic botany. H e gave science a new face -  but no new soul. As a scientist 
Linnaeus somehow seems a stranger to his ow n times, antiquated and primitive'. S. Lindroth, 'Two Faces' 
(1994), p. 37; cf. A. Cain, 'Taxonomic Concepts' (1959), p. 305; C. E. B. Bremekamp, 'Linné's Views on the 
Hierarchy' (1953), p. 244. As we w ill see, however, Linné's scholasticism, like Cesalpino's, implied a 
reinterpretation, which set him apart from the Renaissance tradition at the same time as it placed him within it.
55 C. Linné, Systema Natura? (1766-68), vol. I, p. 13.
56 C. Linné, Genera Plantarum (6th ed., 1764); quoted in C. E. B. Bremekamp, 'Linné's Views on the Hierarch/ 
(1953), p. 243; cap. in org.
57 Linné, Philosophica Botanica (1751), § 157; quoted in E. Mayr, The Growth o f  Biological Thought (1982), p. 258. 
Following some apparently credible reports on hybrid vegetable spedes and after having made a number of 
experiments himself, Linné towards the end o f his life, however, suggested that mutations, which produced 
new and stable spedes, might be possible, and that it was only the genera that God had created in the 
beginning. The spedes would then be viewed as hybrid forms of these. Ibid., p. 259.
58 C. Linné, Philosophica Botanica (1751), § 26; quoted in S. Atran, Cognitive Foundations o f  Natural History (1990), p. 
173.
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the flow er calyx, corolla, stamen, pistil; in the fruit: pericarp, seed, receptacle) should be made 
the fundamentum divisionis in the classification of plants.59 Based on the number, shape, 
proportion and situation of these sexual organs, plants were systematically divided into 
classes, orders, genera and species by means, again, of a relaxed mode of logical division, 
allowing more than two divisions to be made in each case and most often allowing for more 
than one trait of the essential sexual organs as defining differentiae.60 By means of this 
classificatory method, Linné was not only able to classify the plants he actually knew from 
experience, but, in principle, also to foretell which plants would be discovered and in advance, 
single out their position in the taxonomy (as more and more plants were discovered, Linné's 
hypotheses actually turned out to be correct in quite a few cases).61
Within the animal kingdom, the definition of the fundamentum divisionis was more 
complicated. Maybe from 'motives of propriety' as Arthur Cain suggests,62 or maybe because 
they turned out to be unhelpful in the empirical analysis, Linné did not make use of the organs 
of reproduction in his classification of animals. In some ways like Aristotle, Linné based the 
definition of the higher taxa on the heart and blood, and for the same reason: they were 
defined as the locus of life.63 Employing, once again, a method of logical division, the animals 
could be divided into six classes on the basis of heart and blood:
HEART: Two ventrides and aurides \ Viviparous. Mammalia
Blood: Warm and red J Oviparous. Ambus [Birds)
HEART: One ventricle and auride 1 Respiration voluntary. Amphibiis [Amphibia]
Blood: Cold and red ^ Breathing by gills. Pisdbus [Fish]
HEART: O ne ventride without auricle -| Antennated. Insectis [Insects]
Blood: Cold and colourless ƒ Tentaculated. Vermibus [Worms].64
In subdividing these classes into orders, and the orders into genera and species, Linné 
primarily made use of the nutritive organs. Varying from class to class, though the principle 
remained the same, the specific organs differed: in mammals, primarily, teeth and feet; feet and 
beak in birds, feet in amphibia, fins in fish, wings in insects, and shells in worms.
In principle, by employing a relaxed mode of logical division, the classificatory system 
could be laid down from the top downwards. Although, especially in the animal kingdom, it 
proved impossible to pull through such a classification in practice, in particular, at the levels of 
genera and species, the very grid of the classificatory system, i.e. the determination of the
59 A. Cain, 'Logic and Memory ' (1958), p. 161; C. E. B. Bremekamp, 'Linné's Views on the Hierarchy' (1953), pp. 
246, 249.
60 J. L. Larson, 'Linnaeus and the Natural Method' (1967), gives a careful analysis of Linné's method of logical 
division, and traces in addition the changes of classification which occurred through Linné's dassificatory 
career.
61 Cf.S.Lindroth,'Tw o F aces'(1994), p. 28.
62 A. Cain, 'Taxonomic Concepts' (1959), p. 305.
63 C. E. B. Bremekamp, 'Linné's Views on the Hierarchy' (1953), p. 250.
64 C. Linné, System a Naturæ (1766-68), vol. L p. 19; emph. and cap. in org.
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number of levels and the vertical order of those levels, was still fixed from the outset. In this 
scheme, Linné granted that the classes and orders were Constructed [struentis est}' by man, but 
maintained, inversely, that through the analysis of the sexual organs of the plant or the heart 
and blood and nutritive organs of animals man would be able to discover the species and 
genera of 'Nature's work': 'all true knowledge about Species, and likewise about Genera [is] 
real.'65 Proceeding by defining species per genus et differentiam (sive differentias) nature's own 
species and genera could be brought within the regime of the taxonomic system.
Linné, of course, was not only a theoretical systematiser. He also studied plants and 
animals in practice and even did so, not least thanks to his wide ranging network of gatherers 
all around the world, to an extent which few, if any of his contemporary natural historians did. 
In practice, Linné observed in Systema Naturae, a natural historian had to start by investigating 
the particulars 'from which he ascends to more universal propositions/ in order to discover 
how each individual specimen should be classified.66 However, the principles of that 
classification, as well as the parts of the animal or plant that should be taken into consideration, 
were, as we have seen, determined theoretically from the outset.67 In practice, moreover, it 
turned out that plants and especially animals could not always be classified in perfect 
concordance with the rules laid down for the classification. Though the order of Ferae, for 
instance, was defined by six teeth, sharp fore teeth in the upper jaw, and one canine tooth in 
each side, the genus 'Didelphis' was still included within this order, though all of the species of 
the genus were in possession of seventeen teeth, so also was the 'Sorex' with nineteen teeth, 
and the 'Eninaceous' with twenty.68 As a number of historians have noted, in Linné's work 
there was an underlying tension between experience and the demands of logical method; in 
the end it was, usually, logic that won:69
The Sdence of Nature is founded on an understanding of Natural Method and a systematic nomenclature; this, like 
the clew of Ariadne, is the only reliable way to penetrate Nature's meanderingsf.]70
Method became the sine qua non of Linnean taxonomy.
In Linné's hands, the classes, orders, genera and species not only became thoroughly 
explicit categories of thought, but also became explicated as a function of his downward 
method of logical division. In principle, entirely logically built up (if not always so in practice), 
as a hierarchy of fixed categories, the taxonomic system blossomed in Linné's work: the 
concepts of species, genera, orders and classes had come only to make sense in relation to the
65 Ibid., vol. I, pp. 13-4.
66 Ibid., vol. I, p. 14; also cf. C. Linné, 'De curiositate naturali' (1748/1962), p. 20.
67 Also cf. A. Cain, 'Logic and Memory ' (1958), p. 149.
68 As R. Kentish pointed out in An Essay on the Method (1787), p. 77.
69 Cf. A. Cain, 'Logic and Memory '  (1958), p. 149; S. Lindroth, T w o  Faces' (1994), p. 241; W. T. Steam, 'The 
Background ' (1959), p. 18.
70 C. Linné, Systema Naturæ (1766-68), vol. I, pp. 13-4.
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system, though an empirical analysis was still needed to discover the actual species and 
genera.
Em p ir ic is t  Cl a ssific a t io n
Method could only be made a sine qua non in classification upon the presupposition of there 
being an essence that could be discovered by a human observer and hence, be made to act as 
fundamentum divisionis in the methodological arrangement. Within an eighteenth-century 
British context an, in the words of Phillip Sloan,71 it became an 'epistemological impossibility' 
to discover such a fundamentum divisionis because, as we saw in Chapter 2, man here was 
conceived as being incapable of discovering the essence of things. Indeed, the most commonly 
voiced contemporary critique of Linne's work in Britain appears exactly to reflect an 
uneasiness with and a lack of acceptance of Linne's claim that his method should in some 
measure be 'natural' and his system, even if only at the lower levels, should reveal the essence 
of nature and hence, reflect nature's species and genera. Within the eighteenth-century British 
context, the method of logical division, however relaxed it might have become, was generally 
not accepted to lead to such revelations. Hence, R. Brookes characterised Linne's system as 
'speculative', and 'in contradiction to nature and experience,' and Brookes consequently 
rejected it as a guide for the zoological study because his own 'design', inversely, was 'not to 
amuse the speculative, but to direct the industrious'.72 Richard Kentish, though citing Linne's 
zoological classification at length, judged it 'arbitrary and unnatural'.73 William Smellie 
declared that Linne's attempts at 'defining vegetables and animals' had been 'abortive'.74 Even 
Linne's first British biographer, Richard Pulteney, otherwise an ardent disciple of Linn£, 
observed that a 'natural method' was 'so far unknown' and, hence, that Linne's system was but 
a n 'artificial arrangement'.75 Although Linne's works -  both in some cases his arrangement and 
in more cases his descriptions of animals and very often his names -were certainly made use of 
in eighteenth-century British zoology, as well as in botany, his order of animals was not 
acknowledged by the majority of British zoologists to reflect the order of nature, and his 
'natural' method of division, based on only one or a few essential characters, was not adopted. 
To explore what the British zoologists did instead, it will be necessary to firstly take a closer 
look at the impact that the idea of man as incapable of perceiving essences had upon the status 
and understanding of zoological taxa.
71 P. R. Sloan, 'John Locke, John Ray* (1972), p. 364.
72 R. Brookes, A New and Accurate System (1763-72), vol. VL pp. v, vi.
73 R, Kentish, An Essay on the Method (1787), p. 75.
74 W. Smellie, The Philosophy o f  Natural History (1790), vol, I, pp. 4-5.
75 R. Pulteney, A General View (1781), p. iv; emph. in org.
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In the Essay Locke, himself a consumer of natural history literature76 and often 
employing examples from the natural world as illustrations of his philosophical argu­
mentation, brought out the implications of man's lacking ability to perceive essences for the 
conception of species and genera (and it should here be remembered that the Essay was 
published 29 years prior to the first edition of Systema Naturae in 1735 and hence, was not 
targeted against the Linnean system but against the scholastic tradition on which Linne was to 
draw). As man could not perceive essences, Locke argued, it became 'evident7 that what was 
called 'the essences o f  the sorts, or (if the Latin word pleases better) species of things, are nothing 
else but these abstract ideas' made in the mind of man:77 Man's idea of the essence of things 
was but 'nominal',78 and hence the definition of species would also be relative to man:
[The] boundaries of species, are as men, and not as nature makes them, if at least there are in nature any such 
prefixed bounds. T is  true, that many particular substances are so made by nature, that they have agreement and 
likeness one with another, and so afford a foundation of being ranked into sorts. But the sorting of things by us, or 
the making of determinate species, being in order to naming and comprehending them under general terms, I 
cannot see how it can be properly said, that nature sets the boundaries of the spedes of things: or if it be so, our 
boundaries of spedes, are not exactly conformable to those in nature.79 80
The case was not necessarily that there did not exist species in nature, nor that they were not
defined by essences (Locke is not entirely clear on this point); the case was principally that man
could not with any kind of certainty discover that essence and hence the species:
I would here not be thought to forget, much less to deny, that nature in the production of things, makes several o f 
them alike: there is nothing more obvious, espedally in  the races of animals, and all things propagated by the seed. 
But yet, 1 think, we m ay say, the sorting of them under names, is the workmanship [of man...]. For two spedes may be 
one, as rationally, as two different essences be the essence of one spedes: and I demand, what are the alterations 
may, or may not be in a horse, or lead, without making either of them to be of another spedes? In determining the 
spedes of things by our abstract ideas, this is easy to resolve: but if anyone will relegate himself herein, hy supposed 
real essences, he will, I  suppose, be at loss: and he w ill never be able to know when anything predsely ceases to be 
of the spedes of a horse or lead.90
For the classification of animals, this rejection of man's ability to perceive essences meant that 
also the scholastic method of division had to be rejected, as man had no longer an essential 
fundamentum divisionis to take his point of departure from: 'But though defining by genus 
and differentia [...] be the shortest way; yet, I think, it may be doubted, whether it be the best7.81 
Instead, Locke declared, 'we are to take a quite contrary course': 'the want of ideas of their real 
essences, send us from our own thoughts, to the things themselves, as they exist. Experience here 
must teach me, what reason cannot7.82
76 P. R. Sloan, 'John Locke, John Ray' (1972), pp. 21-2.
77 J. Locke, Essay (1706/1997), p. 372/IILiii,12; emph. in org.
78 Ibid., p. 395/III,vi,6.
79 Ibid., p. 409/IILvi, 30.
80 Ibid., pp. 372-3/III,iii,13; emph. in org.
81 Ibid., p. 370/UI,iii,10; emph. in org.
82 Ibid., p. 569/IV,xii,9; emph. in org.
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No knowledge of essences, no certain definition of species, no possibility of employing 
a method of logical division in downwardly constructing a taxonomic system, no scientia of 
nature, Locke concluded: experience was all man could build his only probable knowledge of 
nature on.83 So far, Locke was in perfect harmony with the more general tenets of British 
natural history and with the British zoologists. John Ray, often celebrated as 'the founder of 
systematic Zoology'84 by his eighteenth-century descendants, and in any case, the first natural 
historian to thoroughly conceptualise species in non-essentialistic terms, had even before 
Locke, in the Essay, drew out all the philosophical implications of the human predicament of 
knowledge for classification made an analogous argument for what I, with a concept 
introduced in Chapter 2, shall call an 'empiricistic' approach to taxonomic classification.
Although Ray both acknowledged his debt to Cesalpino and to some extent followed 
his mode of classification of plants,85 and though Ray in some of his works, made use of 
divisions which would seem to resemble those brought about by a relaxed method of logical 
division,86 from the beginning he undermined its philosophical foundation, and proposed an 
alternative conception of classification. In De variis planetarum from 1696, after having stated 
the impossibility of perceiving essences and instituted sensation as the basis for any knowledge 
of nature,87 Ray pointed to the consequences for the classification of plants (and this held good 
for the classification of animals as well88):
Therefore, since the essences of things are unknown to us, certainly the essential generic characters could not be 
known to us. However, it is probable that those plants which agree in several attributes, conform in their nature. 
Therefore, it cannot be properly said that the flower or fruit in plants are essential parts.89
Without perceptible essences, then, it was not, as Cesalpino had earlier done and Linné was
later to do, possible a priori to distinguish between 'accidental' characters, which could be
entirely discarded with in classification, and 'essential' characters which could be used as the
fundamentum divisionis in classification:
According to the rules of logic, genera should be derived and species constituted by essential difference. But since 
the essence of things are unknown to us, certain characteristic accidents [...] should be taken for those differences or 
essential characters. When such characters are not given, nor even known to us, the collection of as many accidents, 
common to all spedes of a genus, should be taken for differentiae, as are not all together in some genus.90
83 Ibid., p. 570/TV;xii,10.
84 T. Pennant, British Zoology (1768-77), vol. I, p. xiii.
85 Cf. P. R. Sloan, 'John Locke, John Ray' (1972), p. 29.
86 Most dearly visible in his dassification in J. Wilkins, An Essay (1668), and in his joint work on ornithology with 
Frands Willughby, The Ornithology (1678/1972).
87 J. Ray, De variis planetarum methodis dissertation brevis (1696), p. 5; quoted in P, R. Sloan, 'John Locke, John Ray* 
(1972), pp. 43-4.
88 Cf. J. Ray, Historia Planetarum (1686), p. 40; quoted in S. Atran, Cognitive Foundations o f Natural History (1990), p. 
162.
89 J. Ray, De variis phmtarum methodis dissertation brevis (1696), p. 5; quoted in P. R. Sloan, 'John Locke, John Ray7 
(1972), pp. 43-4.
90 J. Ray, De variis plantarum methodis dissertation brevis (1696), p. 23; quoted P. R. Sloan, 'John Locke, John R a/  
(1972), p. 45.
173
CHAPTER 5
As the theoretical weighing of characters had become an epistemological impossibility, the 
natural historian also by Ray was propelled from the reign of reason and logic to the 
observation of nature itself where all features of living beings would in principle be equally 
important for classification.
When Ray had first set out his rules for an empiricist approach to classification in 
botany and zoology (the first seeds of this formulation is to be found in his classification of 
animals and plants in Wilkins' Real Character from 166891), he was severely attacked by 
adherents to the scholastic-essentialistic approach for his neglect of the method of logical 
division, and for making use of a variety of different characters when defining botanical and 
zoological species. Said Dr Robert Morison, physician to Charles II and professor of botany at 
Oxford University and in addition leader in the campaign against Ray in the 1660s, about Ray's 
classification in Wilkins' book: 'I saw there only a chaotic muddle of plants: I learnt nothing: I 
will show you the faults and confusion some other time. We must not waste time on them 
now/92
By the turn of the century, however, virtually all of the British zoologists had
acknowledged the human predicament of knowledge and had given up the attempt to
theoretically determine any essential characters in advance and employ a method of logical
division in constructing taxonomic orders. Hence, Thomas Pennant in his Synopsis o f
Quadrupeds, for instance, concluded after having observed how 'ignorant' man was, that,
We ought, therefore, to drop all thoughts of forming a system of quadrupeds from the character of a single part: but 
if we take combined characters of parts, manners and food, we bid much fairer for producing an intelligible system, 
which ought to be the sum of our aim.93
In tire same manner, an anonymous reviewer in the influential Monthly Review observed that 
'Enquiries into the works of nature' ought to be carried out, 'not in the method of hypothesis 
and vain conjuncture, but in the only just and satisfactory method of experiment and 
observation, and with a view to illustrating the wisdom and goodness of the great parent of the 
universe'. Only thus could they become 'extremely useful'.94
In line with the exegesis of natural history requirements voiced more generally during 
this period, in theory, also the zoologist had to start with what could be observed in nature -  
the innumerable, fleeting specimens -  if he wanted any knowledge about its order, and even 
that of a more uncertain kind.
91 J. Wilkins, An Essay (1668). In this work, Ray m ade use of various characters in plants and animals which were 
defined as 'accidents' and hence, unimportant for classification within scholastic natural history. It was only 
later that Ray thoroughly developed the theoretical justification outlined above for this kind of dassification. 
On the developments in Ray's thought, see P. R. Sloan, 'John Locke, John Ray' (1972), pp. 27ff.
92 Morison, Preludia Botanica (1669), p. 476, quoted in C  E. Raven, John Ray (1986), p. 184. See ibid., pp. 183-6, for a 
fuller treatment of the controversy.
93 T. Pennant, Synopsis o f  Quadrupeds (1771), p. ix.
94 Monthly Review, voi. 6 (May, 1752), p. 367.
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This repositioning of the zoologist vis-à-vis nature, as in one sense, a tabula rasa -  a 
man without prior knowledge about essences or suitable methods -  involved a redefinition of 
the taxa and, in tandem, a reformulation of the act of classification. It is to the consequences of 
this epistemological repositioning of man, and to the reformulation of the act of classification I 
now shall him.
As we saw above, in scholastic-essentialistic classification, such as that of Cesalpino or 
Linné, it was possible and even required to start classification at the most general level, and 
construct the taxonomic scheme from the top downwards. A taxon would thereby be defined 
partly, in terms of its membership in a higher level taxon, and partly, in terms of what 
distinguished it from the other taxa of the same level: per genus et differentiam. As we have 
also already seen indicated above, in principle, the empiricist zoologist, inversely, had to start 
from the bottom, at the level of perceptible matter, and work his way up in order to build up 
the more general taxa of the taxonomic system. Consequently, the category of species gained 
an unprecedented prominence as the basic level taxa, as the first building blocks so to say, in 
the structure of the taxonomic system. Therefore, it was also the species that received the prime 
and most explicit attention in the theoretical discussions of the taxonomic system.
In practice, the zoologists did not approach to the specimens as tabulae rasae, and I 
shall later return to some of the more important presupposed ideas implicated in the con­
struction of taxonomy. But it is worth first taking a closer look at how it was imagined that the 
taxa ought to be formed inductively as if by an empty mind. In the discussion of this point 
below the main focus will, following the zoologists, be on the formation of species, and I shall 
in this chapter only more sporadically touch upon the higher level taxa. In the following 
chapter I shall look into the factors that, together with the exegesis of species, conditioned the 
formation of species in practice by zoologists, who had always already a knowledge about 
nature and the universe, and who, in practice, could never act as tabulae rasae. In Chapter 7 1 
shall, finally, turn to the formation of the entire taxonomic system.
The Exegesis of Species
The Cognitive-Philosophical Space o f  Species Formation
In principle, the movement from the level of specimens to that of species was quite 
straightforward. Starting with the simple ideas which the specimens had made upon the mind 
and which reflected their secondary qualities, the zoologist would turn inward and within the 
space of his mind, compare those ideas to each other and through that comparison be enabled
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to generalise. 'By comparing things together/ Lord Monboddo observed, 'we discover their 
differences as well as their likeness/95 By doing so,
it appears, that by the mind's abstracting from any individual one or more sensible qualities, and perceiving these to 
exist in other individuals, the idea is formed, and the one is made out of the many. And what makes this one, is that 
one thing which is common to the many, for that gives them an union, and, as it were, a band or tie, which bundles 
them up together.96
Through this act of comparison the mind would by identifying the one in the many in effect 
transcend the material level of matter:
When the idea is  perfectly formed, the several subjects in which this one common thing exists, are entirely laid out of 
the view of the mind, and the one common thing is only considered; that is to say, in  other words, the likeness, or, to 
speak more accurately, that in which they are like, is only considered, not the things that are like; the commonness, if I 
may so speak, that is, the things which is in common, not the things which have it in common.97
Comparing ideas, determining similarities and differences between them and thereby dis­
covering the abstract one in the material many, was the basic method of classification. Leaving 
the world of matter behind, through such a classification, as James Harris said after having 
detailed the same process in identical terms, the mind would 'com e[...] to behold a kind of 
superior Objects; a new Race of Perceptions, more comprehensive than those of Sense'.98 A 
'superior object' like, for example, a species.
Making such an abstract idea relied upon a prior distinction between material object 
and mental image. Not everyone was considered to be able to make such a distinction, 
however. As David Hume observed 'all the unthinking and unphilosophical part of mankind, 
(that is, all of us, at one time or other)' would 'suppose their perceptions to be their only objects 
and never think of a double existence internal and external, representing and represented/99 
From a learned point of view, the matter looked entirely different. As already Descartes100 and 
later Locke101 had stressed, the objects of the world and their representation in the mind were 
two entirely different things. In the words of Hume:
But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, 
that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets, 
through which these images are conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the 
mind and the object.102
It was alleged that the unphilosophic part of mankind, in other words, the. vulgar was in­
capable of appreciating the distinction between matter and mental representation, and thereby 
was of forming abstract ideas. Lord Monboddo explained:
95 L. Monboddo, O f the Origin (1774), vol. I, p. 68, note*.
96 Ibid., vol. I, p. 62; emph. in org., note excluded.
97 Ibid., vol. I, p. 68, note*; emph, in org.
98 J. Harris, Hermes (1751), pp. 362-4 [sic]; cap. and emph. in org.; note excluded.
99 D. Hume, A Treatise o f  Human Nature (1739-40/1978), p. 205.
100 Cf. C. Taylor, Sources o f  the Self (1989), p. 143ff., and J. Cottingham, Descartes (1988).
101 Cf. J. Locke, Essay (1706/1997), p. 136/11,viii,15, and passim, esp. Book II.
102 D. Hume, An Enquiry (1748/1988), p. 137.
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[T]he idea of the man of science, or philosopher [...] is very different from that of the vulgar. For, in the first place, it 
is entirely separated and abstracted from every thing material, all the several particular objects from which it is 
collected being laid out of the view of the mind, and that only which they have in common being considered; whereas 
the vulgar never perfectly make this separation, but still continue to see the one only in the many. So that among 
them, man, e.g. is no more than one name given to Peter, James, and John, and other individuals of the sp ed « ; and 
when they want to explain their idea of any thing, they cannot do it without an example, that is, without shewing to 
the person with whom they converse, the material image of the thing in their own minds.'®
By introducing a distinction between a common-sensual way of experiencing ideas as material
things and a philosophical appreciation of an ontological distinction between the two, the
philosophers at this level separated common experience from philosophical cognition, and
hence, drew a fundamental line of distinction between the common people and the
philosopher, as Charles Taylor points out.103 04 The vulgar might have been able to assist with
information about individual specimens, as we saw in Chapter 3, to be observed at a material
spatio-temporal level because such information, for the scholar and vulgar alike, could be
obtained by universal common-sensual perception (even if, as we saw in Chapter 4, the vulgar
frequently tended to be all too amazed by what they saw). But they were from the outset
excluded from participating in the formation of abstract ideas, like that of species. This task
was left for those who knew how to transcend mere matter by generalising through
comparison.
The Common and Particular, and the Essence o f Species, Nevertheless
Even for the learned that were deemed capable of distinguishing between idea and object, 
making such a generalisation was not an easy task, however. For the empiricist, the problem 
arose that between any two things, or between any two ideas as it correctly were, there were 
always innumerable differences: "the differences of things are innumerable/ Lord Monboddo 
observed, 'because every thing is different from that which it is not/1® Locke exemplified the 
predicament:
(TJhere is no one thing, whether simple idea, substance, mode, or relation, or name of either of them, which is not 
capable o f  almost an infinite number o f  considerations, in reference to other things; and therefore this makes no small 
part of men's thoughts and words. V.g. one single man may be at once concerned in, and sustain all these following 
relations, and many more, viz. father, brother, son, grandfather, grandson, father-in-law, son-in-law, husband, friend, 
enemy, subject, general, judge, patron, client professor, European, Englishman, islander, servant master, possessor, 
captain, superior, inferior, bigger, less, older, younger, contemporary, like, unlike, etc. to and almost infinite 
number[.]106
More specifically, the zoologist William Smellie made the case with regard to animals:
103 L. Monboddo, O f the Origin (1774), vol. I, pp, 96-7; emph. in org.
104 C  Taylor, Sources o f the Self (1989), p. 146. Taylor's observation is made in relation to Descartes' philosophy.
105 L. Monboddo, O f the Origin (1774), vol. I, pp. 68-9, note*.
106 J. Locke, Essay (1706/1997), p. 290/H,xxv,7; emph. in org.
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[W]hen the productions o f nature are [...] scrutinised by the eye of philosophy, the number of their relations and 
differences is discovered to be almost infinite; and their shades of discrimination are often so delicate, that no sense 
can perceive them.107
The consequence of the empiricist's lack of means to weigh characters, which Ray pointed to 
above, becomes evident here: Without a notion of a somehow accessible essence which could 
guide the choice of differentiae, the empiricist zoologist was, in principle, left with all the 
differences in the world to contemplate on. This was, of course, an impossible position, and the 
British zoologists were not, in fact, left entirely at loss in the meanderings of nature. Even 
though they could not claim any prior knowledge about essential characters, they still 
entertained ideas about the nature of specific differences which, in most cases, made it possible 
to reduce the number of useful differentiae drastically -  it was not every difference which made 
a difference in the formation of spedes. As w e will see, to begin with, it was only common and 
peculiar traits that were of significance in the formation of spedes.
First of all, as Lord Monboddo made clear in general terms, in singling out traits in 
specimens appropriate as differentiae of a 'perfect idea/ like a spedes, one should distinguish 
between 'accidental' qualities and those which were 'characteritical o f  the species', that is to say 
those which were 'common to the spedes'. In defining the species of man, for instance, it would 
not do to highlight 'colour or size, or any other property belonging to the individuals' as these 
would not be the same in all men. Secondly, the qualities should be 'peculiar' to the spedes. It 
would hence not work to 'make my idea of m an to be that of a creature walking on two legs, or 
a horse, that of a creature with four legs', since birds also had two legs, and virtually all 
quadrupeds had four. Finally, referring to Plato, Monboddo stressed that the qualities singled 
out needed to reflect on th e 'nature and essence' of the spedes and thus define 'the prindples of 
things', like in man his capability of 'intellect and sdence'. However, in ’contrast to PlatO/ in the 
empiricist's scheme this essence could only be posited posterior, after the analysis of the 
common and peculiar perceptible traits and as a summation of these:108
If it be asked, from whence we get this knowledge o f likeness and difference, which, I say, is all we know of the 
nature of things? I answer, from the source of all our knowledge in our present state of existence, I mean the senses: 
And, particularly with respect to material objects, we have that knowledge of them directly and immediately from 
the senses. For we know nothing of their likeness or difference, except from their operations upon our organs of 
sense. Those which operate upon our organs in the sam e way, we say, are of the same kind; those which operate in a 
different way, of a different kind.109
The knowledge of essences, on this account, was based on a knowledge of similarities and 
differences between perceptible qualities.
Not everybody agreed with Lord Monboddo on this point. Most notably Locke, as we 
have already seen indications of above, argued that it was impossible for man to ascertain the 
limits of the essence of things by an analysis of such 'sensible qualities':
107 W. Smellie, The Philosophy o f  Natural History (1790), vol. I, p. 2.
108 L. Monboddo, O f the Origin (1774), vol. I, pp. 98-101; emph. in org.
109 Ibid., vol. I, pp. 70-1 (wrongly paginated as p. 17), note*.
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This then, in short is the case: nature makes many particular things, which do agree, one with another, in many sensible 
qualities, and probable too, in their internal frame and constitution: but 'tis not this real essence that distinguishes 
them into species; 'tis men, who, taking occasion from the qualities they find in them, and wherein, they observe 
often several individuals to agree, range them into sorts, in order to their naming [...]: and in this, I think, consists the 
whole business of genus and species.110
It was a similar idea of spedes and genera as nothing else but products of the understanding 
which the French naturalist, Count de Buffon would later bring into play within zoology, 
arguing as he did in his first essays that 'puisqu'il n'existe réellement dans la Nature que des 
individus, & que les genres, les ordres & les classes n'existent que dans notre imagination.'111 12In 
Locke as in the early Buffon the spedes had lost their ontological status.
All the British zoologists, that I know of, did, however, follow suit with Lord Mon- 
boddo rather than with Locke, hence assuming that they in fact did approach the species of 
nature through their analysis of similarities and differences of multiple characters and 
identification of the common and peculiar traits. When that could be assumed it was due to the 
fact that the secondary qualities of things not were produced fortuitously, but were 
systematically produced alike in all specimens of the same spedes by the spedes' defining 
essence. Ray explained:
[T]he essences of things are unknown to us, and therefore the essential Differences of them also. However, since 
from the same essences flow the same qualities, operations and other things which are accidents, there can be no 
surer mark of essential, and so of generic, agreement than to have many common attributes, that is, many parts and 
accidents similar, or to have the whole facies, habit, and structure the same.113
Although the formation of spedes could only be made on the basis of perceptible information 
supplied by the secondary qualities, those secondary qualities still somehow conveyed 
knowledge about the essence of spedes, even if it was only of an indirect kind,. So, though the 
predefined essential-acddental distinction of Cesalpino and Linné within the empiridst context 
had been translated into a common and peculiar, or as these in conjunction most often would 
be called within zoology, a 'characteristic'-'acddental' distinction, multiple characteristics 
would still for most empiridst zoologists (if not for all philosophers) indicate an essence. Even 
though the method had been fundamentally altered and the mode of approaching essences 
redefined, the very idea of an essence generating the visible qualities remained unaltered. And 
that, in turn, allowed the empiridst zoologist to assume that the spedes he formed through 
induction, at least in prindple, corresponded to spedes in nature.
110 J. Locke, Essay (1706/1997), pp. 412-3/III,vi,36; emph. in org, editor's note excluded.
111 G.-L. L. Buffon, 'Premier Discours' (1749/1954), p. 19. For an analysis of the philosophical underpinnings of 
Buffon's position and his critique of taxonomic categories, see P. R. Sloan, 'The Buffon-Linnaeus Controversy' 
(1976).
112 J. Ray, De methodo plantarum in genere (1703); quoted in A. Cain, 'Logic and M em ory' (1958), p. 156.
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The Im m utability o f  Species
In principle, traits singled out as 'characteristic' should also be 'indelible,' We saw already 
Richard Kentish point to the importance of this in the introduction to this chapter in his speech 
to the learned society at Edinburgh: The purpose of the minute examination of animals was to 
determine those characters which nature 'has characterised as indelible/ Similarly, Smellie 
stressed that,
On every animal Nature has imprinted a certain character, which is indelibly fixed, and distinguishes the species. 
This character we discover by the actions, the air, the countenance, the movements, and the whole external 
appearance.113
In order to account for the indelibility of the species characters, the zoologists had recourse to a 
creationistic frame of explanation. On one hand, it was assumed that all species had been 
created by God once and for all at the beginning of time: 'the number of species in nature is 
certain and determined/ as Ray observed, 'God rested on the sixth day, interrupting his great work 
-  that is, the creation of new species/114 Since then, no changes had been made, and hence, the 
characteristic marks in the species remained to the present time as like they had been in the 
time of Pliny and Aristotle, as Richard Brookes pointed out.115
To account for why no changes had occurred in species, it was, on the other hand, also 
argued that species would always reproduce themselves and hence also their characteristic 
marks. Said Ray, echoing Cesalpino's assertion of 'like everywhere engenders like':116 'every 
kind has its seed/117 Although some philosophers such as, again, Locke claimed that nature 
sometimes made 'monstrous productions' by pairing for instance a rat and a cat and that 
species consequently could 'not be distinguished by generation',118 all of the empiricist British 
zoologists, and incidentally also Buffon in his later writings,119 maintained in line with Ray and 
Cesalpino that although hybrids might be produced, they were not capable of procreating. 
Thus, a spedes could be defined as a self-reproducing community of spedmens, and the 
speries' lack of change since Creation could be explained.
I shall return to the notion of hybrids within, or rather outside eighteenth-century 
British zoology in Chapter 6; for now it suffices to observe that by affirming the sterility of 
hybrids and, inversely, the invariable reproduction of like by like, the zoologists added
113 W. Smellie, The Philosophy o f Natural History (1790), voi. II, p. 335; emph. in org.
114 J. Ray, Historia Planetarum (1686), p. 40; quoted in S. Atran, Cognitive Foundations o f Natural History (1990), p. 162; 
emph. in org.
115 R. Brookes, A New and Accurate System (1763-72), voi. I, p. xlii.
116 A. Cesalpino, De plant is (1583), p. 26.
117 J. Ray, The Wisdom o f Cod (1691), p. 181.
118 J. Locke, Essay (1706/1997), p. 403/III,vi,23; emph. removed.
119 G.-L, L. Buffon, Histoire naturelle (1777-89), voi. I, pp. 213ff. For an analysis of the developments in Buffon's 
concept of species, see P. L. Farber, 'Buffon and the Concept of Species' (1972); P. L. Farber, 'Buffon and 
Daubenton' (1975); J. Roger, Buffon (1997), eh. XIX.
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evidence to the claim of the Bible, quoted by Ray, that all species had been made by God once 
and for all in the beginning, regardless of whether man could perceive their essences directly 
or not. The definition of such self-reproducing spedes, then, would, and indeed in prindple 
should, hold good for all time -  the characteristic marks distinguishing them were indelible in 
the sense of being immutable. By this qualification, the spedes were not only lifted out of the 
material maze of matter and into the abstract realm of the mind, but they were also placed 
beyond the sway of time.
There were, however, some types of changes in animals, which the empiriast zoolo­
gists acknowledged and described, which must be taken into consideration. It was accepted 
that breeding as well as the removal of an animal from one dimate to another could change its 
stature in some measure. Hence, Edwards made the case for the changes in animals and plants, 
which resulted from breeding:
I found the agreement between different Generations o f Animal and Plant, which always continues to bear the Form 
and Likeness of those in which they were first inclosed [sic]. Indeed some domestic Animals and Plants differ in 
som e sort horn their first Parents, which were savage. I take these Differences not to be very material, and to 
proceed from the unnatural Food, Habitation, and other Circumstances that may alter the Plant or Animal in 
Magnitude or Colour; which is not material, seeing these Things so made domestick, if turned again to their native 
Habitations in a Generation or two cast off those Accidents attain'd by unnatural Situations, and recover their first 
Form s and Colours stamped on them in the first Creation of the whole Spedes.120
Analogously, Brookes described such changes, which would occur upon the transfer of 
animals between climates:
W e have observed, that among animals of the same kind, there is little variety, except what is produced by the art of 
man; but we would have this observation extend only to animals of the same climate. As in the human spedes many 
alterations arise from the heat or cold, and other peculiarities of the region they inhabit, so among brute animals the 
climate marks them with its influence, and in a few successions they entirely conform to the nature of their 
situation.121
As becomes clear in both these explanations of changes in species, such changes were regarded 
as only minor, and in addition, not even permanent: let the tame, bred animal out into the 
wild, and in a couple of generations it would regain its original form; move an animal back to 
its place of origin and it would likewise recuperate.
Now, at the same time as Edwards and Brookes made these assertions, in Histoire 
Naturelle, a book to be referred to by most of the contemporary British zoologists, Buffon 
vigorously argued that the spedes of America were degenerated from those of the Old World, 
and that through time they had established themselves as new spedes under the influence of 
American climate and consequently had to be studied as separate spedes.122 Some British
120 G. Edwards, A Natural History o f Birds (1743-51), vol. I, p. vii; emph. removed.
121 R. Brookes, A New and Accurate System (1763*72), vol. I, p. xxxiv.
122 G.-L. L. Buffon, concluded after a detailed comparison of animals of the Old and New World, in his Histoire 
naturelle (1777-89), vol. Ill, p. 224: 'Cette loi qui réduit à les juger autant par le climat & par le naturel, que par la 
figure & la confonnaté, se trouvera très-rarement en défaut, & nous sera prévenir ou reconnoitre beaucoup 
d'erreurs/
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zoologists accepted this thesis of American animals being descendants of animals from the Old 
World.123 But none of the British zoologists, to my knowledge, accepted Button's assertion that 
the characters of the American animals had been changed permanently and to such an extent 
that they had become new and different species. In British zoology, though note would 
occasionally be taken of differences arising from breeding and translocation, these differences 
would generally be interpreted to be relatively insignificant and pertaining only to the level of 
'varieties': subspecies which shared in the immutable characteristic marks of the species, but 
between which 'minor' or 'accidental' differences, as for instance in colour or size, could be 
observed.
By making the differences produced by breeding accidental, the unchangeability of 
species over time was once again underscored; by making the differences produced by place 
minor and accidental, place was generally written off as a difference that could make a 
difference to the nature of the species. The 'Bengal goat' could, consequently, be classified 
together with the English ditto, the Indian elephant with the African, and likewise, contrary to 
what Buffon thought, the 'harelipped monkey' of Africa and India ought to be incorporated 
into the same species:
Le Malbrouck of M. de Buffon, xiv. 224 tab. xxix. so much resembles this species [the harelipped monkey of Africa], 
that I place it it [sic] here as a variety. That able Zoologist suspected the same; but separates them, on account of 
some trifling distinctions, and the difference of country: this being a native of India, the other of Africa: but since 
those very distinctions may arise from the last cause, it seems better to unite them, than to multiply the species 
already so numerous.124
The species were severed from any spatio-temporal relations, and would hence emerge as a 
transcendental category, which were valid for all places and to all times. What was essential to 
a species was what characterised it despite time and place.
The idea of the immutable characteristics of species was even reflected in and re­
inforced by the language employed in describing them. In contrast to descriptions of 
specimens, as we saw in Chapter 3, which were many times tied to a specific historically 
situated experience, and which in any case always concerned a particular specimen, and thus 
mostly was given in past tense, the descriptions of species were virtually always given in third 
person, present tense, indicative: 'The Lion is...', 'the Cat is../, 'the Pelican is ../. As James 
Harris observed in a more general discussion of the relationship between language and 
philosophy, in contrast to objects of sensations, by definition 'indefinite’, ’fleeting’ and 
'transient',125 and hence best described in the past tense,126 the 'Immutable, as in Objects o f
123 E.g. R. Brookes, A New and Accurate System (1763-72), vol. I, pp, xxxvi-xxxvii; G. Edwards, A Natural History o f  
Birds (1743-51), vol. U, p. 117.
124 T. Pennant, Synopsis o f  Quadrupeds (1771), p. I l l ;  emph. in org.
125 J. Harris, Hermes (1751), p. 353; emph. in org.
126 Ibid., pp. 90-2.
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Intellection or Sciencef could only be properly designated with the verb 'to be' in its indicative 
mode:
This therefore (the INDICATIVE 1 mean) is the Mode, which as in all Grammars 'tis the first in order, so is it truly 
first both in Dignity and Use. 'Tis this, which publishes our sublimest Perceptions; which exhibits the Soul in her 
purest Energies, superior to the Imperfection of Desire and Wants [...]; but above all in its Present Tense ['to be'] 
serves Philosophy and the Sciences, by just Demonstrations to establish necessary Truth; THAT TRUTH, which from 
its nature only exists in the Present; which knows no distinction whether of Past or o f Future, but is every where and 
always invariable one.127
Knowledge of species, then, was essentially of a different kind from knowledge of specimens: 
in referring to qualities which existed ontologically in a transcendent space, a species in 
principle signified what, as Ephraim Chambers had it in a similar statement, was 'absolute' 
and 'permanent'. In contrast to such knowledge, knowledge of specimens was of a 'merely 
transient, or historical'128 kind, since it only referred to the fleeting existence of matter.
The Exclusivity of Species
In exegetical theory, the empiricists' species could and, indeed, should, to recapitulate, reflect
on permanent and unchanging aspects of nature, just as Linné and Cesalpino had claimed
theirs to do, but they did so for somewhat different reasons. Linné and Cesalpino had based
their claim to truth on a theoretical identification of essential characters, and on a method of
downward divisions which resulted in a definition of the species per genus et differentiam. This,
in turn, had allowed Linné, to stay only within the realm of the contemporaries, to define
genera and species almost monothetically. Without an essence to rely on which allowed for a
weighing of characters prior to empirical analysis, the empiricists had to base their species
definition on a minute examination of the specimens in their entirety (or, at least that entirety
which was constructed in the fashioning of specimens as facts -  more on that in Chapter 6).
This examination aimed at an identification of a number of characteristic marks, which would
in conjunction define the species. The resulting methodological difference between the two
modes of classification, and consequently in species definition, was made clear time and again
as British zoologists reclassified Linnean species by relying on a more general comprehension
of the specimens' characteristics. Hence, with regard to the 'brown mole/ Pennant noted:
Linnaeus places this and our radiated mole in his class of SOREX, or SHREW, on account of the difference o f the 
teeth; but as these animals possess the stronger characters of the MOLE, such as form of nose and body, shape of 
feet, and even the manners, we think them better adapted to this genus than to the preceding.129
Or, George Shaw reclassifed the 'vesperilio' (the bat) in a book dedicated to illustrating
Linnean zoology:
127 Ibid., pp. 159-60, note excluded; emph. and cap. in org.
128 E. Chambers, Cyclopaedia (1741), vol. I, p. ix.
129 T. Pennant, Synopsis o f  Quadrupeds (1771), pp. 134-5: emph. and cap. in org.
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According to the established rule of the Linnæan arrangement of quadrupeds, by which those animals are 
principally classed from the structure and situation of the teeth, it is necessary that the genus Vespertilio should 
rank under the first order, or Primates: but as the general appearance of Vespertilio is so widely different from that 
of the rest of this order, Linnaeus has been in this, as well as in some other instances, thought to pay too little regard 
to the evident and obvious characters of animals, and too much to those of the teeth.130
Teeth alone would not do: Even though the differences which made a difference to the 
empiricist zoologist were not innumerable, because as they were circumscribed by the notions 
of the common, the peculiar and the indelible, the empiricists' species still had to be defined in 
extenso by multiply morphological and at times also anatomical traits and characteristic 
manners and dispositions. Only by proceeding in this way could the empiricist start to 
approach, if ever so indirectly, the essence of nature's species.
From the empiricists' point of view, the downward classificatory movement, so central 
to Linnean taxonomy, was in fact, as Lord Monboddo observed (without, however, explicitly 
targeting Linné) reserved for the angels: '[W]e collect our ideas from objects of sense that we 
set together and compare. Intelligences of a higher order have, no doubt, a manner of 
conception very different':131
From this point of view  let us try if we can discern the difference betwixt us and higher intelligences. Wie begin with 
matter and material objects, and through particulars and individuals investigate generals. They (so far as we can conceive 
of their operations) proceed in a method directly opposite to this: For, beginning with generals, they through them 
recognise particulars. In this way we too proceed, after we have attained to intellect and science; but with this 
difference, that those more perfect minds see the particulars in the generals intuitively; whereas we, for the greater 
part, are obliged to investigate them, and find them out by circuit and collection. If it were otherwise, and that in the 
universels w e could see at once the several subordinate species, and their several properties, connections, and 
dependencies, we should then indeed be divine intelligences, and be ranked with beings of superior order.132
Given the predicament of man, the upward movement became the only legitimate route for
him to take in the formation of species. Within the realm of humans it was, moreover, not a
route open to everybody, but only to the educated that had learned how to discriminate
between idea and object, as we saw.
With this nominal species concept, the British zoologists had decisively moved away 
from scholastic-essentialist classification. With their conception of man as devoid of innate 
ideas, and with the introduction of an inductive method in classification, suitable for such a 
man, the British zoologists provided a new foundation for conceptualising species, and, 
indeed, as we shall see in Chapter 7, for taxonomic classification in general.
The concept of species, which emerged in the empiricist context, although hence, 
differing on essential points from that of Aristotle and the scholastic-essentialist spedes, was 
still, however, conditioned by the history of taxonomic classification in European thought. 
When Cesalpino set out to explicate the taxa of botanical classification in the late Renaissance, 
he drew on Aristotle's eidos and genos, and by coupling them with the scholastic
130 G. Shaw, Speculum Unnæanum (1790), 'Genus Vesperilo' (unpaged).
131 L. Monboddo, O f the Origin (1774), vol. I, p. 84.
132 Ibid., vol. I, pp. 183-4; emph. in org.
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reinterpretation of the Platonic-Aristotelian method of logical division reified them as 
taxonomic categories of thought, which designated a specific level of generality. Although the 
British zoologists rejected the philosophical underpinnings of scholastic-essentialist taxonomy 
and thereby severed it both from the (relaxed) method of logical division, and consequently in 
theory also untied the species definition from the definition of genera, they still adopted the 
idea of species as a taxonomic concept anchored in a specific level of generality. What they, by 
instituting 'observation' instead of the 'vain conjuncture of speculation' as the point of 
departure for the formation of species did was, in principle, to make the species autonomous of 
the higher taxa of the taxonomic system, and most importantly of the genus, in relation to 
which the concept initially had been explicated and defined. The species were now primarily to 
be made sense of and defined in relation to 'observable nature' as a concept for what the 
fleeting specimens permanently had in common.
That the empiricist species were empirically based did not mean, however, that they 
were not framed by a series of preconceptions as well. In fact, as we have seen, the zoologists 
took a number of things for granted which made it possible to conceptualise species in this 
w ay; things which even on their own account they could not have any knowledge about. They 
presupposed, on one hand, that there, indeed, existed an essence, even if it was imperceptible, 
which consistently produced similarities and differences in the secondary qualities of things; 
they presupposed that the spedes were formed once and for all at the beginning of time and 
remained as in the Garden of Eden until the end; they presupposed that like always engender 
like, hence they presupposed fixed spedes boundaries. In brief, they presupposed, on one 
hand, the immutability of spedes. On the other hand, they also preconditioned an 
anthropology, and even a sodology: by making man devoid of innate ideas, they had made 
inductive method the only possible means of acquiring knowledge about spedes; by making 
the vulgar incapable of distinguishing between image and idea, and, in effect, of employing the 
inductive method, they also delimited an exdusive sodo-cognitive space required for the 
definition of spedes. The empiridst zoologists could only pull through their classification of 
spedmens into spedes, not by observing nature alone, but also by reckoning with this whole 
cosmology of spedes, and by positioning themselves as men who were epistemologically 
capable of pulling through such a classification.
What the zoologists had accomplished by moving from the level of spedmens to that of 
spedes -  by distinguishing between thing and image, and analysing the images of spedmens 
with a view to determining similarities and differences and on the basis of these relations 
classing spedmens in spedes -  was, in sum, to move out of the spatio-temporal world of 
matter and into a transcendental realm where the transcendent qualities, the essential, 
immutable traits of animals, exclusively, could be defined. It is, I will suggest, in the context of
185
CHAPTER 5
this idea of species that we have to understand the importance of Bacon's assertion for 
zoology, which we met in the introduction to this chapter, that it was only relations that 
mattered in natural history. As we also saw in the introduction, Lord Monboddo stressed in 
the same vein, that 'knowledge' could only be attained about a 'single or monadic thing,' such 
as a specimen, if it was compared to 'general ideas/ such as species. The reason for this was 
that 'knowledge/ basically, was concerned with what was immutable:
In these [the general ideas] we perceive the objects o f SCIENCE and REAL KNOWLEDGE, which can by no means 
be, but o f that which is general, and definite, and fixed. Here too even Individuals, however of themselves unknownable, 
become objects of Knowlege [sic], as far as their nature will permit. For then only may any Particular be said to be 
known, when by asserting it to be a Man, or an Animal, or the like, we refer it to some such comprehensive, or general 
Idea.133
Within zoology, the descriptions of specimens were only a prelude to zoology proper, then, 
because it was not specimens, but only the general ideas about species which could 
communicate something, if ever so indirectly, about the immutable essence of things. As we 
saw, only the learned was considered capable of making such general ideas. Only they could 
make knowledge. To form a species, then, was an exclusive and excluding task: Doing so, the 
zoologist had to enter a transcendental cognitive space, thereby leaving both the vulgar and 
the fugitive matter of their world behind.
133 J. Harris, Hermes (1751), pp. 368-72 [sic]; emph. in  org.
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Specifying Nature
Outlining an empiricist species concept in theory and settling procedures for defining a species 
comparatively by identifying characteristic traits was one thing. When defining species in 
practice, the zoologists, however, encountered problems and developed practices that were not 
taken account of in the exegesis of species. In the exegesis of species it was, firstly, 
preconditioned that all the required knowledge for making such a comparison that would lead 
to a species definition was at hand. That there, on one hand, was enough specimens of what 
would prove to be animals of the same species available to determine the indelible 
characteristics and, on the other hand, that the individual zoologist who would make the 
species definition possessed an adequate stock of knowledge to be able to define a species. 
However, this was far from always the case. In practice, both lack of knowledge and lack of 
adequate specimens impeded the formation of species, leading the zoologists both to engage 
other zoologists in the act of defining species, and as more information came to hand over the 
years, to redefine already defined species. In practice, comparison was conditioned by the 
available traits of the specimens at hand, and consequently, defining a species became both a 
process -  at times a prolonged process, lasting for years or even decades -  and not seldom a 
collective endeavour as well. The first section of this chapter will be devoted to an analysis of 
the procedural and communal aspects of species definition.
Secondly, in the exegesis of species it was presupposed that there actually existed some 
common, peculiar, and indelible traits, shared by all 'like' specimens, however difficult they 
might be to discover, which would allow for a unification of them in a species and, thereby, for 
a definition of that species. In the face of the mutability of animals living in the world in which, 
as we will see, even some of the marks identified as characteristic would change over time, it 
took more than simply a notion of characteristic marks to form a species, however. In practice,
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the zoologists had to further qualify the idea of the common, peculiar, and indelible in order to 
single out the characteristic marks, in order to form a species. In doing so the zoologists would 
consistently foreground the features of some particular specimens in the species definition: 
some specimens proved to be better representatives of the immutable qualities of species than 
others. In making this qualification, the zoologists brought a whole cosmology of nature's way 
of working and its purpose with the spedes into play. The second part of this chapter will be 
concerned with how the notion of the characteristic marks was interpreted in practice, and 
with a discussion of that cosmology which fadlitated this interpretation.
Finally, there was a whole group of animals, commonly labelled 'monsters/ which, 
given the exegesis of the spedes concept and the practices of spedes formation, it became 
impossible to dassify. Consistently excluded from the classificatory schemes, and even from 
the field of zoology itself, they would, to use Mary Douglas' phrase, be treated as 'matter out of 
place/ Turning to the handling of these monsters in the condusion to this chapter, I shall use 
the ideas surrounding them to examine die boundaries instituted in the actual dassification 
between the 'normal' and the 'abnormal,' between nature and its exterior, and thereby, finally, 
attempt to specify the conceptual borders of the eighteenth-century British idea of spedes.
*
T erms o f  Co m pariso n  
Communal Definition of Species
When Gilbert White finally received a package of Iberian curiosities -  birds, fish, insects -  from 
that young friend at Gibraltar whom he had urged to take up the study of nature a little, the 
first thing White appears to have done was to compare them to other specimens that he was 
already familiar with. White could thereby readily identify some of the specimens as belonging 
to already known spedes. White listed the names of the more curious of these in English and 
Latin in a letter to Pennant.1 We might note here, that the whole question of identification was 
not an issue taken account of in the exegesis of spedes, but which became important for the 
formation of spedes in practice. In order to avoid forming a spedes that had already been 
made, a zoologist had to firstly ascertain that those spedmens, which came into his hands had 
not already been described as a spedes by another zoologist.
Some of the specimens which White could not identify himself were sent to Pennant for 
identification, and some to his brother in London who was also interested in natural history.2
1 G. W hite to T. Pennant, Jul. 12,1770, British Library, Add. 35,138, f.37.
2 G. White to T. Pennant, Aug. 1,1770, British Library, Add. 35,138, f.39, G. White to T. Pennant, Oct. 29,1770, 
British Library, Add. 35,138, f.43.
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Turning to correspondents in the Republic of Letters when a zoologist's own stock of 
knowledge did not suffice to make an identification of a specimen or to define a species was far 
from uncommon. Hence, also Thomas Browne, for instance, made an enquiry to Christian 
Merrett about some specimens of birds that Merrett attempted to determine the species of;3 
and, likewise, Lord Lyttleton sent Pennant a 'schelly' which Pennant identified as 'the Ferra of 
the lake of Geneva/4
Sometimes, a zoologist would ask correspondents to lend him relevant books in which 
he might be able to find information on the topic he was presently working on and in that way 
he could increase his own stock of comparative knowledge. Here, parenthetically, it is worth 
remembering both how difficult it often was to acquire a book, especially if one lived far away 
from the major cities, and especially from London where the book trade was concentrated.5 
David Skene, resident of Aberdeen, lamented: 'Our Publick Libraries afford very little new, & 
except a little Assistance from My Lord Finlateris Library whenever I want to look into a book I 
must commission to London/6 In addition, the comparatively high prices of books in the 
eighteenth century meant that, in many cases, even a zoologist of some standing in the middle 
echelons could not afford to buy all the books that would be essential for his study.7 In both 
cases, the zoologist was forced to borrow books in order to proceed with his work. Thus, James 
Douglas repeatedly asked Hans Sloane to lend him books on the various topics that he was 
working on.8 9Emanuel da Costa asked Dr Fothergill, who patronised his work, to lend him no 
less than nineteen books:
As I am hard at My Studies I beg thee Dear friend if thee hast any of the following in the Indosed list Books (w * I 
have not) to lend Me (one at a time) to Make the Necessary extracts from them for they will be of very great service 
to M e &c I assure thee 1 will take great Care of them, & return you them very faithfully Again as soon as perused.5
The terms of exchange of books as well as of the information given in letters necessary for the
identification and definition of species followed the same ethos of reciprocity as that of the
exchange of specimens within the Republic of Letters, discussed in Chapter 4, and I shall go no
further into the practices of exchange here. What I would like to stress here is the communal
3  C. Merrett to T. Browne, May 8,1669, British Library, Sloane 1,830.
4  T. Pennant to Lord Lyttleton, Oct. 7,1768, British Library, Egerton 2,001, f.270.
5 T. Belanger, 'Publishers and Writers' (1982), pp. 11-3.
6 D. Skene to J. Ellis, Dec. 5,1765, Linnean Sodety, London, Ellis Corr., vol.n.97.
7 Cf. T. Belanger, 'Publishers and Writers' (1982), esp. pp. 12ff, In The Nature o f  the Book (1998), esp. ch. 2, A. Johns 
discussed some of the problems a man of learning might encounter in attempting to acquire a book. Although 
drawn from a Swedish context, the case of Claus Bjerkander illustrates well the precarious position of quite a 
few of the zoologists well. Being a minister in a small parish at the Swedish countryside, Bjerkander struggled 
all his life to be able to in most cases not to buy, but just to get a look at those natural history books, which were 
essential for his pioneering work in entomology. He had to go to such extremes as naming an insect after the 
local Lord in order to get access to his library and hence, to the required books. H. Sandblad, 'linneask pastoral' 
(1974).
8 J. Douglas to H. Sloane, n.d., British library, Sloane 4,058, ff .260-262.
9 E. da Costa to J. Fothergill, Jan. 30,1754, British Library, Add. 28,537; deletion in org.
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dimension of the definition of species, facilitated by this practice of exchange -  the space that 
allowed for the making of those comparisons on which the species definition rested was not 
only a conceptual space, but also a social one. To the extent that a zoologist when faced with 
new specimens did not possess the necessary information about comparable animals himself, 
he was likely to turn to correspondents in the Republic of Letters in order to acquire that 
information, or even, as we have seen, engage them actively in the act of identification and 
definition. In this sense, the definition of species became, in many cases, a collective 
endeavour.
Differences, which Could Make a Difference
Among die Iberian curiosities that White received, White's brother found a quail without a 
bade toe that appeared to be 'a non-descript and a new species'. That single quail was, 
however, not enough to ascertain the fact of the matter: T think it merits further enquiry: and I 
shall accordingly desire my Brother to procure more specimens, & to satisfy himself thoro'ly 
that the back toe is always wanting; and also to get an old bird of each sex/10 It was not only 
lack of knowledge on the individual zoologist's part that became an obstacle to the formation 
of species. No matter how many enquiries were made to correspondents in the Republic of 
Letters, sometimes the features necessary for making a spedes definition could simply not be 
brought to light. In a thoroughly material sense, the formation of spedes was also 
drcumscribed by the often random assortment of specimens which tire zoologist had at his 
disposal.
As we saw in Chapter 3, die description of spedmens to some extent foreshadowed and 
put limits on the classification: Ideally, there was a correspondence between the features 
described in representations of spedmens -  in the circumstantial description: prindpally the 
morphology, and secondarily also die manners and habits, anatomy and usage of an animal; in 
the condse description: a more limited number of mainly morphological traits -  and die marks 
necessary for classifying them into acceptable spedes. In practice, however, not every 
description proved to be as complete as one would have wished, and not every drawing or 
stuffed animal appeared to reveal that particular piece of information which, when comparing 
a spedmen to already known spedes or spedmens, turned out to be essential to have 
information about.
Moreover, the presence of only one or a few spedmens made it hard to determine 
whether a trait, like the missing toe in the quail, was in fact actidental or characteristic. Like
10 G. White to T. Pennant, Oct. 29,1770, British Library, Add. 35,138, f.43. 
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111. 6.1 T h e  MAGELLANTIC v u l t u r e , OR c o n d o r  (G. Shaw, Museum Leveriani explicate, 1792). Though 
George Shaw only had a few feathers and some rumours to rely on, he both described and depicted 
the magellantic vulture of North America. A bird of prey so enormous that it allegedly could take a 
young boy, as it appears from the text, and a seal, as seen in the picture, as prey.
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White's brother, Pennant was also left at a loss at how to characterise and classify a 'grey deer/
because he had only an account of a single specimen to build his definition of the species on:
An obscure species, doubtful whether a Deer, a Musk, or female Antilope; for the horns were wanting in the animal 
described by Linnaeus.
Size of a cat; of a grey colour between the ears a line of black; a large black spot above the eyes: on each 
side the throat a line of the same colour pointing downwards: the middle of the breast blade the fore legs and sides 
of the belly, as far as the hams, marked with black: ears rather long: under side of the tail black.11
Similarly, Edward Tyson was not sure whether to classify an opossum that he had dissected as
of the 'dog-kind' or the 'vermin-kind/ because he had only a female specimen to examine.12
George Shaw was left in uncertainty as to whether there, in fact, existed a species of the
'magellanic vulture' somewhat like the 'vulture gryphus' of Linné but so much bigger that
allegedly it could take a ten year old boy as prey, because Shaw had only some rumours and a
few feathers to identify the species on the basis of. Although Shaw for this reason declared that
'w e must be content that its history and description should still remain in some degree
involved in obscurity', nevertheless, it was described and depicted (see 111. 6.1), and christened
as well in his Museum Leveriani: 'Not chusing [...] to create confusion in natural history by
making it absolutely the same with the Vultur Gryphus of Linnæus, I have rather chosen to
give it a new name, and to place the supposed Linnæan synonym in a doubtful manner.'13
It was not solely the presence of insufficient descriptions or of just a single specimen
that left the zoologists uncertain as to the determination of their species. In the process of
preservation or transportation, animals, moreover, could easily loose limbs that would be vital
for the definition. Hence, Peter Brown made a description of the 'Surinam Dav/ from a
specimen in the cabinet of Marmaduke Tunstall which had lost its tail;14 Shaw described a
'lion-tailed monkey' in which, as the name indicates, the tail was considered to be a
characteristic mark, from a specimen with a mutilated tail;15 Robert Kerr encountered an
illustration of a 'two-toed ant-eater' with such strange feet that he had to assume it was either
of another species or 'might be taken from a mutilated dry skin';16 and Thomas Yeats lamented
that the feet of butterflies often would be mangled or entirely destroyed before they reached
the zoologist from all over the world.17
Such mutilations had implications for the possible formation of species. Hence, Yeats 
had to give up classifying butterflies according to their feet even though Scopoli in Entomologia 
Camiolica (1763) and Geoffrey in Histoire Abregeé des Insectes (1764) had suggested that these 
might be the best characteristic marks; Kerr had to refrain from deciding whether there existed
11 T. Pennant, Synopsis o f  Quadrupeds (1771), p. 55; emph. in org.
12 E. Tyson, Carigueya (1698), pp. 3-4.
13 G. Shaw, Museum Leveriani expiicatio (1792), vol. I, pp. 5-6.
14 P. Brown, New Illustrations o f  Zoology (1776), p. 20.
15 G. Shaw, Museum Leveriani expiicatio (1792), vol. H, p. 72.
16 Kerr's addition in Linné, The Animal Kingdom (1792), p. 105.
17 T. P. Yeats, Institutions o f  entomology (1773), p. 134.
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a one-toed ant-eater as well as a two-toed; and Smith, finally, highlighted the implications of 
such 'accidental mutilations' for the formation of species in general, and for the definition of 
ape species in particular: ,
These accidental mutilations, which occasionally occur in several exotic animals, are productive o f considerable 
errors in the descriptions of authors, and no small confusion has resulted from this cause in the arrangement and 
enumeration of the different species o f Simiae, which with every assistance of figures and descriptions is yet 
involved in considerable obscurity.18
Even in cases where stuffed animals did reach a zoologist in their original form, this did not 
necessarily guarantee certainty. As little as a drawing would allow for an anatomical 
examination would a stuffed specimen; and information about morphology alone did not 
always reveal everything that had to be known in order to define a species. The example of two 
stuffed 'skmc-formed [sic] lizards', sent to Thomas Wilson from New Holland by John White, 
indicates the limits to the use of such information. One of these specimens had an excrescence 
on the upper part of its tail, 'almost like a supernumerary or forked tail', while the other did 
not have any. Wilson was not sure whether this might be a characteristic trait of only one of the 
sexes, and in that case probably the male and hence a defining character of the species, or 
whether it was merely a 'monster' -  an accidental abnormality. The sex of the lizards could, 
however, not be determined without a dissection of the animal, and the matter, and 
consequently, the definition of the species, 'remains still to be proved'.19
These examples highlight that the classification of specimens into species was circum­
scribed not only by the exegesis of species, the fashioning of specimens as zoological facts, and 
by the collective stock of information at hand in the Republic of Letters, but also, in material 
terms, by the actual traits available in the animals under consideration: Only these could in 
practice be made to make a difference, and they often left the zoologists at a loss. By the end of 
the description of a species, it was, thus, not uncommon to see a note expressing uncertainty 
with regard to the species definition in terms like those we have also seen above: '[It] must be 
left to future Enquiry../,20 or 'We confess ourselves unable to decide, with certainty../.21
However, as time passed, more perfect specimens would be conveyed to the zoologists, 
which made it possible to define the species with more certainty. During the eighteenth 
century, a steady flow of new specimens to the zoologists in Europe from all over the world, 
made possible not least by the steady colonial expansion, entailed a continuous redefinition of 
spedes within the realm of zoology. Hence, that 'grey deer' which had caused Pennant 
problems in 1771 could by 1792 be defined with more certainty, as male specimens had been
18 G. Shaw, Museum Leveriani explicatio (1792), vol. I, p. 72.
19 T. Wilson, 'Appendix' (1790), p. 242.
20 M. Catesby, The Natural History o f  Carolina (1731-43), plate 42 (unpaged), on the possibility of there being more 
than one spedes of rattle-snake.
21 Anonymous, The Naturalist's Pocket Magazine (1799-1802), vol. IV, 'Female Zebra' (unpaged); on the possibility 
that the quagga might be a female zebra or maybe a variety of the zebra.
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discovered by then to have characteristic antlers in contrast to the female of which Pennant had 
only had information: 'The characters of the animal are now better known, and it is found to 
belong [...] to the genus Antilope', Shaw concluded with reference to Pennant's description. At 
the same time, it was renamed as 'musk deer.'22 Likewise Tyson himself, only six years after his 
initial examination of the female opossum got a chance to examine a male specimen and, by 
then, could define the species with somewhat more exactness: 'Now having upon the 
dissection [of the male] observed the Penis to be fleshy, and to have no Bone in it; I find it 
cannot be referred to the Dog or Weasel kind, as some', among these, remember, Tyson himself, 
'have thought.'23 24However, Tyson was still not sure how to categorise it:
I m ust confess we cannot be at a certainty in this matter, unless we had a more perfect Enumeration and Description 
of the several sorts of Animals that are in the World; and by a strict Enquiry into their inwards as well as outwards 
Parts, observed, how gradually they differ from one another; by easie and gentle steps, the intermediate Species 
linking the whole together. However till this can be attained, every little help will contribute somewhat.14
In practice, as this example clearly indicates, it was not enough only to have knowledge about
specimens of one species. In order to determine not only a species' common traits, but also the
peculiar ones, a species would have to be defined in comparison to other species and most
particularly, in comparison to those it resembled the most. At the time that Tyson wrote this in
1704, and for the better part of the eighteenth century, much of South America, where
opossums in the beginning of the eighteenth century were thought only to reside, was still left
unexplored, due, as it often went, to 'the jealous Spaniards', who tenaciously guarded their
colonial possessions.25 By the end of the eighteenth century, not only had more South
American specimens had been described, but New Holland had also been discovered and a
number of new specimens of opossums had reached Europe. Shaw outlined the implications of
these discoveries for the definition of opossums:
The preserving efforts of navigators accompanied by naturalists have at length discovered as it were another new 
w orld, and other animals, not less surprising than the Opossum; and which seem in many particulars to agree in 
structure with those animals [discovered in South America]; being like them furnished with an abdominal pouch for 
the temporal residence of their young.26 27
As a result of these discoveries, the opossums would now be determined to constitute a new 
'genus/ characterised by 'An Abdominal Pouch, or Follicle, in which the mammae [breasts] are 
situated, and which serves as a temporary residence for the young.'17 The various species of
22 G. Shaw, Museum Leoeriani explicatio (1792), vol. I, p. 20.
23 E. Tyson, 'Carigueya' (1704), p. 1566; emph. in org.
24 Ibid., p. 1566; emph. in org.
25 T . Pennant, Synopsis o f  Quadrupeds (1771), p. 172; written in relation to want of knowledge of panthers. The 
implications, however, were the same. For a discussion of the problems of getting access to the Spanish 
dominions in South America during the eighteenth century, see M. L. Pratt, Imperial Eyes (1992), p. 16. D. A. 
Baugh discusses in his 'Seapower and Science' (1990), the politico-strategic background to the Spanish guarding 
o f their possessions in South America from scientific exploration.
26 G. Shaw, Museum Leveriani explicatio (1792), vol. L p- 25.
27 G. Shaw, Zoology o f New Holland (1794), p. 5; emph. in org.
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opossums could then be defined and characterised in relation to that 'genus/ and thereby to 
each other.
Many similar examples of such redefinitions of species could be cited, but these suffice 
to make the point that the definition of species in practice changed over time. In order fully to 
appreciate this processual character of the species formation and its implications for zoology, it 
will be useful to step outside of the realm of species formation for a moment, and inquire into 
the influence of the steady influx of new specimens on zoology, and on the conceptualisation 
of knowledge, more generally.
The steady influx of animals becomes especially evident in the prefaces and appendices 
to books, commonly written after or at the time of the printing of the main body of the book. 
Here, authors would often give additional information that had come in hand only after the 
main body of the book had been completed. Thus, Brookes added descriptions of the glutton, 
the shoe-goose and no less than thirteen different species of monkeys in his preface, because, as 
he explained,
There has been of late many new discoveries in natural history, which lying scattered in different essays required 
also to be reduced into system, each of these I have taken care to range under their proper classes in the body of the 
work; but that this is a science that continually improves, new matter arises even during the short time between 
printing and publication. As I would have nothing omitted, therefore it may be proper to insert here such animals as 
have newly come to my notice.18
Similarly, Pennant added a number of clarifying descriptions in an appendix, in this case of 
spedes already described in his book, which had been received too late to go into the book 
itself.28 9 George Edwards found it necessary to attach a systematic index to the last volume of 
his Natural History o f  Birds, and by way of making an apology for this index he also brought out 
the, at times, fortuitous dimension of making zoology:
As there has been no Design at the Beginning o f this Work to have carried it on to the Length it is now come, the 
Matter contained in it could not be arranged in a Classical Order; for as Things of a mixed Nature continually 
offered themselves to me, I was obliged to proceed just as 1 could procure Subjects to go upon: Therefore, if we 
survey this whole Work (which is now brought to a Conclusion) we shall find many Subjects that ought to have 
been placed together, are scattered throughout the four Parts thereof; and as their being so creates some Difficulty 
and Confusion, I  have judged it convenient to bring all the Subjects contained in the Books, into a Generical 
Catalogue.30
At a more general level, it was often stressed that due to the nature of the study, it was 
necessary to print books even though all of the descriptions and definitions might not be 
perfect. In the preface to his more general work on nature, John Ray thus noted in apology for 
h is 'huddling up, and tumbling out' in the book: T know well, that the longer a Book lies by me, 
the perfecter it becomes. Something occurs every Day in Reading or Thinking, either to add, or 
to correct and alter for the better. But should I defer the Edition till the Work were absolutely
28 R. Brookes, A New and Accurate System (1763-72), vol. I, p. xvi.
29 T. Pennant, British Zoology (1768-77), vol. ID, pp, 321-44.
30 G. Edwards, A Natural History o f  Birds (1743-51), vol. IV, p. 235; emph. in org.
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perfect, I might wait all my Life-time, and leave it to be published by my Executors/31 In a 
similar manner, Gilbert White noted in a letter to Pennant, after having pointed out in a 
previous letter some mistakes Pennant had made in the description of some species of the 
'grallae order* in his British Zoology, received good-humouredly by Pennant: 'If a man was 
never to write on natural knowledge 'til he knew every thing, he would never write at all: & 
therefore a readiness to acknowledge mistakes on due conviction is the only certain path of 
perfection/32 345
Indeed, every piece of information on animals, every shadow of a specimen, and every 
definition of a species regardless of how uncertain it might be, was usually welcomed eagerly 
within eighteenth-century zoology, if better could not be had. The author of the Naturalist's 
Pocket Magazine stressed this, as he invited his readers to forward him information in 
connection with a description of the Australian 'porcupine caterpillar* of which he had never 
seen a grown insect (as we will see below, ideally, it was only on the basis of the grown insect 
that a species definition could be made):
W e are thankful, however, for such information as we can get for the present respecting any non-descript articles 
and patiently wait the farther development of time: a doctrine which we most cordially recommend to our readers; 
as som e information is certainly better than none, and every little commonly gives rise to a little more.®
Some information was better than no information because it could be improved over time as
also Edwards stressed:
It is the Work of some only to hint to us what there is in Nature, barely by Names; and of others, to search a little 
farther, and give some tolerable Account of them, which may enable others, who come after, to attain a more perfect 
Knowledge of Things, who perhaps would never have busied themselves about them, had they not received their 
first Hints from Authors far more dark than themselves.54
As also becomes evident in this quotation, zoology, as indeed (human) knowledge more
generally, was conceptualised as a process towards perfection in which the individual author in
the grand perspective, only mattered as one step towards achieving this perfection. White, in
yet another letter to Pennant, made this dear as he critidsed Scopoli's new work on
entomology, but at the same time found that it might serve some useful purpose, nevertheless:
Monographers have a fair pretence to challenge some regard and approbation from the lovers of Nat: History: for as 
no man alone can investigate all the works of nature; those partial writers may, each in their different departments, 
be more accurate in their discoveries, and freer from errors than those that undertake in a more general way; St so  
by degrees may pave the road to a correct universal Nat: history.55
In more general terms, Ephraim Chambers went as far as to annihilate the rights of property 
within learning for the sake of such perfection:
'Tis vain to pretend any thing of property in things of this nature. To offer our thoughts to the public, and yet 
pretend a right reserved therein to one's self, if it be not absurd, yet is sordid. The words we speak, nay, the breath
31 J- Ray, Three Physico-Theological Discourses (1732), p. xv; emph. in org.
32 G. White to T. Pennant, Jan. 2,1769, British Library, Add. 35,138, f.24.
33 Anonymous, The Naturalist's Pocket Magazine (1799-1802), voL L 'Porcupine Caterpillar1 (unpaged).
34 G. Edwards, A Natural History o f Birds (1743-51), vol. D, p. 111.
35 G. White to T. Pennant, Sept. 14,1770, British Library, Add. 35,138, ff. 41-2.
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we em it is not more vague and common than our thoughts, when divulged in print. You may as well prohibit 
people to use the light that shines in their eyes, because it comes from your candle
We see the same thought, which was first started by one author under a word of crudity, borrowed by 
another, become farther improved, and ripened; and at length, being transmitted to a third, yield fruit in abundance. 
All plants will not thrive in all soils that will produce them; some languish in their mother beds: whence the 
gardener is under a frequent necessity of replanting them, &C.36
Although every zoologist would certainly not have agreed that there was not some kind of 
legitimate right to the words one had produced -  allegations of dishonest citations, or 
'plagiarism' as it was called, were recurrent in the books37 -  Chamber's idea of knowledge as 
something which was perfected over time through a communal effort certainly resonated 
within the zoological community. This idea, as well as the actual practice within zoology, of 
course, squared well with the notion already launched by Bacon in the early seventeenth 
century of natural history being a communal endeavour.
Acknowledged as a premise of knowledge in general in a world where new animals 
continuously arrived, and where one man could never get to know everything and much less 
effect and perfect all of the descriptions and definitions by himself, the communal path to 
perfection was also celebrated in the formation of species. Here, as we have seen, it entailed 
numerous redefinitions of species in introductions and appendices, and in books by other 
authors as new information came at hand throughout the century. In nature, and hence also 
ideally within zoology, a species might once and for all be eternally defined, but the zoologists' 
'discovery' of this definition was pervaded by mutilated specimens, insufficient descriptions, 
non-discovered continents and a lack of books: in practice, the species, ironically, became a 
category in flux.
S pec ifyin g  P er fec tio n
Let us leave this dimension of change out of the picture for now (I shall return to it in con­
clusion of this section), and focus on the other crucial aspect of the practical formation of 
species, namely the specific modes of singling out those characteristic traits of species which 
allowed for the species definition: the interpretation of what was, in fact, common, peculiar 
and indelible. This mode of interpretation remained constant throughout the period, although 
it would be applied to different specimens as new ones came at hand.
Before starting, it is necessary to clarify an issue of terminology. In the following, I shall 
make use of a distinction between the 'definition' and the 'description' of a species. This
36 E. Chambers, Cyclopaedia (1741), vol. I, p. xxiv.
37 See for instance J. Ray, 'The Preface' (1728) (unpaged). For a more general discussion of plagiarism, piracy and 
copyright in eighteenth-century Britain, see T. Belanger, 'Publishers and Writers' (1982), pp. 13-6, 20-2; A. Johns, 
'Miscellaneous methods' (2000), pp. 163-4.
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distinction would usually not be as clear-cut in British zoology as it was, for instance, in 
Linne's Systema Naturx where the difference was highlighted typographically. There was, 
however, still a difference in empiricist zoology even if the definition was elaborate and 
commonly not distinguished typographically from the description in the text. Usually, a 
zoologist would sum up all of a species' defining characteristics in the first paragraph of a 
section devoted to a species, before he moved on to give a more general description of the 
spedes concerned in the next paragraph. The distinction instituted thereby became evident not 
least in cases of comparison of spedes. In referring to a spedes, the reference would generally 
be to those features, which had been singled out in the first paragraph. Though for heuristic 
reasons, reifying the distinction between 'definition' and 'description' here, the distinction is 
made on the basis of a tadt, but not absolutely dear-cut distinction in the British zoologists' 
representation of spedes.
To begin this discussion of the definition of characteristic marks, we might identify an 
apparent problem in the identification of them (although the zoologists themselves never put 
the matter in these terms, for good reasons, as we will see): When having to determine what 
were actually to be deemed immutable, indelible characteristics in practice the zoologist would 
seem to be left with a problem in face of the continuous alterations in the live animals. As we 
might observe, nature is not only fugitive with regard to 'acddental' marks but also, more 
seriously, with regard to some of the marks defined as 'immutable and indelible.' Hence, a 
horse, for instance, does not get all of those teeth by which- in conjunction with other traits -  it 
be distinguished by most zoologists would until its fourth year; a butterfly is first a larva, then 
a caterpillar, before it finally emerges as an insect with such distinctive marks on its wings as 
would normally enter into the spedes definition; numerous birds and quadrupeds change 
colour from season to season; and males and females of abundant spedes differ significantly in 
appearance, far from always, as we will see below, sharing the same characteristic marks; and 
so on and so forth. In the face of such variations between spedmens and alterations in 
individual spedmens, how did the zoologists manage to fix the characteristic marks in 
practice? How did the zoologists concretely manage to transgress the gap between the 
mutability of spedmens situated in a spatio-temporal world of matter and the transcendent 
realm of nature's immutable spedes?
It might at first be argued that the choice of what was deemed essential in an animal 
had already been made in the zoologists' fashioning of specimens as zoological facts, 
characterised as these were by a relatively limited series of attributes, as we saw in Chapter 3. 
And, as I have argued earlier, demarcations of the space of dassification were derisively made 
in the selection of traits through this mode of transforming raw nature into facts. However, at 
least as regards the specimens described in the circumstantial mode, the particular kind of
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taxonomic classification, and the specific definition of a species' 'immutable" characteristics 
were far from determined by it. The zoologists would still be left with a large variety of 
fashioned specimens to work on: old and young, males and females, birds in summer dress 
and birds in winter dress, etc. etc., which were all described by a range of morphological and, 
less frequently, extra-morphological traits. Even though the fashioning of specimens 
circumscribed classification by drastically reducing the possible number of traits the zoologists 
could work on, the zoologists were still confronted with the question of which particular traits 
should be considered as immutable and characteristic and hence, definitive of a species.
In seeking an answer to this question in the following, I shall start by considering 
which traits were generally singled out as characteristic of a species, and, more specifically, in 
which animals and in which state of the life of those animals, the zoologists usually found 
indelible marks.
Specific Prototypes
Metamorphosing as they did from larva to caterpillar and to insect and, furthermore, not 
always terminating in the production of only male and female specimens but, as with bees and 
some types of ants, also in a variety of different kinds of grown insects, insects became one of 
the most tricky groups of animals to deal with, and I shall start the enquiry into how the 
characteristic marks were captured with these.
Henry Smeathman's description of the 'termes bellicosus' or 'white ants' will serve as a 
case in point. In African Guinea, Smeathman had met these 'wonders of creation' which 
constructed whole 'commonwealths' by working together in building hillocks with halls, 
chambers, corridors and galleries, raising as much as twelve feet above the ground (see 111. 
B.S).38 Now, these insects were divided into three different sorts, which were labelled with 
inspiration from contemporary social classification. Firstly, there were the 'labourers' who did 
all the work; then there were the 'soldiers, which do no kind of work' except fighting; and, 
finally, there was the 'nobility or gentry : the 'perfect insects, which are male and female, and 
capable of propagation.'39 The white ants not only varied according to their functions in the 
commonwealth but, more importantly for classification, also in their appearance (see HI 6.2). 
Hence, the labourers were very small and without wings and with the mouth 'evidently 
formed for gnawing or holding bodies'; for their part, the soldiers had 'undergone a change of 
form, and approached nearer in degree to the perfect state': They were much larger, half an 
inch in length and hence equal to fifteen labourers in size, and had, furthermore, 'jaws [...]
38 H. Smeathman, 'Some Account of die Termites' (1781), pp. 139,144,148-9.
39 Ibid., p. 154; emph. in org.
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ni. 6.2 D if f e r e n t  k in d s o f  w h it e  
a n t s  (H. Smeathman, 'Some 
Account of the Termites/ 1781). In 
Africa, H. Smeathman had met the 
'sagadous' white ants, which both 
built commonwealths in enormous 
ant-made hillocks, as depicted 
below, and which were divided 
into three different ranks, 
comparable to those of contem­
porary soriety. In the illustration to 
the left, Fig. 2 and 3 represent the 
'King' and 'Queen,' respectively, or 
the white ants in their 'perfect 
stage.' Fig. 8 shows the 'soldier/ 
with 'his' forceps made for fighting 
(magnified in fig. 9). Finally, the 
lowest rank, and most imperfect 
kind of the white ant, the 
'labourer/ is depicted in fig. 8. 
Figs. 10-25 show other termites in 
their different stages of perfection.
111.6.3 HILLOCKS OF WHITE ANTS (H. Smeathman,'Some Account of the Termites, 1781)
T a b . x n n
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HI. 6.5 Six p e r f e c t  b u t t e r f l ie s  (M. 
H a m s, A n Exposition o f  English In-sects, 
1782)
A lth o u gh  at tim es, eggs, larvae and 
caterp illars would be d escribed  and 
d ep icted  as above, it was alw ays only 
the fully-grow n, perfect insect that 
w ould  figure in the representations of 
species o f insects, as below.
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shaped like two sharp awls a little jagged, [...] destined solely for piercing or wounding'.40
Finally, 'The third order, or the insect in its perfect state, varies its form still more than ever':
The head, thorax, and abdomen, differ almost entirely from the same parts in the labourers and soldiers; and, 
besides this, the animal is now furnished with four fine large brownish, transparent wings In short it differs so 
much from its [sic] form and appearance in the other two states, that it has never been supposed to be the same 
animal, but by those who have seen it in the same nest; and some of these have distrusted the evidence of their 
senses.41
By digging into the hillocks of the white ants, Smeathman, however, was enabled to ascertain
the fact of the matter that the different insects were indeed of the same kind. On the basis of
this observation, the species was reclassified according to its proper characteristics:
The great LINNAEUS, having seen or heard of but two of these orders, has classed the genus erroneously; for he had 
placed it among the Aptera, or insects without wings; whereas the chief order, that is to say, the insect in its perfect 
state, having four wings without any sting, it belongs to the Neuroptera; in which dass it will constitute a new genus 
of many speries.42
Labourers, soldiers and nobility were all included into one species, but it was the insects 
identified as 'perfect' which, as a matter of course, were made the representatives for the entire 
species in the species definition.
The mode of making what was considered to be the most perfect animal the repre­
sentative of the species as such can be observed more generally in definitions of insect species, 
and other metamorphosing animals such as frogs. It was not, as is also evident in Smeathman's 
case, that the 'less perfect' specimens were not mentioned at all. Quite often they were taken 
note of in the more general descriptions of the spedes, as Moses Harris' treatment of English 
insects also clearly illustrates. In The Aurelian, Harris, merely describing and illustrating 
different spedes without attempting to dassify them, took pains in every single instance to 
depict and describe not only the fully-grown flies, but also the eggs and caterpillars in their 
different states (see 111. 6.4). In An Exposition o f English Insects, published ten years later where 
Harris attempted to make a classification, however, it was only the features of the fully-grown 
insect that were used in that dassification (and depicted in the illustrations, see 111. 6.5).43 The 
point was, then, here as in other entomological studies44 (the frogs I shall return to below), that 
although the spedes certainly induded the eggs, larvae and caterpillars, soldiers and labourers 
as well as the perfect insect, it was the fully-grown insect and its features alone which featured 
in the definition of the spedes.
The same mode of subsuming the heterogeneity of specimens under what was con­
ceived to be the perfect specimen in the spedes definition can be discerned in zoology 
generally: Hence, it would be the number of teeth in the fully-grown horse which, together
40 Ibid., pp. 163-4.
41 Ibid., pp. 164-5; note excluded.
42 Ibid., p. 144; note excluded; emph. and cap. in org.
43 M. Harris, The Aurelian (1766); M. Harris, An Exposition o f English Insects (1782).
44 See, for instance, E. Albin, A Natural History o f English Insects (1720); T. P. Yeats, Institutions of entomology (1773).
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with other traits, would figure in spedes definitions of the horse,*45 it would be the plume of the 
fully-grown, male birds in their summer dress which would feature in ornithological 
classifications.46 In similar fashion, a young elephant without tusks had, by the hand of 
Edwards, to have those added in the depiction in order to make the elephant 'complete' and 
hence, stand as a representation of the spedes (see 111. 6.6): "This [the elephant depicted] being a 
young one, it had no tusks, which therefore I have added to compleat the figure'.47 And, to give 
a final example, in the same vein, when evaluating the descriptions of the 'Cape Cat' by two 
different zoologists, John Reinhold Forster's and Thomas Pennant's respectively, the author of 
the Naturalist's Pocket Magazine deemed Forster's description of a live specimen48 'incongruous' 
because it was taken from a young specimen. Inversely, Pennant's description, taken from a 
'distended skin' but of a fully-grown spedmen was accepted as the basis for defining the 
spedes.49
We can, in other words, observe a dear preference for the features of the fully-grown 
male as those to be singled out as characteristic. We might say, that the 'perfect' animals and 
their characteristic traits were in effect made the prototype of the spedes as they were judged 
to be the best examples of the entire category.
Following Ellen Rosch, prototypes can be defined as 'the clearest cases of category 
membership defined operationally by people's judgement of goodness of membership in the 
category'.50 In the case of eighteenth-century spedes, the prototypical effect worked by a 
metonymic replacement of the entire species with a part of it in the spedes definition -  the 
perfect exemplar. As George Lakoff has pointed out, following Rosch, such a metonymic 
replacement results in a hiding of the heterogeneity between members in a category: the 
prototype is nothing but a 'mere shadow' of what the category contains.51 The 'irregularities of 
experience' are thereby 'flattened out' by the unit categories, as Edwin Ardener says, as the 
heterogeneity of category members is replaced by a single prototype in representation.52 Such a 
'flattening-out' was exactly the result of eighteenth-century spedes definitions: by making only
45 T. Pennant, Synapsis o f  Quadrupeds (1771), p. 1.
46 See for instance, G. Edwards, A Natural History o f  Birds (1743-51); idem., Gleanings o f Natural History (1758-64); 
M. Catesby, British Library, Sloane 4047, ff. 90, 147, 212, 290, 307; F. Willughby and J. Ray, The Ornithology 
(1678/1972); G. Edwards to T. Birch, Feb, 3,1752, Royal Society, London, L & P.II.260.
47 G. Edwards, Gleanings o f  Natural History (1758-64), vol. L pp. 22-3.
48 Given in J. R. Forster, 'Natural History and Description of the Tyger-caf (1781).
49 Anonymous, The Naturalist's Pocket Magazine (1799-1802), vol. VI, 'Cape Cat' (unpaged).
50 E. Rosch, 'Principles of Categorisation' (1978), p. 36.
51 G. Lakoff, Women, Fire and Dangerous Tilings (1987), p. 82.
52 E. Ardener, The Voice o f  Prophecy (1989), p, 169. Ardener develops his theory of category representiveness in 
relation to a concept of 'semantic density,' and not in relation to prototype theory. These two approaches can, 
however, be seen as parallel traditions developed within two different disciplines, Ardener's within 
anthropology and the prototype theory within cognitive science, cf. K. Hastrup, A Passage to Anthropology 
(1995), p. 30.
2 0 0
m . 6 .6  Y o u n g  e l e p h a n t  w it h  t u s k s  a d d e d , a n d  a  RHINOCEROUS (G. Edwards, Gleanings of Natural 
History, vol. I, 1758-64). Any one specimen could not represent a species equally well: in order to 
make the elephant above -  an animal too young to have grown tusks yet — a representative of the 
species, G. Edwards added tusks -  a feature which was invariably singled out as one of the elephant's 
characteristic traits, but which was, of course, only present in grown specimens.
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the perfect males' characteristic traits figure in the species definition, the less perfect animals 
and their traits were relegated to the background.
In relation to the problem outlined at the beginning of this section -  that of the 
variability and alterations of animals in the world of matter compared to the stasis and 
immutability of species -  this mode of foregrounding the perfect and fully-grown male and 
making his traits the basis of the species definition, had the consequence that such variations 
and alterations could be overcome in the creation of species. The authors managed to arrest the 
flux of observable nature by making the perfect, grown male stand for what was common, 
peculiar, and indelible. By means of the metonymic replacement the zoologists managed, in 
practice, to create their species as immutable, just like they ought to be in theory.
We might, however, ask how such a metonymic replacement became meaningful. How 
was it that the perfect male could, consistently and without questioning, act the part of 
prototype throughout eighteenth-century zoology? As Rosch has argued, prototypes can be 
seen as 'theories of context':53 It becomes meaningful to make some members, rather than 
others, representatives of a category only in relation to something else -  in itself a category 
cannot provide the reason for the pattern of metonymic replacement. Rosch mainly focuses on 
contexts of use in her explanation of prototypes. However, following Kirsten Hastrup, who 
also draw on Rosch's theory, we might add that the judgement of prototypicallity also, and 
maybe even more fundamentally, is mediated by the cultural context:54 What makes it 
meaningful to install some category members as representatives, rather than others, is 
predicated upon a theory of the relationship between the category and the wider world. In the 
case of the eighteenth-century definition of zoological species, I will suggest that we might find 
the best clue to this context of the judgement of prototypicallity in the cluster of ideas relating 
to the 'perfect': What did the authors mean by perfection? and why did it make sense to centre 
the species definition on the perfect?
To explore this point, we have in the following at times to move far away from the 
formation of species, and also, at times, outside the domain of zoology in order to encircle the 
meaning of 'perfection/ and, hence, the context within which it became meaningful to posit the 
perfect male as the prototype of the spedes. My point of departure will, however, be the ideas 
of perfection entertained within zoology.
The idea of perfection worked at three different levels in the zoological literature, and 
starting with that of the individual, I shall move on to consider its place at the level of species 
and, finally, at the grand level of nature herself. For the present, I shall leave the relationship
53 E. Rosch, 'Principles of Categorisation' (1978), p. 43.
54 K. Hastrup, A Passage to Anthropology (1995), pp. 30-1.
201
iiJIX
CHAPTER 6
between males and females out of consideration as in some respects it presents us with a 
special case, but only to return to it after the analysis of perfection has been carried out.
Perfection o f  Individuals
As Bradley highlighted in a description of the transformations of insects and frogs, nature 
always worked to perfect its creatures in die development of an animal from its youth to 
adulthood, as illustrated here by the perfection of the frog (see 111. 6.7):
An infinite Number o f Parts, which were folded up [in the tadpole], explain and open themselves at the End of a 
certain time; some become absolutely useless, dry up, and fall off; and others are alter'd beyond our Knowledge. 
Nothing can be more admirable than the Tracing of all these Changes. A Frog is a Fish in its Beginning, named 
Tadpole; it has a great Head, the Mouth of a Fish, the Finns and Tail like Fishes; it respires by the Gifts, which are 
Lungs peculiar to Fishes; some time afterward its Tail and Finns drop off, and its Feet appear, which are as well 
adapted to Walking as Swimming; the Fore-part of its Head, or rather its Mask, falls off, with its GUIs; in the mean 
while, the Lungs, which resemble those of terrestrial Animals, unfold and dilate themselves, and become expanded 
and very visible, from almost invisible Parts that they were before. May not he look upon this as an extraordinary 
Perfection, and even more than Man himself can boast of, that Gift of Power in tasting Life successively in different 
States and in dfferent [sic] Elements?55
The result of this process of unfolding was, Bradley concluded, turning to the analogous case 
of insects, the production of the perfect animal:
These considerations may undeceive those who are prejudiced in their Opinions, that a Creature in the Rank of 
Insects cannot become a perfect Animal, especially if they reflect that for the most part the State of Worms or 
Caterpillars is only a State of Passage to bring them to another Form.56
So, the forms preceding die adult cum perfect animal were only imperfect stages of passage, 
which made the formation of the perfect animal possible. Edwards also highlighted this in a 
discussion of the frog, but this time of the extraordinary Surinam frog, which allegedly 
metamorphosed from a fish to a tadpole to a frog and then back again to a fish and which, as 
we have already seen examples of, caused some debate within eighteenth-century British 
zoology:
I think however that our assent to such an opinion [as advanced by Seba and Merian about the metamorphosis of 
the frog] may reasonably be suspended til [sic] we are confirmed in it by further Observations of the real fact, for it 
seems strange that a tadpole should first be changed into a Frog and that the Self same frog by a reversed process of 
Nature should change again into a Very large tadpole [... I]t seems very strange that another tail should grow from 
the frog that hath lately lost one and that he should gradually loose his leggs [sic] and become a Perfect Fish. Nature 
in her ordinary course is not accustomed to act in  such a Manner backwards and forwards, to seem to perfect a work 
and then to reverse it b y  a process directly Opposite.57 58
'[N]ature', Thomas Hutchinson similarly stated after he also had refuted Merian's and Seba's 
theories regarding the frog-fish, 'seldom deviating from her general laws/ and neither had she 
done so in 'producing this A n im al'N atu re  always worked forward. 'Every animal, and every 
plant, rises, by gentle gradations, from an embryo, or gelatinous state/ Smellie likewise
55 R. Bradley, A philosophical account o f  the works o f  nature (1721), p. 105; emph. in org.
56 Ibid.; emph. in org.
57 G. Edwards, Letter to Royal Society, Mar 27,1760, Royal Society, London, L&P.IV.3.
58 T. Hutchinson, 'The Natural History of the Frog Fish' (1796), p. 7.
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111. 6.7 TRANSFORMATION OF THE frog  (R. Bradley, A Philosophical A ccount o f  the W orks o f  N ature, 1721). 
N ature w as consid ered  to always w ork forward in its creation of beings, bringing an anim al to 
perfection in its developm ent from  an egg to a grown individual. The metam orphosis of the frog w as 
a favourite exam p le w hen nature's sense o f direction was to be illustrated.
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concluded in a more general statement on nature's way of producing animals, 'to a certain 
degree of perfection exactly proportioned to their several orders/59 Nature, it would seem, had 
a clear sense of direction and an equally clearly defined sense of purpose with its work: to 
bring out the most perfect animal possible.
This forward process towards perfection was, however, not always impeccably 
achieved, as John Hunter here underscores:
The propagation of continuance of animals in their distinct classes, is an established law of nature; and, in a general 
way, is preserved with a tolerable degree of uniformity: but in the individuals of each species, varieties are every 
day produced in colour, shape, size, and disposition.10
So, the forward movement towards perfection was one of nature's laws, though far from 
always perfectly enacted. By implication, the occasional slips in nature became, in a sense, 
unnatural. Samuel Johnson clearly brought out this point in a recapitulation of nature's general 
end and design:
Thus we see plainly, at one View, as in a Glass, that all Nature acts, or is acted upon, in all its various Species and 
Beings, separately and jointly to its own Perfection, and to the End and Design o f the first Fiat, or of Matter being 
put into Motion, dependent on its first Cause, and effected by a continual Change, Fluctuation and Rotation, and 
that different Communications of Motions produce the innumerable Variety of Figures and Effects in the material 
World.
That this World was formed in Time, and that Time is a Part in Eternity, and Matter a Place in Space: That 
it is natural for all the different Kinds of Beings to tend to its Good and Perfection, and unnatural for any to deviate 
from the original Plan o f Existence and Order.61
To begin with, the perfect specimens became suitable as examples of species, one might 
suggest, because, in a sense, they agreed the best with nature's intent.
Perfection o f Species and the CEconomia Naturse
At the level of species, the idea of perfection was transposed into a more clearly formulated 
teleological framework already foreshadowed in this conception of the perfection of individual 
animals. Raising the question of perfection versus imperfection once again, however this time 
at the level of species, Bradley advanced that it was impossible to distinguish between perfect 
and imperfect species. This assertion, it should be noted, was made in reaction to a notion, 
launched by Aristotle and revitalised during the Renaissance, of animals being classifiable on a 
scale according to their degree of perfection -  with man usually embodying the highest 
possible degree of (terrestrial) perfection and insects, inversely, being regarded as the most 
imperfect:62
59 W. Smellie, The Philosophy o f  Natural History (1790), vol. U, p. 436,
60 J. Hunter, Observations (1786), p. 199.
61 S. Johnson, The Philosophic Mirrour (1763), p. 273.
62 Cf. A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain o f  Being (1948), chs. II and IV. On Aristotle's notion of perfection, see also A. 
L. Peck, 'Introduction' (1965), pp. xii-xxiv.
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It is an antient Error to make the Distinction o f Perfect and Imperfect Animals. Our Eyes do not discover the same 
Parts that are in some Animals, in Worms, Butterflies, Flies, Bees, and other Insects; so that some have thought such 
Parts were wanting.63
This conception of the necessary perfection of every species had a theological dimension to it, 
as the reverend William Jones, also a keen natural historian, highlighted in a sermon. The idea 
of an imperfect species would be an affront against a Creator who by definition embodied the 
Good:
When vegetable and animal life are compared, different things are to be admired, but nothing is to be preferred; for 
the wisdom of the Creator, being infinite, is every where equal to itself; to its works nothing can be added with 
advantage, nothing can be taken from them without loss. All things are perfect in their several kinds, and possessed 
of that goodness or sufficiency which must be found in every work of God.64
Although quite a few eighteenth-century zoologists, among these incidentally Bradley, Smellie 
and Jones, in fact did unfold a peculiar species of the Aristotelian notion of a scale of perfection 
when they changed their perspective from that of species to that of the Great Chain of Being, as 
we will see in Chapter 7, they also consistently maintained that at a species level animals were 
perfect in their own kind.
What was meant by this, being perfect in one's kind? Smellie gave a hint, as he linked 
perfection to the destiny of the species: 'Every creature is perfect, according to its destination/65 
It was in relation to the working of nature at large that the perfection of species and thereby 
their nature could be understood and explained: 'Beings must not be contemplated 
individually, but by their rank, and the relations they have to the constituent parts of the 
general system of Nature'.66
In eighteenth-century natural history, the 'general system of Nature' was generally
conceptualised through two interrelated complexes of ideas: the idea of the Great Chain of
Being, and the notion of CEconomia Naturae. The notion of the Great Chain of Being -  or scala
nature as it was sometimes alternatively called -  almost universally embraced by eighteenth-
century natural historians, outlined the structure of relations between species in hierarchical
terms.67 Joseph Addison succinctly sketches the outline of the Great Chain of Being here:
The whole Chasm in Nature, from a Plant to a Man, is filled up with diverse Kinds of Creatures, rising one over 
another, by  such a gentle and easie Ascent, that the little Transitions and Deviations from one Species to another, are 
almost insensible. This intermediate Space is so well husbanded and managed, that there is scarce a degree of 
Perfection which does not appear in some part of the World of Life.68
Every species, then, had its particular, pre-ordained and fixed place on the Great Chain of 
Being. I shall return to a more extensive discussion of the Great Chain of Being in connection
63 R. Bradley, A philosophical account o f  the toorks o f  nature (1721), p. 104; emph. in org.
64 W. Jones, Considerations (1785), p. 2 . A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain o f  Being (1948), ch. V, reviews the arguments 
made in favour of the goodness of God and the concept of sufficiency.
65 W. Smellie, The Philosophy o f Natural History (1790), vol. H, p. 428.
66 Ibid., vol. U, pp. 435-6.
67 A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain o f  Being (1948), pp. 184ff.
68 Addison, The Spectator, no. 519 (Oct. 25,1712), reprinted in R. J. Allen, Addison and Steele (1970), p. 436.
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with my analysis of the entire taxonomic scheme in Chapter 7. What I would like to examine in 
more detail here is the doctrine of CEconomia Naturae, which had a more direct bearing on the 
understanding of species' perfection. Though never, to my knowledge, thoroughly developed 
as an exegetical theory by any British author in the period,69 nevertheless the zoologists time 
and again invoked a notion of nature's ceconomy in order to account for the nature and destiny 
of species. Before we turn to the ceconomy of nature itself, it seems useful to take a closer look 
at the more general ideas associated with 'ceconomy' in eighteenth-century Britain, in order to 
clarify the meaning of this term.
Far from only related to a narrow field of economy in the strict sense of the term, 
oeconomy was applicable to much wider fields in eighteenth-century discourse -  hence, 
besides 'rural ceconomy' and 'the nation's ceconomy,' authors also talked about 'human 
ceconomy,' 'regal ceconomy,' 'moral ceconomy/ 'political ceconomy/ 'religious ceconomy/ 
'divine ceconomy/ and, of course, 'natural ceconomy/ Philosophy, husbandry, politics, 
physiology, theology, morals, national economy, and natural history -  the range of fields in 
which the concept of 'ceconomy' was made use of was wide, and its semantics consequently 
rich. We might, however, discern some common denominators. Firstly, as Edward Watkinson 
underscored in An Essay upon Oeconomy, 'Oeconomy is a comprehensive Word': 'It includes all 
that provident Care, exact Uniformity, and prudent Conduct, so absolutely requisite in human 
Life.' (Economy was 'a moral, it is a Christian Virtue'.70 In a similar fashion, Arthur Young 
stressed that by ceconomy, one was not merely to understand 'frugality', but a 'system of 
GENERAL MANAGEMENT', far transcending the narrow bounds of pure economic 
concerns.71
In the sense of a doctrine of 'general management/ oeconomy was above all concerned 
with the maintenance of relationships between part and part, and a part and the whole in a 
given domain. Hence, within human society, ceconomy was used both as a model of and, when 
applied as a moral, a model for72 the proper management of social relations between king, 
landholder, merchant, mechanic, and labourer, and their relation to the whole nation. In 
general, the requirement of being ceconomic in these relations meant accepting the terms of 
subordination, embracing ones place in life and acting, as it was repeated time and again, with 
'moderation' so that social order could be maintained for the sake of the commonwealth: 'What
69 To my knowledge, the most thorough treatment of the doctrine in the period is to be found in a tract by the 
Swede Isac J. Giberg from 1750, translated into English in 1762, by Benjamin Stillingfleet as part of his collection 
of tracts by or made under the auspices o f Linné. 1. J. Biberg, CEconomia Naturae (1750); B. Stillingfleet, 
Miscellaneous Tracts (1762).
70 E. Watkinson, An Essay upon Oeconomy (1763), pp. 3 ,4 ; emph. in org.
71 A. Young, Rural Oeconomy (1770), p. 2; cap. in org.
72 The distinction between 'model o f  and 'model fori is drawn from C. Geertz, The Interpretation o f  Cultures (1973), 
pp. 93-5. Here the distinction is applied in connection to an explanation of religion.
205
CHAPTER 6
is required of man, is for every one in his particular station to perform their part in this great
world, and then the blessings of heaven will allow to every individual in the land', as one
essayist explained.73 In contrast to human society, where ceconomy had to be turned into moral
decrees for order to be maintained -  because man was, as we have seen, equipped with both
self-will, passions, and desires which might entice him to transgress his appointed place in
society -  no such decrees were needed within nature as animals possessed none of these self-
indulging faculties. Nature managed itself. The laws of nature ensured that every animal was
kept in its place in the natural hierarchy of subsumation on the Great Chain of Being.
Watkinson, after having elaborated on his doctrine of human ceconomy, thus pointed out:
OBSERVE the DIVINE OECONOMY, Ranging and adjusting every thing in such a manner, that there is not a Particle 
of Matter but what hath its proper Place in Subserviency to the whole of the Creation.
'ORDER is Heav'n's first Law/ [...]
View the whole Frame of the World, (the wondrous Work of Him who is perfect in Knowledge.) Reflect on the great 
Laws of Nature, by which it is preserved in Order and Beauty!
Every Part o f the Creation concurs to prove that GOD is, (as the Apostle speaks) not the Author of 
Confusion, but of Order.
Look unto the Heavens, and see all the celestial Bodies are constant in the Courses! They speak in the 
common Voice of Reason, and want no Interpreter to explain their Meaning. [...]
In every other Part the Powers of Nature are duly and regularly exerted! Even the inanimate Things of the 
World have their Office!
Every Work of the Creation hath its proper Business, and is designed by  the first Cause of all Things to serve 
some wise End.74
It was in this extended sense of a general management directed towards the maintenance of 
order that the concept of ceconomy would be employed within natural history.
Within the animal kingdom the divine ceconomy managed order primarily through 
two means: by the physiological make-up of the animals, and through regulating their 
appetites. The working of the divine ceconomy could thus already be observed in the very 
physiology of, primarily, species as God had wisely designed every species of animals for their 
particular place and destination in nature. 'Nature' had, as the zoologist Frederick Watson 
explained, 'provided for the Necessities of All Animals, by adapting the Structure of their 
Parts, and the immediate Organs of Life to them.'75 Or, in the words of the natural history poet 
Richard Collins:
In ev'ry Clime, in ev'ry Soil, we see,
A different Kind of Beast, to this agree;
And all the Parts of ev'ry different Kind,
Adapted to the proper use design'd —76
73 Anonymous, Populousness loith Oeconomy (1759), p. 21; cf. Anonymous, The New Oeconomy o f Human li fe  (1766), 
pp. 1-3 and passim ; R. Dodsley, The Oeconomy o f Human Life (1767), pp. 20-2 and passim; S. Johnson, The 
Philosophic Mirrour (1763), p. 85 and passim.
74 E. Watkinson, An Essay upon Oeconomy (1763), pp. 13-4; cap. and emph. in org.
75 F. Watson, The Animal World Display'd (1754), p. 138.
76 R. Collins, Nature Display'd (1727), p. 69.
206
SPECIFYING NATURE
Some birds, zoologists observed, were thus made for the 'purpose' of inhabiting the 'empty 
regions of air'; others also for swimming and diving for fish, and hence, they had their wings ;
and legs placed further back in order to facilitate movement in water;77 some birds which were j
'continually passing through hedges and thickets' had membranes on their eyes to protect !
diem 'from external injuries'.78 Like the various species of birds, so the various species of 
quadrupeds had also been formed to occupy their specific place in nature:
The head of Quadrupeds are generally adapted to their mode of living. In some, it is sharp, to enable them to turn
up the earth, where they find their food deposited; in  others, it is long, in order to afford room for the olfactory ;
nerves; in many, it is short and thick, to strengthen the jaw, and qualify it for com bat Their legs and feet are entirely
formed to the nature and exigencies of the animal. W hen the body is heavy, the legs are thick and strong; when it is
light, they are active and slender. Those that feed on fish, are made for swimming, by having webbed feet; those that
prey upon animals, are provided with daws, which they can draw and sheath at pleasure; but the more peaceable
and domestic animals are generally furnished with hoofs, which, being more necessary for defence than attack,
enable them to traverse the immense tracts which they are destined to pass over, either to serve man, search for
food, or avoid hostilities.7’
Finally, some animals, like the dromedary and the camel (as well as the horse, the sheep, the 
oxen and cow, and many other beasts of burden or of common use80), had been made 
particularly for the benefit of man:
When we consider the structure of the camel and dromedary, we cannot be deceived with regard to their 
destinations. The four stomachs indicate a vegetable diet, and the same docility and gentleness of manners which 
characterise the whole ruminating tribes. From the addition of a fifth bag, or reservoir for the reception and 
preservation of water, we should expect to find some peculiarity of disposition. In this conjecture we are not 
deceived. Of all animals which man has subjugated, the camel and dromedary are the most abject slaves. With 
incredible patience and submission they traverse the burning sands of Africa and Arabia, carrying the burdens of 
amazing weight. [.,.] Both the constitution and structure of camels are nicely adapted to the soil and climate in 
which they are produced.81 82
The underlying purpose of this pre-ordained design of animal forms was, as Smellie concluded 
after having given a number of examples, to make each species fit for the grand scheme of 
nature:
In all the variety of animated beings whose general structure has been exhibited, the intelligent reader will easily 
perceive, that the bodily forms of the different kinds are exactly adapted to the rank they hold in the creation, and 
that their ceconomy and manners are strictly and invariably connected with their structure and organs.®
In the very creation of animal forms, the general order of nature had been implicated: Animal
species had been predestined to occupy a specific recess in a nature which (like in the Bible)
was already created before the species were formed.
It was not only the relationship between animal species and habitat which nature had
taken care of. Also the relationships between species were regulated by nature's wise
management, most importantly by dietary means. 'Nature had provided', Brookes said, 'that
77 R. Brookes, A New and Accurate System (1763-72), vol. II, pp. xi-xiii.
78 W. Smellie, The Philosophy o f Natural History (1790), vol. I, p. 111.
79 Anonymous, The Beauties o f the Creation (1790), pp. 2-4.
80 Cf., for instance, Anonymous, The Beauties o f  the Creation (1790), p. 4.
81 W. Smellie, The Philosophy o f Natural History (1790), vol. I, pp. 100-1.
82 Ibid., vol. I, p. 121.
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each spedes shall make war7 on other spedes in order to feed and hence, to survive.83 As 
Smellie observed in the same manner, it was 'an established law of Nature' that the 'existence' 
of every animal 'universally terminates in death and dissolution':84 'The Goat feeds the 
Glutton, the Glutton the Mice, and the Mice the Owl';85 the sparrow-hawk prey on the thrush 
and the falcon on the bustard,*86 in fact, the carnivorous animals invariably feed on the 'weaker 
and more timid tribes'.87
At a first glance, such an arrangement might appear invidious, as authors were quick to
note:
In contemplating the system of animation exhibited in this planet, the only one of which we have any extensive 
knowledge, the mind is struck, and even confounded, with the general scene of havock and devastation which is 
perpetually, and every where, presented to our view. There is not, perhaps, a single spedes of animated beings, 
whose existence depends not, more or less, upon the death and destruction of others.8*
Although such apparent evil proved to be something of a theological knot in the eighteenth
century -  for how could a wise and good God have created a world displaying preying
destruction?89 -  within zoology this theological problem was usually passed over in silence,
and the cruelty explained as, in fact, a very wise way of maintaining order.
Although a war might be going on in nature; it was not a war without providentially
defined rules. Nature, exhibiting her 'wise and wonderful economy,' had thus 'with such
amazing precaution severally formed' her 'children' so 'that the discriminating appetites
of every individual continues as distinct as their spedes/90 Thus, every spedes had, in the
words of Bradley, 'a  Food natural to it'.91 In addition, by the general fashioning of carnivorous
spedes, nature had ensured that no spedes of prey would be unduly hunted and hence,
exterminated:
In general, whatever be the food, nature seems finely to have fitted the creature for procuring it, tho' never without 
a proper exertion of its strength, or industry. Large animals of the forest, such as the Elephant, and Lion, want 
swiftness, and a distinguishing scent for catching their prey, but have strength to overcome it: Other who want 
strength, such as the W olf and the Fox, make it up  by their cunning; and those to whom nature has denied both 
strength and speed, as the Hound, and the Jackal, follow by the smell, as all the last overtake their prey by 
perseverance. Thus each spedes seems only possessed of one talent in perfection, so that the power of destruction in 
one dass, may not be greater than the power to escape in another.92
Inversely, then, nature had also equipped the prey with a fair means of escape:
83 R. Brookes, A New and Accurate System (1763-72), vol. II, p. xiv.
84 W. Smellie, The Philosophy o f  Natural History (1790), vol. II, p. 184.
85 F. Watson, The Animal World Display'd (1754), p. 31.
86 R. Brookes, A New and Accurate System (1763-72), vol. II, p. xiv.
87 W. Smellie, The Philosophy o f  Natural History (1790), vol. L p. 89.
88 Ibid., vol. IL p. 184.
89 A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain o f  Being (1948), pp. 208ff, discusses the precarious role of evil in eighteenth- 
century theological thought.
90 Anonymous, Beauties o f  Natural History (1777), p. vi.
91 R. Bradley, A philosophical account o f  the works o f  nature (1721), p. 58.
92 R. Brookes, A New and Accurate System (1763-72), vol. I, pp. xxix-xxx.
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As Nature has given to many Animals in the several Ways Instruction to escape and Means to save themselves 
from the Violence of their Enemies; so has she not been wanting in giving to many others a peculiar Sagadty, and 
instructing them in many singular Methods of catching their Prey. In this, as throughout her whole CEconomy, all is 
regular and appropriated, and the Advantages given on either Side are as just disposed as they are wanted.93
The (Economical laws, which guided the 'war' between the species, hence served, not too
unlike those moral decrees for moderation advocated within human society, to ensure that the
relationship between hunter and prey remained the same at the end of the day:
The Provision which is made for one Species of Animals by the Number and Bigness of others, is in general very 
regular, and calculated for the Support of the several larger, without the Destruction of the several smaller Kinds. 
Thus the Tygers are less numerous than the Wolves; and the Creatures in general, as they severally prey upon one 
another, are in the largest and fiercest Kinds least numerous, and in the smallest o f all, most.
In general, the Country which breeds any particular Kind, produces also the several smaller Creatures, 
which become naturally its Prey, in greater Numbers, as there are more of the Destroyers^]94
Smellie summed up the implications of such a maintenance of order, after also having re­
viewed these laws of nature's oeconomy:
There is a wonderful balance in the system of animal destruction. If the general profusion of the animated 
productions of Nature had no other check than the various periods to which they live, when not extinguished by 
hostilities of one kind or another, are limited, the whole would soon be annihilated by an universal famine, and the 
earth, instead o f every where teeming with animals, would, unless re-peopled by a new creation, exhibit nothing but 
a mute, a lifeless, and an inactive scene. If even a single species was permitted to multiply without disturbance, the 
food of other species would be exhausted, and, of course, a period would be put to their existence.95
Had it not been for this oeconomy of nature whereby nature had moulded the appetites of
species, and controlled the relationship between hunter and prey, the 'herbivorous and
frugivorous races' would 'increase to an hurtful degree'; insects would 'cover the surface of the
earth', and 'hares, rabbits, mice, and rats' would have multiplied enormously.96 In order to
maintain order, destruction was needed, then. What is crucial to note here is that such
destruction, however, always and invariably involved the destruction of individuals:
Nature, it must be confessed, seems almost indifferent to individuals, who perish every moment in millions, without 
any apparent compunction. But, with regard to species of every description, her uniform and uninterrupted 
attention to the preservation and continuation of the great system of animation is conspicuous, and merits 
admiration. Life, it should appear, cannot be supported without the intervention of death. Through almost the 
whole of animated Nature, as we have seen, nothing but rapine, and the destruction of individuals, prevail. This 
destruction, however, has its use. Every animal, after death, administers life and happiness to a number of others.97
By allowing animals to prey upon each other according to (Economical laws, the stable order of
nature could continue to exist.
In this world of destruction and réanimation, nature was, indeed, in a state of flux, and 
yet she remained the same. The perpetual changes at the level of individual animals -  birth and 
growth, death and destruction -  did not alter the basic order: the relationship between species. 
On the contrary, these perpetual changes worked to maintain the equilibrium: 'A circle of
93 F. Watson, The Animal World Display'd (1754), p. 56.
94 Ibid., p. 62.
95 W. Smellie, The Philosophy o f Natural History (1790), vol. II, p. 217.
96 Ibid., vol. II, pp. 217-8.
97 Ibid., vol. II, pp. 211-2.
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animation and destruction goes perpetually round. This', as Smellie concluded, 'is the 
ceconomy of Nature/98 What had appeared at first sight as utter cruelty proved, upon a closer 
inspection, to be a very wise mode of management. The war of individual hunters and prey 
was necessary for the continuation of the species order.
It is, I will suggest, within this context of the ideas of perfection and the oeconomy of 
nature -  of every individual animal having a potential for perfection, but only the fully-grown 
male realising it; of every spedes being perfect in its kind and for its preordained place and 
destination in the grand managed order of nature -  that we have to understand the judgement 
of prototypicallity in the eighteenth-century zoological definition of spedes. Although the 
individual animals as specimens were epistemologically essential for the empiridst zoologist, 
and although the individual animals as prey or hunter were essential for nature to maintain its 
perfect order, they were cosmologically insignificant. In the grand scheme, only the spedes 
mattered, and within these it was the most perfect animals, those realising their spedes 
potential most fully and hence, in the best possible way illustrating the pre-ordained 
destination of the spedes, which were judged to be the best possible representatives for the 
spedes as such. Although they were made the prototypes of the spedes, the perfect specimens 
did not exhaustively represent all of the specimens included in the category -  hence, the need 
for additional information on the larva, the tadpole, the foal, the young ones etc. in the more 
elaborate descriptions of spedes. And that neither was their task when they were used as the 
basis for the spedes definition, I will argue: On the contrary, the perfect specimens were used 
as prototypes in order to represent that potential perfection of the spedes which became of 
significance in relation to the grand order. There were good reasons, then, to conceal the 
catégorial heterogeneity in the spedes definition: in the final analysis, this variety simply did 
not matter.
Male Prototypes
Let me now turn to the role of the male in the judgement of prototypicallity. We have already 
seen some examples above of the singling out of the perfect adult male as the best 
representative of the spedes. Let me here give a few more examples. The practice can be no 
better observed than in the case of spedes of deer and birds, where the traits considered to be 
characteristic would often not even be present in the female spedmens. The spedes of the deer 
kind would, for instance, normally be defined with reference to, among other characteristics, 
their antlers, as in Brookes' typical definition of the deer: "These animals chew the cud, and
98 Ibid., vol. II, p. 225.
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shed their horns every year, which are always solid, and this sufficiently distinguishes them
from others of the ruminating kind/99 In the definition of each species of deer, the exact
position and layout of the antlers would normally be included in the species definition.100
Remember, however, that antlers are only present in the male deer.
The effects of this prototypical judgement are also evident in the more elaborate
descriptions of the species. Usually, an author would start out by describing the male and
either leave the description at that or else proceed to a description of the female in terms of the
characteristics in which she differed from the male. A typical example of this can be found in
Peter Brown's description of the 'black ostrich':
SIZE, Ostriches are sometimes twelve feet high.
HEAD, and N ECK brown.
BA C K  lower part of N E C K  BREAST, and RUMP, black.
WINGS, and TAIL, of a snowy whiteness.
PLACE, Africa.
At the Cape of Good Hope the people assert that the males of Ostriches, when full grown, are always black as the 
bird here described, and the females of a pale greyish-brown.101
Or, in this description by Catesby of the hen of the 'little hawk' given after a full description of 
the cock qua 'little hawk':
The Hen differs from the Cock, as follows: her whole Wing and Back is of the same colour as the Back of the Cock; 
the Tail of the Hen is marked as in the Back, with transverse black lines; her Breast has not that strain of red as in the 
Cock.1®
As here, the females would in general, if at all, be represented as 'deviations' of the male.103
This preference for the traits of the male specimens was even extended to the level of 
pronouns. In the many cases where the neutral pronoun IT or the plural THEY were not used, 
the male pronoun HE would be employed with few exceptions in the description in reference 
to the species as such, as here in Brookes' description of the lion:
All the members of a Lion in general express the strength of his body, and he has a very majestic gait, with a noble 
air, and a large mane. He has lively sparkling eyes, with dreadful paws, and his steady pace cannot but excite the 
attention of the beholder; plainly shewing that he is the king of quadmpedes.104
It was only in a few cases of animals, such as the pelican, which were strongly associated with 
what was conceived to be female qualities, that the authors occasionally used the female 
pronoun in reference to the species. The pelican, hence, was often described as exceptionally 
maternal as, in a frequently retold story, she was depicted as gathering water often from 
sources far away in 'her great gular pouch' to fill in her nest 'in order to cool her young ones'
99 R. Brookes, A New and Accurate System (1763-72), vol. L p- 58.
100 Ibid.; see, for instance, also T. Pennant, Synopsis o f  Quadrupeds (1771), pp. 40ff.
101 P. Brown, New Illustrations o f Zoology (1776), p. 38; emph. in org.
102 M. Catesby, The Natural History o f Carolina (1731-43), vol. I, description accompanying Plate 5 (unpaged).
103 Cf. L. Schiebinger, Nature's Body (1993), pp. 88ff., who makes this argument in connection with eighteenth- 
century studies of anatomy. I shall return to this study later.
104 R. Brookes, A New and Accurate System (1763-72), vol. I, p. 178.
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from the burning heat in the torrid desert where the pelican allegedly usually breed.105 Such 
cases were exceptions to the rule, however. In general, the male would stand for all, like the 
lion for the lions: Prototypically the species was male.
Although at times authors gave more explicit consideration to the relationship between 
male and female, as we presently shall see, the reasons for this judgement of prototypicallity 
remained tacit. In seeking an explanation for the self-evidence with which the prototype 
gained a sex, it is worth taking a closer look at both the ideas of the relationship between male 
and female in the animal kingdom and in the world of humans. In order not only to elucidate 
this point in the spedes formation, but at the same time also to indicate why women were 
excluded from the possibility of forming such spedes -  the two things were, in fact, connected 
through the same chain of ideas - 1 shall here dwell a bit longer on the conceptualisation of 
gender in human sodety than is, strictly speaking, necessary to explain the sex of the spedes 
alone.
In addition to the differences in reproductive organs, between brute males and females
it was most often the strength of the male that was singled out as his distinctive mark:
One of the most general marks is the superior strength of make in the male; and another circumstance, perhaps 
equally so, is the strength being directed to one part more than to another, which part is that most immediately 
employed in fighting.106
The same matrix of differences would be unproblematically transposed to the realm of 
humans, as Smellie does here, starting with a description of animals and moving straight on to 
differences between man and woman:
The bodies of males, though not without exceptions, are, in general, stronger, larger, and more active, than those of 
the females. In the hum an spedes, the male is not only larger then the female, but his muscular fibres are firmer and 
more compact, and his whole frame indicates a superior strength and robustness of texture. He does not acquire his 
full growth, and best form, till he arrives at the age o f thirty years. But, in women, the parts are rounder, and their 
muscular fibres more feeble and lax than those of men, and their growth and form are perfect at the age of twenty.107
Within human physiology, remaining within the world of humans for the present, the firmness
of man's fibres, his 'superior strength and robustness of texture' would in general, as here, be
contrasted to the softer qualities of the female body, as Ludmilla Jordanova observes: 'In the
descriptions of the smallest constituents of women's bodies, images of softness, rotundity,
delicacy, feebleness and childishness were used.'108 Again, as is also intimated in the quotations
105 See, for instance, T. Pennant Synopsis o f  Quadrupeds (1771), pp. 165-6; emph. added.
106 J. Hunter, Observations (1786), p. 63. It should be noted that Hunter as, to  my knowledge, the only author from 
the period, advocated for induding only the traits shared by male and female in the spedes definition. Hence, 
after having determined the general differences between males and females, he stated: 'where the sexes are 
separate, and the animals have two characters, neither o f them can be called the true one; the true 
distinguishing properties being those peculiar to neither sex' (ibid., p. 65). Hunter, however, was a physiologist 
rather than a zoologist, and this assertion did not become influential in the zoological practice of the eighteenth 
century.
107 W. Smellie, The Philosophy o f Natural History (1790), vol. I, p. 374.
108 L. Jordanova, 'Naturalizing the Family' (1986), p. 108.
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111. 6 .8  F a l l o w  d e e r  a n d  fe m a l e  f a l l o w  d e e r  (Buffon ed. Sm ellie, N atural History, vol. IV, 1780). 
Fem ale anim als w ere  usually described as a derivation o f th e  m ales. T h is m ode o f conceptualisation  
becam e evident even  in  the designation o f th e  anim als, as h ere  in  the case  o f the fallow  deer.
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from Hunter and Smellie above, it would be the features of the male that determined the terms 
of comparison between the sexes. As Londa Schiebinger has pointed out in her analysis of 
eighteenth-century bio-medical discourse, the man would be portrayed as 'the universal 
subject' while the woman would be construed as 'a sexual subset/ It was the traits, which 
distinguished her from man, and mainly those associated with her reproductive abilities 
(breasts and reproductive organs), which would get the main attention in physiological and 
anatomical literature.109
This conception of the female as, in the words of Schiebinger, a 'deviation' from man110 
resonated with a more general conception of the relationship between the sexes, voiced in 
political and philosophical literature from the period.111 As has often been noted, the 
relationship was construed in complex terms, and the fact that theory was one thing and 
practice could be quite another only added to the complexity.112 13For the purposes here, it 
suffices to focus on the exegetical representations, and I shall further mainly concentrate on 
how the relationship was construed in terms of marriage. An area, which in the period under 
consideration here became one of the, if not the most important focal point for discussing the 
nature and roles of man and woman.
In the seventeenth century, a model of patriarchy had been predominant in the 
conceptualisation of marriage. Often legitimised with reference to the institute of God in the 
Garden of Eden and the commands of Exodus and Deuteronomy and/or with reference to the 
greater rational capacities granted man by nature, man was made the natural master of his 
wife. As John Milton stated in Paradise Lost, after he had made God create Adam and Eve:
Not equal, as their sex not equal seemed;
For contemplation he and valor formed,
For softness she and sweet attractive grace,
He for God only she for God in him[.Jm
'You must lay it down for a foundation in general', the Earl of Halifax similarly told his 
daughter, 'that there is Inequality in the Sexes, and that for the better CEconomy of the World, 
the Men, who were to be the Lawgivers, had the larger share of Reason bestow'd upon 
them.'114 In this patriarchal model, a wife became akin to something like 'an upper servant' of 
her husband.115
109 L. Schiebinger, Nature's Body (1993), p. 88.
110 Ibid.
111 Also cf. R. Porter, English Society in the Eighteenth Century (1982), pp. 35ff.
112 See, especially, L. Jordanova, 'Natural Facts' (1980), and L. Colley, Britons (1996), ch. 6. Both authors discuss the 
relationship between theory and practice.
113 J. Milton (1667/1952), Paradise Lost, Bk. IV, 1.296-9.
114 Earl of Halifax, The Lady's New Year Gift (1688), Introduction (unpaged), quoted in R. Porter, Enlightenment 
(2000), p. 322. See J. B. Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman (1981), pp.102-8, for a more general discussion of the 
theories underlying this patriarchal model.
115 Cf. R. Trumbach, The Rise o f  the Egalitarian Family (1978), pp. 151-3.
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During the long eighteenth century, the patriarchal model was relaxed and new terms 
of distinction were introduced.116 An increasing number of, in particular, liberal writers, among 
these John Locke, argued that man and woman were bom  free and equal and with souls of a 
like quality.117 As this idea became more widespread, the terms of marriage to some extent 
«hanged. Still, however, throughout the eighteenth century, a woman would come under the 
legal authority of her husband by entering into marriage:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law, that is the very being or legal existence of the woman is 
suspended during die marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of her husband.118
A wife's belongings thus entered into her husband's care: 'She can't let, sell, give away, or
alienate any thing without her husband's consent. Her very necessary apparel, by the law, is
not heris [sic] in property.'119 The importance of this legal subordination of the wife under her
husband lay not only in the fact that the husband, legally, was made the guardian of his wife,
but also in the fact that the wife, devoid of her own property and dependent on her husband,
could not by definition be a citizen with political rights: By implication, women were excluded
from the public-political sphere.120
Outside the law, however, terms of greater equality were introduced into the institu­
tion of marriage. Not only did the idea of marriage as a union made by mutual consent gain 
prominence -  hence, the wife might legally be under the authority of her husband, but she 
entered into that position by free consent. In addition, marriage was still more often clothed in 
romantic terms within the aristocracy and the middle echelons, as a union of companionship 
entered into for reasons of love.121 Despite consent, romance and companionship, husband and 
wife did not stand in a symmetrical relationship in this union, however. Fusing the patriarchal 
model with that of companionship, it was still common to portray marriage as a hierarchical 
relation by the second half of the eighteenth century: 'Remember, thou art man's reasonable 
companion, not the slave of his passions', Robert Dodsley cautioned his female readers in 1767, 
but went on declare that 'the end of their [the wives'] being is to assist [their husbands] in the 
toils of life, to smooth him with their tenderness, and recompense his care with soft 
endearments.' Hence 'Submission and obedience' would be 'the lessons of her [the wife's]
116 J. B. Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman (1981), pp. 108-31, and M. L. Shanley, 'Marriage Contract' (1982), 
discuss the transition at some length.
117 See, for example, J. Locke, Ttoo Treatises (1690/1988), p. 269/11,§4.
118 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Lotos o f England (1765-9), vol. I, p. 430, citing Magnae Britannie Notitia (1716, 
pp. 192-3); quoted in R. Porter, Enlightenment (2000), pp. 320-1.
119 The Laws Respecting Women as they Regard their Natural Rights (1777), p. 65; quoted in L. Colley, Britons (1996), p. 
252.
120 It was not until 1832, that they would be excluded by law from the franchise. That had been self-evident until 
then, as Linda Colley observes. L. Colley, Britons (1996), p. 263.
121 On the aristocracy, see R. Trumbach, The Rise o f  the Egalitarian Family (1978), esp. ch. 2, and on the middle 
echelons, see P. Earle, The Making o f  the English Middle Class (1989), chs. 7-8; M. Hunt, 77« Middling Sort (1996), 
esp. ch. 8.
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life'.122 Likewise, Samuel Johnson would make the wife her husband's 'Fellow Companion', but 
at the same time allocate her a place only 'next in equality to him/ The husband remained 'the 
Governor of all', and among these his wife, 'committed to his Care'.123
The reason for this designation of roles was found in a difference in 'dispositions' 
between the two sexes, making them naturally suitable for different roles within society. 
Although, in particular, the liberal writers argued that man and woman were bom  equal and 
free, they got into a bit of a problem explaining the origin of the different dispositions and roles 
of male and female -  and almost always left the matter unexplained124 125-  some authors based 
their idea of the different dispositions in nature. Hence Smellie, for instance, after having taken 
note of the difference in physiology between men's strength and women's feebleness, went 
straight on to observe in not uncommon terms that 'A similar observation is applicable to the 
minds of the two sexes':
Man is, comparatively, a bold, generous, and enterprising animal. Women, on the contrary, are timid, jealous, and 
disposed to actions which require less agility and strength. Hence they are entitled to daim, and, by their amiable 
weaknesses, they actually receive our protection. Men are endowed with majesty of figure and force of mind; but 
beauty, and the graces, are the proper characteristics of women.115
Whereas women -  sensible, feeble, emotional and physiologically created for child rearing -  
seemed fashioned for the domesticity of the private sphere, men (or at least the free citizens 
who were made to stand for men in general) were as strong and reasonable creatures better 
suited to participating in the affairs of the public sphere. Although, in practice, women 
certainly did transcend the realms of the private world in a number of different ways,126 this 
'doctrine of separate spheres,' as it is often called, became crucial for the conceptualisation of 
the relationship between the sexes in broader sociological terms. Ultimately, the distinction 
between private and public centred on a distinction between desire and understanding. As we 
have already seen, in order to enter into the public sphere, to become acceptable as a political 
agent or a man of knowledge, a man was required to be free. As the eighteenth century 
progressed, he had to be free not only, and, with regard to especially learning, not even 
necessarily, in the traditional civic humanistic sense of being autonomous economically, but 
more importantly, to be free in the sense of having disciplined and hence transcended his own 
desires and self-interests. Thereby he would have become eligible for entering the public 
sphere and work for the common good in the political realm, or for understanding the general 
laws of nature in the learned. Women, being always dependent on someone else (a father or a
122 R. Dodsley, The (Economy o f  Human Life (1767), pp. 44-5.
123 S. Johnson, The Philosophic Mirrour (1763), pp. 86-7.
124 Cf, R. Porter, Enlightenment (2000), pp. 334ff.
125 W. Smellie, The Philosophy o f Natural History (1790), vol. I, pp. 374-5.
126 L. Colley, Britons (1996), ch. 6, discusses their range of political engagement; M. Hunt, 77ie Middling Sort (1996), 
ch, 5, discusses women's involvement in the economic sphere; and J. Brewer, 'The Most Polite Age' (1993), 
touches upon their participation in the cultural domain of the public sphere.
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husband) and being unable to transcend their private selves to the same extent as men, were 
considered genetically unsuitable for the affairs of political and philosophical life.
Although women were certainly more strongly associated with passions and desires 
than men were, and hence, also more strongly associated with the private sphere, and, 
inversely, men were more strongly associated with reason and the public sphere, we should be 
careful not to read this as a rigid distinction, at least as regards the men.127 As we have also 
seen earlier, reason did not have an exclusive hold over man; passions and desires lived in him 
as well: 'Our reason and passions are in a kind of civil war within us', as an anonymous author 
noted, 'and whichever of the two is most predominant, so are we either good or bad/128 A man 
might turn out 'bad/ but as a man, genetically he had the potential to overcome his private 
passions and self-interest in a way that women had not. What distinguished man from woman, 
therefore, was not that the former possessed reason and the latter only passions, but that man 
had a potential to overcome his desires and develop his rational faculty in such a way that he 
could most perfectly realise mankind's m ost distinguishing quality vis-à-vis the brutes: his 
transcendental reason. And in such a way that he, to the extent that he was also civilised and 
learned, could form species out of the brutes, which women could not.
It was, I will suggest, this understanding of man and woman which made it self- 
evidently meaningful to describe the female brutes solely in terms of her deviations from the 
males and which, more fundamentally, made it sensible to judge the male specimens as the 
best representatives of the species as such. It was this understanding of the relationship 
between the sexes which made it perfectly meaningful within the animal kingdom to define 
deer species by, among other characteristics, its antlers, or the black ostrich by the male's black 
colour. As man, so also the male specimens displayed the perfection of the species.
This mode of prototypical judgement, making the perfect adult male the representative 
of the species, constitutes, I will argue, one of the basic pillars in the formation of species 
throughout eighteenth-century zoology. The contents of the definitions of species would, as we 
have seen, be subject to continual change as more specimens were brought to Britain from all 
over the world, allowing the zoologists to redefine species with more precision. The mode of 
prototypical judgement was not, however, subject to change. W e might say that, in conjunction 
with the exegesis of species, it provided the basic conceptual structure for defining species in 
practice, and hence also for the way new specimens would be incorporated into the order of 
species. For a considerable period, witnessing the discovery of an abundance òf new animals, 
some of them as strange as the kangaroo, or (if not discovered, then at least rediscovered by 
some eighteenth-century zoologists) the giraffe, the conceptual system underpinning the
127 Cf. L. Jordanova, 'Natural Facts' (1980), p. 63 and passim .
128 Anonymous, The Mirrour (1759), p. 93.
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formation of species remained unaffected. Although the contents of the concrete species 
definitions changed, the conception of nature's ceconomy, of species' position in nature, and of 
the nature of the category of species itself did not change during the long eighteenth century.
S pecifying  Normality
So, a species was first and foremost characterised by its perfect members, and natural history 
itself could, in fact, be described as a study of perfection: 'Amongst the many Acts of Gratitude 
we owe to God, it may be accounted one, to study and contemplate the Perfections [sic] and 
Beauties of Nature', as George Edwards stated in the first volume to his seven books on natural 
history by way of making a justification for the publication:129 It was the perfect animals which 
mattered in zoology. Although the females, the young, the tadpoles, the larvae and all of the 
other in some way less perfect animals were occasionally mentioned in the zoological works, 
there was a whole group of animals which were consistently rejected from the pages, being not 
merely imperfect, but downright contrary to perfection: the monsters. Thus, Brookes noted in 
the introduction to his six volumes on the animal and vegetable kingdoms:
I have been sparing however in the description of the deviations from the usual course of production, first, because 
such are almost infinite, and [, second,] the Natural Historian who should spend the time in describing deformed 
nature, would be as absurd as the Statuary, who should fix upon a deformed man from whom to take his model of 
perfection.130
A similar equation of perfection with the zoologically interesting which Edwards made explicit
in his statement above is here underlying Brookes' argument for excluding any animals
deviating 'from the usual course of production': That deformity should be interesting had
become an absurdity by the eighteenth century.
How exactly this 'usual course of production' was to be defined -  or, in other words,
where normality ended and monstrosity begun -  was never made explicit. It was easy enough
to explain what a monster was, in principle. Here defined by Chambers in his Cyclopedia:
MONSTER, MONSTRUM, a birth, or production of a living thing, degenerating from the proper and usual 
disposition of parts, in the species it belongs to. -  As, when there are too many members, or too few; or some of 
them  are extravagantly out of proportion, either on the side of defect or excess.
Aristotle defines a monster to be a defect of nature, when acting towards some end, it cannot attain to it, by 
reason some of its principles are corrupted.131
In practice, however, the identification of which specimens were monstrous and which were 
not, proved to be more difficult. In some cases, animals from far away places would be brought 
to the zoologists in Britain which appeared to differ markedly from nature's 'common course 
of production,' but which did so consistently in a number of specimens. 'Nature' could, for
129 G. Edwards, A Natural History o f  Birds (1743-51), vol. I, p. v.
130 R. Brookes, A New and Accurate System (1763-72), vol. I, p. xv.
131 E. Chambers, Cyclopaedia (1741), vol. II, 'Monsteri (unpaged); note excluded, cap. and emph, in org.
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instance, 'be said to have violated the general rules of proportion' in the flamingo, according to 
George Shaw, as it had furnished these birds with 'enormously and even awkwardly long' legs 
and neck.132 Likewise, when creating the spedes of armadillo, covered with crust as it was, the 
porcupine, covered with 'prickly feathers', and the pangolin, 'armed with scales like fish', 
nature appeared to have deviated from her common mode of fashioning quadrupeds, as 
quadrupeds would be expected to be covered by fur:
[W]hen we talk of a quadruped, the very name seems to convey the idea of an animal covered with hair; as, when 
we mention a bird or a fish, feathers or scales present themselves to our imagination, and seem inseparable 
attributes of these creatures: yet Nature, as if willing to deviate from this characteristic uniformity, and to astonish 
us by uncommon productions, manifests herself contrary to our general ideas, at variance with our denominations, 
and with the characters which we have acknowledged, and amazes us still more by her exceptions than by her 
laws.133
In New Holland, as it occurred towards the end of the century, nature seemed to have made an 
entirely 'new world' of animals and plants as the president of the Linnean Society of London, 
James Edwards Smith said.134 Here, entire species of animals deviated to such an extent from 
the common course that at times it even seemed appropriate to include 'anomalous' in the very 
name of their spedes, as in the case the 'Anomalous Hombill'. This was, as White stressed, a 
'bird so very singular in its several characteristics that it can scarcely be said to which of the 
present known genera to refer it':
In the bill is seems most allied to the hombill, but the legs are those of a toucan, and the tongue is more like that of a 
crow than any other[.]135
More examples of such uncommon spedes could be dted, but these instances suffice to 
indicate that, firstly, while an idea of nature's common course of production -  a variety of 
which we have already encountered above in Chapter 3 -  worked in understanding spedes, 
uncommon shapes in spedes was not a reason to exdude them from the space of zoological 
attention. However much the hombill, the armadillo, the flamingo, or the pangolin deviated 
from the common course, and however difficult they might be to classify in the taxonomic 
scheme, they still deserved the attention of the zoologist because, despite their peculiarities in 
external form, they obeyed a more fundamental law of nature: They were capable of 
reproducing themselves, and hence, they allowed the zoologist to draw relations between 
specimens and make a spedes out of them.
In a sense, the animals excluded from the zoological study can be said to be those that 
did not allow the zoologists to draw any such relations. Monsters, by definition, were singular 
occurrences. Hence, when discussing whether that excrescence, mentioned above, on one of 
the 'skinc-formed lizards' he had received from White in New Holland, was 'natural' or a
132 G. Shaw, Museum Leveriani explicatio (1792), vol. M, p. 134.
133 Anonymous, The Naturalist's Pocket Magazine (1799-1802), vol. II, 'Six-Banded Armadillo' (unpaged).
134 Quoted in B. S. Smith, European Vision and the South Pacific (1960), p. 124; see ibid. pp. 124ff. for a more general 
discussion of the conceptualisation of Australian flora and fauna towards the end of the eighteenth century.
135 J. White, Journal o f  a Voyage to New South Wales (1790), p. 142; emph. in org.
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'monster/ Wilson took special note of the fact that White had seen a number of lizards with 
such excrescences and conjectured: 'Now if it was a monster, arising either from accident, or 
originally so formed, it would hardly be so common as to be taken notice of'.136 Edward Tyson, 
in a similar fashion, reflecting on whether the 'Pygmies' described by Homer in Iliad as 
participatants in the battle of Troja137 138might be the same with that 'pygmie ape' Tyson himself 
had dissected, observed that although Homer certainly had taken 'the liberty of pleasing the 
Reader's Phancy' in his description, subsequent writers had taken his portrayal at face value. 
However, such spedes of animals could not exist, as Tyson conduded:
Nature never formed a whole Spedes of Monsters; and 'tis not the heat of the country [Africa], but the warm and 
fertile Imagination of these Historians, that has been more productive of them than Africa itself.1M
As is here indicated, monsters were invariably to be found at the level of spedmens. They
belonged thereby, as Thomas Browne said while determining a two-headed snake to be a
monster, to the 'Quae genus' of nature:
[Such] are monstrous productions, and beside the intention of Nature, and the statutes of generation, neither 
begotten of like parents, nor begetting the like againe, but irregularly produced to stand as Anomalies, and make up 
the Qua? genus, in the generall booke of Nature[.]139
So, the monsters belonged to a spedal dass in nature, or, maybe more accurately in the words 
of Browne, 'beside' nature: Within the context of a nature which was conceptualised as a 
regular field, managed by unchanging laws, the monsters which had played such a significant 
part in Renaissance scholarship, lost their philosophical appeal. As abnormal spedmens, by the 
eighteenth century they were systematically exduded from the field of zoology. Indeed, it was 
only logical that they should be so exduded from a study concerned with this type of 
regulated, well-managed nature.
In particular, anthropologists working in the field of folk dassification have shown that 
the systematic exclusions of one kind of animals or another (or other items) from dassificatoiy 
systems are far from uncommon. To the extent, as Roy Ellen has argued, that there is 
necessarily an element of arbitrarity in all dassificatory systems, these systems will have the 
potential of creating anomaly.140 Such anomaly is what Mary Douglas, in her cross-cultural 
study of classification, has called 'dirt': 'Order implies restrictions; from all possible materials, 
a limited selection has been made [in the dassification] and from all possible relations a limited 
set has been used.'141 Dirt, then, is all of those items that do not fit into the dassification, given 
its particular definition of restrictions and limitations. Dirt is 'matter out of place:'
136 T. Wilson, 'Appendix' (1790), p. 242.
137 Homer, Iliad, p. 117/bk.III, w . Iff.
138 E. Tyson, Orang-Outang, sive Homo Sylvestris (1699), Philosophical Essay, p. 7; emph, in org.
139 T. Browne, Pseudodoxia Epidemica (1646), p. 142; emph. in org.
140 R. Ellen, 'Introductory Essay (1979), p, 14.
141 M. Douglas, Purity and Danger (1966), p. 94.
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It implies two conditions: a set of ordered relations and a contravention of that order. Dirt then, is never a unique, 
isolated event Where there is dirt, there is system. Dirt is the by-product o f a systematic ordering and classification 
of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements.142
In some places, such dirt or anomaly tends to become tabooed. The swine was in the Old 
Testament defined as undean because it fell between two generic categories of animals, those 
which have a divided hoof and those which chew the cud, respectively;143 the pangolin, having 
the body and tail of a fish but also four legs like quadrupeds, and, moreover, a preference for 
living in trees, is tabooed by the Lele and endowed with spiritual potential,144 and so forth.
In eighteenth-century British zoology, the monsters were neither tabooed nor endowed 
-  as in the Renaissance -  with a peculiar preternatural potentiality. Looming at the periphery 
of zoology, on the contrary, they were assodated with chaos and confusion. This point 
becomes especially dear if we consider those kinds of monsters which eighteenth-century 
British zoologists, despite their general exdusion, often did make a reference to: the hybrids.
'Tho' we cannot discover how animals are generated, we know that every speries is 
still transmitted down without mixture, and that the same characteristic marks which 
distinguished them in the times of Aristotle and Pliny, divide them to this day', Brookes 
observed, reiterating the idea of the immutability of spedes. That order of things was, 
however, disturbed by the existence of hybrids:
142 Ibid., p. 55. In  a well-known article, Dan Sperber has (D. Sperber, 'Pourqois les animaux parfaits' (1975)) 
criticised Douglas' theory. He rightly points out that taxonomic dassification is only one kind among a variety 
of different modes of dassification, and goes on, focusing only on taxonomic classification, to show that 
taxonomic systems by definition always dassify normal animals logically and exhaustively: 'La taxinome, dans 
sa structure générale et dans le format de ses définitions, est telle que tout animal sans exception en relève. Elle 
constitue une partition exhustive et cohérente de la faune' (p. 26). Hence, Sperber asserts, that a taxonomie 
classification cannot produce 'dirt' as Douglas has argued (p. 23). The reason for some animals being endowed 
with a peculiar symbolic potential according to Sperber, cannot to be found in dassificatory systems, but 
beyond them. Although Sperber is right to highlight the importance of the more general conceptual frame for 
the understanding of symbolism (a thing Douglas, to be fair, in fact also does in her analyses, if not very 
explidtly in her theory), it appears to me that Sperber misses two basic points in his critique of Douglas. 
Although it m ight be possible, as Sperber argues, to construct a thoroughly logical taxonomy without internal 
contradictions -  and that in itself is questionable (even the dassificatory system by the Iogidan of logidans, 
Linné, was fraught with contradictions, as W. T. Steam has shown in 'The Background ' (1959), pp. 16ff.) -  that 
does not mean that every dassification has been developed along such purely logical lines. In fact, assuming 
that they have, as Sperber taddy seems to do, would imply assuming that nature is somehow made in such a 
fashion that it is possible to dassify it logically. It might be, but to my knowledge, nobody has ever proved that 
it was so. Moreover, as Sperber himself notes, taxonomic dassification far from exhausts the field of folk 
dassification (or dassification in the history of biology, for that matter), and even though some of the 
dassificatory schemes that Douglas deals with tend to be of a taxonomic nature, others are not. Although on the 
basis of Sperber's critique, it might be necesary to give a more prominent role to the broader cultural context in 
the theory of 'd irt,' Sperber's critique does not, as far as I can see, fundamentally invalidate Douglas' thesis. On 
all accounts, as I hope to demonstrate in the present section, the eighteenth-century zoological dassification of 
spedmens into spedes did produce anomalies, though we have to go outside the narrow realm of dassification 
in order to account for the nature and significance of them.
143 M. Douglas, Purity and Danger (1966), ch. 3.
144 Idem., Implicit Meanings (1975), pp. 33ff.
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Creatures of different kinds may be brought to produce between them, indeed an animal partaking something of 
each, yet different from either, but here the confusion ends; for this new being, this monster of nature, is incapable of 
continuing the breed, and is marked with perpetual sterility.145
In a similar vein, though in shorter terms, an anonymous author made the same observation
specifically with regard to the mule. It might be "engendered" by a horse and an ass,
But that that distinction which nature has established among the several orders of her children may not be 
confounded, she has marked this mongrel production with unerring and lasting sterility.146
Monsters, mongrels, hybrids loomed in eighteenth-century zoology because by their very
being, they challenged the order of specific nature: the production of like by like guaranteeing
the immutability of species. The monsters, as another author stated, threatened to contaminate
the perfection of creation, had it not been for their barrenness:
This [their barrenness], indeed, seems to be the barrier between every species of animals, which keeps them 
asunder, and preserves the unities of their forms. If the mule, or monster, bred between two animals whose forms 
nearly approach each other, be no longer fertile; we may conclude that the animals, whatever external similitude 
appears between them, are distinct and separate kinds. Nature, who always provides for the perfection and 
preservation of her productions, has wisely stopped the fecundity of these ill-formed productions, to preserve the 
form of every animal uncontaminated: were not this the case, the different species of animals would soon be 
blended with each other; no one kind would preserve it's original perfection; every creature would quickly 
degenerate; and the world must inevitably be over-run with monstrous and deformed productions.147
A fundamental dimension of nature's general management of order was not only to keep the
relations between the species in place, but also and prior to this, to keep those species perfect
and, which amounted to the same thing, distinct. The boundaries between spedes were
constitutive for nature's order: they were the foundation on which the order rested.
Given the nature of the dassificatory system, concerned as it was with dearly defined
self-reprodudng spedes, and given the notion of ceconomia naturae implied in this
dassificatory scheme, of every spedes working together to reproduce the same order of nature
by their very being, the monsters, indeed, became matter out of place. They pointed to the
confusion which would have existed had it not been for a God, who ensured that even though
like might not always produce like, the offspring of like and unlike would invariably be
unproductive, and hence, not be able to contaminate the primeval order:
Since the visible Creation is sustained always, producing the same Forms of natural Things, which succeed from one 
Generation to another, through the Course of Time; which could not be, if senseless Chaos prevailed, as some have 
taught; for were the immense Mass of Matter without a living, all-powerful Being to animate it, it must rest without 
Motion, or at best act by a lifeless Ferment, that would always generate new and monstrous Forms.148
The monsters, in brief, pointed to the chaos of a world without a God.
Although the monsters were systematically excluded from the order of nature, and
were not considered interesting to zoology they, then, nevertheless, served their task for
zoology. By their sheer existence, they pointed to the chaos that would have existed -  the
145 R. Brookes, A New and Accurate System (1763-72), vol. I, p. xlii.
146 Anonymous, Beauties o f  Natural History (1777), pp. 5-6.
147 Anonymous, The Naturalist's Pocket Magazine (1799-1802), vol. I, 'A ss' (unpaged).
148 G. Edwards, A Natural History o f  Birds (1743-51), vol. H, pp. 108-9; emph. in org.
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degenerated contamination, the confusion, the deformation -  had nature not in general been 
wisely and ceconomically managed. By being made sterile and hence, placed outside of the 
order of species, they also pointed to the antidote provided by nature against such chaos: the 
inviolable boundaries, and hence, the immutability of species. The monsters, then, accentuated 
that enormous significance accorded to unchanging boundaries in the understanding of 
species. Boundaries that had only, indeed, could only have been made visible as the implicit 
species concept was made explicit during the late Renaissance and early modem period. By 
incarnating chaos, the monsters, in a word, pointed to the absolute necessity of laws guiding 
the life of species for order to be maintained in nature as a whole.
Although the eighteenth-century zoologists, with their notion of oeconomia naturæ 
developed a theory of life to some extent, it is significant that those relationships examined 
within the domain of oeconomia naturae -  between animal and habitat, between species and 
species -  only in an indirect way, through the judgement of prototypicallity, entered into the 
species definition, and only by implication. In contrast to the Renaissance use of extraneous 
relations to classify their basic level taxa -  relations between plants or animals and medicine, 
other plants or animals, scala humanæ, or all sorts of things which they might resemble -  the 
eighteenth-century empiricists only made use of such relations in order to explain the nature of 
species. Although the conception of these relations framed the mode of defining what was 
peculiar, common, and indelible in a species, the characteristic traits highlighted in the species 
definition were invariably to be found in the animals themselves. This, in turn, allowed the 
eighteenth-century zoologists to systematically integrate the species into a taxonomic scheme, 
as we will see in the next chapter.
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Inaccurate Orders
Some authors/ such as William Frederick Martyn, George Edwards and Peter Brown, dedicated
their zoological work to the description of species, or at times even specimens, alone. They
merely presented a selection of animals in an often random order, or as we saw Edwards say
earlier regarding the arrangement of animals in his oeuvre, as they by the hand of different
patrons had "offered themselves to" him.1 Most zoologists, however, went further than that and
attempted to classify the species in relation to each other in their work.
The purpose of such a classification might be one of two, and in most cases both at the
same time. William Smellie summed up these two aims, repeated time and again throughout
the zoological corpus, as he noted that, "In natural history, two ends can be attained by system":
"System may be employed either to facilitate the distinction of objects, or to ascertain their
relations in the scale of being."2 "The first species of system", Smellie went on to observe,
must consist entirely of a series of external or internal characters. It is o f little moment, whether the objects ranked 
under particular ORDERS be mutually connected [...]. If the general and particular characters be so marked, that a 
student, after learning the divisions and language of the author, can investigate the proper names of the objects 
presented to him, then is this system perfect; because its sole and primary intention is fulfilled.3
This kind of system, then, worked as a "technical index or dictionary/ which helped a student
to identify particular species, but which did not help him to determine their place in nature. It
was an entirely "artificial arrangement," as it were. Within botany, where the known species
outnumbered those of the animal kingdom by thousands, this idea of system as a "technical
index' gained importance. The "second species of system," inversely, was directed towards
revealing some of nature's own order, and therefore deemed more "elevated and sublime" than
1 G. Edwards, A Natural History o f  Birds (1743-51), vol. IV, p. 235. Edwards did, however, in appendices to two of 
his volumes order the spedes he had described in a taxonomic table, as I also noted in the previous chapter. 
Ibid., vol. IV, pp. 236-43; idem., Gleanings o f Natural History (1758-64), vol. Ill, pp. 327-47.
2  W. Smellie, 'Preface' (1780), pp. ix-x.
3  Ibid., p. x; cap. in org.
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the first. As Smellie noted, in contrast to the first, this kind of system 'includes the whole 
philosophy of Nature'.4 Establishing the true relations between species, establishing a 'natural 
system/ as it were, relied upon an understanding of the way that nature worked, the way 
species interacted with each other and the very nature of creation. Taxonomy here, I would 
say, became intermingled with cosmology, as the order of nature itself was attempted 
reconstructed by taxonomic means.
Although none of the empiricist zoologists claimed that their taxonomy was 'natural/ 
and that for good epistemological reasons as we will see later, those who attempted to go 
beyond the mere description of species, nevertheless inclined more to the second kind of 
system than to the first: their order was motivated with reference to nature's order, though no 
one dared to claim that his taxonomic system directly mirrored nature's order.
In the present chapter I shall examine the entire taxonomic system, and its relation to 
nature's order. Beginning with a discussion of the indigenous idea of system which quickly, as 
we will see, turned out to have a double-edge, I shall turn to an analysis of the exegesis of the 
formation of higher level taxa, before I zoom in on the formation of the taxonomic system in 
practice. Having reviewed both the conceptual and structural dimensions of the taxonomic 
system, I move on to a discussion of the cosmological context and model, as it were, for the 
taxonomic system: the notion of the Great Chain of Being. This discussion will pave the way 
for a concluding section on the relationship between man's and nature's orders.
Before commencing, a note on my use of taxonomic terminology will be in place. As it 
will soon become evident, the British zoologists did in many cases not employ a consistent 
taxonomic terminology equivalent to that outlined, for instance, by Linné in the introduction to 
Systema Naturæ (Class, Order, Genus, Species, Variety, see Chapter 5). In British zoology, the 
names of the generic taxa varied greatly, not only across the empiricists' zoological corpus, but 
frequently also within a single zoologist's work. As the existence of this terminological 
inconsistency can be seen in itself as highly significant for understanding the empiricists' 
taxonomic endeavour, I have not wanted to impose a too regular terminology, for instance, by 
adopting Linné's clearly defined concepts in my analysis, as is often done in historical studies 
of natural history. Instead, I have employed a more technical, and rather tedious, terminology, 
using 'supreme taxa' to refer to the taxonomic categories at the highest levels, and 
'intermediate taxa' to refer to those at one or more of the intermediate levels between the 
species and the supreme taxa. The term 'species' is kept in reference to the basic level taxa.
4 Ibid., p. x.
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S ystem s ' Do uble-E dge
It seems fair to say that the empiricist zoologists had a somewhat precarious relation to
systems, such as taxonomic schemes. On one hand, too much system -  a too consistent
application of a system, a too strict adherence to favourite doctrines -  was likely to be read as a
sign of preconceived notions. And, as we saw in Chapter 2, preconceived notions were
condemned by the empiricist natural historians as entirely contrary to a proper natural history
(remember Sprat's cautious portrayal of the natural philosopher who was led astray in his
investigations and out of 'Presumption' and 'warmth of Imagination' only took note of those
observations which suited his hypotheses: Quod volumus, facile credimus). From this perspective,
system could easily be read as prejudices, as the author of the Naturalist's Pocket Magazine here
makes dear while contemplating on systems, in general, and on Bufforis notion that the
animals of America were degenerated spedes of the Old World, in particular:
The fact seems to be, that we are all more or less under the influence of particular prejudices; and that we have, 
generally, too little charity, for those who are attached to notions, perhaps not more erroneous or absurd than those 
entertained by ourselves, but only of a different nature. [... J No slave of system (...] can more rigorously contend for 
his favourite arrangement of any particular spedes; nor any nomendator for his select name of distinction; than 
Buffon constantly labours to establish his favourite doctrine, 'that the animals of the Old World, as Europe, Asia, 
and Africa, are denominated, will never be found predsely the same in America, or the New World, unless they are 
transported thither.' This rule, though very general, has certainly, like most other general rules, as they are called, 
many exceptions.5 6
'Method' and 'system' in taxonomic schemes could at times be easily equated with 'wild 
conjuncture' and contrasted with 'rational demonstration':
In attempting to methodize, and reduce to dasses, creatures opposite in their propensities, dispositions, and 
conformations, though acddentally corresponding in some particular instances, the lights presented to the eyes of 
man serve only to bewilder and confound him. The analogy between some creatures is evident, and the genus 
distinct; this encourages him to proceed in the investigation of his favourite hypothesis and insuperable chasm 
interrupts his progress, and wild conjecture usurps the place of rational demonstration.4
Too much method and system, then, indicated that one had not formed one's ideas about
nature on the basis of a proper study of nature itself, but that, on the contrary, they stemmed
from the mere prejudices of a man who had not been able to overcome himself and his private
notions in the study of nature.
On the other hand, however, it seemed undeniable to the overwhelming majority of 
naturalists that there did exist an order in nature, created by God at the beginning of time.7 Sir 
Thomas Pope Blount, for instance, pointed out in introduction to A Natural History, that 
'Whoever Surveys the Curious Fabrick of the UNIVERSE' could not fail to see but that it
5 Anonymous, The Naturalisf's Pocket Magazine (1799-1802), vol. It  'Virginian Opossum' (unpaged).
6 W. F. Martyn, A New Dictionary o f  Natural History (1785), vol. I, Preface (unpaged).
7  There are a few exceptions, however, like Martyn (W. F. Martyn, A New Dictionary o f Natural History (1785), vol. 
I, Preface (unpaged)) who saw only a 'sublime disorder* in nature; or like Richard Pulteney (R. Pulteney, A 
General View (1781), p. 108, emph. in org.) who advanced that 'nature does not seem to have observed any 
system'.
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"carries with it the Impress of its Maker", of God, "the great Architect'.8 Likewise, a century 
later, William Smellie asserted with the same sense of self-evidence that, "To men of 
observation and reflection, it is apparent, that all the beings on this earth, whether animals or 
vegetables, have a mutual connection and a mutual dependence on each other". To "men of 
reflection," it was hence apparent that everything in the universe was ordered in one 
"graduated scale or chain of existence."9 In brief, it also appeared evident, then, that nature was 
ordered systematically, and it was considered laudable to attempt to reconstruct this order in 
taxonomic schemes.
In fact, when narrating the history of zoology, as well as of botany, the long eighteenth
century would be singled out by the natural historians themselves proudly as the age of
'systematic zoology",10 and contrasted with the "age of [Renaissance] commentators", as Sir
James Edward Smith did it in his general review of the history of natural history:
It is remarkable that a part of natural history, so evidently the most important and the most interesting to man, who 
is himself at the head of the animal creation, should have lain so long uncultivated. From the time of Aristotle to 
Gesner and Aldrovandus, little or no improvements were made in the knowledge of animals, nor with respect to 
classification was any alteration attempted till the time of Ray.11
Though Aristotle had laid the seeds, and Gesner and Aldrovandi contributed with infor­
mation, it was unanimously agreed that the glorious age of zoology started with John Ray: the 
age of taxonomy.
The zoologists" way out of this dilemma -  unveiling some of nature's order and hence, 
part of God's design without landing in the ditch of merely imposing one's own order aka 
prejudices on nature -  was, not surprisingly, to opt for an empiricist approach to the formation 
of the taxonomic system, and, perhaps more surprisingly, intentionally to remain inaccurate in 
its formulation. In the following I shall, firstly, look more closely into the formation of the 
supreme and intermediate taxa of the taxonomic systems and into how the relations between 
them were drawn and defined. Secondly, I shall review the outline of the systems, which were 
thus made, before returning to the inaccuracy of the systems and the reasons for celebrating it.
Ta xo n o m ies
When the species had been "formed" and "recorded in the memory, as the perceptions of sense 
were before", Lord Monboddo observed,
the mind again exerts its power of comparison upon them; and discovering among them likewise resemblances, 
forms of those resemblances another set of generals above the first; with respect to which they are, in  the language
8 T. P. Blount, A Natural History (1693), The Preface (unpaged); emph. removed, cap. in org.
9 W. Smellie, The Philosophy o f Natural History (1790), vol. II, p. 427.
10 J, E. Smith, 'Introductory Discourse' (1791), p. 18.
11 Ibid., p. 15.
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of logic, said to be the genus* And thus we arise from general to general, till we come up to those of the highest order, 
which are distinguished from those of inferior order by the name of universals.ü
As the spedes would be formed on the basis of an analysis of similarities and differences 
between specimens, so the higher taxa of the taxonomic system would also, in prindple, be 
formed on the basis of a similar analysis. In this way, the taxa of the immediately preceding 
level came to play an analogous role to that of the specimens in the formation of spedes, as the 
'many" in which a more abstract category would specify the 'one' of the similarities uniting 
them.
Like in the formation of spedes, the super-spedes taxa would also be established 
through an analysis of the general resemblance between sub-categories. Hence, as Frederick 
Watson noted, usually, though not invariably, a general 'uniformity' between taxa would 
allow for the grouping of them together:
The Uniformity is in general so great among the several Creatures of the same Kind, that if any one who had not 
been seen by a Person before, should be met by some Accident, he would be able to call it by its general Name. Thus 
the Man who had never seen a Mule, would as soon as he met it say it belonged to the Horse; and he who for the 
first Time saw a Buffaloe [sic] would not scruple to say it belonged to the Ox Kind,12 3
Like the spedes also the higher taxa had, in prindple, to be defined polythetically in an 
upward, inductive movement.
Making induction the proper method of dassification meant, furthermore, that the 
empiridst zoologists also at the level of higher taxa found reason to argue with other 
naturalists, such as Linné or Klein or Brisson, who only made use of a few traits in their 
formation of super-spedes taxa, and in effect, tended to define them monothetically. Thus, 
while praising Richard Brookes for his classification of animals on the basis of 'their most 
obvious similitudes; so that all those which at first view appears most to resemble each other, 
he has referred to the same genus', an anonymous reviewer contrasted this mode with the 
Linnean:
Linnaeus, a friend to systems, seems to examine every subject for minute resemblances, and classes his animals by 
very trifling characteristics. He draws, for instance, the distinction of one dass from the similitude of daws, that of 
another from the teeth, a third from the number of paps [teats], and so on; thus with him two animals that have no 
resemblance to each other, except in the teeth or paps, are of the same dass, as a mole and an elephant. This is in fact 
not following the resemblances of nature, but forcing a similitude.14
Likewise, Thomas Pennant would critidse Klein's dassification of the sloth together with the 
camel in one taxon, and the mole and the bat in another, because Klein, thus, 'by a servile 
regard to a method taken from the number of toes, [...] has jumbled together most opposite 
animals/15 Also the super-spedes taxa, then, had to be established on the basis of an analysis of 
similarities and differences along numerous axes. The taxonomic system would, in prindple,
12 L. Monboddo, O f the Origin (1774), vol. I, p. 4; emph. in org.
13 F. Watson, The Animal World Display'd (1754), p. 100.
14 Critical Review, vol. 16 (Aug., 1763), p. 146.
15 T. Pennant, Synopsis o f  Quadrupeds (1771), p. iv.
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be built up step-by-step, horizontal level for horizontal level from the bottom up, and not on 
the basis of some predefined differentiae.
In practice, however, everything was not quite as neat. Firstly, both the generic taxa at 
the various levels above the species (like "tribe/ "family/ 'race/ "genus/ etc.) were usually not 
explicitly defined, nor were the generic concepts consistently used to designate taxa at the 
same level of generality; and neither did the name of individual taxa (like 'cat/ "coot-footed 
tringa/ "quadrupeds") designate in any transparent way a particular taxon's place in the 
taxonomic system. Both generic and designatory naming worked against the construction of a 
transparent taxonomy. Secondly, and as a not surprising consequence of this, the relationship 
between taxa at different levels of generality would often, though not always, be only 
implicitly defined. In the following I shall look at these two points in turn, the question of the 
language of taxonomy, and the question of the structure of the taxonomy, in order to encircle 
the peculiarities of the empiricists' taxonomic schemes.
The Language of Taxonomy
Eighteenth-century natural history has, especially in the work of Michel Foucault, been 
described as "a well-constructed language'.16 Pointing to that separation of language from 
things which took place during the seventeenth century whereby language was made entirely 
arbitrary in relation to the world (and which I have touched upon in Chapter 3), Foucault has 
argued that the task of the natural historian became to bring language and nature as dose 
together as possible again in their taxonomic scheme:
natural history [ ...]  is the space opened up in representation by an analysis which is anticipating the possibility of 
naming; it is the possibility of seeing what one will be able to say, but what one could not say subsequently, or see at 
a distance, if things and words, distinct from another, did not, from the very first communicate in a 
representation.17
Closing the gap between language and natural beings were by the natural historian -  and in 
Foucault's analysis the natural historian usually denotes Linné and Buffon18 -  done through, 
firstly, a filtering of the visible, and, secondly, a critical reconstruction of language. In the first 
respect, Foucault argues that all beings were reduced to four describable variables -  form and 
quantity of elements, respectively, their distribution and relative magnitude. This filtering in 
turn, according to Foucault, allowed for the construction of a universally valid language: 
"confronted with the same individual entity, everyone will be able to give the same description;
16 M. Foucault, The Order o f  Things (1970), p. 158.
17 Ibid., p. 130; emph in org.
18 Hence, it is Linne's and Buffon's works, with the dear emphasis on the former, which receive the 
overwhelming part of the attention in the analysis. Besides these, other 'great' and mainly French naturalists 
from the period (such as Toumefort, Adanson, Bonnet and Robinet) are also referred to at times.
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and, inversely, given such a description everyone will be able to recognize the individual 
entities that correspond to it/19 Designation was, in effect, superimposed upon articulation -  
naming a living being and designating it became one and the same thing.20 The reconstruction 
of language in turn, Foucault claims, allowed for a transcription of the structure of nature's 
beings to a table in the natural historian's representation. Through an analysis of similarities 
and differences between the four, and according to Foucault only four, variables in living 
beings, the natural historian was enabled to tabulate the visible in a taxonomic structure. In 
Foucault's analysis, natural history thereby became 'a fundamental arrangement of knowledge, 
which orders the knowledge of beings so as to make it possible to represent them in a system 
of names.'21 Natural history became 'nothing more than a nomination of the visible', in which a 
transparent and universally valid representation of the visible was made possible thanks to the 
critical reconstruction of the language of natural history.22
Now, the central point in Foucault's thesis is, of course, that the gaze of the natural 
historian was severely filtering nature and that the natural historian's language was, in fact, 
critically reconstructed to unequivocally suit its taxonomic task. This seems to a large extent to 
hold good for Foucault's major representative of eighteenth-century natural history, namely 
Carl von Linné, and not least for the final editions of the Systema Natures. The British 
empiricists' gaze and language were also reconstructed to a certain extent. As we saw in 
Chapter 3, at the level of the description of specimens, the zoologist's representation was 
removed from everyday language in order to be suitable for describing animals as matters of 
facts. As we also saw, the gaze of the zoologist was pointed, directed mainly towards 
morphological and anatomical traits. However, as we have also seen in the preceding chapters, 
the empiricist's vision was never filtered to such an extent that he only took note of the same 
few characteristics in all cases, which would have made his description universally valid, in the 
sense that Foucault gives to the term, and which would have allowed him to succinctly 
nominate taxa and transparently transcribe nature's order onto a regular table: The necessity of 
polythetic definitions impeded him from doing this. I shall return to this point below in my 
discussion of the structure of taxonomy. For now, the focus will be on taxonomy's language.
Although language was certainly shaped in order to represent the traits of animals one 
to one in the zoologists' representations of specimens, language was by no means so 
fundamentally reconstructed in practice within empiricist zoology, that it could serve as a 
universally valid nomination of the visible.23 That 'lack' of fundamental reconstruction, to put
19 Ibid., p. 134.
20 Ibid., p. 136.
21 Ibid., p. 157.
22 Ibid., p. 132.
23 Though attempt also were made at doing that in Britain most notably by John Wilkins in J. Wilkins, An Essay 
(1668). On Wilkin's universal language, see the chapter on this in H. Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure (1982); B.
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the matter negatively for now, reverberated in the formation of higher-level taxa. Besides not 
only describing many more kinds of traits that the four identified by Foucault, and besides, 
furthermore, making use of various of these traits in the formation of species, the higher level 
taxa were also only implicitly defined generically in most cases. Moreover, at the level of 
designation, the individual taxa were not unambiguously named within British zoology in 
such a way that they transparently designated the place of a taxon in the taxonomic structure, 
as they were in Linné's nomenclature, where through the introduction of a binomial system of 
nomination, Linné designated all animals by genus and species.24 Although, from the natives' 
point of view, the description of specimens ideally should represent nature transparently, the 
zoologists' polythetic definition of species and higher level taxa, their general lack of generic 
definition of the higher-level taxa, and their frequent vagueness as to which level of generality 
a specific taxon belonged to, all contributed to preventing their taxonomic systems from 
becoming a transparent representation of nature's order, even on their own account. Seen in 
relation to Foucault's portrait of the natural historian's well-structured nomination of the 
visible, the empiricists' taxonomies, in fact, appear to be rather perplexing. There were good 
practical, historical, and epistemological reasons for them being so, however. To elucidate 
those reasons we shall firstly take a look at the generic definition and designation of taxa.
As we have seen in the preceding chapters, the 'species' was not only defined geneti­
cally as the basic level taxa, it was also relatively consistently designated as 'species' or with its 
English equivalents, 'kind' or 'sort,' even if the two last concepts did not unequivocally refer to 
basic level taxa. In the generic designation of the higher-level taxa, the picture becomes more 
blurred. Across the zoological corpus, as well as often within a single work, the same taxa 
could easily be called 'kind,' 'genus/ 'tribe,' 'family,' 'race/ among other things. There are 
exceptions to this 'unclear' taxonomic terminology, to put it once again in negative terms, most 
notably to be found in the works of Thomas Pennant, John Berkenhout, George Shaw and John 
Hill. Even though they differed between themselves, these authors employed an almost 
consistent taxonomic terminology. However, both across the zoological works and within the 
majority of individual books such a consistency cannot be observed.
The consequence of this inconsistent use of taxonomic terminology -  except in most 
cases for the 'spedes' -  was that, out of context it became virtually impossible to determine at 
which level of generality a taxa -  a 'kind/ a 'race/ a 'genus/ a 'dass/ a 'family/ etc. -  belonged. 
Even within a given context the level of generality was not always made entirely dear since, as
Shapiro, John Wilkins (1969); for more general discussions of the quest for the construction of a universal 
language in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century, see N. Hudson, Writing and European Thought (1994), pp. 
41ff.; T. Fràngsmyr, 'Drommen' (1974).
24 The binomial system was introduced in the tenth edition of C. Linné, Systema Naturæ (1758/1939). On Linné's 
binominal system of nomination, see W. T. Steam, 'The Background '  (1959).
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we will see below, also the relations between the different taxa were only implicitly defined in 
many cases.
An analogous case of names defying their transparent nominative potential may be 
found in the designation of individual taxa. In principle/ a trivial name ought to capture the 
distinguishing marks of a taxon, as Nehemiah Grew stressed, and hence, work as a 'short 
Definition' of the taxon in question:
So that the Names of Things should be always taken from something more observable dedarative of their Form, or 
Nature. The doing of which, would much facilitate and Improve the Knowledge of them many ways. For so, every 
N am e were a short Definition, here as if Words are confus'd, little else can be distinctly leam'd.25
Even though a taxon could not be defined entirely by a name, the name ought at least to give
an idea of the most distinguishing mark of the taxon in question: 'trivial names should if
possible always be contrived in such a manner as to convey some idea, (even tho' an indistinct
one), of the subject itself.26 27Especially when christening non-descripts this principle was often
followed. Hence Tyson's opossum, for instance, got its name after a careful analysis of its
distinguishing marks:
U pon the whole, since it is an Animal sui Generis, and in several Parts having a great Resemblance to those of 
different Species; I think, a Denomination might be best given to it, from that Particular, wherein 'tis most distin­
guished from all other; which is that remarkable Pouch or Marsupium it has in the Belly, into which, upon any 
Occasion of Danger, it can receive its Young. [...]
This Consideration (it being so distinguishing a Character of this Animal from all others, that as yet we 
know  of,) makes me most inclinable to find out some Name, that might be most expressive thereof; nor can I think 
of, a t present, a better, than to call it, Marsupiale AmericanimP
Hence, we also find a new spedes of tringa or snipe named the 'coot-footed tringa,' again after
a careful analysis of distinguishing characters (see 111. 7.1 for the plate referred to):
This bird is like in shape to most others of the tringa or snipe kind. [ . . . ] !  choose, by way of distinction, to name it 
the coot-footed tringa, as it differs from other birds of that genus no otherwise, than in having its toes webbed in the 
sam e particular maimer as the fulica, or our bald-coot. One of its feet is shewn in the plate, magnified a little, to 
m ake it the better understood, in what manner the webs or membranes spreading on both sides of the toes are 
scalped or indented at each of the toe-joints.28
Likewise, the 'long-tailed sparrow7 was so named because 'the length of the tail certainly forms 
it's chief peculiarity';29 the 'dcadae sanguiflua' was given this name 'on account of the bloody 
veins' which could be observed at its wings;30 the 'great bood/ had gotten its name because it 
resembled the boody in all other respects and could only be distinguished from this with 
reference to its size,*31 and so on. Also at this level, naming should be in prindple and 
sometimes were in practice, a function of dassification. Here, Foucault's conception of dassic
25 N. Grew, Museum Regalis Sociétés (1681), Preface (unpaged), emph. removed.
26 G. Shaw, Museum Leveriani explicatio (1792), vol. I, p. 30.
27 E. Tyson, Carigueya (1698), p. 3; note excluded; emph. in org.
28 G. Edwards, 'An Account of a new-discovered Species' (1757), p. 254.
29 Anonymous, The Naturalist’s Pocket Magazine (1799-1802), vol. VI, 'Long-Tailed Sparrow' (unpaged).
30 P. Brown, New Illustrations o f Zoology (1776), p. 62.
31 M. Catesby, The Natural History of Carolina (1731*43), vol. I, description accompanying plate 86 (unpaged).
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language as a transparent system of signs entirely exhausted by its representational role and of 
natural history as a nomination of the visible becomes evident: naming equalled knowing,32
As Grew's use of the subjunctive mode in his statement on the designative function of 
names also suggests, such classificatory names, however, did not exhaust the actual names 
employed by zoologists. Far from, actually. For one thing, different ways of classifying yielded 
different ways of naming taxa; moreover, different authors might use the same name for 
different taxa; and on top of that -  and evident, in particular, in relation to species -  a variety of 
names had already been given to the same animals through the ages and in different countries, 
so that by the eighteenth century, an animal could easily be known and identified by five, ten, 
or even, as in the not untypical case of Pennant's description of the hog, thirteen different 
names.33 Often all of those names would, as in Pennant's case, be given as 'synonyms' at the 
beginning of the description of a species. Predictably, this 'multiplication of names/ as it were, 
was condemned as it gave rise to uncertainty as to the object of reference. Take this description 
of the 'sea otter' as an example:
Many are the names under which this amphibious animal has been described by naturalists; and, as usual, the 
variety of appellations has given birth to great confusion. It is the Mustela Lutris, Plantis Palmis Pilosis, Cauda 
Corpore quadruple breviore, of Linnaeus; the Jiya, called at Brasil the Carigyeibeju, of Marcgrave; the Lutra 
Brasiliensis, of Ray; the Lutra Nigricans, Cauda depressa et glabra, of Barrere; the Loutre, or Carigueibeju, of 
Desmarchais; the Lutra Marina, of Kalm; the Lutra Atri Colons, Macula sub Gutture Flava, of Brisson; the 
Saricovienne, of Thevet; the Saricovienne, or Sea Otter, of Buffon; and the Sea Otter, of Muller, Pennant, and most 
other naturalists.34
As it later became evident, this multiplication of synonyms had indeed caused confusion, 
since, in their descriptions, Buffon and Pennant had not been able to agree upon exactly which 
animal should be designated by all these names. It was not, as Watson also concluded, always 
possible to know an animal simply by knowing its name (see 111. 7.2):
So many Persons have written concerning Natural History, and so few of them have understood it, that the Names 
of Things are often strangely confounded, and those of one Animal given to another. If any one were to mention that 
he had seen a Sea-Horse, the best Naturalist could not tell by that Name, whether he meant an Animal somewhat of 
the Shape of a Horse, and as big as the larger Coach-Horse; or a Creature without Legs, or any Resemblance of a 
four-footed Beast, and of the Bigness of his little Finger,
The Animal of the quadruped Kind intended to be treated of here is called the Hippopotamus, in English 
the River-Horse: The other little Creature is usually seen dry, and has so much the Appearance of some Insect, that 
the Antients, not well acquainted with what it was, called it Hippocampus; but this they leant to call it the largest 
Kind of Caterpillar; the Term expresses the Horse Caterpillar: And thus they called the largest Kind of Ant the 
Horse-Ant; and so other Animals of extraordinary Size in their Kind. This Hippocampus is a Sea Fish of a particular 
Qass; and partly from its old Name, and partly from some forced Resemblance between the Shape of the Head and 
Neck of this Creature and those of a Horse, People have also called this the Sea-Horse.35
32 M. Foucault, The Order o f Things (1970), p. 62.
33 T. Pennant, Synopsis o f  Quadrupeds (1771), p. 68.
34 Anonymous, The Naturalist's Pocket Magazine (1799-1802), vol. IV, 'Sea Otteri (unpaged).
35 F. Watson, The Animal World Display'd (1754), pp. 91-2.
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Although well-known species, and taxa more generally, would at times be renamed,36 the 
British zoologists were usually reluctant to introduce new names, which would only add to the 
confusion, even though they might designate the taxon of reference more precisely. Hence, for 
instance, the 'order" of the 'tail-less maucauco' retained its name since it had been established 
by 'universal consent/ even though, in fact, there existed a number of species of maucaucos 
without tails, because, as the author observed, These names, being once given, great 
authority would be requisite to change them with advantage.37 Likewise, the name of the 'ugly 
lizard' was kept in Thomas Shaw's account, since
there is nothing that occasions greater Confusion in the several Branches of Natural History, than that any Species o f  
Plants or Animals should have new Names and Descriptions given to them, after that their old ones have already 
received a sufficient Sanction and Authority.38 39
In one of the more extreme cases, John Ellis, the 'discoverer' of the animal nature of zoophytes, 
retained the names developed within botany to denote their taxa:
In order to be the better understood, in treating of the several marine Productions, which are the Subject of the 
following Essay, I find myself under a kind of Necessity to speak in the common Language of those, who, 
considering them merely as Plants or marine Vegetables, have, as Botanists, reduced them to certain Gasses; and, 
with the celebrated Ray, shall divide them into Corals, Carolines, Keratophyta, Escara, Sponges, and Alcyonia.*
Though signs, ideally, should signify transparently, there were other and more pragmatic
concerns at play in the practical naming of taxa. A description not only had to signify but also
be intelligible, and if intelligibility could be obtained by employing names with a less
transparent signification, then such established names were not always, but in most cases
adopted.
Language was not fully reconstructed and the signs never entirely made a function of 
the taxonomic endeavour neither in the context of generic concepts nor in the context of trivial 
names. The articulation of a name and the designation of a taxon never entirely merged in a 
tabulated structure in British empiricist zoology. And that is not so very surprising when it is 
taken into consideration that that structure itself was far from always unequivocally laid out, 
as we now shall see.
The Structure of Taxonomy
The structure of the taxonomic system -  the levels of taxa and their mutual relations -  were 
usually not directly addressed in the British zoologists' works. That does, however, not mean 
that such relations were not laid down; but it does mean that they often worked tacitly,
36 E.g. G. Shaw, Museum Levemni explicatio (1792), vol. L p. 30; G. Edwards, Cleanings o f Natural History (1758-64), 
vol. Ill, p. 244; Anonymous, The Naturalist's Pocket Magazine (1799-1802), vol. VL Paca (unpaged).
37 Ibid., vol. IV, 'Tail-less Maucauco' (unpaged).
38 T. Shaw, A Supplement (1746), p. 62; emph. in org.
39 J. Ellis, An Essay towards a Natural History (1755), p. 1; emph. in org.
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although more transparently in some works than in others. In the following section, I shall look 
into how the taxonomies were structured, and in order to allow for a closer comparative 
reading of different empiricist schemes, I shall zoom in on the classification of quadrupeds. 
Before doing so, it will be useful to see how the taxon of die 'quadrupeds' itself came into 
being in the grand division of the animal kingdom into supreme taxa -  this mode of division in 
itself being, of course, an example, though in some ways an unusual one, of how the taxonomic 
scheme was structured.
Grand D ivisions
As we saw above, the zoologists themselves related the eighteenth-century zoological system 
to two main fathers: Aristotle and John Ray. John Ray's grand classification of the animal 
kingdom, and, in particular, his delimitation of the category of quadrupeds, would be adopted 
with some modifications by most of the eighteenth-century zoologists. In Synopsis Methodica 
Animalium Quadrupedum (1693), where Ray's zoological scheme was outlined, Ray himself did 
engage in a dialogue with Aristotle. Although quickly dismissing Aristotle's categorisation to a 
large extent, it might be worth briefly considering what he dismissed before turning to discuss 
Ray himself.
From Aristotle's works, and especially from Generation o f  Animals, a grand classification 
of animals into seven general groups had already been extrapolated by Renaissance scholars, 
and similar divisions were made use of, for instance, in Gesner's division of his Historiae 
Animalium into five volumes, each corresponding to a major animal class (I. Viviparious 
quadrupeds, II. Oviparious quadrupedes, HI. Birds, IV. Fishes, V. Serpents). Aristotle divided 
the entire animal kingdom into general classes partly on the basis of the perfection of the 
offspring of animals and, partly, on the blood and respiratory organs. Both of the latter aspects 
was by Aristotle linked to the combination of hot and cold, and solid and fluid substances 
through his theory of the animals' 'blend/ fcrasis. Leaving out his considerations of the blend, 
as that was to be neglected by the zoologists under consideration here, Aristotle's classification 
I might be extrapolated thus: 1) Vivipara: comprising animals which 'bring their young to 
perfection, and bring forth externally a creature similar to themselves',*40 and which, 
furthermore, have lungs and blood. Such as, for instance, man, horse, sheep, dog, etc. as well as 
the Cetacea. 2) Ovovivipara: animals which 'are internally oviparous at the first stage, and 
thereafter are externally viviparous', that is, which first produces a 'perfect' egg within the 
parent, before it produces an offspring which is bom as a 'perfect' animal. The Selachian fish 
and the viper would be examples of this. 3) Ovipara I: animals which 'lay their eggs in a
40 Aristotle, Parts o f  Animals (1963), p. 135/II.i.732a; for a more detailed discussion of Aristotle's theory of 
generation and dassification, see A. L. Peck, 'Introduction' (1965), pp. xiiiff.
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perfected state', such as 'birds, oviparous quadrupeds and footless animals, e.g., lizards and 
tortoises, and the majority of serpents'.41 4) Ovípara II: animals which 'lay their eggs in an 
imperfect state, as the Fishes, and the Crustacea and the Cephalopods[...], whose eggs do grow 
in size after they are laid.'42 5) Larvipara: bloodless animals that produce larvae, such as 
locusts, spiders, wasps and cicadas. 6) Inserta: produced through spontaneous generation, like 
fleas, bugs and lice. 7) Testacea: shellfish, produced through spontaneous generation.
Now, although Ray acknowledged the importance of this scheme, he also rejected its 
most basic axis of division, the status of the egg, as a cardinal axis, as he argued that all animals 
were generated from eggs, regardless of whether that egg was hatched inside or outside the 
womb of the mother.43 Instead, Ray introduced the respiratory system as the most important 
axis for the classification of animals into the supreme taxa, making use only occasionally of the 
status of the egg. Even though Aristotle, as we saw, also made use of the organs of respiration, 
the more immediate source for Ray's classification seems to have been seventeenth-century 
physiological and comparative anatomical studies,44 and most notably William Harvey's study 
of the circulation of the blood and the heart.45
On the basis of the information provided by such comparative studies, Ray made a 
general division of animals into: I. Sanguinae and II. Exanguiae, dividing the first into 1) those 
breathing by lungs, and subdividing this class further into a) those with a double ventricle and 
hot blood (further subdivided into i/ Vivípara (Quadrupeds and Cetacea) and ii/ Ovípara, 
Birds), and b) those with a single ventricle (Batrachians, Lizards, Snakes), and 2) those 
breathing by gills, namely the blooded fish except the cetaceous. The Exanguia was subdivided 
according to size into 1) the greater (Fedata, Cephalopods, Crustaceaus, Apoda, Snails, 
Shellfish, and Slugs), and 2) the lesser (Inserta). (See HI. 7.3)
Although this scheme would appear to give an unambiguous division of animals there, 
in fact, arose problems. Most clearly, this can be seen in the case of the cetaceous -  the whales, 
sperm whales and dolphins. In Ray's introduction, it was suggested that they should be 
classed as quadrupeds on the basis of the respiratory organs, and this classification was an 
entire novelty -  during the Renaissance whales had been consistently treated as fish. Ray, 
however, chose to exclude them from the main body of the text in the synopsis of quadrupeds: 
'To remain in agreement with common opinion', he noted in the introduction, 'and to avoid the 
appearance of affected novelty we shall list the Cetaceans among Fish even though they
41 Aristotle, Parts o f  Animals (1963), p. 135/II.i.732b.
42 Ibid., pp. 135-6/n.i.732b.
43 J. Ray, Synopsis (1693), p. 55.
44 C. E. Raven, John Ray (1986), pp. 373-9.
45 William Harvey, An Anatomical Disputation Concerning the Movement o f  the Heart and Blood in Living Creatures 
(1657). On esp. Harvey, see also A. Wear, 'William Harvey' (1983), an on comparative anatomy in the period, F. 
J. Cole, History o f Comparative Anatomy (1944).
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obviously agree with viviparous Quadrupeds in everything save for hair, feet and the element
in which they live/46 Although Linné would later include the cetaceous within his class of
mammalia, most empiricist zoologists followed suit with Ray. For, as Thomas Pennant argued
almost a century later, even though they 'breathe by means of lungs' and 'Like land animals
[...] have warm blood, [and] are furnished with organs of generation, copulate, bring forth,
and suckle their young, shewing a strong attachment to' the land animals,47
yet there still remains other [characteristic marks], that in a natural arrangement of the animal kingdom, must 
determine us after the example of the illustrious Ray, to place them in the rank of fish; and for the same reasons, that 
first of systematic writers assigns,
That the form of their bodies agrees with that of fish. ,
They are entirely naked, or covered only with a smooth skin.
They live entirely in the water, and have all the actions of fish.48
Appearance could still, within empiricist zoology, overrule the classification made on the basis 
of only a few internal characteristics.
Although later zoologists both would modify Ray's general division of animals in this 
case of the cetaceous as well as in other cases, as we will later see, in its general outline Ray's 
division was almost universally accepted and adopted in eighteenth-century zoology. Often, 
however, the grand division between Sanguinae and Exanguiae would be neglected, and the 
highest taxa of the taxonomic system usually be defined as Quadrupeds, Birds, Reptiles, Fish, 
Insects. Thereby the more apparent, visible similarities of the animals would be foregrounded, 
while hidden similarities in the heart and blood, the lungs and gills, inversely, would be 
backgrounded, although they were not necessarily forgotten about.49
I n t e r m e d i a t e  T a x a
This division of the animal kingdom into supreme taxa was untypical in the sense that these 
taxa, although usually neither genetically named nor delimited in exactly the same way by all 
zoologists -  as the case of the whales shows -  nevertheless, provided an almost uncontested 
general framework for the classification of animals. Like the spedes unequivocally provided 
the basic level for classification, the supreme taxa also provided the most general divisions of 
the taxonomic schemes. Within this framework, through a mixture of upward and downward 
classification, the animals would be distributed into categories at one, two, three or four 
intermediate levels of generalisation -  which were less general than that of the supreme taxa, 
and more general than that of the spedes.
46 J. Ray, Synopsis (1693), p. 55.
47 T. Pennant, British Zoology (1768-77), vol. Ill, p. 33.
48 Ibid., pp. 33-4; note excluded, emph. in org.
49 Especially in the definition of reptiles, the blood usually played a role; and likewise in the definition of fish, 
reference was usually made to the gills.
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In contrast to Cesalpino, who had lined up his taxa as a well-regulated 'army' of 
'classes/ 'genera/ and 'spedes/ and in contrast to Linné, who ordered his taxa dearly and 
unambiguously in five labelled ranks -  'dass/ 'order/ 'genus/ 'spedes/ and 'variety' -  in the 
empiridsts' zoological works, the order which emerged between the spedes and the supreme 
taxa was in general rather more blurred. In order to investigate how the space opened up 
between the basic level of the spedes and the supreme level of the grand divisions was 
structured in the British empiridsts' taxonomies, it is necessary to distinguish between two 
partially different ways of defining the relations between taxa, the one more explidt in its 
layout of the taxonomy, and the other more covert.
The first group consists of a few authors, all from the second half of the eighteenth- 
century -  such as Thomas Pennant, John Hill, and John Berkenhout -  who employed a 
relatively consistent taxonomic terminology, and who each defined the relations between taxa 
in a relatively regular fashion. John Berkenhout 'implicitly which is to say 'in regard to 
arrangement'50 followed Linné's classificatory scheme, and even the typographical layout of 
Systems Natures, in his description of British fauna, and he, thus, divided the animals into 
classes, orders, genera, spedes, and varieties, each being named, and in the style of Linné, 
succinctly defined,51
John Hill, although in the introduction to his volume on the animal kingdom stressing 
that he had 'adopted so much of the method of Linnæus, as is consistent with observation', 
nevertheless, introduced new terms of taxonomy, partly drawn from a literary terminology. 
Hence, the book, like the animal kingdom, was divided into 'parts/ 'books' -  which were 
sometimes also called 'dasses' -  'series' -  which were sometimes also called 'dasses' -  'genera' 
and 'spedes/ Thus, Part I was made up of 'The lesser animals, called ANIMACULES and 
INSECTS', Part II of amphibious animals, Part III of Shell-fish, Part IV of Fish, Part V of Birds, 
and Part VI of Quadrupeds. To take just the quadrupeds as an example of the division of the 
intermediate taxa, basing the divisions on the visible, these were defined as 'animals which 
have the body covered with hairs, which walk on four legs, and the females of which bring 
forth their young alive, not in the egg state, and nourish them with milk from their teats/52 
These were further subdivided into the following 'classes' or 'series' (see 111. 7.4 and 7.5): 1) 
Glires, comprising the genera mouse, sorex, sdurus, lepus, castor, hystrix and didelphis; 2) 
Agriae (genera: ant-bears and manis); 3) Sylviæ (genera: bradypus and simiæ); 4) Feræ (genera: 
ursus, felis, lutra, cards, phoca, meles, erinaceus, daasypus, talpa, vespertilio); 5) Jumenta 
(genera: elephant, rhinoceros, hippopotamus, equus, sus); 6) Pecora (genera: camelus,
50 J, Berkenhout, Outlines o f  the Natural History o f  Great Britain (1769-72), vol. I, p. viii.
51 Ibid., vol. I-m.
52 J. Hill, A General Natural History (1751-58), vol. Ill, p. 515; emph. removed.
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moschus, cervus, capra, ovis and bos). In each case, the taxa would be briefly defined, with the 
emphasis, as in Linné, being on the teeth, feet and teats. !
In Synopsis o f  Quadrupeds, Thomas Pennant leaned more towards the system of Ray 
than that of Linné. Quite exceptionally, in introduction to his work Pennant summarised his 
dassificatory scheme in a table, entitled 'Method' (see 111. 7.6), and consistently uses this 
scheme as a framework for classification throughout the book. Like Ray, in his classification of 
quadrupeds, Pennant distinguished between two grand 'divisions/ as they were called with a 
new term: I. the Hoofed, and II. Digitated quadrupeds. In addition, Pennant added another 
two divisions, ID. the Pinnated, and IV. the Winged. These were further subdivided into 
'Sections/ and these were again divided into 'Genera' (sometimes also called 'kinds'53) and 
'Species.' The first Division, for instance, was divided into 'Section I': 'Whole hoofed' (genus: 
horse), and 'Section II': 'Goven hoofed' (genera: ox, sheep, goat, giraffe, antelope, deer, musk, 
camel, hog, rhinoceros, hippopotamus, tapir, elephant). Finally, within the main body of the 
text, some of the Sections would, be further divided into sub-genera, as in the case of the 
'Goven hoofed' quadrupeds which were divided into those '*  With tails' and those '** Without 
tails' (Pennant himself did not give any generic name to these taxa). 4 • •
Even by the very names of the Divisions ('Hoofed/ 'Digitated/ etc.) and Sections 
('Whole hoofed/ 'Cloven hoofed/ etc.), a short characterisation of the taxon in question was 
already offered in the introductory table. In a few more words, the central features of the 
genera would be summed up at the beginning of each new genus in the main body of the text. 
Regarding the genera goat it read, for instance: 'Homs bending backward, and almost dose at 
their base. Eight cutting teeth in the lower jaw, none in the upper. The male generally 
bearded.'54 Such summaries were, however, not to be taken as any thing more than 
preliminary, shorthand definitions which allowed for an expeditious identification of taxa, but 
which did not exhaustively define the taxa. As Pennant already stressed in the Preface, 'a 
system of quadrupeds cannot be formed from the character of a single part'.55 Only a polythetic 
definition would do in a proper dassification.
More, though not many more, examples of zoologists could be mentioned who 
employed a relatively uniform taxonomic terminology and who, either by way of an 
introductory table as in Pennant's case, or, as in his, Hill's, and Berkenhout's case, through the 
organisation of the literary presentation, the hierarchical relations between taxa at different 
levels were made dearly visible. These example will suffice, however, as illustrations of the
53 E.g. T. Pennant, Synopsis o f Quadrupeds (1771), p. 24.
54 Ibid., p. 13.
55 Ibid., p. ix. I  have already previously quoted Pennant on this point, but to repeat: 'W e ought [...] to drop all 
thoughts of forming a system of quadrupeds from the character o f a single part: but if w e take combined 
characters of parts, manners and food, we bid much fairer for producing an intelligible system, which ought to 
be the sum of our aim.'
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first taxonomic strategy: Here the animals were distributed into taxa in an apparently clearly 
defined structure, supported by an almost consistent taxonomic terminology, and by clearly 
visible, if not necessarily explicitly defined relations between the taxa.
The second mode of structuring taxa, and most often not genetically consistently 
defined taxa, tended to rely more heavily on the textual divisions of the book. Hence, Richard 
Bradley, for instance, in his A Philosophical Account o f the Works o f  Nature (1721), used the 
chapters the main structuring device. After having treated the Earths and minerals in Ch. I, 
Corallines, fungus, and sponges in Ch. II, and 'Plants and Super-plants' in Ch. HI, he turned in 
the reminder of the book to the animals, dividing the kingdom into: Ch. IV: 'Immovable Shell­
fish, of such as have local Motion; with Variety of Observations upon the rest of the Fish-Kind 
in Salt and Fresh Waters'; Ch. V and VI (sic: these two 'chapters' were joined together in one 
section -  in itself a striking indication of the importance of textual divisions for taxonomic 
classification): 'O f Serpents, the Crocodile, Lizard, Camelion, and other of the Scaly Tribe, 
which are Amphibious, and Inhabitants of the Land; and of Flying Lizards, &c which seem to 
be the immediate Passage between the Fish and Birds Kind'; Ch. VII and VIII (sic, again): 'Of 
Birds and Fowls; as also of the Bat (or Flying mouse), Flying Squirrels, &c which seem to be the 
Passage between Fowls and Four-footed Beasts'; Ch. DC: 'Of Quadrupeds, or such Animals of 
the Viviparous Race, as have four legs or Branches to their Bodies'; Ch. X: 'Of Frogs, Toads, 
and such Creatures as are partly Animal and partly Insectal'; Ch. XI: 'Of Snails, Earth-worms, 
Milepeds, spiders, and Insects without wings, which may be styled Irregular Insects'; Ch. XII 
and XIII (sic): 'Of the Papilionaceous or Butterfly Kind; and of Bees, Flies, and some others 
observed with the Microscope.' Each category of animals would be briefly described at the 
'chapter' level, and narratively subdivided into 'heads,' 'races' or 'kinds,' as for instance, the 
'tribe of four-footed beasts':
The Tribe of Animals with four Feet are for the most part dothed with Hair; but some few only have a Scaley 
Covering, or else are dothed in Spines. The general Heads 1 shall range them under are, the Tallon-footed, the Claw­
footed, the Hoof-footed, and the double H oof o r  Cloven-footed; And again, those of the Hom ed  Race 1 shall distinguish by 
the Characters of the Perennial hom'd, and the Annual hom'd Beasts
Within the realm of the chapter, these intermediate taxa and the species they comprised would 
be described successively, usually without marking the transition from one 'race' to another in 
any way, other than by the beginning of a new paragraph.
In the same maimer, the author of Beauties of Natural History (1777) divided the animals 
by means of 'Books' into five supreme, though partly unnamed groups (I: Unnamed, but 
treating of Quadrupeds, which were also defined here; II: 'The Serpent tribe, Lizard tribe, Frog 
or Toad Tribe'; III: Unnamed, but dealing with insects; IV: Unnamed, dealing with birds; V: 
'Fishes'). These were again divided into, sometimes named, sometimes unnamed, 'classes' or 56
56 R. Bradley, A philosophical account o f  the works o f  nature (1721), p. 88; emph. in org.
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'tribes/ which again comprised 'kinds/ 'sorts' or 'species'. In the classification of quadrupeds, 
the tribes would, like was also the practice of other authors, as we will later see, be organised 
according to a tame-savage continuum. Hence, the author started his description of the 
Quadrupeds with those which 'share our friendship' (the Horse tribe, Cow tribe, Sheep, Deer, 
Hog, Cat, Dog), proceeding to those which led a 'savage life' (Weasel, Rat, Prickly Tribe, Scales 
and Shelly Tribe, Bat, Amphibious animals and Monkey), and ended with the 'Solitary Tribe' 
(comprised of Elephant, Rhinoceros, Hippopotamus, Camel, Lama, Bear, Badger, Tapir, 
Racoon, Sloth, and others).57
Finally, to give just one more example of this classificatory strategy, Richard Brookes 
also made use o f the divisions offered by the textual presentation in order to organise his 
oeuvre on nature. Hence, in each of the six volumes of die work, a different supreme taxa or 
kingdom was dealt with (Vol. I: Quadrupeds, II: Birds, ID: Fishes, IV: Insects, V: Water, Earth, 
Stones, Fossils, Minerals, VI: Vegetables). Each volume would then be divided into chapters, 
each dealing with a different 'kind' (see 111. 7.7). With regard to Quadrupeds, also Brookes in 
broad outline organised the presentation of taxa along a tame-savage continuum:58 'Of Animals 
with an undivided Hoof, of the Horse kind'; 'Ruminating Animals, or those that chew the cud'; 
'Of the Bull, Ox, and Cow'; 'Of the Ursus, Buffalo, Bison, Bonasus, and other Animals of the 
Beeve Kind', 'O f Sheep', 'Of Goat', 'Of Animals of the Deer kind'; 'Of the Animals of the Hog 
kind, which are cloven-footed, but do not ruminate, or chew the Cud'; 'Of Anomalous 
Quadrupeds with regard to their Hoofs' (like the tapir, the rhinoceros, the elephant, the musk, 
and the hippopotamus among others); 'Animals of the Camel kind'; 'Apes, Monkeys, and 
Baboons'; 'M ankind'; 'Animals of the Cat kind'; 'Animals of the Dog kind'; 'Animals of the 
Weasel Kind, commonly called Vermin'; 'Animals of the Hare kind'; 'Animals with divided 
feet and a longish snout' (like the hedge-hog, the armadillo, the mole and shrew); 'Animals of 
the Bat kind'; 'O f the Sloth or Sluggard'; 'Sanguineous animals, which breath through the 
lungs, and which lay eggs' (frogs and toads); and finally -  and taking the four feet literally -  
'Of lizards'.
Beyond the brief definition of some of the 'tribes' in the headlines, these taxa would not 
be further defined in most cases, as Brookes usually in the very first sentence of a chapter 
began describing the first 'species' or 'sort' within the 'tribe.'
It would be easy to reject taxonomic systems like these as outside the province of 
natural history proper as the work of unaccomplished amateurs who did not possess the gift of 
abstract or consistent thinking, and who, consequently, did not contribute to the development 
of natural history. But that would be a mistake if we want to understand natural history as a
57 Anonymous, Beauties o f  Natural History (1777), ch. I.
58 Cf. R. Brookes, A New and Accurate System (1763-72), vol. I, p. xxvi.
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sodo-cultural phenomenon. And, even more importantly, these works, I will argue, can be 
read as an accentuation of a general epistemological strategy where vagueness and inaccuracy 
became an important means in the construction of taxonomies. The ideal taxonomy might be a 
regular system of signs transparently denominating the structure of nature, but the humanly- 
made taxonomy did not necessarily need to be so, and, in fact, as we will see, even the 
regularity displayed in the taxonomic schemes of the first type reviewed above would be 
qualified in essential aspects by their authors.
The vagueness and 'inaccuracy7 in the representation of taxa was actually something 
that would receive praise by contemporary reviewers. Hence, Brookes compared John Ray's 
system to that of Linné and concluded that the former was to be preferred over the second, 
since Ray
was sensible that no accurate idea could be formed from a mere distribution of animals into particular classes; he 
has therefore ranged them according to their most obvious qualities; and, content with brevity in his distinctions, 
has employed accuracy only in the particular descriptions of every animal.”
'Those', Brookes later observed in the same vein, 'who have attempted accuracy in classing the 
productions of Nature, have only embarrassed their works by their endeavour to arrange them 
methodically.'59 60 Likewise Brookes' own system was, again through a comparison with Linné's 
and this time also with Buffon's fellow naturalist Daubenton, praised for its inaccuracy by a 
writer in the Critical Review: Brookes had thus ordered his material,
in the most judicious method; not quite wedded to system, nor yet wholly abandoning it. His manner of classifying 
animals seems to be taken from their most obvious similitudes; so that all those which at first view appears m ost to 
resemble each other, he has referred to the same genus. By this means, in our opinion, he has judiciously steered 
between the extremes of Linnaeus and Daubenton.*1
It was in this connection that the reviewer went on, in the passage 1 quoted in the introduction 
to this section, to determine Linné to be a 'friend to systems' who was not 'following the 
resemblances of nature, but forcing a similitude' in his scheme.62 Too regular a system, and too 
well-defined categories could be read as an 'embarrassment/ then, while inaccuracy in the 
description of taxa and vagueness in the classification, inversely, clearly served a recognised 
purpose.
Even those authors who employed their taxonomic concepts relatively systematically, 
such as Hill, Berkenhout and Pennant, still qualified, to some extent, as being 'inaccurate' in as 
much as 'inaccuracy' also included defining animals polythetically 'according to their most 
obvious qualities/ as Brooked had it above. The inaccuracy of polythetic definition arose, of 
course, because the taxa which were defined along a large number of axes, partly differing 
from taxon to taxon, did not allow the zoologists to lay down a consistent grid, regularly
59 Ibid., p. xi.
60 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. xix.
61 Critical Review, vol. 16 (Aug., 1763), p. 146.
62 Ibid.
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defined by equivalent differences, as would be possible in a taxonomic system which relied on 
a monothetic definition of taxa and on a method of logical division as the structuring device. 
Polythetic definition did not allow the zoologists to define all taxa by the same few traits, and 
hence, to establish a common and universally valid foundation for the formation of a structure. 
The construction of such a uniform foundation was, inversely, seen as a dear sign of the 
prejudiced system, since it implied defining the fundamentum divisionis and the method of 
division, prior to empirical analysis -  that was exactly the core of the 'embarrassment/
Moreover, the zoologists from the first group described above, qualified, to a signifi­
cant extent, the regularity of their systems in their introductory statements. Hence Berkenhout, 
who faithfully copied Linné in the main body of his work as we saw, stressed in the 
introduction that 'That the System [of Linnéj is imperfect is most certain; but those who expect 
perfection in a system of Nature, are unacquainted with the subject'. Given the nature of 
nature, it would not be possible to construct an entirely faithful representation of it in a 
taxonomic scheme:
The works of the Creator are linked in one continued perfect chain, so as to admit of no absolute division, and 
consequently can never be reduced to a positive system. All that we can expect is such an artificial arrangement and 
division of bodies into kingdoms, dasses, orders, genera, and spedes, as may enable us to distinguish, with 
precision, one body from another.®
Likewise, Pennant qualified the neat categories of his classificatory system as he noted that 
there would necessarily be many 'exceptions' in the book and that this could not be 'otherwise 
in all human systems':
we are ignorant of so many of the links of the chains of beings, that to expect perfection in the arrangement of them 
would be the most weak presumption.63 4
Even the most consistent of the empiridsts's taxonomic systems were not presented as a 
tabulation of nature's order, then. The zoologists certainly attempted to approach such an 
order -  it was, indeed, the 'age of systematics' -  but the taxonomic system itself did not square 
with that order, as Berkenhout and Pennant indicated above: All that could be hoped from the 
structuration of taxa, in more or less vague, more or less consistent form, was the 'producing', 
as Pennant stated, of 'an intelligible system', which allowed man to get an idea about nature, 
but which did not, indeed could not, as we will see below, pretend to be, or be presented as, an 
accurate tabulation of nature's order.
Positioning themselves between system, on one hand, always threatening to turn into 
embarrassing prejudices, and, on the other hand, sheer randomness which French naturalists 
like Buffon and Daubenton, not quite fairly, came to represent, the intentional inaccuracy 
became a third way. Allowing the higher level taxa to remain to some extent covert -  even if it 
was only, as in Pennant's and Hill's case, by refraining from generically defining them, and by
63 J. Berkenhout, Outlines o f  the Natural History o f Great Britain (1769-72), vol. I, p. viii.
64 T. Pennant, Synapsis o f  Quadrupeds (1771), p. ix.
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defining the actual taxa polythetically -  made it possible for the zoologists to avoid the dangers 
of too much method and system, and still approach the order of nature. Vagueness and 
inaccuracy here became an epistemological strategy.
Ultimately, the reasons offered for the need to take up this position were grounded in 
man's epistemological insufficiencies vis-à-vis nature. To elucidate this epistemological 
strategy further, we thus have to turn to the relationship between the zoologists' taxonomy, the 
order presumed to exist in nature, and man's ability to obtain knowledge about that order.
Na tur e 's O rder
Without comparison, the most common way to conceptualise nature's order, indeed the order 
of the universe, within eighteenth-century natural history, was through the notion of the Great 
Chain of Being, as also noted in Chapter 6. 'For the attainment of [the] Philosophy of Nature/ 
Robert Kerr observed,
it is necessary to possess some knowledge of the objects of creation, as they are connected with each other in one 
vast chain of being, and naturally arranged under greater or lesser links of mutual relation. Without an acquaintance 
with these, the pleasing and highly important study of Nature, as a Science, must, if not utterly impossible, be 
extremely difficult and embarrassing.“
The ideas about nature's order expressed through the idiom of the Great Chain of Being did 
not originate within natural history, but were entertained, refined, and interpreted much more 
widely within contemporary society. The Great Chain of Being, moreover, had a history of 
some two thousand years, as a variation of the notion can be found in Aristotle's conception of 
a chain of increasingly perfected beings (touched upon in Chapter 6 in connection with the 
perfection of offspring).
We have already encountered glimpses of the Great Chain of Being, and I shall not go 
into the history of the notion here, which has already been so well examined by Arthur 
Lovejoy in his classic study,*65 6 it is sufficient here to give a more comprehensive review of the 
notion and the use which was made of it in conceptualising nature's order within the context of 
the eighteenth century. It should be noted from the outset that quite a few of the zoologists 
under consideration here did not contemplate elaborately on this notion. As often as not, the 
Chain was simply taken for granted, alluded to or mentioned in passing as a justification for 
the arrangement of animals, or as an explanation for the particular attributes or manners of a 
single species. Often, then, the complex of ideas signified by the notion of the Great Chain of 
Being remained in the background of the zoological works.
65 R. Kerr, 'To the Public' (1792), pp. v-vi.
66 A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain o f  Being (1948).
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The Great Chain of Being or, in its Latin version, Scala Naturae, as Lovejoy has observed, 
gained an unprecedented "diffusion and acceptance" within and beyond natural history in the 
eighteenth century.67 The notion relied on a creationist conception of nature as "designed" -  as 
purposely constructed and ordered by, again, God, the Architect. Although it. was oftentimes 
stressed that man had but a "very imperfect" knowledge of this the Creators work,68 
nevertheless, outlines of that order were given time and again. '[T]he whole universe", Smellie 
stated, "is linked together by a gradual and almost imperceptible chain of existence both 
animated and inanimated."69 As we have already seen, all beings were considered to be 
connected on this chain by almost imperceptible links of similarities and differences, from the 
smallest plant, through zoophytes to the animals, and through gentle transitions in the animal 
kingdom gradually rising up to man, who again was connected to the angels who through 
countless ranks, finally, reached God at an infinite distance from the terrestrial beings. Often 
conceptualised as a chain of perfection, the Great Chain of Being would invariably be 
understood as a vertical hierarchic order, stretched out between 'brute matter" at one end, and 
pure spiritual intelligence at the other.
The notion of the Chain of Being relied on three principles, as Lovejoy has pointed 
out.70 Firstly, the "principle of plentitude" -  of the creation of an infinite variety of beings in the 
world, created in such a manner that no "chasm" on the scale of being was possible. In the 
eighteenth century, this did not imply, however, that every being imaginable would have been 
created -  the mermaid, the centaur, the three-headed snake, for instance, were by the 
eighteenth century deemed to be "creatures of tire Imagination/ as we have seen: Not only the 
principle of plentitude, but also the law of nature's "common course of production" set limits 
on how beings could be created. Secondly, the 'principle of continuity" -  the idea that every 
being had "a mutual connection' with other beings, linked together by means of similarities 
and imperceptible differences. The idea of continuity could be applied at a number of different 
levels: from that of major groups of beings (e.g. Plants, Animals, Man, Angles), through 
species, to individuals. There was no clearly defined unite of connection, no theory about the 
level that the principle of continuity applied to -  it functioned as a transferable principle. 
Finally, "the principle of gradation": the idea that every being (at some level or another) 
differed ever so slightly from its neighbour on the chain, that it became hard to identify the 
specific differences. Hence, Brookes in discussing the polyp pointed out that "Nature chuses to 
mix the kinds of beings by imperceptible gradation, so that it becomes hard to determine
67 ibid., p. 183.
68 See, for instance, W. Smellie, The Philosophy o f  Natural History (1790), vol. II, p. 430.
69 Ibid., p. 436.
70 A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain o f  Being (1948), passim.
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where the animals end, or the vegetables begin'.71 72Likewise Soame Jenyns, employing the 
metaphor of shimmering colours, described the nature of the links:
The manner by which the consummate wisdom of the divine artificer has formed this gradation, so extensive in the 
whole, and so imperceptible in the parts, is this: -  He constantly unites the highest degree of the qualities o f each 
inferior order to the lowest degree of the same qualities belonging to the order next above it; by which means, like 
the colours of a skillful painter, they are so blended together, and shaded off into each other,, that no line of 
distinction is anywhere to be seen.71
On the Scale of Being, there were no definite distinctions; the chain was held together by virtue 
of the nature of neighbouring beings being mixed.
Although the Great Chain of Being could not be observed by man, by joining these 
three principles together in the notion of the Great Chain of Being, the perceptible, infinite 
variety in the world could not only be explained, but it could also -  in cosmological theory -  be 
reduced to a simple, uniform, and harmonious structure, worthy of a rational God. 'Were there 
no other argument in favour of the UNITY of DEITY,' Smellie thus observed after having 
described the chain in outline, 'this uniformity of design, this graduated concatenation of 
beings [...] seems to be perfectly irrefutable.'73 Likewise Benjamin Stillingfleet stressed in a 
poem on nature how this order pointed to God:
Almighty Being,
Cause and support of all things, can I view 
These objects of my wonder; can I feel 
These fine sensations, and not think of thee?
[...]
Without thy ray divine, one dreary gloom;
Where lurk the monsters of phantastic brains,
Order bereft o f thought uncaus'd effects,
Fate freely acting, and unerring Chance.
Where meanless matter to a chaos sinks 
Or something lower still, for without thee 
It crumbles into atoms void of force,
Void of resistance -  it eludes our thought.74
As in the case of the monstrous productions, chaos here again was presented as the only 
possible alternative to a Divine order, and this order was, tautologically, read as a certain sign 
of the existence of God.75
An important consequence of this opposition of only one possible kind of order to 
chaos was, that every being had to be kept in its place on the Chain. It was, of course, in this 
connection, in explaining the stability of the God-given order that the notion of ceconomia
71 R. Brookes, A New and Accurate System (1763-72), vol, IV, p. xv.
72 Soame Jenyns, Disquisitions on Several Subjects (1790), quoted in A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain o f  Being (1948), p. 
197.
73 W, Smellie, The Philosophy o f Natural History (1790), vol. n, pp. 436-7.
74 Stillingfleet, quoted in T. Pennant, British Zoology (1768-77), vol. IV, pp, vii-viii.
75 For more general discussions of nature's ability to communicate something about God, as this idea was 
developed within eighteenth-century deism and natural theology, see N. C. Gillespie, 'Natural History, Natural 
Theology' (1987); C  C. Gillespie, Genesis and Geology (1969), ch. 1; C. L. Becker, The Heavenly City (1977); C  B. 
Tinker, Nature's Simple Plan (1922).
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naturae, discussed in Chapter 6, gained significance. Concluding his work on the three 
kingdoms of nature, Bradley thus in a typical way connected the Great Chain of Being and the 
doctrine of nature's ceconomy by concluding 'that all Bodies have some Dependence upon one 
another; and that every distinct Part of Nature's work is necessary for the support of the rest; 
and that if any one was wanting, all the rest must consequently be out of Order.'76 The working 
of oeconomia naturae explained the stability of the Chain.
I shall not go further into the notion of ceconomia naturae here, since it has already been 
reviewed at length in the previous chapter; what I would like to stress in this connection is the 
complete monopolisation of the Great Chain of Being in the cosmological conceptualisation of 
nature's order within eighteenth-century zoology, which the doctrine of ceconomia naturae 
helped to support: The Great Chain of Being not only emerged as a simple, stable structure 
which subsumed the universal variety of beings under its uniform, gradated and harmonious 
hierarchy, but also as the only thinkable alternative to chaos.
Nat ur e ' s O r d er  c f . Man' s  O rd er
'It is vain for us to pretend to lay down any one certain uniform Rule/ Tubervill Needham 
cautioned, 'and say to Nature, This is thy Scheme; such are thy Statutes; and from these thou 
shalt not deviate.'77 Though the warning was offered in connection with some thoughts on the 
generation of animals, it seems to be relevant for attempts to recreate the Great Chain of Being 
in taxonomic schemes, as well.
Surely, the Great Chain of Being was posited as the divine model for the zoological 
classificatory endeavour -  the imperceptible order, structuring all beings in the world, which 
ought to be reconstructed by taxonomic means in natural history. And zoologists certainly 
drew on the conceptions of order relating to the Great Chain of Being in their classification of 
animals: Like the Great Chain of Being, the taxonomic schemes were structural hierarchies 
which, in principle, transcended both time and place. At a more specific level, the zoologists 
identified intermediate links between groups of animals in their works. Hence, for instance, 
frogs would be described as a connecting link between quadrupeds and insects,78 the genus of 
antelope as connecting the goat and deer 'kinds';79 the polyp as the link between animals and 
vegetables;80 the flying maucauco and the flying squirrel, respectively, as links between the
76 R. Bradley, A philosophical account o f  the works o f  nature (1721), p. 159.
77 T. Needham, Observations upon the Generation (1749), p. 14.
78 R. Bradley, A philosophical account o f  the works o f  nature (1721), p. 116.
79 T. Pennant, Synopsis o f Quadrupeds (1771), p. 25.
80 E. Bancroft, An Essay on the Natural History o f  Guiana (1769), p. 225; R. Brookes, A New and Accurate System (1763- 
72), vol. IV, p. xiv-xv.
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quadrupeds and birds,81 the sea otter as a link between fishes and quadrupeds,82 and so on and 
so forth.
At a more comprehensive level, the zoologists would also, in most cases, organise their 
entire presentation of animals according to a scheme whose layout closely followed the Chain's 
gradations of perfection. Starting with the quadrupeds, they would often, but not invariably, 
proceed to the birds, move on to the fish and insects and, if they went this far, which quite a lot 
of zoologists did not, end with the most imperfect class of all animals, approaching to the 
vegetables in their nature, the animacules. Or, some zoologists would, inversely, go through 
the same chain of animals the other way around. Although the zoologists could not, as they 
noted time and again, actually know anything about the imperceptible Chain, nevertheless, it 
served in crucial ways to make sense of the animal kingdom.
But there were significant differences as well between the man-made order and the 
(man-made) divine order. Firstly, where the Great Chain of Being displayed an exclusive 
hierarchy in which each animal group, like the ranks of soldiers in an army, was not included 
in the category above it, an inclusive hierarchy was unfolded in the taxonomic schemes, in 
which the lower taxa would be included in the higher taxa, like in a pyramidal structure. The 
systems were essentially of two different kinds, and it would therefore be logically impossible 
to reconstruct the Great Chain of Being in the taxonomic scheme.
Secondly, although the zoologists certainly mentioned intermediate links every from 
time to time, and although species belonging to the same higher taxon would most often be 
represented in a series which stressed their interconnections (the bull would be followed by the 
ursus, then the buffalo, the bison, the bonassus, the sheep, the goat;83 the 'true apes' without 
tails would be followed by the baboons with short tail, and those by the monkeys with long 
tails,84 etc.), there would be only sporadic attempts made to connect the last species of one 
super-species taxon to a series of species in another super-species taxon. The series would 
usually end nowhere. In effect, the llama, for instance, would in one scheme be standing 
between the dromedary (to which it on the zoologists' account did bear a resemblance) and the 
ape (to which it did not);85 the sea-cow would stand next to species of the strix genus, to which 
no connection was made, which would again be placed beside the genus of falco, to which it 
did bear resemblance, and so on.86
Thirdly, the Great Chain of Being was built up by interconnected groups of animals 
chained together in an analogous series, while the taxonomic system, in its basic structure,
81 Anonymous, The Naturalist's Pocket Magazine (1799-1802), vol. D, Flying Maucauco (unpaged).
82 G. Shaw, Museum Leveriani explicatio (1792), vol. m , p. 111.
83 As in R. Brookes, A New and Accurate System (1763-72), vol. VI, pp. 23ff.
84 For instance, T. Pennant, Synopsis o f Quadrupeds (1771), pp. 94ff.
85 R. Brookes, A New and Accurate System (1763-72), vol. VL pp. 114-6.
86 J. Hill, A General Natural History (1751-58), vol. ID, pp. 316ff.
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built on a digital distinction between animal groups. True, the polythetic characterisation of 
taxa, in contrast to a monothetic one based on logical division, contributed in some way to 
reducing the difference between these two ways of structuring the animal kingdom, since it 
allowed the zoologists to partly characterise different taxa of the same level by the same traits. 
But only in part: although a taxon could share traits with another taxon, the combination of 
those traits still had to be unique in each case, and the choice of where an animal belonged still 
had to be made in the end: either this taxon or that one. The taxonomic system was predicated 
on the drawing of borders, regardless of how these were defined, while the Great Chain of 
Being, like shimmering colours, defied borders. In the first case, differences had to be made 
visible in order for classification to proceed; in the second case, though differences had to exist 
for the Chain to continue its progression, they were by definition 'imperceptible.'
Though the Great Chain of Being provided the zoologists with the most important 
cosmological frame for their taxonomic endeavour, cosmology was not, then, simply re­
produced in zoology. In practice something else was created in its place. The metaphor for the 
eighteenth-century taxonomic schemes would have been that of a branched tree rather than of 
a chain, allowing, however, for not all of the branches being visible (had it not been to take the 
metaphor too far, I would have said a branched tree with leaves turned upside down).
The zoologists themselves were well aware of the discrepancies between their own 
order and nature's. Rather than questioning nature's order (or more accurately: their 
assumptions about nature's order), and rather than letting such discrepancies challenge their 
taxonomic endeavour, the zoologists turned to what was presented as 'natural' and, hence, 
inevitable shortcomings in their own practice and conceptualisation of nature in order to 
explain the discrepancies.
Firstly, a simple lack of knowledge about innumerably species was offered as part of 
the explanation for the defects of the humanly created system: 'Seas and Deserts hide Millions 
of Animals from our Observation', Joseph Addison pointed out after he had reviewed the 
possibility of constructing a universal natural history: 'Innumerable Artifices and Statagems 
are acted in the Howling Wilderness and in the Great Deep, that can never come to our 
Knowledge', and besides these there were 'infinitely more Species of Creatures', so petite that 
even 'the finest Glasses', that is microscopes, could not reveal them to the human eye.87 There 
was simply still too much to be discovered in the empirical world for perfection to emerge.
Secondly, and more basically, the principal difference which I took note of above 
between the analogous construction of the continuous Great Chain of Being as an exclusive 
hierarchy, and the digital construction of the taxonomic systems as an inclusive hierarchy, 
which would make a perfect taxonomic reconstruction logically impossible, did not escape at
87 J. Addison, Spectator, no. 121 (Jul. 19,1711).
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least some of the zoologists' attention. Hence, we have already seen Berkenhout pointing to
this logical impossibility above. Also Smellie touched upon the problem as he remarked,
W hen examining the characters by which beings are distinguished from each other, we perceive that some of them 
are more general and include a greater variety than others. From this circumstance all our distributions into classes, 
orders, genera, and spedes, are derived. Between two classes, or two genera, however, Nature always exhibits 
intermediate productions so closely allied, that it is extremely difficult to ascertain to which of them they belong.88
In practice, this difference in the definition of categories and their mutual relations on the Great
Chain of Being and in the taxonomic scheme became most obvious in connection with animals
of an intermediate nature -  animals falling between clearly recognisable taxonomic categories.
The 'extraordinary animal' the gnu was one such:
It partakes of the horse, the ox, the stag, and the antelope: the shoulders, body, thighs, and mane, are equine; the 
head completely bovine; the tail partly one and partly the other, exactly like that of the quacha [sic]; the legs, from 
the knee-joints downwards, and the feet are slender and elegant like those of the stag, and it had the subocular sinu 
that is common to most, though not all of the antelope tribe.89
'Nature', Barrow concluded after having given this description, 'though regular and systematic 
in all her works, often puzzles and perplexes human systems, of which this animal affords an 
instance.'90 To solve the puzzle Barrow proposed to form a new and intermediate genus, 
especially for the gnu.
The hog was another animal, which repeatedly caused problems for the zoologists.
"These animals are remarkably singular', the author of the Naturalist's Pocket Magazine noted,
Their species is solitary, and detached: it is approached not by any neighbouring species which, like that of the horse 
and ass, and of the sheep and goat, may be regarded as principal or as accessory; neither is it subject to a variety of 
races, like that of the dog. It participates of several species, but essentially differs from the whole.91
It had cloven hoofs, but it did not resemble those of other cloven hoofed animals, as the hog
had both clearly visible toes, cutting teeth in the upper and lower jaw, no horns and only one
stomach; neither could it be ranked with the digitated animals since it walked on its toes, and
in relation to the whole hoofed tribe, it evidently differed in the form of its feet:
In sh ort the Hog seems to be of an equivocal nature; or, rather, it appears so to those who mistake the hypothetical 
arrangement of their own ideas for the common order of Nature, and only perceive, in the infinite chain of being, 
some conspicuous points, to which they would refer every natural phenomenon.92
Such species, which were impossible or very difficult to classify, are to be meet with fairly 
frequently within the zoological literature. And that, as also indicated in this quote, was not at 
all surprising. Given the differences between the taxonomic system and nature's, order, it was 
only logical that some animals, as Ray said (though in connection with botanical classification), 
should become 'homeless' in man's taxonomic scheme:
But I would not have my readers expect something perfect or complete; something which would divide all plants so 
exactly as to include every species without leaving any in positions anomalous or peculiar; something which would
88 W, Smellie, The Philosophy o f  Natural History (1790), vol. II, p. 433.
89 J. Barrow, An Account o f  Travels (1801-04), vol. I, p. 260; emph. in org.
90 Ibid.
91 Anonymous, The Naturalist’s Pocket Magazine (1799-1802), vol. L 'Wild Boari (unpaged).
92 Ibid.
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so define each genus by its own characteristics that no species be left, so to speak, homeless or be found common to 
many genera. Nature does not permit anything of the sort. Nature, as the saying goes, makes no jumps and passes 
from extreme to extreme only through a mean. She always produces spedes intermediate between higher and lower 
types, speties of doubtful dassification linking one type with another and having something in common with both -  
as for example the so-called zoophytes between plants and animals.93 45
What collided here, then, were two different conceptions of animal categories and their 
interrelations, each playing an important part in the zoologists' conceptualisation of nature. On 
the one had, the zoologists' taxa, which were digitally defined, and, as becomes especially 
evident in the case of species, were taken to be immutably delimited groups and, furthermore, 
ordered in an inclusive pyramidial structure. On the other hand, the animal groups on the 
Great Chain of Being, which were analogously defined and interconnected in an exclusive 
hierarchy in such a way, that borders between them vanished. In some measure, the 
discrepancy would be attempted resolved by introducing intermediate genera or species, like 
that of the gnu or hog. But this did not solve the fundamental problem: it was logically 
impossible to reproduce the Great Chain of Being transparently in the taxonomic schemes 
because it was of a different nature.
But why, a stranger could ask a bit naively, why did the zoologists not simply recon­
struct the Great Chain of Being in their works, as it was, after all this order they had set out to 
unveil? Why did it become sensible to make such taxonomic systems in which some taxa were 
difficult to classify and others became 'homeless/ and within the framework of which it, on 
any account, was impossible to accurately reproduce nature's order? The short answer to this 
question is, because it was impossible for man to reconstruct nature's order. The longer 
answer, and hence, also the fundamental cause of the discrepancies between the two systems, 
can be found in the human predicament of knowledge.
T o  mark the distinctions, to investigate the relations, to ascertain the great chain that 
unites the numerous tribes with people and adorn the universe, would demand talents of 
superior genius, perhaps, to those of humanity', Smellie underscored in the preface to his 
translation of parts of Buffon's work in 1780.94 Ten years later he elaborated on this point:
Our knowledge of the chain of intellectual and corporeal beings is very imperfect; but what we know gives us 
exalted ideas of that variety and progression which reign in the universe. A thick doud prevents us from re­
cognising the most beautiful and magnificent parts of this immense chain o f being.9S
In similar terms, George Edwards compared previous attempts of zoologists' to classify 
different animals and observed that 'not two men, who had not consulted others, would place 
them in the same order',96 and accounted for such differences by also pointing to the human 
predicament of knowledge:
93 J. Ray, Methodus Plantarum Nova (1682), Praeludia Botanica (unpaged), quoted in C. E. Raven, John Ray (1986), p. 
193.
94 W. Smellie, 'Preface' (1780), p. xi.
95 W. Smellie, The Philosophy o f Natural History (1790), vol. II, p. 400.
96 G. Edwards, Gleanings o f  Natural History (1758-64), vol. II, p. xvi.
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I believe it would be a vain attempt, in the most knowing naturalist to think of ranging all the productions of 
nature, animals, vegetables, and minerals, in such a true and natural order, that each particular body should stand 
precisely in its proper place, between two other bodies that justly and naturally should go before and follow after i t  
There arise insurmountable difficulties, when we go about to consider what relation any one body or thing bears to 
another: sometimes, indeed, the chain of connection may be carried on, in seeming regular links, for a little way; but 
we shall find it impossible for human judgement to continue it to any great length.
And the reason:
M an is  a creature too weak and imperfect to trace the works of the Great Creator in their just and natural gra­
dations.97
In a  world where man had access only to perceptible particulars and where the essential part of 
G od's order remained hidden, man's attempts at reconstructing that order would inevitably 
fall short. Perfect definitions, in the sense of a definition corresponding to nature's, of animal 
groups and of their relations were not even to be hoped to be achieved within this 
epistemological frame. '[DJefitions, when applied to natural objects, must always be vague and 
elusory7, Smellie concluded after having attempted to make the, for zoology, very basic 
distinction between the animal and vegetable kingdoms: 'We know not the principles of 
anim al life. We are equally ignorant of the essential causes of vegetable existence. It is vain, 
therefore, to dream of being able to define what we can never know.'98
It is, I will suggest, this human predicament of knowledge which impeded man from 
know ing the defining essences of things, which also impeded man from obtaining certain 
knowledge about God's order and the essential principles structuring it: It is all these 
shortcomings of human knowledge, produced by the 'weak and imperfect understanding' of 
man, which were made visible in the intentional inaccuracies in the empiricists' taxonomic 
schemes. The inaccuracy in definition, and the accentuation of this in the vagueness of 
presentation of taxonomic schemes in some cases, made the human origin of the zoologists' 
taxonomic orders plain.
The Great Unknown
The observation of the human imperfections vis-à-vis nature's order also served another 
purpose. Viewed in hindsight and from a stranger's point of view, the natives' idea of the 
impossibility of constructing a perfect scheme might, as one possible scenario, have led to a 
redefinition of some of their basic assumptions and hence, of the entire system. Of, for instance, 
the definition of taxa, and especially of the spedes, whose immutable borders the zoologists 
stubbornly retained even though this idea of spedes collided with the idea of animal groups 
without predse borders premised in the Great Chain of Being, and which, furthermore, made it
97 Ibid., voi. n, p. xvii.
98 W . Smellie, The Philosophy o f Natural History (1790), vol. I, pp. 4-5.
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difficult, if not impossible in some cases, to classify some of them in the taxonomic schemes. 
Nothing of the sort was, of course, to happen until the nineteenth century, and especially, until 
the theory of evolution was introduced as the explanation for the origin of species, and higher- 
level taxa, whereby also, as we will see in Chapter 8, the stable borders of taxa were partially 
dissolved. The eighteenth-century zoologists might have questioned the nature of the relations 
between taxa, defined solely in terms of similarities and differences between perfect, adult 
specimens, whether it was in terms of morphology, anatomy, manners and habits or a mixture 
of these. Or, they might have reviewed their assumptions about the Great Chain of Being and 
(Economia Naturae, but never once did they attempt to do that. The basic assumptions and the 
basic methods remained unquestioned, self-evidently true, and, consequently, they remained 
intact throughout the entire period. The changes, which can be observed in the taxonomic 
schemes during the one hundred and forty years under consideration here, are rather to be 
found at a more 'superficial' level in the specific arrangement and particular content of the 
definitions of taxa. Given the preying awareness of the discrepancies between nature's order 
and the zoologists' order in the natives' own accounts, this stability seems to be as much in 
need of an explanation as the changes which took place at the beginning and end of the period.
Even though the zoologists seemed to know a considerable amount about what they 
also knew they could not know anything about with certainty, namely God's order, they did 
not know everything about it. Far from. Although the Great Chain of Being would be 
described in detail from time to time, the idea of an order existing in nature beyond the reach 
of man at the same time functioned as what I shall call the 'Great Unknown.' The Great 
Unknown constituted a space demarcated by what the zoologists, possibly through 
conjuncture, had some knowledge about, but the major part of which, like an iceberg beneath 
the water, remained hidden for the human eye and understanding due to man's 
epistemological limitations.
The lack of perfection in the man-made taxonomic order, the failure to account for the 
proper place of any one animal, the impossibility of ascertaining the cosmologically 
meaningful raison d'etre of each and every animal would be explained with reference to this 
space of concealed divine causes. Now, as a human being one might not be able to understand 
the causes which conditioned the being, form and structure of the harmonious universe, but 
that was no reason, as it was repeatedly underscored, for not reckoning with them. Hence 
Smellie, for instance, cautioned the reader in the introduction to the translation of Buffon's 
Natural History, that one should be wary in accepting Buffon's, as well as other French 
philosophers' disregard for 'final causes':
it is a subject o f much regret, that philosophers, the persons who are best qualified to unfold the mysteries of 
Nature, instead of comforting and informing mankind, by showing that her most hostile forms are real expressions 
of benevolence, and that the great chain of causes and effects, whether in the natural or moral world, are all
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intended to promote general felidty, should so frequently stretch their fancy for the perverse purpose of throwing a 
gloom over all her productions, and of excluding design from the operations of her great Author. Because they 
cannot comprehend the supreme Being, because they are unable to perceive his mode of acting upon matter, they, 
therefore, seem willing to disbelieve his existence. [...] It shall only be remarked, that a universe without design and 
intelligence, is more incomprehensible than an active machine without a moving principle.*
The same mode of explanation was employed more specifically as well. We have already seen
above, how the zoologists referred the imperfections in their taxonomic order to 'man's
imperfect knowledge/ to 'a thick cloud' preventing man from seeing the Great Chain of Being,
and so on. In many other cases, the Great Unknown was also at one and the same time evoked
as the limit to man's knowledge, and the reason why some filings in natural history simply had
to remain unexplained and imperfect. Hence, while Brookes discussed the reason for the
creation of noxious snakes, he firstly pointed out that at least in some places, some of them
were used by man, and then went on to observe, 'Whether Providence intended that all things
should be for man's use, is a question we cannot resolve, as we are ignorant of the designs of
Providence/9 100 Likewise, the author of the Naturalists’ Pocket Magazine, while not being able to
decide why the 'small mud tortoise' had got an armed tail, concluded: 'We do not, however,
undertake to penetrate into all the wonderful designs of Nature; which, we conceive, are
frequently inscrutable to man/101 While discussing whether fossils might be extinguished
species and why the earth where they were found was always so fertile, John Ray noted, after
having reviewed the arguments pro and contra: 'tho' we acknowledge that there is an End in
all the Productions of Nature; yet it is no less certain, that we are often but very improper
Judges of such final Causes/102 And later, although this time in connection with whether God
might create a new race of rational beings to inhabit the earth after the day of judgement: 'there
may be an End of the restoring of the World, tho' we are not able to find out or determine
what. We are too short-sighted to penetrate the Ends of GOD.'103 104Similarly, to give just one last
example, discussing, like Brookes above, the raison d'être and place of snakes in nature,
Charles Owen summed up in a succinct manner the logic of the Great Unknown:
The Divine Wisdom so variously displayed in the Works of Nature, even the lowest Order of them, entertains the 
human Eye with Prospects exquisitely beautiful and pleasurable: As our Knowledge is defective, we are at a loss 
how to account perfectly for the particular Ends of their Formation, and Manner of their Subservience to the Whole 
of the Eternal Design. However, by Observation and Improvements in Natural Philosophy, we are assured thus far; 
that as the Almighty Creator made nothing in vain, so all his Work are good, and admirably fitted to answer the 
Purposes of his Will, and that his Wisdom, like his tender Merdes, shies through all the Systems of his Creation.
That there is not a wise Purpose in every thing that is made, because we do not understand it, is as absurd 
as for a Man to say, there is no such thing as Light, because he is blind, and has no Eyes to see it.10*
99 Idem., 'Preface' (1780), pp. xii-xiii.
100 R. Brookes, A New and Accurate System (1763-72), vol. Ill, p. xx.
101 Anonymous, The Naturalist’s Pocket Magazine (1799-1802), vol. 1H, 'Small mud tortoise' (unpaged).
102 J. Ray, Three Physico-Theological Discourses (1732), p. 202.
103 Ibid., p. 413; cap. in org.
104 C. Owen, An Essay towards a Natural History o f Serpents (1742), p. vi.
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The taxa might not always be perfectly defined; the classificatory schemes far from a perfect 
representation of nature's order; the explanation of the oeconomy of species and hence of their 
reason d'etre, not always possible to elicit, however, that did not challenge the fundamental 
tenets of the empiricist zoological enterprise. For, reckoning with a Great Unknown -  placed 
far enough beyond the reach of man for him not to be able to specify its contents, yet dose 
enough to man for him to be able to have a vague idea of its contours -  the inevitable loops and 
flaws of the human zoological enterprise found a satisfactory explanation. They had a natural 
cause, not to be found in nature where perfect order indeed did exist, but to be found in man's 
nature, which impeded him from perfectly comprehending and representing God and his 
Creation. In a sense, there was no need for redefining the species concept, or the higher level 
taxa and their interrelations; no need for remoulding the zoological endeavour, nor for 
questioning the basic cosmological assumptions, because within this epistemological space of 
manoeuvring it was perfectly reasonable that the zoological systems should be imperfect: 
man's blindness explained it all.
So, although the zoologists through their method of comparing specimens and thereby 
making abstract categories, and through their method of relating these categories to each other 
within a vaguely defined taxonomic scheme, did transcend the material, particularised 
perspective of the vulgar, they never quite reached the transcendental sphere of the divine. 
That would, as we saw Smellie note, require a genius 'superior' to that of 'humanity.' This, 
once again, would take the pure intelligence of an angel.
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Man in the Mirror of Nature
Throughout this thesis, we have seen how the British empiricist zoologists struggled to 
overcome the human predicament of knowledge in their zoological endeavour; how they 
attempted to control their passions, curb their self-interests, discipline their gaze and purge 
their mind, so that they could turn the animals into matters of facts. We have seen how they 
carefully distinguished between ideas and objects, how they compared such ideas, and how 
they classified the animals in their taxonomic systems by determining similarities and 
differences between. We have seen how the zoologists in every step they took attempted to 
establish a perspective from nowhere, and how they were never quite successful in doing that. 
Removed far enough from the animals to turn them into objects of study, the zoologist was still 
not enough of an angel to represent them transparently. His relation to nature was precarious, 
and this precariousness in itself reflected on man's own place in the Creation. Confronted with 
nature man was also confronted with his own nature. Here, self-fashioning and world- 
fashioning converged.1
In this final chapter, I shall look closer into the play of reflections between man and 
nature, and by placing it, and thereby also the entire zoological endeavour, within a broader 
contemporary context attempt to explore the relationship between self-fashioning and world- 
fashioning further.
It was not only within zoology that man's relation to, and with, nature became of 
importance. During the long eighteenth century, the distinction between nature and culture, in 
a modem recognisable form, came into being, and the specific attributes of the two categories 
and the terms of differentiation between them gained significance as a crucial operator in 
multiple fields: natural historic and philosophic literature; auto-anthropological
1 To borrow, again, Biagioli's pair of concepts; M. Biagioli, 'Scientific Revolutions, Social Bricolage' (1992).
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representations of foreign people and tribes in travel accounts; auto-sociological analyses of the 
history and progress of society; moral tracts, novels and poems. The relationship between 
nature and culture was never simple, and consequently, the semantics of the two categories 
were complex.2
While the zoological investigations contributed to specifying the terms of the relation­
ship, the conceptualisation of the nature-culture relation within a broader contemporary 
context also provided one of the most important contexts for the study of zoology. It became, 
in particular, important in two ways. On one hand, it contributed to the definition of the 
zoological object of study, nature, and, on the other, to the definition of the epistemological 
space of manoeuvring of the zoologist within a broader socio-cultural context. In the following, 
I shall attempt to elucidate how conceptualisations of the nature-culture relationship, 
entertained more generally, impacted upon world- and self-fashioning in the zoological 
endeavour. I start by discussing man's place in zoology and turn, next, to nature's, and 
culture's, place within contemporary auto-sociological conceptions of society and social 
classification. This analysis will, in turn, allow me to return to the question, introduced in 
Chapter 1, of the relationship between the zoological endeavour and 'society/ and to discuss 
the outcome of the zoologists' simultaneous confrontation with nature and man within this 
context. In the final section of this chapter, I turn to an analysis of the end to natural history's 
zoology, and the emergence of biology during the nineteenth-century.
Man in  Zo ology
Already in his first edition of Systema Naturæ (1735), Carl von Linné had introduced man into 
zoology. Adopting the category of Anthropomorpha from John Ray,3 Linné extended its borders, 
so that it not only included the humanlike apes and the sloth, but also man. With the 
introduction of the binomial system in the tenth edition of the Systema (1758), Linné also 
renamed and partially restructured the categories pertaining to the classification of man. 
Mammalia, literally 'of the breasts,' was introduced as a substitute for the prevalent class of 
Quadrupeds, now defined as all those animals who had a four-chamber-heart, were (in most 
cases) covered with hair, had three ear bones, and, moreover, who had breasts and suckled 
their offspring. The first order within this class was the Primates, substituting the earlier 
category of Anthropomorpha, and now included the genera Homo, Simia (apes), Lemur
2 L. Jordanova, 'Introduction' (1986), discusses aspects of this relationship in relation to eighteenth-century 
'science;' see also A. E. Pilkington, "N ature' as Ethical Norm' (1986), and the essays in M. Strathem and C. P. 
MacCormack, Nature, Culture, Gender (1980).
3 J. Ray, Synopsis (1693), pp. 148-61.
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(maucauco) and Vespertilio (bats). Within the genus Homo, man was distinguished by the 
epithet sapiens, 'the knowing man/ from homo troglodytes (also called homo noctumus), the cave­
man who turned day into night, and lived in caves in Ethiopia, Java, Armbiona, at Mount 
Ophir in Malacca and on the Ternate Islands. In a note, it was suggested that there might also 
exist a homo caudatus, a tailed man.4
There was nothing new in viewing man as an animal. Through the Renaissance, the 
proposition 'homo est animal/ man is an animal, had often been asserted. But, in this context, 
man was quickly removed from the animal kingdom again, as the category of animals was 
divided into 'homo' and 'bestiae' by a logical division on the basis of the possession or lack of 
reason.5 What was new in Linné's scheme, then, was that although also he certainly 
acknowledged man's distinctive rational abilities -  cf. the chosen species epithet 'sapiens' -  he 
still found man's morphological and anatomical similarities with the brutes to be so significant 
that man could be approached as a zoological object.
In contrast to what has sometimes been asserted in studies of the history of biology, 
Linné's Anthropomorpha, Primates, Mammalia, and Homo Sapiens, in brief, Linné's 
introduction of man as a zoological object were not readily accepted, at least not by British 
zoologists.6 The British zoologists' reception of the Linnean zoological treatment of man, while 
not necessarily saying so much about Linné's conception of man, reveals quite a lot about their 
own conception of man and his relation to nature. Only a very few British zoologists in the 
eighteenth century adopted either of Linné's zoo-anthropological categories, and even fewer of 
those zoologists accepted Linné's alleged treatment of man as an animal on an equal footing 
with the brutes, without making explicit and often elaborate qualifications.7 Hence, Pennant
4 C. Linné, Systema Naturæ (1758/1939), vol. L pp. 14ff.; idem., Systema Naturæ (1766-68), vol. I, pp. 21ff. For the 
history of the concept of Mammalia, see T. Gill, 'The Story of a Word - Mammal' (1902), on the introduction of 
Mammalia into natural history, and for an analysis of its, mainly, gender-political implications, see L. 
Schiebinger, Nature's Body (1993), ch. 2; for a more general discussion of lin n é 's  dassification of man, see G. 
Broberg, 'Homo Sapiens' (1994).
5 For a review of Renaissance conceptions of the relationship between man and animals, see ibid.; pp. 158ff.
6 E.g. L. Schiebinger, Nature's Body (1993), p. 46, about 'mammalia/ See, however, also G. Broberg, 'Homo 
Sapiens' (1994), pp. 170-4, for a review of European wide reactions against Linné's dassification of man.
7 Among those who, at times, with some qualifications adopted Linné's dassification of man, Berkenhout is the 
only one in my corpus who unconditionally accepted Linné's dassification o f man within the zoological world 
-  as we have seen, he followed Linné all the way through. As Berkenhout's book dealt with British zoology 
only, however, he was never confronted with the near resemblance of man to ape. In Britain, homo sapiens 
remained the only member of the order of Primates. J. Berkenhout Outlines o f  the Natural History o f  Great Britain 
(1769-72), p. 1. Richard Kentish accepted Linné's dassification of man, but stressed the difference between man 
and the rest by pointing to the epithet sapiens: By this 'concise and elegant comment he [Linné] endeavours to 
shew, that however near his alliance to the mere animal, yet by culture o f his facilities, it is in his power to 
prove himself an intelligent and moral being/ R. Kentish, An Essay on the Method (1787), p. 79; emph. in org. 
Towards the end of the century, George Shaw also accepted the indusion of man into the zoological system, but 
only on the condition that the genus Homo was vacated by the other spedes Linné had placed there. G. Shaw, 
Museum Leveriani explicatio (1792), vol. n, p. 56. Finally, also Linné's first British biographer, Richard Pulteney, 
accepted the dassification, but also felt compelled to defend and qualify i t  though man 'stands as an anim al in
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discarded Linne's classification of man, explaining that '1 reject his first division, which he calls
Primates, or Chiefs of the Creation; because my vanity will not suffer me to rank mankind with
Apes, Monkies, Maucaucos, and Bats, the companions LINN/EUS has allotted us even in this his
last system/* 8 Likewise in reference to Linne's earlier categories, John Hill stated:
Linnaeus has distinguished this class by the name o f Anthropomorphae, beasts having the form of the human 
spedes. It is an assertion of that author, that he could find no distinction in characters between man and the 
monkey. I am apt to believe few would join with him  in this opinion, but still fewer, in the putting the ignavus or 
sloth in the same class; since, whatever unlucky likeness there might be between the monkey-kind and ourselves in 
form, this ugliest of the creation can have no daim to such a resemblance.9
Man was entirely excluded from the zoological accounts of both Pennant and Hill. Many
authors followed suit, and in the cases where man would be included into the account -  except
for the few zoologists who accepted Linne's classification -  it would always be with a clear
indication of a qualitative break between man and the rest. The treatment of man in Beauties o f
Natural History is typical in this respect. 'Such is the ample and complicated scale in which the
lovely emanations of universal beauty run through so many delicate distinctions, and assume
so many different and distant modifications', the author noted as he ended his description of
the brutes and turned to man, 'the King of Animals': 'But in the Human make we are to look
for the perfection of this principle, where all its gradations are so justly and happily blended':10
He deviates so invariably and methodically from Nature, and is so totally artificial in every thing, that he is, without 
exception, the most extraordinary phenomenon in the whole compass of organised existence. He sometimes, though 
rarely, discovers all the merit and worth conceivable in his nature. His manners are simple and undisguised; his 
temper, kind and condescending; his sentiments o f others, liberal and benevolent; and all his actions adorned with 
clemency and candour. He is, then, the visible image of the invisible DIVINITY, and the amiable reverse of all that is 
savage and unrelenting in Nature.11
The author went on to describe, not as he had done in his portraits of brutes morphological
and anatomical traits, but man's ability to invent, to recollect and reason, his disposition to live
in society, his ambitions, and, finally, the relation between his mind and body.12 '[UJpon the
whole', Smellie congenially concluded after having compared man to the brute creation,
the dignity of m an's rank depends not upon the structure of his organs. It is from the powers of his intellect alone 
that he is entitled to claim a superiority over the brute creation. These powers enable him to form ideas, to abstract, 
to reason, to invent, and to reach all the heights of science and of art.13
As such a distinguished creature, man could not be turned into a zoological creature.
the system of nature, at the head of this order* it was important to take his epithet into account, because Sapiens 
was 'the true application of which, he cannot but be sufficiently elevated above every humiliating idea which 
can otherwise arise from such an association' of man with the beasts. R. Fulteney, A General View (1781), p. 65, 
emph. in org. Again, then, though accepting Linne's classification, it was done in such a way that man, 
nevertheless, was removed one, crucial step from the other animals.
8 T. Pennant, Synopsis o f  Quadrupeds (1771), pp. v-vi; emph. and cap. in org.
9 J. Hill, A General Natural History (1751-58), vol. m , p. 534.
10 Anonymous, Beauties o f  Natural History (1777), p. 327.
11 Ibid., p. 332, cap. in org.
12 Ibid., pp. 327-40.
13 W. Smellie, The Philosophy o f Natural History (1790), vol. I, p. 98.
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III 8.1 Sk ele to n s  o f  m a n  a n d  ape (R. 
Bradley, A Philosophical Account of the 
Works o f‘Nature, 1721).
111. 8.2 SlMLE (F. Watson, The Animal 
World Display'd, 1754).
The similarities between m an and ape 
were described both in terms of 
anatomy, as illustrated above, and 
examined through comparisons of their 
manners. In the last case, especially the 
big apes' ability to use their hands and 
primitive tools were highlighted as a 
sign of their close relation to mankind, as 
shown below.

MAN IN THE MIRROR OF NATURE
The reluctance to treat man on equal terms with the animals did not arise because the 
British zoologists did not acknowledge continuities between man and the brutes. Quite on the 
contrary. As we have seen, man and brutes were considered to be connected on the Great 
Chain of Being, as both man and brutes possessed a body with all that implied. Man had, as 
Richard Bradley concluded, 'many Particulars in his frame, which bear Analogy with the Parts 
of those Creatures he is ordain'd to govern. The Harmony which Nature maintains in the 
Generation and Production of Quadrupedes, is not contradicted in HIM/14 Physical similarities 
between man and beasts were usually taken note of in descriptions of apes.15 In comparative 
anatomical studies, such as Edward Tyson's influential comparative study of the pygmy ape, 
monkey, and man, resemblances in muscles, vessels, speech organs, skeletons etc. would be 
dissected and specified -  Tyson, for instance, took note of no less than 48 points of physical 
resemblance between the pygmy ape and man16 (see also 111. 8.1 and 8.2). Moreover, as we have 
seen hinted at earlier (esp. Chapter 4) and as will be explained in more detail later, in proto- 
sociological descriptions of the vulgar and the savages, more similarities would be still brought 
to the fore. The zoologists, like other writers from the period, even occasionally designated 
man as an 'animal/
The British zoologists, then, acknowledged similarities between men and brutes and 
continuities between them. But, it was argued that these did not define the essential 
characteristics of mankind. Hence, the reluctance to turn man into a zoological object. Indeed, 
as we have seen indicated above, it was, conversely, the traits that differentiated man from 
animals (and, inversely, connected him with the angels), which defined the species of 
mankind. 'Nature,' Frederick Watson declared while describing the Satyr Ape, 'seems to have 
created this Animal to give us an humble Opinion of our Bodies; and to inform us, that it is in 
our Souls, and not in our exterior Shape, that we are properly distinguished from the Beasts 
that perish/17 18Nature, it was likewise stated in Beauties o f  Natural History, provided an inverted 
reflection of man:
It [nature] seems as if intended as a mirror in which we may recognise most of our own feelings, operating under 
the unbridled impulse of the blindest instinct, and leam to respect the utility and importance of those powers by 
which we are enabled to keep them in subjection. For what such brutal creatures are, is a striking picture of what, 
but for the principles o f reason, of conscience, and restraint, we must certainly have been.1®
14 R. Bradley, A philosophical account o f  the works o f  nature (1721), pp. 167*8; emph. and cap. in org.
15 R. Wolker, 'Perfectible Apes' (1978), and S. J. Gould, 'Chimp on the Chain' (1983), discuss aspects of the ideas of 
similarity between men and apes.
16 E. Tyson, Orang-Outang sive Homo Sylvetris (1699), pp. 92-4. See also, for instance, J. Douglas' comparative study 
of the anatomy of man and dog in Myographix Comparatx (1707). Regarding Tyson's study, Stephen Jay Gould 
has noted that Tyson's enumeration of points of similarities seems to be based on an over-zealous emphasis on 
'the humanlike qualities' of the pygmie ape. S. J. Gould, 'Chimp on the Chain' (1983), pp.l8ff. For those who 
would like to compare for themselves, the skeleton of Tyson's pygmy ape can still be seen at display at the 
Natural History Museum in London.
17 F. Watson, The Animal World Display'd (1754), p. 332,
18 Anonymous, Beauties o f  Natural History (1777), p. ix.
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As Tyson concluded after having compared the organs of speech in man and apes, taking note 
of their physiological similarities and stressing the fact that only man could speak, man was 
not 'mere Brute[...] and Matter': On the contrary, his unique ability to speak, along with his 
possession of reason showed that
those Nobler Faculties in the Mind of Man, must certainly have a higher Principle; and Matter organized could never 
produce them; for why else, where the Organ, is the same, should not the Actions be the same too?
'[I]n truth/ Tyson concluded, 'Man is part a Brute, part an Angel; and is that Link in the Creation,
that joyns them both together/19 In contrast to the brutes, man by virtue of his very being also
transcended matter: That, we may now say, was mankind's distinguishing trait.
Men on the S cale
As a species, man might form an intermediate link between the brutes and the angels, but 
when mankind was broken down into men, it became apparent that some men were closer to 
the brutes, and others to the angels. "T is  a true Remark, which we cannot make without 
Admiration/ Tyson hence noted in the dedication of the book on the pygmy ape to Lord 
Somers, President of the Royal Society and Lord Chancellor to William III,
That from Minerals, to Plants; from Plants, to Anim als; and from Animals, to Men; the Transition is so gradual, that 
there appears a very great Similitude, as well betw een the meanest Plant, and some Minerals; as between the lowest 
Rank of Men, and the highest kind of Animals. The Animal of which I have given the Anatomy, coming nearest to 
Mankind; seems the Nexus of the Animal and Rational, as your Lordship, and those of your High Rank and O rder 
for Knowledge and Wisdom, approaching nearest to that kind o f Beings which is next above us; Connect the Visible, 
and Invisible World.20
The structure of the Great Chain of Being could be smoothly transposed from the realm of the
natural world to that of the social, where it would be applied as a favourite metaphor in
analyses of the interrelations between social groups in both history and contemporary society.21
Samuel Johnson's observation in The Philosophic Mirror is not unusual in this respect:
we should consider ourselves as so many Links of a Chain united together for one sole Purpose, all to beat a 
Proportion of Duty, let which will be uppermost, in  the middle or lowest, that there are no Gradations but what are 
just, and therefore most eligible for every Individual, to be satisfied in the Place of his Appointment^]22
In fact, the idea of 'society' and the relationship between groups of men within it seems to have
been virtually inexplicable without the notion of hierarchy in the eighteenth century. 'It is
obvious/ Adam Ferguson thus stated, 'that some mode of subordination is as necessary to men
19 E. Tyson, Orang-Outang, she Homo Sylvestris (1699), p. 56; emph. in org.
20 Ibid., Dedication (unpaged).
21 P. J. Corfield, 'Class by Name and Number' (1987), p. 40 and passim; Cf. A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being 
(1948), ch. V I .
22 S. Johnson, The Philosophic Mirrour (1763), pp. 84-5; emph* in org.
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as society itself; and this, not only to attain the ends of government but to comply with an 
order established by nature/23 As in nature, so in society: hierarchy equalled order.
In the following section I shall examine how the notion of hierarchy worked in con­
ceptualising society and categorising the different 'ranks' within a society. In the preceding 
chapters, we have already seen glimpses of the zoologists drawing upon a hierarchical notion 
of society, especially in distancing themselves from the vulgar. We must, however, transgress 
the boundaries of zoology, where man and society would not be treated comprehensively, and 
enter the terrain of contemporary auto-soriology in order to more fully investigate the 
prevailing ideas about sodal order.
During the eighteenth century, understanding the nature of society to a very large 
extent meant analysing the 'progress' of society in history where the sodal thinkers found a 
display of a hierarchy of progressingly more perfect and, as we will see, increasingly less 
natural social organisations.24 In the first part of this section I zoom in on this auto-sociological 
analysis, aiming both to make the terms of human hierarchy explidt and to pin down the terms 
of differentiation between man and animals in more detail. This analysis will pave the way for 
a more general discussion of the relationship between nature and culture in the next section, 
and ultimately for a concluding section on the zoologists' and zoology's precarious relation to 
both.
Progress of Society
Human history began in nature. Just like the zoologists, the sodal thinkers preconditioned a 
fundamental unity in human nature, and hence, asserted that men w’ould be bom equal and 
free. 25 And so they would continue to be, with the possible exception of the relationship
23 A. Ferguson, An Essay (1767/1995), p. 64.
24 In the following I shall mainly focus on the common trends in eighteenth-century sodal thinking, leaving out 
those points of divergence which certainly also marked the field. For a more comprehensive study of the auto- 
sodological field, see J. G. A. Pocock, Politics, Language and Time (1973); idem., Virtue, Commerce, end tUrtory 
(1985); A. Skinner, 'Analytical Introduction' (1999); K. O'Brien, Narratives of Enlightenment (1997), and for a 
discussion of the relationship between English and Scottish Enlightenment thinking see J. C. A Ptxixk. 
'Between Machiavelli and Hume' (1976); J. Robertson, 'The Scottish Enlightenment* (1953), J Dunn, From 
Applied Theology' (1983).
25 See, for instance, J. Locke, Ttoo Treatises (1690/1988), p. 269/H§4; J. Millar, ObsemifiiWi (1771), p m A notable, 
but rare exception is David Hume who, though in general pointing to 'morat causes' as the source of difference, 
in 'O f National Characters' (1748) argued for a natural difference between the white and the rest ‘1 am apt to 
suspect the negroes, and in general all the other spedes of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be 
naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other completion than white, nor 
even any individual eminent either in action or speculatioa No ingenious manufactures amongst them, rw artx 
no sdences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the whites, such as the ancient GERMANS, the 
present TARTARS, have still something eminent about them, in their valour, form of government, or some 
other particular. Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and agrs. if
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between men and women, in a "state of nature' or, what amounted to the same thing, in a 
"savage state."
Indiscriminately drawing on material from both historical records and descriptions of 
"primitive" societies in contemporary travel literature,26 the savages were "allochronistically"27 
identified in age-old and contemporary societies alike as the origin of human society: 'It is in 
their present condition", Ferguson noted regarding the American tribes, 'that we are to behold, 
as in a mirror, the features of our own progenitors';28 'in the beginning all the World was 
America", John Locke29 similarly proclaimed in an oft-quoted statement with reference to those 
Indians, who together with the 'Hottentots/ other African tribes, and the aboriginals of New 
Holland and the inhabitants of the South Sea, who came to supply the British writers with the 
material for investigating the natural state of man as the eighteenth century came to an end.
The principal characteristic of men in 'the lowest and rudest state of society", as Adam 
Smith called it,30 was that they did not accumulate property at all. In the analyses of the 
Scottish Enlightenment writers, their economic mode would most often be described as 
'hunting and fishing," its distinctive trait being that man lived from hand to mouth: 'His great 
object is to be able to satisfy his hunger; and, after the utmost exertions of labour and activity, 
to enjoy the agreeable relief of idleness and repose", John Millar observed.31 'The food of to­
morrow is yet wild in the forest, or hid in the lake",32 3Ferguson affirmed, and savage man 
would not go out to hunt unless his hunger urged him to do so:
Directed in this particular by the desire of nature, men, in their simplest state, attend to the objects of appetite no 
further than appetite requires; and their desires of fortune extend no further than the meal which gratifies their 
hunger. [,..T]hey can apply to no task that engages no immediate passion[.p
The savages' reluctance to gather property meant, as Locke explained, that no ranks or 
distinctions would emerge between them. Living in a state 'wherein all the Power and 
Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another", there was
nothing more evident, than that Creatures of the same species and rank promiscuously bom to all the same 
advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal amongst another without Sub­
ordination or Subjection!.]34
nature had not made an original distinction betwixt these breeds of men.' Quoted in W. D. Jordan, White over 
Black (1968), p. 253; cap. in org.
26 Cf. P. J. Marshall and G. Williams, The Great Map of Mankind (1982), esp. ch. 2.
27 The term is due to Johannes Fabian who coined it to account for 'the denial of coevalness' of the 'primitive' with 
the 'civilised' in twentieth-century anthropological studies -  the idea o f the 'primitive other' as an ancient relic 
lingered for a long time to come. J. Fabian, Time and the Other (1983), p. 32.
28 A. Ferguson, An Essay (1767/1995), p, 80.
29 J. Locke, Two Treatises (1690/1988), p. 300/11,§49; emph. in org.
30 A. Smith, Wealth of Nations (1776/1999), vol. II, p. 279.
31 J. Millar, Observations (1771), p. 2.
32 A. Ferguson, An Essay (1767/1995), p. 81.
33 Ibid., p. 91.
34 J. Locke, Two Treatises (1690/1988), p. 269/11,§4.
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In fact, such a 'promiscuous' intercourse and organisation not only meant that the savages
would remain equal, but also that even 'society/ understood as an ordered structure of
subordinated ranks, could not even emerge.
The savages' desire for only such things as would satisfy his 'immediate passions/
furthermore, meant that he never got a chance to develop that human faculty of reason which
most decisively distinguished man from the animals. '[T]hey study no science, and go in
pursuit of no general principles', observed Ferguson: 'They even seem incapable of attending
to at distant consequences, beyond those they have experienced in hunting or war/35 In his
description of the Indians of Guiana, the traveller Edward Bancroft explained the relationship
between lack of possessions, or 'luxury/ and lack of refinement and understanding in detail:
These Indians are indeed unlettered and ignorant, as are all those whose wants are few; the progress of arts and 
sciences having ever kept pace with luxury. Mankind seldom attends to objects, which are not connected with either 
their pleasures or necessities; and where curiosity is thus unexcited, reason will never undergo the trouble of 
investigating the properties and causes of objects, which, when discovered, could afford no entertainment: Where, 
therefore, the wants and desires of mankind are few, their enquiries, and consequently their knowledge, will be 
confined.36
Living under the sway of their primitive passions, and not having developed their faculty of 
reasoning, the savages were evidently only barely removed from the world of nature. 
Comparing 'the lowest Savages of our own species with a Newton or a Locke', George 
Edwards, indeed, arrived at the common conclusion that 'the disparity will be thought greater 
than that between the Savage and some of his brute companions of the woods and mountains' 
-  like them the savage would be 'governed by mere instinct and sensual appetite'.37 'Man, in 
his lowest condition/ William Smellie likewise found, 'is evidently linked, both in the form of 
his body and the capacity of his mind, to the large and small orang-outangs.'38 Placed at an 
infinite distance from the learned writers themselves, the savages came to embody the link 
between the brute creation and mankind.
What separated man from the animals and set the progress of society in motion was the 
accumulation of property, as Ferguson here explains:
It must appear very evident, that property is a matter of progress. It requires, among other particulars which are the 
effects of time, some method of defending possession. The very desire of it proceeds from experience; and the 
industry by which it is gained, or improved, requires such a habit of acting with a view to distant objects, as may 
overcome the present disposition either to sloth or to enjoyment. This habit is slowly acquired, and is in reality a 
principal distinction of nations in the advanced state o f mechanic and commercial arts.39
What, more fundamentally, instigated the accumulation of property was a 'human' or, as it
was also called, an 'instinctive propensity' to, in the words of Smith, 'truck, barter, and
exchange', a desire for gain, that is. Such a selfish desire for gain had been condemned in
35 A. Ferguson, An Essay (1767/1995), pp. 88-9.
36 E. Bancroft, An Essay on the Natural History of Guiana (1769), 342; emph. in org.
37 G. Edwards, Gleanings of Natural History (1758-64), vol. It, p. ix.
38 W. Smellie, Vie Philosophy of Natural History (1790), vol. II, p. 431.
39 A. Ferguson, An Essay (1767/1995), p. 81.
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seventeenth-century civic humanism,40 however during the eighteenth century, it gained a 
paramount, and even salutary, role in the history of human society, at first by the periodical 
writers early in the century and later in Scottish Enlightenment thinking, as it came to be seen 
as the agent behind that accumulation of property which would gradually introduce ranks and 
civil government, in short, 'society/ into the world of humans.41 Singling man but as 'the great 
storemaster among animals', Ferguson, in no uncommon terms, defined property as 'the 
principal idol' of man's 'mind': The accumulation of property not only helped to create society; 
this accumulation also became instrumental for the development of the human character. 
Relying on a common idea of a fundamental affinity between property and personality,42 
Ferguson described the nature of the relationship thus:
He [man] apprehends a relation between his person and his property, which renders what he calls his own in a 
manner a part of himself, a constituent of his rank, his condition, and his character, in which, independent of any 
real enjoyment he may be fortunate or unhappy; and, independent of any personal merit, he may be an object of 
consideration or neglect; and in which he may be wounded and injured, while his person is safe, and every want of 
his nature completely supplied.43
The 'beaver and the squirrel, the ant and the bee' might also accumulate when they collected 
'their little hoards for the winter',44 but in contrast to them when man moved beyond his 
savage state of nature, he would both accumulate far beyond his needs, and this accumulation 
would work to shape his manners, and help the human species to progress 'from rudeness to 
civilisation/45
At first, man would begin gathering livestock, hence the preference of the Scottish 
Enlightenment writers in particular, of labelling the second stage in the human developmental 
hierarchy as 'shepherds/ most often exemplified by the Germans, Huns, and Tartars at the 
time of the Roman empire, and by contemporary desert Arabs. With the accumulation of 
property, society was introduced. For, on one hand, this accumulation would lead to 'a more 
remarkable and permanent distinction of ranks', as Millar explained, because some shepherds, 
'being more industrious or more fortunate than others', acquired bigger herds, and were 
thereby 'enabled to live in greater affluence, to maintain a number of servants and retainers, 
and to increase in proportion their power and dignity/46 Thereby a hierarchy of ranks was 
introduced. Moreover, the accumulation of property necessitated the establishment of a 
defence, and that became the raison d'etre of civil government. Entering into civil society by
40 On the changes in the conception of self-interested gain and property from the seventeenth century to the 
eighteenth century, see J, G. A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History (1985), ch. 6.
41 A. Smith, Wealth o f  Nations (1776/1999),voi. I  p. 117. Cf. E. Gibbon, The Deline and Fall (1776-88/1998), p. 280; A, 
Ferguson, An Essay (1767/1995), pp. 16-7.
42 Idem., 'Between Machiavelli and Hume' (1976), p. 160; idem.. Virtue, Commerce, and History (1985), p. 116.
43 A. Ferguson, An Essay (1767/1995), p. 17.
44 Ibid., p. 17.
45 Ibid., p. 7.
46 J. Millar, Observations (1771), p. 40.
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consent, the shepherds entrusted some of their power to the hands of a legislative body, which 
in return, guarded their property. 'Gvil governments, in their first institutions, are voluntary* 
associations for mutual defence/ Gibbon stressed.*7 Gvil government. Smith likewise 
observed, I s  in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who 
have some property against those who have none at all.'41 It was the emergence of civil 
government and the distinction of ranks, which together came to signify the existence of 
'society/
With the formation of barbarian society a change of manners and character also 
followed, as we saw Ferguson describe above in more general terms. 'Being thus provided 
with necessaries, he [the barbarian] naturally aims at some little improvement in his manner of 
living', as Millar explained:
The leisure, tranquillity, and retirement of a pastoral life, seem calculated in a peculiar manner to favour the 
indulgence of those indolent gratifications. From higher notions of elegance and refinement a nicer distinction is 
made with regard to the objects of desire; and the mere animal pleasure is often accompanied with the more delicate 
correspondence of inclination and sentiment.47 89
The shepherds might have risen above the 'mere animal pleasure' of the savages -  their drive 
to satisfy hunger and to procreate -  however, as becomes especially clear in contemporary 
portraits in travel literature, they were still very rude compared to civilised nations such as 
Britain: "Their nastiness in the eyes of Europeans is much against them. [...] The Arabs are the 
reverse of cleanly7, John Taylor hence noted when describing the Arabs he had met in the Great 
Desert:
and we cannot fail to remark, that as civilization induces industry, industry in like manner, promotes cleanliness 
and decorum. The nice and delicate feelings of the human mind are not developed till the age of barbarism is past, 
and that the community begin to experience the necessity and comfort of accommodating, individually to those 
habits which pure nature does not inculcate.50
Although the barbarians had moved to some extent away from nature, they were still -  
illiterate, unlearned, unmannered -  far way from civilised society.
Gradually, the barbarians would start to settle down and begin cultivating the land. 
Again the 'desire to gain' would prompt some to accumulate great amounts of land, and 
slowly their estates would grow so large, that they would not only rent out some land to 
tenants, but also needed men to hire men to take care of their estates. A hierarchy of ranks was 
thereby created, and 'a  regular subordination, accompanied with a long train of services and 
duties, from the king down to the smallest proprietor,51 introduced. Feudal society, often 
exemplified by the Italian Renaissance city-states and fifteenth and sixteenth century Britain 
had come into being.
47 E. Gibbon, The Deline and Fall (1776-88/1998), p. 195.
48 A. Smith, Wealth of Nations (1776/1999), vol. II, p. 302.
49 J. Millar, Observations (1771), pp. 38-9.
50 J. Taylor, Travels (1799), vol. I, pp. 244-5.
51 A. Smith, Wealth of Nations (1776/1999), vol. D, p. 511.
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As the landlords gained possessions they also gained the time to pursue and the means 
to patronise the arts and sciences -  it was in this period that those departments of human 
enterprise took off -  as well as to further refine their tastes and manners:
The improvement of agriculture produceth a greater abundance of the necessaries of life; and excites, in the better 
sort of people, more attention to those pleasures and refinements of which their situation admits, and to which they 
are prompted by their natural appetites.52
As more property had been accumulated, the society had been divided into more ranks than in 
the barbarian state, the manners and character of men had become more refined, and their 
minds more developed, and thereby both society and the character of man had become still 
more perfected. But the most happy and most advanced state of all, civilised society, had not 
been realised yet.
In the feudal state, foreign trade was still only in its infancy and 'no other manufactures 
but those coarse and household ones which almost every private family prepares for its own 
use' were in existence.53 As the manufactures began to develop, and with them the cities, where 
the manufacturers normally congregated, trade gained momentum, and thereby the 
foundation was laid for the emergence of civilised society. A steady specialisation of 
production brought about greater productivity, with the result that the country became 
steadily wealthier: The 'effects of the division of labour', Smith underscored, caused the 
'greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour/54
Though specialisation worked to increase productivity it was again, ultimately, the 
passions of man, which urged on the labourers, and the specialisation: 'Every thing in the 
world is purchased by labour; and our passions are the only causes of labour/55 It was a 
maxim, to be repeated innumerable times during the eighteenth century, that it was the private 
passions, the desire to become richer and richer, and the urge to acquire things -  fashionable 
clothes, carriages, paintings, books, china-ware, exquisite furniture, wigs, ribbons, jewellery, 
curiosities, stuffed animals, exotic butterflies etc. etc. etc. -  which was the fundamental cause of 
the emergence and the continuation of civilised society. Although such passions would have 
become 'rectified and swayed by reason,'56 through the course of time -  in civilised man 
refinement went far beyond what a savage was capable of feeling -  and though civilised men's 
passions would often be couched under terms such as 'desire' and 'taste/ they were passions, 
nevertheless. It was still the human propensity to gain that made society go round.
While men 'in their rude state', due to their common vocation, had displayed a 'great 
uniformity of manners', in a 'civilised' state, where they would be 'engaged in a variety of
52 J. Millar, Observations (1771), pp. 45-6.
53 A. Smith, Wealth of Nations (1776/1999), vol. II, p. 281.
54 Ibid., vol. I, p. 109.
55 David Hume, Of Commerce (1742), partly reprinted in S. Copley, Literature (1984), p. 109.
56 J. Addison, The Spectator, Nov. 6,1711, reprinted in G. A. Aitken, The Spectator (1898), p. 225.
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pursuits/ they would 'tread on a larger field, and separate to a greater distance', as Ferguson 
stressed.57 It was hence not only people's economic position, but also, and in dose conjunction 
with that, their very character which differed substantially within civilised sodety: 'They', 
Ferguson said with reference to people's 'employment',
require different talents, and inspire different sentiments; and whether or not this be the cause of the preference we 
actually give, it is certainly reasonable to form our opinion of the rank that is due to men of certain professions and 
stations, from the influence of their manner of life in cultivating the powers of the mind, or in preserving the 
sentim ents of the heart.58
This diversity of social groups in civilised society was highlighted in sodal dassifications from 
this period. In Joseph Massie's sodal table from 1759 on British sodety -  the soaety most often 
exemplifying dvilised sodety, possibly together with andent Greece and Rome -  no less than 
fifty-one sodo-economic groups were, for instance, listed. In a descending hierarchy, they 
ranged from the 'Temporal lords,' 'Spiritual lords,' 'Baronets/ Knights/ 'Esquires/ and 
'Gentlemen' at the top through numerous groups of merchants, manufacturers, fanners and 
military men to the 'Labourers/ 'Cottagers & paupers/ and 'Vagrants' at the bottom. These 
fifty-one categories were subsumed under four super-taxa, defined by the use of luxury goods: 
'Families which drink Tea, Coffee, or Chocolate, Morning and Afternoon,' 'Families which 
drink Tea or Coffee in the Morning,' 'Families which drink Tea or Coffee occasionally/ and 
'Labouring Families, &C'.59 60More moderate was Daniel Defoe's sevenfold classification, offered 
in 1709 and also based on consumption:
1. The Great, who live profusely
2. The Rich, who live plentifully
3. The middle Sort, who live well
4. The working Trade, who labour hard but feel no want
5. The Country people, Farmers etc., who fare indifferently
6. The Poor that fare hard
7. The Miserable that really pinch and suffer want*0
The contemporary sodal landscape might also, and would often be categorised simply in three 
ranks -  'Vulgar/ 'Middle sort/ 'Aristocracy' -  or even just two -  • 'High/Low/ 
'Superior/Inferior/ 'Rich/Poor.' Regardless of how the cut was made, how the ranks were 
labelled, and how many ranks were listed, it was absolutely certain that, just like in the 
description of the relationship between human sodeties in history, the relations between sodal 
groups would be described in terms of hierarchy. In fact, we might see the hierarchy 
constructed in the analysis of the progress of sodety replicated here in a static version as there 
were striking parallels between the qualities ascribed to men in different states- of sodety in 
history and to different ranks within dvilised sodety. I have already in different places
57 A* Ferguson, An Essay (1767/1995), p. 179.
58 Ibid., pp. 175-6.
59 P. H. Lindert and J. G. Williamson give a sketch of Massie's table, in their 'Revising England's Sodal Tables' 
(1982), pp. 394ff.
60 D. Defoe quoted in P. J. Corfield, 'G ass by Name and Number' (1987), p. 50; emph. in org.
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previously touched upon those qualities which marked the major social groups within Britain 
in contemporary analysis, so let me just recapitulate the arguments here.
At one end of civilised society's hierarchy were the labourers, peasants, servants, and 
journeymen, in short, the poor and vulgar, who as a result of having to work in 'mechanic 
vocations' neither got an opportunity nor leisure to develop their faculty of reason, nor to 
refine their passions and manners. In this state, reduced to taking care of th e 'bare Necessaries 
of Life', the vulgar, unlearned and illiterate, were, just like the savage, 'approaching] nearer to 
the Brutal State' than any other men.61 As another author stated in almost similar terms, they 
'approach[.„] more to the Brute, or has fewer of those Qualities that exalt Mankind above 
other Animals'.62 Hence, on the Great Chain of Being the vulgar in the hierarchy of ranks in 
civilised society came to play a role symmetrical to that of the savages in the hierarchy of 
societies, because the human part of this hierarchy ultimately was not defined by time, but by 
the two extremes of nature and culture.
At the other end of civilised society's hierarchy, was the affluent minority: the wealthy 
traders and merchants, the men of professions, and the aristocrats in whose hands the 
economic and political power were vested. As society had evolved these men had not only 
become rich, but their character and manners had also become increasingly civilised. 'In a 
civilised state every faculty of man is expanded and exercised', Gibbon stressed: His passions 
were refined, his taste developed, his manners civilised, and on top of that his understanding 
extended:
The employments, too, in which people of some rank or fortune spend the greater part of their lives are not, like 
those of the common people, simple and uniform. They are almost all of them extremely complicated, and such as 
exercise the head more then the hands. The understandings of those who are engaged in such employments can 
seldom grow torpid for want of exercise. The employments of people of some rank and fortune, besides, are seldom 
such as harass them from morning to night They generally have a good deal of leisure, during which they may 
perfect themselves in every branch either of useful or ornamental knowledge of which they may have laid the 
foundation, or for which they may have acquired some taste in the earlier part o f life.63
Taken together this group of the 'superior' or 'rich' -  that is to say, the middle and upper 
echelons -in  the comparison of civilised society to the lower stages of society, came to stand for
civilised society as such.
The progress of society had, then, led man further and further away from nature, 
recreating him as an increasingly 'artificial' being. 'Art itself is natural to man,' Ferguson 
observed: 'He is in some measure the artificer of his own frame, as well as his own fortune, and 
is destined, from the first age of his being, to invent and contrive.'64 'Custom/ John Taylor
61 Josiah Tucker, The Elements of Commerce and Theory of Taxes (1755), partly reprinted in S. Copley, Literature 
(1984), p. 116.
62 J. Richardson, An Essay (1725), pp. 27-8.
63 A. Smith, Wealth of Nations (1776/1999), vol. U, p. 371.
64 A. Ferguson, An Essay (1767/1995), p. 12.
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noted, 'becomes second nature'.65 6In the same manner, and partly in the same terms, Lord 
Monboddo emphasised that 'our nature is chiefly constituted of acquired habits, and (...) we 
are much more creatures of custom and art than of nature':
It is a common saying, that habit (meaning custom) is a second nature. I add, that it is more powerful than the f:n? 
and in a great measure destroys and absorbs the original nature: For it is the capital and distinguish^ characteristic 
o f our species, that we can make ourselves, as it were, over again so that the original nature in us can hardly be *em. 
and it is with the greatest difficulty that we can distinguish it from the acquired*
'A rt' and 'custom' were, of course, not equally natural to all men. In the case of the savages and 
vulgar, art and customs had so very far from 'absorbed' the original nature. It was only in 
civilised man, that man's true nature, his artificial culture, fully showed itself. It was civilised 
man, who acted the part of the perfect specimen in the human realm, the prototype of men, 
and it was his allegedly exclusive characteristics -  the refined manners, the artificial character, 
the extended faculty of reason -  which were brought to the fore when mankind was compared 
with the brute creation.
Between Culture and Nature
Every type of human organisation which had developed throughout history would, then, be 
conceptualised as 'states of society' linked together on a hierarchical scale, ranging between the 
two extremes of nature and culture, respectively: savage, barbarian, feudal and civilised state 
of society. Nature and culture were hereby linked together in a sequential fashion with the 
savages and the vulgar together accounting for the link between man and the brutes.
At a number of different levels, nature and culture, however, also shared some basic 
features, and in a sense, it was exactly the sharing of these features, which allowed the writers 
to connect the natural and cultural realms in the first place. To begin with, in the analysis of the 
progress of society, the social thinkers relied on a few determinants -  without comparison the 
most important of these was the propensity to gain, which was uniformly located in human 
nature, and uniformly seen as the agent which set the accumulation of property in motion. This 
process itself was also taken to evolve along a common course, introducing ranks into society' 
and altering the character of men in similar ways regardless of where or when such alterations 
took place. Preconditioning a uniformity of human nature and a uniformity' of historical 
causation, social history was represented as unfolding in a consistent and regular universe just 
like natural history, or maybe more accurately: both social and natural history' unfolded in the 
same regular universe. Indeed, just as nature was understood to operate in a providentially 
ordained universe, the regularity of the human realm was explained with reference to the
65 J. Taylor, Travels (1799), vol. I, p. 123.
66 L. Monboddo, O f the Origin (1774), vol. L pp. 24-5; emph. in org.
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working of providential forces. Through the human propensities, Providence had thus in the 
progress of society, as Smith explained, like an "invisible hand" worked "to promote an end 
which was no part of his [man's] intention",67 by making man gradually realise society in its 
most happy, that is, civilised state: "we necessarily pursue the most effectual means for 
promoting the happiness of mankind, and may therefore be said, in some sense, to co-operate 
with the Deity, and to advance as far as in our power, the plan of Providence."68 Both the 
natural and the social order, then, were considered preconditioned, so to say, by the same 
providential force.
Secondly, the analogies between nature and culture went further than that. Drawing on 
Lévi-Strauss" theory of totemism, where the focus is directed towards the interrelations 
between series of natural species and series of social groups at a structural level,69 we might at 
first note a striking homology between the classification of animals and the classification of 
men. A homology that was, indeed, made explicit in the contemporary linking of brutes and 
mankind on the Great Chain of Being. Although the Great Chain of Being was never positively 
reconstructed in the zoologists" taxonomies, the natural world was still, at least in cosmological 
theory, conceptualised within zoology as a hierarchy of increasingly more perfect forms of 
beings, just like the states of human societies, which were portrayed as progressively more 
perfect forms of society within social thinking. Within both domains, the terms of order were 
understood through the same medium of a hierarchy of perfection.
Indeed, hierarchy was understood both in the natural and social domain as the sine qua 
non of order. We have already seen how order aka hierarchy was contrasted with a threatening 
and destructive chaos in the natural domain, and we have seen how central this idea was to the 
zoologists' conceptualisation of species, to their understanding of the relationship between 
species, of ceconomia naturae, and of nature itself. A similar chain of associations, linking order 
to hierarchy and contrasting it with chaos, was fundamental to social analysis. By 
conceptualising contemporary society through a metaphor of a body or an engine, the different 
ranks were seen as analogous to the different body or mechanical parts: "Man", Ferguson hence 
observed, 'is only a part of a whole; and the praise we think due to his virtue, is but a branch of 
that more general commendation we bestow on the member of a body, on the part of a fabric 
or engine, for being well fitted to occupy its place, and to produce its effect.'70 Like every group 
in the natural world was conceived to be intimately bound up with the whole, and the whole, 
inversely, was seen to be dependent on every part, so also in human society. Maybe a bit
67 A. Smith, Wealth o f  Nations (1776/1999), vol. II, p. 32.
68 Adam Smith, The Theory o f  Moral Sentiments (1759), III.5.7, quoted in A. Skinner, 'Analytical Introduction' (1999), 
p. 24. See ibid., pp. 18-26, for a more through discussion of this point in Smith's theory.
69 C. Lévi-Strauss, Totemism (1964).
70 A. Ferguson, An Essay (1767/1995), p. 59.
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ironically given the emphasis on the transformative potential of man in the analysis of the 
progress of societies, in portraying the hierarchy within British society, it became of prime 
importance that every part was kept in place for order to be maintained: "since it is necesssary 
[sic] in the present constitution of things that order and distinction should be kept up in the 
world/ Joseph Addison thus stated,
w e should be happy if those who enjoy the upper stations in it would endeavour to surpass others in virtue as much 
as in rank, and by their humanity and condescension make their superiority easy and acceptable to those who are 
beneath them; and if, on the contrary, those who are in the meaner posts of life would consider how they may better 
their condition hereafter, and by a just deference and submission to their superiors, make them happy in those 
blessings with which Providence has thought fit to distinguish them.71
It was in connection with the maintenance of order within civilised society that the notion of
oeconomia humanae, touched upon in Chapter 6, gained importance. In order to achieve the
same ends as oeconomia naturae, namely the maintenance of an order in equilibrium,
oeconomia humanae had, as we also saw, to work through different means, because man, in
contrast to the animals, might be induced to act contrary to order due to his possession of self-
interests and passions. In contrast to in nature, chaos was considered a real threat to human
society.72 Praising moderation and self-restraint, within the human realm the doctrine of
oeconomia was turned into a moral device directed towards preserving such an equilibrium as
would naturally exist in the natural world. Using nature's equilibrium as an ideal for human
society, the moral was brought out loud and clear in John Gay's very popular Fables. For
instance, in this story where Jove the God had observed discontentment among the animals
and called everyone together in order to leam the reason for the prevailing chaos. At first a
description of the chaos:
The lion crav'd the fox's art;
The fox, the lion's force and heart;
The cock implor'd the pigeon's flight,
Whose wings were rapid, strong, and light:
The pigeon strantg of wing depis'd 
And the cock's matchless valour priz'd:
The fishes wish'd to graze the plain;
The beasts, to skim beneath the main.
Thus, envious of another's state 
Each blam'd the partial hand of Fate.
Then the antidote:
The bird of heav'n then cry'd aloud,
Jove bids disperse the murm'ring crowd;
The god rejects your idle prayers.
Would ye, rebellious mutineers,
Entirely change your name and nature,
And be the very envy'd creature?
71 Addison, The Spectator (Nov. 10,1711), reprinted in G. A. Aitken, The Spectator (1898), p. 245.
72 The great concern with this threat, and analyses of the sources of a possible chaos, were recurrent themes in a 
variety of moral, political, and periodical writings from this period. See, for instance, Anonymous, The Mirrour 
(1759); Anonymous, The New Oeconomy of Human Life (1766); E. Watkinson, An Essay upon Oeconomy (1763).
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What, silent all, and none content!
Be happy then, and learn content:
Not imitate the restless mind,
And proud ambition of mankind.73
The hierarchical order in society should be maintained through oeconomical means similar to 
the hierarchic order in nature.
Although, in sum, it would be wrong to argue that the zoological conceptualisation of 
nature's order defined the contemporary conceptualisation of society, or vice versa, there was 
still a significant exchange between social and zoological analysis at the level of examples and 
metaphors, and, more fundamentally, a shared ground of conceptions about die order of the 
universe and the hierarchical nature of that order.
But at a certain point, the homologies break down. Even though the two domains 
might unfold in the same kind of universe, and even though they might be structurally 
homologous, and even continuous, from another perspective, nature also differed funda­
mentally from culture, particularly as culture was embodied in civilised man; We get a clear 
indication of the source of the difference in the very notion of the progress of society, in the 
possibility of the transformation of the character of man through that progress, and in the 
different means through which ceconomia had to work in the natural and social world, 
respectively. In contrast to nature which was created once and for all at the beginning of time 
and had simply continued to 'be/ culture, as we have seen, was man-made, and always in the 
process of 'becoming/ In the course of history, the line of distinction between nature and 
culture, animals and man, had migrated, as in the progress of history man had moved 
increasingly further away from nature, and had become increasingly absorbed by culture.
Given vs. man-made, being vs. becoming: Ultimately, the opposition between nature 
and culture can be reduced in substantial terms, to an opposition between a static nature and a 
transformative culture. Whereas nature, as we have seen, was essentially unchanging, species 
having remained invariably the same since the Creation, and the individual animals, as a result 
of their instincts and the natural ceconomic laws guiding their actions, stayed in their 
preordained place and through their acts of procreation, preying, destruction, and death 
contributed to the reproduction of the same order, whereas nature, in brief, was essentially 
static and its order unchanging, it was in the human nature to change. The 'propensities' in 
man to barter, exchange, and gain, his passions for things, his strive to develop his 
understanding and faculty of reason, were presented as agents of change, and as agencies in 
the formation of what was quintessentially human in man. In the history of human society, 
these propensities had ushered man into accumulating property, to dividing into ranks, to 
forming civil governments to protect that property, and thereby, though not necessarily with
73 J. Gay, Fables (1750), pp. 12-3.
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his own knowledge, they had led him to form societies, which were increasingly more complex 
and more perfect. Man's 'emblem', Ferguson concluded, 'is a passing stream, not a stagnating 
pool'.74 True, the transformative power of culture was most dearly visible at the level of 
individuals or sodeties while the stasis of nature was invariably displayed at the level of 
spedes and above. But within the animal spedes, no transformation of individuals or 
populations was observed to take place, equivalent to that which the sodal thinkers found in 
their analyses of the history of man. The progress of sodety would, furthermore, be seen as an 
elevation of the entire spedes, even though it did not pertain to every individual, or even every 
human sodety:
Nature [...] we shall presume, having given to every animal its mode of existence, its dispositions and manner of 
life, had dealt equally with those of the human race [...] . Yet one property by which man is distinguished, had been 
sometimes overlooked in the account of his nature, or had only served to mislead our attention. In other dasses of 
animals, the individual advances from infancy to age or maturity; and he attains, in  the compass of a single life, to 
all the perfection his nature can reach: but, in the human kind, the spedes has a progress as well as the individual; 
they built in every subsequent age on foundations formerly laid; and, in a succession o f years, tend to a perfection in 
the application of their faculties, to which the aid of long experience is required, and to which many generations 
must have combined their endeavours.75
What, ultimately, distinguished mankind from the brutes was the transformative power of his 
culture, then. Whereas nature remained in stasis, man had a potential for change and, as we 
have seen, that change took as a rule, the shape of a movement away from nature -  from the 
brute-like man in a natural state -  towards an increasingly still more artificial and cultured, 
and for the man of learning, as we will see shortly, even spiritual state. In substantial terms, 
through the progress of human history, man came to differ from the brute creation, because the 
brutes, encapsulated by their preordained being, remained simple matter, whereas man in his 
least natural and most cultured state, had remade himself. When civilised man was made to 
represent men in the species definition, the brutes, entirely trapped in their nature, entirely 
determined by their instincts, became rather an inverted reflection than a model for the human 
kind.76
B etw een  S p ir it  and Matter
In a sense, it was exactly the space thus opened up through the progress of society between 
nature and culture, which allowed for the study of zoology in the shape it took in the 
eighteenth-century British context. This is not to say that the steadily increasing influx of 
animals in one form or another in one way or another during the seventeenth and eighteenth
74 A. Ferguson, An Essay (1767/1995), p. 10.
75 Ibid.
76 Also cf. M. Bloch and J. H. Bloch, 'Women and the Dialectics of Nature' (1980), p. 31.
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centuries, the circulation of them between naturalists, and the meticulous studies of them did 
not also contribute derisively to making eighteenth-century study of zoology possible. The 
networks of communication within the Republic of Letters, the engaging of sailors and 
travellers as collectors in the service of knowledge, the accumulation of collections of animals 
under private or public aegis, the itinerant showmen with their lions and elephants, bears and 
tigers giving the zoologists a rare glimpse of exotic animals live, the servants and slaves sent 
into the field at home or abroad to procure specimens, the gentlemen and their wives going 
hunting themselves for specimens, the zoologists' scrupulous observations, descriptions and 
depictions of animals, the fashioning of facts, and their notions and practices of building 
taxonomic systems -  all these ventures did, of course, derisively help to make the study of 
zoology possible as an investigation based on the examination of discrete and particular 
matters of facts, and aimed at uncovering nature's order, however imperfectly, with taxonomic 
means. But it was the terms of the relationship between nature and culture with all that 
implied which shaped both the ontological and epistemological dimension of the zoological 
endeavour, which shaped the way these animals were approached, studied and understood.
During the early modem period, nature had been reconfigurated, as we have seen. The 
Renaissance pipeline between nature and man in the shape of Ideas had been severed, and at 
the same time, to the eyes of man nature had been transformed into an autonomous empirical 
being, an assemblage of matters of facts that were only comprehensible as physical objects. 
Although the zoologists themselves never articulated it in this way, it could be said that nature 
thereby had become objectified, or maybe more accurately: objectifiable. But it had only 
become so to a certain extent and only to the eyes and minds of some particular men. Nature 
was, as we have seen, not only seen as a material, objectifiable being. Beneath the visible 
surface and concealed from the gaze and understanding of man, there was an ideational order, 
defining the essence of visible forms. As a mondo duplex, nature was only entirely 
comprehensible from the perspective of angels.
Even so, certain men were in a better position than others to observe and describe 
matters of fact, to compare and form taxonomic systems, to understand nature and produce 
knowledge about it. In the course of this study, in a more fragmentary fashion, we have seen 
how the zoologists established an epistemologically privileged position for themselves and 
their study of nature, and we have seen how this epistemological positioning drew on existing 
socio-cultural divides in most cases. In the introductory chapter, we saw how the zoologists, as 
generally learned men, positioned themselves at the margins of Polite Society as gentlemen, 
yes, but also distinguished from other gentlemen by virtue of their learning. In Part I, we have 
seen how in their encounter with animals, the zoologists distanced their mode of detachedly 
turning them into facts from both that of the 'vulgar people' -  the servants, peasants,
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mechanics, blacks, Indians, slaves -  who at the sight of curious animals all too easily 
responded with inappropriate wonder, and also from that of the affluent connoisseurs, whose 
fetishistic pleasure was equally at odds with the course of knowledge. We have, furthermore, 
in Part II seen how the zoologists as they turned the facts of matter into transcendent 
taxonomic categories again distinguished themselves from the vulgar and, hence, just as they 
had established an exclusive experiential space in the fashioning of facts, also established an 
exclusive cognitive space for analysing them. In the light of the indigenous theory of the dose 
relationship between sodo-economic position and personality, touched upon above, the 
demarcation of the zoologists' space of manoeuvring vis-à-vis the vulgar comes as no surprise: 
That the vulgar were deemed incapable of producing acceptable knowledge -  of turning 
matter into facts, of transcending the world of empirical matter by help of reason -  was only 
logical given the conception of them as cognitively almost brutes. Perhaps, it is more surprising 
that neither all of the zoologists' sodo-economic brethren in Polite Sodety, nor all of their 
sodo-economic superiors of the highest echelons, were readily accepted as reliable spokesmen 
for reality, as we have also seen. In order to understand the zoologist's positioning within the 
'dvilised' part of sodety, and hence to understand the exdusiveness of the zoologist's 
epistemological position vis-à-vis nature, we will have to inquire further into the formation of 
that man who was able to objectify nature to the greatest possible extent; who was able to 
approach nearest to the perspective of the angels.
In the account of human history it was, as we have seen, dvilised sodety which made 
the study of nature or, indeed, the study of anything, possible: With the accumulation of 
property followed that leisure, which fadlitated both the development of understanding and 
extensive, time-consuming studies. Indeed, studying would, espedally by the scholars 
themselves, be highlighted as the supreme sign of dvilisation: 'It is by such pursuits', Richard 
Kentish said with reference to natural history,
that the human intellect asserts its native dignity, and claims the ascendancy which it possesses. Every subordinate 
spedes of the animal creation acts contended in a lesser sphere, and performs the part assigned it with instinctive 
quietude, but man contemplates on the things wound him, surveys, examines, and admires.77
Through the 'ARTS and SCIENCES' Ephraim Chambers likewise explained to the King in the
dedication of his Cyclopaedia to the majesty,
the mind is redaimed from its native wilderness, and enriched with sentiments which lead to virtue and glory. 'Tis 
they, in fine, that make the difference between Your Majesty's subjects, and the Savages of Canada, or the Cape of 
Good Hope.78
Civilised society, although providing the necessary context for the pursuit of knowledge, 
however, did not in itself turn every man, not even those among of the civilised ranks -  the 
middle and upper echelons -  into a man who could pursue studies with credibility. Indeed,
77 R. Kentish, An Essay on the Method (1787), pp. 9-10.
78 E. Chambers, Cyclopaedia (1741), voi. I, Dedication (unpaged); cap. in  org.
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those passions and self-interests of the middle and higher echelons which made civilised 
society go round were perceived by the learned to be at odds with the pursuit of knowledge, 
however refined they might have become. We have already in seen Chapter 4, how, for 
instance, George Edwards declared 'these depraved times of pleasure, sensuality and 
dissipation' to be in discord with the 'spirit for the promotion of learning and arts'.79 'Reason 
and appetite are', Oliver Goldsmith also observed in his Enquiry into the Present State o f Polite 
Learning, 'masters of our revels in turn; and as we incline to the one, or pursue the other, we 
rival angels, or imitate the brutes. In the pursuit of intellectual pleasure, lies every virtue; of 
sensual, every vice'.80 Whereas passions and progress could be reconciled within the 
sociological understanding of society, passions and knowledge could not be reconciled within 
the epistemological context of learning 81
From an epistemological point of view, the problem with giving in to pleasure and 
sensuality was, ultimately, that the quest for the gratification of private prerogatives and self- 
interests limited a m an's perspective. In the words of Dr Johnson:
I have often amused m yself with thinking how different a place London is to different people. They, whose narrow 
minds are contracted to the consideration of some one particular pursuit, view it only through that medium. A 
politician thinks of it m erely as the seat of government in its different departments; a grazier, as a vast market for 
cattle; a mercantile m an, as a place where a prodigious deal of business is done upon 'Change; a dramatic 
enthusiast, as the grand scene of theatrical entertainments; a man of pleasure, as an assemblage of taverns, and the 
great emporium for ladies of easy virtue. But the intellectual man is struck with it, as comprehending the whole of 
human life in all its variety, the contemplation of which is inexhaustible.®
Gvilised man might have escaped the brute passions of the vulgar and the savages, but 
thereby he had not automatically gained an angel's perspective. In order to understand how 
this perspective might be approached we must take a closer look at the formation of man as a 
rational being.
As a homo duplex man might be an intersection of spirit and matter, but whereas his 
body, like the rest of nature, was cast as a necessary point of departure, an unavoidable 
presentia, his spiritual capacity was considered to be a matter of potentia. 'Their operations', 
Ferguson said w ith reference to reasoning and thinking, 'alone discover them: when un­
applied, they lie hid even from the person to whom they pertain.'83 It took not only culture, but 
culture in the form of education to bring reason to the fore. In comparing the infant child to the 
brutes, Lord Monboddo explained in more detail how such education would work:
79 G. Edwards, Gleanings o f  Natural History (1758-64), vol. II, pp. vi-vii.
80 O. Goldsmith, 'A n  Enquiry' (1759/1966), p. 337.
81 And, indeed, passions and civil government were also hard to reconcile. Hence, John Brown, for instance, 
seeing idleness and self-interests as the primary characteristics of the highest echelons, that is of the people in 
government, argued in the middle of the eighteenth century that the country was in a 'miserable state', because 
the politicians only thought of gratifying their own interests. J. Brown, An Estimate of the Manners (1758), vol. I- 
H .
82 Samuel Johnson quoted in J. Boswell, Life o f  Samuel Johnson (1791/1999), p. 215.
83 A. Ferguson, An Essay (1767/1995), p. 30.
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[M]an, we know, may, by education and culture continued for many years, be transformed almost into an animal of 
another spedes. Thus, with respect to his body, though he is undoubtedly by nature a terrestrial animal, yet he may 
be so accustomed to the water, as to become as perfectly amphibious as a seal or an otter. -  And, with respect to the 
mind, it is impossible to say how far science and philosophy may cany it.M
It was through education of the mind that a man could be prepared for the pursuit of 
knowledge:
O f all animals capable of culture man is the most ductile. By instruction, imitation, and habit, his mind may be 
moulded into any form. It may be exalted by science and art to a degree of knowledge, of which the vulgar and 
uninformed have not the most distant conception. The reverse is melancholy. When the human mind is left to its 
own operations, and deprived of almost every opportunity of social information, it sinks so low, that it is nearly 
rivalled by the most sagacious brutes.84 5
With reason conceptualised as a potentia which had to be educated to surface and work, 
education became, at least from the scholars' perspective, the difference which made the 
difference between men. As Goldsmith put it:
It is this difference of pursuit, which marks the morals and characters of mankind; which lays the line between the 
enlightened philosopher, and the half-taught citizen; between the civil citizen and the illiterate peasant; between the 
law-obeying peasant, and the wandering savage of Africa, an animal less mischievous indeed, than the tyger, 
because endued with fewer powers of doing mischief. The man, the nation, must therefore be good, whose chiefest 
luxuries consist in refinement of reasonf.]86
When it came to learning, the potential for change was, again seen from the point of view of 
the scholars themselves, thought to be vast:
It is a calling, which being duly followed will most sever us from the vulgar sort of men, and advance us above the 
common pitch; endewing us with light to see farther than other men, disposing us to afleet better things, and to 
slight those meaner objects of human desire, on which men commonly dote: freeing us from the erroneous conceits, 
and from the perverse affections of common people. ( ... I]f a man by serious study doth acquire a dear and solid 
judgment of things [...] he thereby becometh another kind of thing much different from those brutish men (beasts 
o f the people) who blindly follow the motions of their sensual appetite or the suggestions of their fancy, or their 
mistaken prejudice.87
It was the education of the mind, then, which elevated the learned above other men, and, 
potentially, propelled him on his way towards the angels:
there is no doubt but the human nature may, by such culture, be so exalted, as to come near to what we conceive of 
superior natures, and perhaps even to possess the rank of such as are immediately above us in the chain of being.88
On this account, the scholars, though not necessarily the richest or of aristocratic breed, had
moved the furthest away from the brute creation and the nearest towards the next link on the
Great Chain of Being, the angels. Although the King and the Lords would occupy the highest
rank on the human hierarchy, when that was conceptualised as ranging between nature and
culture, in the social thinkers' analyses, by substituting 'spirit/ or, which was the same,
'reason' with culture and bringing the angels into the picture, the men of learning constructed
a somewhat different hierarchy in which it became possible for the learned to transgress the
84 L. Monboddo, O f the Origin (1774), vol. I, p. 22
85 W. Smellie, The Philosophy o f Natural History (1790), vol. II, p. 287.
86  O. Goldsmith, 'An Enquiry1 (1759/1966), p. 337.
87 I. Barrow, O f Industry (1693), pp. 163-4.
88 L. Monboddo, O f the Origin (1774), vol. I, pp. 22*3.
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position of aristocratic gentlemen: '[T]his at least is worth the consideration of those who call 
themselves gentlemen/ John Locke thus observed,
that however they may think credit, respect, power, and authority the concomitants of their birth and fortune, yet 
they will find all these still carried away from them, by men of lower condition who surpass them in knowledge. 
They who are blind, will always be led by those that see, or else fall into the ditch: and he is certainly the most 
subjected, the most enslaved, who is so in his understanding.*9
'How many gradations may be traced between a stupid Huron, or a Hottentot, and a profound
philosopher?' William Smellie asked rhetorically, also instituting the philosopher as the
paragon of mankind: 'Here the distance is immense';89 0 'From this lowest degree in the
Hottentot/ Soame Jenyns likewise stated after he had described the Hottentots' link to the
brutes, 'reason, with the assistance of learning and science, advances, through the various
stages of human understanding, which rise above each other, till in a Bacon or a Newton it
attains the summit/91 92From this perspective, the superior link on the human scale, connecting
man to the angels, as Pope in Essay on Man also indicated became -  not the king, but -  the
wisest of the men of learning:
Superior being, when of late they saw,
A mortal man unfold all nature's law,
Admired such wisdom in an earthly shape,
And show'd a Newton as we show an ape.M
Learning, then, decisively helped to widen that gap between nature and culture, between 
ignorant brutes and rational man, which the progress of society had at first introduced. 
Although the accumulation of property and the formation of civilised society certainly 
provided the grand framework for the eighteenth-century understanding of the progress of 
learning, the conceptualisation of the privileged epistemological position of the learned within 
civilised society relied to a very large extent on education or Bildung, rather than on property.93
In this connection, the chain of associations linking education to credibility discussed in 
Chapter 3, is worth remembering: 'In the pursuit of intellectual pleasures, lies every virtue/ we 
saw Goldsmith note above. 'A  habit of observation refines our feelings/ William Smellie 
likewise stressed, 'It [...] prevents idle or vicious propositions, and exalts the mind to a love of
89 J. Locke, Essay (1706/1997), pp. 626-7/IV,xx,6; editor's note excluded.
90 W. Smellie, The Philosophy o f Natural History (1790), vol. II, p. 431.
91 Soame Jenyns, quoted in A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain o f  Being (1948), p. 197. On the common use of the 
'Hottentots' as idioms of the lowest link at the human scale, see W. D. Jordan, White over Black (1968).
92 Pope, Essay on Man, quoted in S. J. Gould, 'Chimp on the Chain' (1983), p. 27.
93 The use of the German concept here is intentional. As also indicated in Ch. 1, the British scholars' use of 
learning, rather than primarily social or institutional position, to distinguish themselves from society, closely 
resembles the mode of positioning of scholars of the contemporary German intelligentsia, as described by 
Norbert Elias: 'W hat legitimised this eighteenth-century middle-class intelligentsia to itself, what supplied the 
foundation of its self-image and pride, was situated beyond economics and politics. It existed in what was 
called for precisely this reason das rein Geistige (the purely spiritual), in books, scholarship, religion, art, 
philosophy, in the inner enrichment, the intellectual formation (Bildung) of the individual, primary through the 
medium of books, in the personality.' N. Elias, The Civilising Process (2000), p. 24; emph. in  org.
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virtue, and of rational entertainment/94 Credibility and the epistemological ability to transcend 
oneself and take a perspective from nowhere merged in the almost angelic position of the 
learned by virtue of his education, including his disciplining of the mind.
Even though as stressed in Chapter 1, there were no dearly defined, institutionalised 
divides between the men of learning and Polite Sodety, even though, indeed, the men of 
learning were vaguely positioned at the margins of Polite Sodety, with the introduction of 
Bildung as the most important agent in the creation of the naturalists' epistemologically 
privileged position learning was becoming visible as a separate division within dvilised 
sodety, as also both Ferguson and Smith took note of.95
Although learning and education itself might explain the epistemologically privileged 
position of the zoologists from the natives' point of view, as historians, we have to go one step 
further. Not only the ideas of the being of the scholar, but also his actions, the whole corpus of 
practices which has been traced in the present work, impliritly or explidtly, helped to 
distinguish the learned from the rest, by framing and reinforcing the zoologists' privileged 
stance, at the same time as zoology was produced. As the zoologist disdplined his gaze and 
curbed his passions he was -  in contrast to the vulgar and the connoisseurs -  enabled to treat 
the animals as senseless matter, and this, in turn, made it possible through representational 
means to transform them into matters of facts, zoologically standardised working objects, both 
in description and depiction. Distinguishing carefully between mental image and material 
object -  and thus again delimiting an exclusive space for knowledge production -  the zoologist 
could work further on these matters of facts. Comparing specimens, determining similarities 
and differences between them, and drawing on a whole cosmology of nature's order and way 
of working, he was able to form species and build up an entire taxonomic scheme. In 
conjunction, these techniques of observation, methods of representation, and modes of 
transcending matters of facts contributed to establishing the epistemologically privileged 
position of the zoologist both vis-à-vis society, by distinguishing the zoologists sodo* 
epistemologically, and vis-à-vis nature, by placing him in a position external to nature from 
where knowledge could be produced.
Even for the most learned, taking up such an external stance to nature was only 
possible to a certain extent. However far from nature education might have, brought the 
zoologist, nature was never entirely objectified in their works. Not only did man, however
94 W. Smellie, The Philosophy o f  Natural History (1790), vol. I, p. vii.
95 In Smith's partly prophetic words: 'In the progress of society, philosophy or speculation becomes, like every 
other employment, the principal or sole trade and occupation of a particular class of citizens. Like every other 
employment too, it is subdivided into a great number of different branches, each of which affords occupation to 
a peculiar tribe or class of philosophers; and this subdivision of employment in philosophy, as well as in every 
other businesses, improves dexterity, and saves time/ A. Smith, Wealth o f  Nations (1776/1999) vol. I, p. 115; cf. A. 
Ferguson, An Essay (1767/1995), p. 174.
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civilised and educated he might have become, also always carry nature within him -  in the 
shape of the embodied sense organs, passions and self-interests, and the humanly imperfect 
reason -  which impeded him from fully taking up a perspective from beyond. But neither was 
nature itself, from the zoologists' point of view, entirely objectifiable. As a mondo duplex, the 
world of observable matter concealed cardinal secrets from the vision and understanding of 
man -  the secret of life, the defining essence of beings, the divine order of the world. In the 
mondo duplex, only the surface was material and hence, accessible to man; its ideational, 
essential dimension remained principally unobjectifiable, and some of the questions put to this 
nature -  such as the precise nature of species and their mutual relations -  remained impossible 
for man to answer with certainty. Striving towards the position of the angels at the margins of 
Polite Society in the shape of, for the present, the perfection of the human kind in history, the 
zoologist remained still too much of an animal himself to fully comprehend the being of 
species and their divine order. The nature of nature made its complete objectification 
impossible because the being of man impeded him from entirely escaping the nature within 
him.
Through the study of animals the zoologist might be enabled to describe them with 
factual accuracy, to compare their physical traits and to establish taxonomic systems somewhat 
inaccurately displaying their visible interrelations, and on the basis of these studies he might 
see man, and in particular civilised and educated man, reflected in the mirror of nature as the 
most perfect being, the Lord of terrestrial creation.
But in his need for self-discipline, for critical strategies of reading, and for remaining 
vague and inaccurate in his building of taxonomic systems the British empiricist zoologist 
would also see his own imperfections reflected in his knowledge of nature, and see his own 
lowly position on the universal scale of beings displayed. 'To the great Creator of an universe, 
of orbs behind orbs, of suns beyond suns, through all the regions of unbound space/ a writer 
in Monthly Review observed in his review of John Hill's Essays in Natural History , 'we, who 
pride ourselves as lords of this creation, may be inconsiderable as the minutest worms.'96 From 
the point of view of superior beings, it seemed likely that man would appear as a mere 
curiosity, not unlike the way that strange animals would appear to man: '
There is no doubt, that Beings of a superior order regard him as the greatest novelty and morace of all that is new 
and wonderful in earth or heaven. To them it m ust be a spectacle equally astonishing and ludicrous, to behold a 
little, pert, two-legged insect, not yet emerged from its aurelia state, or near so stout and alert as many of its kindred 
tribes, thus, by infinite address and perpetual intrigue, flyly acquiring the sovereignty of the world.97
Confronted with 'orbs immeasurably great/ also learned men became, as George Edwards
observed after having dedicated his fourth volume of A Natural History to God, no less, 'Atoms
96 M onthly Review , no. 7 (July, 1752), p. 62.
97 Anonymous, Beauties o f  Natural History (1777), p. 336.
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of Imperfection'.98 With both man and nature stretched out between spirit and matter, 
zoological knowledge came to reflect not only man's terrestrial perfections but also his 
cosmological shortcomings. And this point of view had consequences for the knowledge the 
zoologist could have about the animal kingdom, and the way he could obtain it, as I have 
attempted to show in the present thesis.
Although the two histories, that of the zoologists and that of zoology, can be distin* 
guished with reference both to their objectives and results -  the first concerned with the 
epistemological space of manoeuvring of the zoologists and resulting in the establishing of a 
sorio-epistemologically privileged position, the second concerned with the transformation of 
raw nature into knowledge and resulting in the description and classification of animals -  they 
necessarily preconditioned each other. As nature was transformed into taxonomic knowledge 
in practice, the zoologist positioned himself epistemologically; as the zoologist from his 
epistemologically privileged position approached nature in practice, he was enabled to turn 
nature into knowledge of a particular kind. In the structuring practices, self and world were 
fashioned in tandem, and came to make sense from the same point of view.
T he E nd of Natural His t o r y 's  Zoology
Zoology in the natural history shape it had taken during the long eighteenth century did not, 
like neither the Renaissance mode of study had done, disappear from one day to another, or 
even from one decade to the next. The natural history study of animals, as a study of animals' 
perceptible traits, of species as static self-reproducing groups, defined by an ideational essence 
in an unchanging universe and classifiable in a taxonomy, lingered on for decades to come. 
Indeed, Charles Darwin could, without exaggeration, note in introduction to 77tf Origin of 
Species in 1859 that, 'Until recently the great majority of naturalists believed that species were 
immutable productions, and had been separately created.'99 Although most naturalists became 
more specialised in their field of study, many of them basically continued the work of their 
eighteenth-century predecessors well into the nineteenth century. But not only were such 
natural history studies of animals increasingly relegated to the margins of science, as it were to 
become, during the first half of the nineteenth century. As new approaches to the study of 
living beings emerged at the turn of the nineteenth-century -1775 till 1825 are often given as
98 G. Edwards, A Natural History o f Birds (1743-51), vol. iv, Preface (unpaged).
99 C. Darwin, Origin o f  Species (1859/1979), p. 53. See also P. F. Stevens, 'Metaphors and Typology (19S-I) for a 
discussion o f conceptual continuities in, especially, botanical dassification, and C. McOuat, 'Cataloguing 
Power' (2001), for a discussion of the spedes concept, and the battles over it, at the Bntish Museum in the 
nineteenth-century.
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the dates of the transformation of the field100 -  new modes of investigation, also came into 
being, new fields of investigation were opened up, new kinds of questions posed, and the 
conception of nature, the position of the scientist, as he soon became, and the study of nature 
were gradually reconfigured once again. This is not the place to trace those changes in depth, 
but let me, nevertheless, indicate more tentatively some of the major transformations which 
occurred during the first half of the nineteenth century both in the positioning of the naturalist 
and in their understanding and approach to nature, if only to account for the end of that type 
of zoological investigation which has been studied in the present thesis.101
At a first glance, the studies of nature emerging in the nineteenth century appear to 
have been characterised by an exuberant diversification. In contrast to natural history, which 
had presented a rather unified field for the study of nature, and in contrast to the zoologists 
who to a very large extent, as we have seen, were engaged in exploring the same kinds of 
questions, the study of nature became increasingly specialised as the nineteenth century 
progressed. An abundance of new disciplines arouse, each defined in some measure by their 
own distinct interests, their own methods of study, their own horizons; and new, specialised 
societies and journals come into existence, reflecting the new trends and interests in the 
research. This very diversification and specialisation can in itself be read as one sign of the field 
transformed. Not only did such specialisation, as we will see, allow the scientists to pursue 
their studies in new ways, but in some measure, it also indicated the coming into being of a 
new institutional setting for the pursuit of science. Though happening later in Britain than, in 
particular, in France and Germany, the new natural sciences were incorporated into the 
universities, especially from the 1830s onward. By the final decades of the nineteenth century, 
science had become a vocation everywhere,102 and the education of the future scientist had 
been removed from the more vague terrain of Bildung to a well-defined university training.103 
By then, Ferguson and Smith's vision of establishing a special profession for the study of 
science had to a large extent been realised. In the process of institutionalisation, the 'right to 
control of the exercise7 of studies was increasingly removed from the amorphous Republic of
100 Both Michel Foucault in 77te Order o f  Things (1970), p. 221, and, following him, Wolf Lepenies in  Das Ende der 
Naturgeschichte (1976), p. 16, give this half century as the timeframe for the transformation of natural history 
into biology. Both, however, focus in their studies mainly on changes in a French and German context, where 
the new approaches were developed and more generally embraced earlier than in Britain; neither do any of 
these authors consider the continuation of the tradition of natural history studies. Though what they term 
biology, would certainly constitute the centre o f the studies of animals and plants from the 1830s onward, also 
in Britain, it did not entirely conquer the field until much later.
101 The following outline will mainly be based on W. Lepenies, Das Ende der Naturgeschichte (1976); idem., 'De 
l'histoire naturelle a l'histoire de la nature' (1979); P. L. Farber, Finding Order in Nature (2000); W. Coleman, 
'Llyell and the 'Reality' of Species' (1962); idem., Biology in the Nineteenth Century (1971); M. P. Winsor, Starfish, 
Jellyfish (1976); E. Mayr, The Growth o f  Biological Thought (1982).
102 As Max Weber puts it in  his 'Science as a Vocation' (1970).
103 See E. Mendelsohn, 'The Emergence of Science' (1964), and J. Ben-David, The Scientist's Role in Society (1971), for 
a discussion of the professionalisation of science and the different tempi it took in different European countries.
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Letters and learned societies, to a well-defined institutional setting and 'vested in the 
profession itself, as Joseph Ben-David has observed.104 Even though the inodes of 'control of 
the exercise' thereby did not necessarily become more transparent, the very idea of science as 
an autonomous field helped to position the scientist and validate his claims to truth. In contrast 
to the eighteenth-century naturalists, who had sodo-epistemologically demarcating their space 
of manoeuvring through comparisons with the ignorant vulgar and the partially blinded 
sensual men of Polite Society, and cosmologically through comparisons with animals and 
angels, in the basic demarcation of his space of manoeuvring, the scientist of the late 
nineteenth-century relied on a more simple distinction between science and non-sdence: the 
world of the universities and the rest. Sdence was becoming endosed, and to a greater extent 
the sdentist's claim to truth would be defined by parameters shaped, implidtly or explidtly, 
within the boundaries of that enclosure. However, in Britain it would take the whole of the 
nineteenth century these borders to consolidate. It is worth recalling here, that Darwin, for 
instance, was a man of independent means who, although having been educated at 
universities, did not write The Origin o f Species as a university sdentist. Though sdence was 
dosing in on itself, until the end of the nineteenth century, there was no necessary 
contradiction between being an 'amateur' and being a 'sdentist.' The gradual 
professionalisation of sdence helped to augment its spedalisation, however there was no 
simple relation between professionalisation and spedalisation, and the institutional setting of 
nineteenth-century sdence might best be characterised as a mixture of the older tradition of 
Learned Sorieties, the Republic of Letters and, with increasing force, the universities.
If we turn to the studies pursued within this complex institutional setting, although 
they appear confusingly diversified at a first glance, it is still possible to find unifying themes 
at both an empirical and an explanatory level. Empirically, we might identify two general 
trends, breaking with the main concern of the eighteenth-century naturalists with physical, 
perceptible characteristics of living beings: one, as Foucault has pointed out,105 opening up an 
internal space for study, the other an external space. In the following, I shall review these two 
general trends in turn in order to indicate the changes taking place in the conceptionalisation of 
both living beings and nature during the first half of the nineteenth century. Continuing my 
history of dassification in European thought, my primary focus will be on those changes, 
which paved the way for evolutionary theory, and I shall end with a discussion of Darwin, and 
his idea of spedes, higher-level taxa and natural dassification.
The internal space was mainly investigated in physiological studies, and in dose 
connection with this -  the two terms were virtually synonymous in the nineteenth-century106 -
104 Idem., 'The Profession of Science' (1972), p. 363.
105 M. Foucault, The Order o f  Things (1970), esp. pp. 263ff.
106 W. Coleman, Biology in the Nineteenth Century (1971), p. 18.
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anatomical studies. The main interest of physiology lay in the investigation of the vital 
functions of the 'organism/ as living beings would be known as, and when coupled with 
anatomy, in the examination of the relationship between the structure of the organs and their 
functions. Though we might find antecedents for such physiological investigations in an 
embryonic form in some late eighteenth-century British studies, and especially in the work on 
animal oeconomia by John Hunter,107 it was in the writings of George Cuvier that the 
conception of an animal as a functional whole, as an organism, was first most forcibly given 
shape.
As is well known, Cuvier's main thesis was that an animal constitutes a functional unit 
whose anatomy is determined by its relationship to its 'conditions of existence/ by which was 
meant that the anatomy of an animal was predicated upon its overall relationship to its general 
place in nature. 'The carnivore', as Coleman sums up Cuvier's argument was, for instance, 
'perfectly constructed for his place in the economy of nature. Keen senses, great speed, and 
fearsome claws and teeth were nicely suited to the pursuit, capture, and consumption of 
animal prey. The carnivore was created to fill such a role and thereby his construction and 
behaviour determined.'108 There was nothing new in this idea in itself. Indeed, we can see this 
idea as an elaboration of the eighteenth-century zoologists' conception of the divinely ordained 
construction of animals to occupy every place in nature, which I touched upon in Chapter 6. 
But whereas this adaptionistic perspective only played a secondary role in the eighteenth- 
century zoologists' explanation of the oeconomy of nature, in the writings of Cuvier, as well as 
in many of his contemporaries', it was brought to the fore. And it was, moreover and more 
crucially, coupled here with the new conception of the animal as a functional unit. 
Approaching the different anatomical parts of an animal as interrelated and interdependent, 
the animal was transformed into a functionally defined entity whose individual parts could not 
be understood and described independently. The idea of function had altered the conception of 
form.
With this conception of the animal as a functional whole, the animal was turned into an 
organism. No longer to be understood as an assemblage of morphological and anatomical 
traits, the organisation of the particular assembly of traits was in itself to become crucial, and 
the particular relations between form and function to be investigated in increasingly 
diversified physiological fields. Although most of the physiological studies of the nineteenth 
century, in contrast to Cuvier, did not take the entire animal (or man or plant) as its object, but 
merely a more restricted part of it -  the digestive system, the respiratory system, cell structure 
etc. -  they were generally based on the same conception of the animal (or plant) as an
107 See, especially, Stephen Cross's convincing argument for this in S. J. Cross, 'John Hunter' (1981), esp. pp. 28ff.
108 W. Coleman, Biology in the Nineteenth Century (1971), p. 18.
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integrated organism. As Henry Huxley said in common terms, organisms were 'living 
machines in action',109 and as J. S. Henslow specified, it was now 'the construction of the 
machinery by means of which life is enabled to act, and to produce its effect' which lay at the 
core of the physiological investigations.110
As is indicated in Henslow's statement, the transformation of animals and plants into 
organisms allowed the scientists to pursue a new set of questions, all centring on the grand 
question of life. 'Physiology' became, as Coleman concludes, 'the science whose special 
responsibility it is to study functions, the separate vital mechanisms of the organism as well as 
their collective effect, life itself.'111 By reshaping the focus, and by redefining animals and 
plants as organisms, it hence, became possible to address that question of life, which had been, 
principally, inscrutable to the eighteenth-century zoologist. The 'object of our researches is 
physical life/ Treviranus hence observed, "The first step towards meeting that objective must 
therefore be to answer the question, What is life? But just this question is the most difficult of 
all to answer/112
Answers to this question were sought within numerous specialised studies of the 
organism and its vital functions. The sites of respiration, the interrelations between, and the 
respiratory functions of lungs or gills, the blood and heart were investigated, and the cardiac 
movement and blood flow were explored. The complex production of heat and energy within 
the body would be examined in studies of how food was transformed to energy, how it was 
carried around and transmitted to the muscles, and how metabolism worked. Coupling 
physiological studies with chemistry, the study of the chemistry of foodstuff was initiated -  by 
1854 food would be divided into carbohydrate, fat, and protein, and the levels of energy in 
different kinds of foodstuff would be counted in joules and tabulated -  and the chemistry of 
digestion would enter into the physiological studies. The nervous transmissions and the 
glandular secretion would gain increasing attention, and so would studies of embryological 
development and of the structure of cells.
Within these specialised physiological studies, two fields in particular are of interest to 
us here because they entailed a redefinition of living beings and became of importance in 
classification: cellular and embryological studies, respectively. Starting with Xavier Bichat's 
studies of the tissue of pathological organs in the first decade of the nineteenth century, and 
acquiring a sharp expression in cellular studies in the 1840s, the organism was resolved into 
small, constitutional parts -  'tissue' in the words of Bichat and many of his contemporaries, 
and in later studies 'cells' and its parts -  'nucleus/ 'membrane/ 'cytoplasm/ and, designated in
109 Henry Huxley, quoted in ibid., p. 143.
110 J. S. Henslow, quoted in P. R. Sloan, 'Darwin, Vital Matter' (1986), p. 376.
111 W. Coleman, Biology in the Nineteenth Century (1971), p. 144.
112 Treviranus, quoted in ibid., p, 12
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1888, 'chromosomes/ Facilitated by technological improvements of the microscope, cellular 
physiology would gain increasing importance in the search for an answer to the question of 
'what is life/ as, in the words of the German physician and cellular pathologist Rudolf 
Virchow, the cell came to be seen as 'the last constant link in the great chain of mutually 
subordinated formations that form tissues, organs, systems, the individual/113 By the middle of 
the century, the cell had become the essential structural unit in the organism, and the body 
could now be understood and studied, as Farber says, as an 'organised system of cells/ where 
the vital functions could be related to 'chemical reactions occurring in cells/114
What is of crucial importance for the reconfiguration of the study of nature -  for that 
field which only towards the end of the nineteenth-century was to become known as 
'biology'115 -  was that at a cellular level, there was no significant distinction between plants and 
animals. The structure and formation of cells was found to be parallel in plants and animals, 
and the cell thus came to provide a unifying ground for the study of all living organisms. The 
previous distinction between mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdom, and as a result between 
mineralogy, botany, and zoology, was superseded by a distinction between inorganic and 
organic matter, with life now becoming the distinguishing criteria. A further consequence of 
this redefinition of the field of study was that also man could now be included 
unproblematically into the field of study. As a biological being, just like the plants and animals, 
composed of cells upon cells man, in principle, did not differ from other living organisms. 
Although civil history and sociological studies would not thereby necessarily be subsumed 
into the life sciences, the inclusion of man into the field of organic matter, nevertheless, opened 
up new avenues for the biological study of man, and the differences between men. It was, of 
course, during the latter part of the nineteenth century, following this redefinition of man as an 
organic being, that phrenology, craniology, anthropometries, etc. came into being.116
Within cellular studies special attention was given to generation, the constitution of the 
eggs and sperm in animals and their fusion and multiplication in the production of new 
individuals, and as the nineteenth century progressed, these studies were to influence the 
second branch of physiology I would like to call attention to here, namely embryology. Long 
before the embryo would be studied at a cellular level from the middle of the nineteenth 
century, at first, developed through more traditional physiological means, embryology had 
gained importance within the life science. In studies of the development of individual 
embryos, and comparative studies of different species of embryos, the developmental stages of
113 Rudolf Virchow, quoted in ibid,, p. 32.
114 P. L. Farber, Finding Order in Nature (2000), p. 78.
115 On the emergence and slow acceptance of 'biology' as a general designation for the life science, see J. A. Caron, 
"Biology' in the Life Sciences' (1988).
116 For a discussion of these new natural scientific approaches and their implications for the conceptualisation of 
man, see S. J. Gould, The Mismeasure o f  Man (1981).
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organisms were examined. Embryological studies are especially of interest to us here because 
they influenced taxonomic classification in two ways. Firstly, as Karl Ernst von Baer argued in 
the 1820s, the comparative embryological studies could assist the taxonomist in distinguishing 
characters that adult individuals truly had in common -  as these would develop from the same 
embryological parts -  from random similarities, which would originate from different 
embryological parts. More specifically, it was argued that individuals sharing structural 
similarities for a long period of time in their embryological development would be closely 
related taxonomically.
Secondly, the studies of embryological development might, but would in the first half 
of the nineteenth-century not necessarily be related to proto-evolutionary theories of the 
development of spedes. Most dearly formulated in the 'recapitulation doctrine/ as designated 
in the 1820s, it was argued that the individual development of an embryo recapitulated the 
progressive developmental stages of the adult forms; that ontogeny reflected phylogeny. In the 
words of Johann Friedrich Meckel:
The development of the individual organism obeys the same laws as the development of the whole animal series; 
that is to say, the higher animal, in its gradual evolution, essentially passes through the permanent organic stages 
which lie below it.117
I shall consider the full implications of this doctrine for the classification of organisms when I 
turn to the theory of Darwin. For now, it suffices to observe that with the emergence of 
embryological studies, the adult, perfect animal was no longer a natural and obvious prototype 
for the species as such. Bringing the development of the individual organism into focus 
facilitated a redefinition of the differences that made a difference within taxonomic 
classification. The organism was now not only to be understood as a 'whole' in a functional 
sense, but also in a developmental sense.
Before pursuing the implications of this reconceptualisation of animals and plants as 
organisms for the classification of both, especially in the writings of Darwin, let me first take 
note of the other general trend in nineteenth-century studies of nature: the inquiries into the 
external space of the relationship between an organism and its environment. We have already 
seen above how Cuvier, drawing on an older, more marginal tradition, gave attention to the 
general relationship between an organism and its 'condition of existence/ More specialised 
studies of local flora and fauna, such as Edward Bancroft's on South American Guiana, Gilbert 
White's study on Selbome, Thomas Pennant's on Britain, Hindustan, and Arctic respectively, 
had also been pursued, especially during the second half of the eighteenth century. However, 
in general, these would be carried out without any attempt being made to explain the existence 
of particular plants and animals in relation to the local environment. From the final decades of 
the eighteenth century onwards, what we might term bio-geographical studies were pursued
117 J. F. Meckel, quoted in W. Coleman, Biology in the Nineteenth Century (1971), p. 50.
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more systematically, gaining force not least through the studies of Alexander von Humboldt. 
Regional patterns of distribution of animals and plants were described and related to the 
special environmental conditions of their life -  the quality of the earth, the climate, altitude, 
moisture, geographical location etc. The question of the conditions of possibility of life was 
thereby also pursued in environmental terms. A s Lyell explained in 1832:
The possibility of the existence of a certain species in  a given locality or of it thriving more or less therein, is 
determined not merely by temperatures, humidity, soil, elevation, or other circumstances of the like kind, but also 
by the existence or non-existence, the abundance or scarcity of a particular assemblage of other plants and
animals.118
Such bio-geographical studies helped to undermine the status of the transcendent Great Chain 
of Being as the primary point of reference for understanding living beings, by siuating animals 
and plants in a historically and geographically specific and specified nature: New and 
observable relations between animals and plants, cutting through their eighteenth-century 
taxonomic relations, gained an unprecedented importance. In some accounts, the bio- 
geographical patterns were, furthermore, linked to theories of adaptation and, through 
adaptation, to a transformation of species. While neither Cuvier nor Lyell's accounts were 
amongst these -  both authors adhered to a static conception of nature and both stressed the 
immutable nature of species119 -  Buffon had already foreshadowed the doctrine of 
transformation through adaptation with his claim that the species of the New World were 
degenerated species of the Old World. This theory was to be more fully elaborated by 
Lamarck, and later, after the doctrine had been further transformed during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, it was incorporated into the evolutionary theory of Darwin. Indeed, it was 
with a reference to Buffon's theory of the transformation of species, and Lamarck's idea of the 
modification of species, that Darwin opened his introductory 'Historical Sketch' in The Origin 
o f Species.
Darwin's The Origin o f Species has often been described as a synthesis of nineteenth- 
century biological studies. And this is not incorrect in the double sense that Darwin both 
united the two major trends, which have been outlined above, in his theory of evolution, and 
that Darwin, furthermore, gave a coherent explanation to an overwhelming mass of those 
matters which had been established as facts through the studies of physiology and bio­
geography, as well as, as we will see, through palaeontological and geological studies by the 
middle of the century.120
118 Lyell, quoted in ibid., p. 68.
119 Lyell only doing so, however, until the publication of The Origin o f  Species; on his spedes concept, see W. 
Coleman, 'Llyell and the 'Reality* of Spedes' (1962).
120 In the following account, I shall omit the historical complications brought about by Alfred Russel Wallace's 
formulation of a theory of evolution simultaneously w ith Darwin, and simply treat Darwin as a metonym for -  
as well as an important contributor to -  the transformation of the conception of nature which took place in the 
middle of the seventeenth century and dealt a final deathblow to the natural history conception of nature. For a
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As we saw Darwin take note of earlier, by 1859, there were still naturalists who, despite 
the new focus in biological research, continued to believe in the immutability of spedes. In his 
first two chapters, drawing on numerous studies already made, as well as on his own 
observations made both on his voyage with the Beagle and, later, on experiments with 
breeding of domesticated animals and plants, Darwin set out to show that numerous variations 
between individual specimens could be observed. Highlighting all those variations which had 
been backgrounded by the natural historians in their search for such common characteristics 
w hich could be used to unite individuals in a spedes, Darwin argued that it was impossible to 
determine the difference which made the difference between varieties of spedes: 'the amount 
of difference considered necessary to give to two forms the rank of spedes is quite 
indefinite/121 Indeed, and a bit ironically given the title of the work, Darwin found it 
'immaterial for us whether a multitude of doubtful forms be called spedes or sub-spedes or 
varieties/122
It was, of course, exactly these individual variations that were to make the basis for 
Darwin's claim of 'modification through descent/ Referring to T. R. Malthus' calculation of 'a  
geometrical ratio' of increase in human populations,123 124Darwin argued that similar geometrical 
ratios could be found among all organisms, and hence that there would be a continuous over­
production, so to say, of plants and animals. Consequently, each individual would have to 
'struggle for existence' -  to fight against other individuals in its locality in order to survive. In 
this struggle, any variation in the individual, which gave it an advantage over other organisms, 
would help to ensure its survival:
Owing to this struggle for life, any variation, however slight and from whatever cause proceeding, if it be in any 
degree profitable to an individual of any spedes, in its infinitely complex relations to other organic beings and to 
external nature, will tend to the preservation of that individual, and will generally be inherited by its offspring. The 
offspring also, will thus have a better chance of surviving, for, of the many individuals of any spedes which are 
periodically bom, but a small number can survive.114
Now, the eighteenth-century naturalists had also, as we have seen, observed that there was a 
'perpetual wari going on in nature. However, in contrast to Darwin, their war was waged 
under providentially instituted, and thus also partly inexplicable oeconomical laws, which 
ensured the continuation of the same order of species. By seeing the war as a struggle for 
existence, simply brought about by an inevitable over-production of individuals, and by 
relating the organisms to their complex environmental context of 'other organic beings and 
external nature' Darwin could give an entirely different explanation to the logic of war. In his
more thorough treatment of the coming into being of the theory of evolution, see P. R. Sloan, 'Darwin, Vital 
Matter' (1986); T. H. Eriksen, Charles Darwin (2000); D. Ospovat, The Development o f  Darwin's Theory (1981).
121 C. Darwin, Origin o f Species (1859/1979), p. 113.
122 Ibid., p. 114.
123 Ibid., p. 118. a .  T. R. Malthus, An Essay (1803/1992), Ch. 1, esp. p. 17.
124 C  Darwin, Origin o f  Species (1859/1979), p. 115.
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scheme, what determined the course of the war was 'natural selection': Only those varieties 
best fitted, as Herbert Spencer was later to put the matter, to the overall environment survived.
As we saw Darwin note above, the individual variations that would thus have helped 
an individual to survive in the struggle for life tended to be inherited by its offspring, and it 
was in this observation that the basis for Darwin's explanation of the origin and development 
of species lay. Drawing especially on geological studies, Darwin, like many other authors in 
the first half of the nineteenth century, argued that the earth was much older than the 5700- 
some years the eighteenth-century naturalists had taken for granted -  tentatively Darwin 
suggested 3 millions years.125 By this extension of world history, Darwin was enabled to give a 
historical explanation to the origin of species. Through generation after generation, thousands 
or tens of thousands such, the variations would accumulate in a given group of organisms, and 
this group would gradually come to differ so much from its progenitor that it would form a 
new species. The same process would repeat itself with regard to offspring of the same original 
species with varying results because different variations would be selected in different 
environmental contexts, and consequently, an array of divergent, but related species would be 
formed which would agree in some measure in their structure because they originated from 
the same parent. The group of such related spedes was what was commonly known as a 
genus. The same process would repeat itself over time with regard to the spedes of this genus, 
whereby an array of new spedes and of new genera would gradually be created, and so on. 
The relations of resemblance in structure between taxa were, then, genealogically determined: 
'that fundamental agreement in structure, which we see in organic beings of the same type [...] 
is explained by unity of descent.'126 Ultimately, Darwin argued, it was likely that all organisms 
on the earth had thus descended from only one organism.127
It was, however, not possible to actually show this genealogy of spedes. In the struggle 
for existence, many spedes would have become extinct and the traces of their genealogical 
relations would have been to some extent erased with them. Hence, the organisms to be 
observed at Darwin's time only constituted a minor selection of the total number of spedes, 
which had existed. Through the study of fossils, now taken to represent extinct spedes, within 
palaeontology, and through the help of embryological studies of the embryo's recapitulation of 
phylogeny through its development, Darwin was, however, enabled to fill in some of the
125 Ibid., p. 297, cf. pp. 291-7, As Wolf Lepenies has argued, already in the latter decades of the eighteenth century 
ideas of the earth having a much longer history than usually assumed had already emerged, most notably 
voiced by Buffon who argued in his late works for an age of ca. 180,000 years. The tendency to prolong the age 
of the earth was further intensified during the first half of the nineteenth century, especially in geological 
studies. On the transformation of the idea of the age of the earth, see W. Lepenies, Das Ende der Naturgeschichte 
(1976), esp. chs. 1, 6 and 7. On geology's contribution to this transformation, see also C. C. Gillespie, Genesis and 
Geology (1969).
126 G  Darwin, Origin o f  Species (1859/1979), p. 233.
127 Ibid., p. 455.
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missing links in the genealogical tree. Incomplete as the genealogical reconstruction might
have been, Darwin felt certain that his theory successfully explained the nature of the
similarities and differences between taxa (in the wake of the publication of The Origin a lot of
other, though far from all students of the life science came to agree with him on this point128):
[T]he natural system [in classification] is founded on descent with modification; [and] the characters which 
naturalists consider as showing true affinity between any two or more species, are those which have been inherited 
from a common parent, and, in so far, all true classification is genealogical; [and the] community of descent is the 
hidden bound which naturalists have been unconsciously seeking, and not some unknown plan of creation, or the 
enunciation of general propositions, and the mere putting together and separating objects more or less alike.129
At a structural level, the similarities between the classificatory schemes of Darwin and the
eighteenth-century zoologists are striking, both branching out alike into a tree structure (see HI.
8.3). But at a conceptual and explanatory level, it was an entirely different kind of nature, and
an entirely different kind of species, that Darwin presumed to exist. Substituting the
unknowable essences and the divine Plan with a historical account of modification through
descent as the raison d'être of the taxonomic relations, Darwin had, in principle, made nature
and the processes it was produced by entirely explicable, also from the point of view of man.
Being emptied of its divine content, nature had become entirely natural, so to say.
The process that had been under way since the final decades of the eighteenth century 
of transforming natural history into a history of nature, as Wolf Lepenies has termed it, has 
here fully conquered the mode of explanation. The idea of a transformation over time, which 
had only been thinkable within human history for the better part of the eighteenth century, 
and here only in a limited form and linked to an idea of an eternal human nature, was -  with 
the widening of the time span of the earth's history, with the idea of a struggle for life and of 
the survival of the fittest, with the idea of variations as hereditary, and with the idea of the 
mutability of species -  offered as the explanation. The transformation of natural history to a 
history of nature, we might say, opened up entirely new ways of explaining and 
understanding nature, and, more specifically, for understanding and explaining those patterns 
of similarities and differences between different groups of animals and plants which had been 
portrayed in the natural historians' works as, ultimately, the product of a divine intelligence, to 
be represented in a static transcendental scheme. Darwin himself indicated the differences 
between his approach and that of the natural historians, underscoring that his theory of 
evolution would cause 'a considerable revolution in natural history', because what previously 
had been taken as inexplicable essences, defining the nature of species, could now be explained 
by descent:
Systematists will be able to pursue their labours as at present; but they will not be incessantly haunted by the 
shadowy doubt whether this or that form be in essence a species. [...] Systematists will have only to decide (not that
MAN IN THE MIRROR OF NATURE
128 On the reception of Darwin's evolutionary theory, see T. H. Eriksen, Charles Darwin (2000), pp. 144ff.
129 C. Darwin, Origin o f Species (1859/1979), p. 404.
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this will be easy) whether any form be sufficiently constant and distinct from other forms, to be capable of 
definition; and if definable, whether the differences be sufficiently important to deserve a specific name.130
Indeed, the natural historians' references to 'essences/ to a 'plan of creation/ or 'unity of
design' in order to account for the existence of structural patterns in the world of living beings,
would now be seen as mere 'ignorance'.131 What the natural historians had thought to be
inexplicable because it was divinely instituted and thus beyond the comprehension of man
was, Darwin concluded, entirely explainable if only one took the work of evolution into
account. It was in thus explaining his new approach to living beings that Darwin in the
passage quoted in part at the beginning of this thesis, compared the eighteenth-century natural
historians to savages looking at a ship:
When we no longer look at an organic being as a savage looks at a ship, as at something wholly beyond com­
prehension; when we regard every production of nature as one which has had a history; when we contemplate 
every complex structure and instinct as the summing up of many contrivances, each useful to. the possessor [...]; 
when we thus view each organic being, how far more interesting, I speak from experience, will the study of natural 
history become!132
In a sense, the topics that had been placed outside the reach of man by the natural historians 
during the eighteenth century -  the nature of species, the precise nature and structure of their 
interrelations, the question of life -  were brought to the centre of scientific inquiry during the 
nineteenth century. If we return to the figure of the Great Unknown and the line of distinction 
between what man, in principle, could obtain knowledge about, and what was situated beyond 
his reach, which had played such a significant role in eighteenth-century zoology, we might 
say that the line of distinction was vanishing during the nineteenth century. God might still 
loom in the background -  for instance, it was still hard to explain the creation of the earth itself, 
regardless of when that might have taken place, and the coming into being of the first 
organism from which all the rest descended, without taking a divine creator into account. 
However, God and his inexplicable actions were being pushed to the background. Not only the 
observable part of nature, but also the forces and processes by which it came into being had 
become objectifiable through the course of the first half of the nineteenth century because they 
had been redefined, at the same time as nature had been reconceptualised as nothing but 
nature. Thereby it had become possible to open up new avenues and pose new types of 
questions in the studies of nature -  the most important and leading of these being, of course, 
'what is life?' Though there certainly was a lot of things about nature that the scientists on their 
own account did still not know -  Darwin himself frequently pointed out such blind spots in the 
course of his work -  they were no longer referred to a Great and in principle Unknown, but to 
the inquiries of future studies. By opening up both an internal and external space for inquiry 
and by introducing historical and functional explanation as the guiding modes of elucidation,
CHAPTER 8
130 Ibid., p. 455.
131 Ibid., p.453.
132 Ibid., p. 456.
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the nature of nature had been redefined in such a way that it, in principle, became entirely 
'knowable.' At the same time, the premises of knowledge about nature had, of course, also 
changed. To their nineteenth-century descendants the zoologists of the eighteenth century 
might have appeared like savages looking at a ship for the first time, which they' could not 
comprehend. However, this image only becomes possible if one fails to acknowledge the 
fundamentally different kind of nature, ranged between spirit and matter, between the divine 
and the material, between the non-objectifiable and the objectifiable, between the unknowable 
and ttxe knowable, which the zoologists of the eighteenth century had pursued their studies 
within. As I have attempted to show in the present thesis, their endeavour made perfectly good 
sense, even though it did so from a point of view differing from both Darwin's and ours.
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